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  Both inside and outside of China, debates rage about the capacity of the state to 
effectively govern the economy.  In the West, those who claim that the Chinese state is 
rapidly improving its ability to effectively regulate the expanding market economy 
face off against those who insist that economic liberalization has ushered in a period 
of deteriorating state capacity to control those very market forces the state itself has 
unleashed.  Within China, a similarly contentious debate over how the state should 
best govern the economy pits neoliberal champions of naturally orderly market forces 
against New Left critics who call for strong central state authority to rein in 
unregulated markets. 
  I argue that any understanding of Chinese state capacity remains incomplete 
unless the crucial role of “market order” as a concept of governance is taken into 
account.  Market order refers to the balance between markets as the primary engine of 
economic growth and the maintenance of economic, social, and political stability.  
Any measure of state capacity must be judged relative to the goals the state itself 
promotes.  I argue that the state’s capacity to maintain market order, especially over 
certain markets within the so-called “informal economy,” involves unexpected 
combinations of strength and weakness.  Furthermore, because maintaining market 
order is promoted as one of the state’s key goals, it is key to state legitimation efforts.  
The very ambiguity of market order makes it a powerful tool of governance at 
different levels of politics and the economy.  However, that same ambiguity played a 
 
  
 
part in one of the state’s own regulatory institutions becoming a threat to these larger 
legitimation efforts.   
  This dissertation also presents detailed empirical evidence of Chinese state-
economy relations based on the relationship between street vendors and the local City 
Appearance Administration in the city of Nanjing.  The findings presented in the 
dissertation are based on three years of field research in China, including over 250 
formal and informal interviews with government officials from central “Leading 
Groups” all the way down to local “street offices,” with academics and leading 
intellectuals, and with street vendors and small business owners. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
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Introduction: 
The Chinese Regulatory State and Its Critics 
 
 
The Chinese government has…steadily boosted its regulatory capacity to 
sustain and police the markets and cope with various forms of market failure.  
(Yang 2004a:183) 
 
[T]he [Chinese] state’s control over the economy and social activities of its 
citizens has greatly eroded as a direct result of its declining presence in the 
economy.  
  (Pei 2006a:2) 
 
The reality was that China was morphing into a society with voluminous rules 
and regulations that few bothered to obey or enforce. 
(Pomfret 2006:212) 
 
 
How should we understand the relationship between the state and the economy 
in contemporary China?
1  Is Chinese state governance of the economy becoming more 
modern, rational and efficient as Yang would have us believe or is Pei correct in 
pointing to the state’s deteriorating regulatory presence and authority?  Or, alternately, 
is Pomfret correct in identifying China as a country where the state systematically fails 
to enforce its own increasingly prolific set of rules?  Ultimately, each of the statements 
quoted above involves a separate and seemingly mutually exclusive judgment about 
the Chinese state’s capacity to effectively govern its own economy.  In this 
dissertation I address the crucial question of how capable the Chinese state is in 
enforcing its own stated goal of maintaining social and economic stability while 
                                                 
1 I will sometimes refer to “state-economy” relations and at others to “state-market” relations.  I mean 
the former in the most general level of abstraction between the Chinese state and all aspects of the 
economy, whereas by the latter I mean state regulation of specific markets.  I also purposely do not 
refer to “state-business” relations as my focus in the dissertation is not on the firm per se.  For more on 
the firm-based state-business literature related to China see Kennedy (2005) and for an important 
comparative study using this framework see Maxfield and Schneider (1997). 
1 
 pursuing market-led development.  I pursue this question by focusing on China’s 
governance of what is often referred to in other countries as the “informal economy.”    
These issues are of vital importance not only to academics but also to policy 
makers and businesspeople across the world and are increasingly the subject of intense 
debate both within and outside of China.  On one side of this debate are those, 
including the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself in addition to a handful of 
western academics, who claim that China is developing into a “regulatory state” along 
the lines of economic governance systems in the United States and much of western 
Europe.
2  In essence, to claim that China is becoming a regulatory state is also to 
assert that Chinese state capacity is increasing.  These claims that China is a rising 
regulatory state have elicited strong criticisms from two other groups of western 
scholars.   
The first group of critics argues that in important ways, despite claims about its 
rising regulatory state status, China has adopted a number of policies that fit more with 
a “developmental state” model most often associated with Japan or South Korea.  This 
critique focuses on regulatory state arguments’ failure to account for the strategic 
political motivations driving regulatory reforms, but not necessarily on the ultimate 
results claimed by proponents of a growing regulatory state (i.e. effective regulation).  
A second group of critics, however, takes direct aim at claims that the Chinese state is 
effectively governing the economy.
3  Focusing on a wide variety of economic and 
social problems that purportedly stem from poor or nonexistent state oversight over 
the market forces the state itself unleashed, this group claims that China is a case of 
                                                 
2 As I will explain in more detail below, many China scholars who argue for the emergence of a 
Chinese regulatory state rarely provide a concrete definition of the term.  However, regulatory state 
advocates like Yang Dali and Wang Shaoguang use terms such as “rational,” and “modern,” to describe 
the rise of independent, rule-based institutions to regulate the economy (see Yang 2004a and Wang 
2006). 
3 In this sense, this second group of critics would also find little to praise in any developmental state 
arguments about the success of strategic regulation. 
2 
 “partial reform” reminiscent of other developing and post-socialist countries with poor 
or declining state capacity.
4   
Here I step into the debate with a puzzle that neither the regulatory state 
perspective nor either group of critics adequately address.  If on the one hand China is 
a well-governed regulatory or developmental state
5 with increasing capacity or if on 
the other hand state authority over markets has largely broken down, how can we 
explain the widespread and active engagement of state agents in markets that are 
formally prohibited?  And, what is the significance of state agents’ selective 
enforcement of these prohibitions?  For instance, how can we understand why state 
officials charged with enforcing policies to prohibit unlicensed street vending or the 
sale of counterfeit DVDs, instead of attempting to eradicate such practices, at times 
allow illicit commerce and at others punish those engaged in these formally prohibited 
commercial activities, leading to the continued and often pervasive existence of these 
markets?  None of the existing approaches listed above effectively explain this 
phenomenon because either they assume that the state is present and regulating 
                                                 
4 As I discuss at length in chapter two, within China “New Left” scholars pose a similar critique, 
arguing that corruption and/or a complete lack of government oversight have led to a variety of social 
ills.  However, I do not include these scholars here and choose to focus on them in the next chapter for 
three reasons. First, whereas the western scholarly debate is based on academic efforts to identify 
patterns of Chinese state-economy relations, participants in the Chinese debate are more overtly intent 
on influencing state policy and therefore less concerned about purely academic debates about whether 
state-economy relation fit any one particular model or another.  Second, the Chinese scholars on 
China’s New Left and western “partial reform” scholars, even though both decry rampant corruption 
and poor state regulatory oversight, each see different forces driving these problems and therefore call 
for diametrically opposed solutions.  Finally, some of those scholars on the Chinese New Left, like 
Wang Shaoguang and Zheng Yongnian, are the same people who write about an emergent regulatory 
state in China.  So while they identify a number of economic and social problems, they believe that the 
Chinese state is responding through the creation of rational and modern regulatory institutions.  
Therefore, to place them alongside western critics of an emergent Chinese regulatory state would be 
misleading and confusing.  If anything, the point of New Left criticism of certain social problems and 
government policies is to push the Chinese authorities in the direction of creating a regulatory state. 
5 As I note, despite being critical of the failure of regulatory state scholars to recognize the political 
importance of the developmental state aspirations of the Chinese state, the developmental state 
approach shares with regulatory state approach the understanding that the economy is being well 
regulated.  Therefore I juxtapose them here against claims that the state basically does not regulate the 
economy at all. 
3 
 markets effectively, which would certainly not include active state toleration of 
prohibited market behaviors, or their model posits that these markets are effectively 
unregulated.  Thus, state capacity is seen to be either increasing or decreasing, with no 
allowance for the possibility that it might be moving in different directions depending 
on where one looks and how one defines gains or losses to capacity. 
Selective enforcement of policies prohibiting certain markets presents a puzzle 
not only for the key approaches to contemporary Chinese state-economy relations but 
also for key literatures in comparative and international political economy.  In fact, the 
relatively recent regulatory state debate among China scholars closely corresponds to a 
long-standing body of work in comparative and international political economy about 
the politics of market reform.  In particular, scholars have debated whether market 
reforms have led to increased state strength and facilitated enhanced centralized 
authority (Schamis 2002; Greskovits and Schamis 1999) or alternately whether they 
have led to state retreat and ungoverned markets (Walton and Seddon 1994; Strange 
1996; and Van Creveld 1999).  These two sets of arguments reflect many of the same 
blind spots as their regulatory state versus partial reform Chinese equivalents.  This is 
because they either assume effective, rule-bound enforcement from strengthened state 
institutions, or they argue the opposite: that state authority has deteriorated in the face 
of overwhelming market forces.  Both are thus ill-suited to explain how the Chinese 
state could be involved in what often amounts to the active toleration of markets that 
the state itself has formally prohibited through laws or bureaucratic regulations. 
However, a growing body of scholarship that has arisen as an explicit response 
to the state retreat literature has called attention to the importance of the political 
economy of re-regulation in the wake of liberal market reforms.  Initial work on re-
regulatory processes began with a focus on national-level regulatory reforms that 
followed in the wake of market liberalization in the advanced industrialized world 
4 
 (Weingast 1981; Moran 1991; Vogel 1996).  Books with titles like Freer Markets, 
More Rules (Vogel 1996) posed a clear challenge to any claims of state regulatory 
retreat at the national level.   This focus on regulatory reforms in the developed 
countries was soon followed by work on re-regulatory political processes in 
developing and post-socialist countries.   
Some of the most interesting studies in this literature have looked beyond the 
unidirectional centripetal or centrifugal forces associated with market reforms and 
have instead looked at processes of re-regulation at the sub-national level in 
developing and post-socialist countries (Snyder 1999 and 2001; Verdery 1996).
6  In 
particular, Snyder’s work on the politics of re-regulating the coffee sector in the wake 
of Mexico’s neoliberal reforms is a model of the kind of approach that can provide 
traction on the puzzle I have posed above.  As Snyder states, “neoliberal policies, 
rather than unleashing market forces, trigger the construction of new institutions for 
market governance” (Snyder 2001:3).
7  While the literature on re-regulation does not 
focus on formally prohibited market activities, it nonetheless directs our attention 
toward a level of analysis and a set of political processes that can serve as a solid 
starting point from which to build an explanation for the puzzle I have posed.  In other 
words, we must look at how market reforms and state efforts to maintain or create new 
modes of authority over markets play out at both central and local levels.   
One of the concepts that has been employed extensively in discussions about 
the aftermath of liberal market reforms is the “informal economy.”  Much of the 
literature on informality fits in with the state-retreat perspective by emphasizing the 
growth of unregulated markets and labor in many developing countries.  In chapter 
                                                 
6 Verdery (1996), writing of privatization of formerly state-owned business enterprises and property in 
eastern Europe, has alternately theorized this process as one of “de-” and “re-statization”. 
7 Snyder makes clear that his approach to the politics of re-regulation is inspired by the original work of 
Karl Polanyi (1944).  For a variation on this approach applied to Southeast Asia, see Walker (1999). 
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 four of the dissertation I make an extended critique of the concept of informality and 
offer the alterative concept of “marginal markets” as a replacement.  A focus on 
marginal markets, which explicitly allows for different forms of state regulation of 
even illegal markets, facilitates the kind of political analysis about modes of re-
regulation that has been so fruitfully employed elsewhere.  
 
Concepts and Arguments: “Market Order,” State Capacity and Legitimacy 
  As the literature on comparative re-regulation emphasizes, state and social 
actors have responded in a variety of ways to control and channel the sometimes 
unpredictable forces that have been put in play by economic liberalization.  No 
country has tapped into the transformative power of markets more dramatically than 
China and no government is more concerned about how to harness that power in order 
to maintain social and political stability than China’s.  In chapter two I argue that 
different ideas about how to promote market-led development while maintaining 
social stability, the bundle of ideas connected to “market order,” play a prominent role 
in patterns of Chinese state-economy relations.  This balance between markets and 
stability is one of the most central, yet taken-for-granted and therefore under-theorized 
aspects of contemporary Chinese political economy.  In this dissertation I analyze the 
different levels at which the concept of market order is institutionalized, debated, 
enacted as policy, and, in some cases, subverted.  I then link this analysis to debates 
about Chinese state capacity and legitimacy.  
  Throughout the dissertation I analyze the importance of the idea of market 
order in China at a number of different levels and different arenas.  In chapter two I 
largely focus on intellectual debates about different understandings of market order 
and then explain the “official,” Party center, understanding of the concept.  Then in 
chapters three and four I provide case study evidence of state bureaus that are charged 
6 
 with the day-to-day regulation of what in many developing country contexts would be 
considered informal or even illegal markets, but which in China, given the centrality 
of “market order,” are frequently designated as “disorderly” markets.  Here I will first 
explicate the different levels at which market order operates in China, then I will 
explain what these different levels have in common and finally, I will analyze the 
reasons behind these connections. 
  The first level at which the concept of market order operates is at the official, 
central Party and state level.  This level I describe in the final segment of chapter two, 
with a particular emphasis on the central market order “Leading Group.”  As I 
demonstrate in chapter two, this official understanding of market order emphasizes the 
problems associated with a number of “disorderly” markets, especially as they are 
related to intellectual property rights violations and to the production of “fake and 
shoddy” goods.
8  This official understanding of market order also draws attention to 
problems of local protectionism, and closely related to this, corruption among local 
officials who may actively facilitate the spread of “disorderly” market activities.  
Finally, I also demonstrate that under the Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao leadership, the 
official understanding of market order has involved a critique of the threat of 
“neoliberalism” both in its domestic and international variants.  Thus, at the level of 
official policy, market order is aimed at combating the corrosive, socially and 
economically-destabilizing impact of disorderly market activities and the officials (and 
foreign governments) that facilitate these activities.  Ultimately, the official 
understanding of market order should also be seen as connected to the central 
government’s policies and rhetoric of creating a “regulatory state,” a concept that I 
                                                 
8 As I show in chapter two, Margaret Pearson makes a convincing case that at the level of state 
regulation of “strategic” sectors of the economy, market order takes on the much more concrete policy 
meaning of ensuring that “excess” competition does not lead to excessive price or rate cuts (Pearson 
2005b and 2007). 
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 explore more fully in this chapter.  That is, the state has been (and wants to be seen as) 
actively creating new regulatory institutions, and/or reforming old ones, with the 
capacity and intent of overcoming problems with market order. 
  The second level at which I describe the existence and importance of market 
order to contemporary Chinese political economy is as the central, but contested, 
concept at the heart of elite intellectual debates about the Chinese state’s proper role in 
governing the economy.  Again, in chapter two, I detail the debate between 
“neoliberal” and “New Left” understandings of the meaning of market order and, in 
turn, what the key threats to market order are and how they can and should be 
effectively confronted.  I argue that the ability to define the essence of market order, 
and the threats to it,
9 constitutes a crucial weapon in the ongoing struggle over the 
ends to which state governance of the economy should be directed and, in turn, what 
means should be employed to achieve these ends.  I demonstrate that the neoliberal 
and New Left market order debate revolves around quite different understandings of 
how state governance of the economy can best facilitate the maintenance of economic, 
social and, ultimately, political “stability.”  Thus at this level of elite intellectual 
contestation, which is ultimately directed at influencing official policy, market order 
constitutes the key axis of debate. 
  A third level at which the concept of market order operates is as propaganda 
designed to influence public opinion and establish expectations about proper state 
governance of the economy.  Through the media and through other officially-
sponsored publications and conferences like the centrally-sponsored critique of 
neoliberalism I describe in chapter two, the Party leadership promotes certain 
understandings of market order.  Through the press and other officially-sponsored 
                                                 
9 As I describe in chapter two, this is what Blyth (2002) has argued to be the power to identify a 
problem as a problem and therefore to call forth a specific type of state response. 
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 publications the Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao leadership has sought to locate threats to 
market order in the form of “neoliberalism” at home and abroad.  At the same time, 
print and television media are daily filled with reporting about problems associated 
with “disorderly” market practices and often with the corrupt official practices that 
facilitate such practices.
10  I argue in chapter two, and again more extensively in the 
conclusion, that such efforts by the state to locate threats to market order in the nature 
of markets themselves and the corrupt practices of local officials are a key component 
of state, and even leadership faction, legitimation strategies.   
  Finally, the last level at which I analyze the concept of market order is in its 
relationship to actual policy implementation by government bureaus with oversight 
over what are constructed as disorderly markets.  In chapter three I focus on the 
Nanjing shirong bureau that has responsibility for regulating street vendors and in 
chapter four I explore a range of other bureaus that have oversight over other 
disorderly markets and market activities.  At the level of policy practice by these 
bureaus, the notion of market order takes on some related, but different characteristics 
from those described at the three levels above.  Certainly, some local level state bodies 
are directly connected to central market order policies and mandates, as in the case of 
newly created local level IPR “aid centers” or local government bureaus specifically 
charged with enforcing policies connected to the Leading Group mentioned above.
11  
The official understanding of market order, especially as it is embodied in the Market 
Order Leading Group, provides signals that “market order work” involves the 
                                                 
10 Aside from presenting an overview of the state-sponsored critique of neoliberalism, I do not provide 
an extensive analysis of print and television media coverage of problems related to market order.  
Nevertheless, one must be careful to note that the “officially-controlled” press is made up of 
increasingly market-responsive entities that are connected to different levels and divisions of the state in 
ways that make any statements about the role of the “media” as a straightforward propaganda tool of the 
Party-state complicated at best.  However this is all the more reason to further research this important 
link in the state’s efforts to shape public understandings of and expectations related to market order. 
11 On the IPR aid centers see Xinhua News Service (2007) and the creation of market order bureaus at 
the local level was raised by a local official in Xinji, Hebei (Interview XJ4, 5/27/06). 
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 regulation of markets and markets activity whose legal status is in question, but even 
this can serve as only a general guide to local authorities.   
However, in my analysis of local regulatory bureaus like the Nanjing City 
Appearance Bureau, I demonstrate that often local officials use the concept of market 
order as a tool to justify their own authority as necessary for maintaining control and 
“stability” over very specific market actors (e.g. street vendors).  I show that 
organizations like the Nanjing City Appearance bureau, in terms of their regulatory 
mission, find themselves somewhere in between law enforcement bureaus like the 
Public Security Bureau and business promotion/regulation entities like the Industrial 
and Commercial Administration Bureau.  I argue that while bureaus charged with 
enforcing market order at the ground level often deploy the language of “stability” and 
“order” to justify their own authority and the nature of the challenge they face in 
regulating a specific market, they may actually use enforcement methods that 
ultimately lead to popular or even official central government criticism.   
  What is the common thread between the different levels of market order and 
what is the nature of that connection?  First, the primary element shared by all four 
levels discussed above is that the notion of “stability” is central in all cases.  It may be, 
and in fact is, interpreted or presented differently at each level, but the notion that state 
governance of the economy must be aimed at the promotion and maintenance of 
stability is paramount.  Moreover, at each level there is a shared commitment to the 
importance of markets as the key engine of development.  Nevertheless, apart from the 
neoliberal scholars who are part of the second level intellectual debate I describe 
above, the concept of market order entails a common theme that the state must be 
aware of and constantly vigilant against the threat posed by markets, which inherently 
tend toward instability and disorder.   
10 
   Where did the concept of market order come from and what accounts for its 
centrality in contemporary Chinese political economy?  The concept has fairly 
proximate historical roots.  These roots are, in turn, linked to reform-era politics and 
the Party-state’s efforts to (re)constitute its role in regulating the economy and its 
efforts to shape common expectations about this role.  As I show in chapter two, the 
state’s emphasis on “stability” as a central theme in reform-era China has evolved 
through a series of events beginning with the Cultural Revolution and progressing 
through international challenges like the collapse of socialism in the former Soviet 
Union and eastern Europe and domestic challenges like the 1989 Tiananmen crisis.
12  
While each of these events has played a role in the centrality of stability and order to 
contemporary Chinese political-economy, the impact of the Cultural Revolution as the 
immediate backdrop to China’s “Opening and Reform” policies and as an example of 
the kind of instability and chaos that must be avoided for reform to succeed cannot be 
underestimated.  Deng Xiaoping emerged from the era of the Cultural Revolution, 
having twice been purged from his leadership roles, intent to build a development 
model on the back of a stable social, political and economic system.  As Deng 
emphasized, “The key to our success in modernization, the reform and the opening up 
to the outside is stability…China cannot afford any disorder” (Deng Xiaoping 
1994:279).
13  However, for as central as stability and the closely related concept of 
market order are to understanding the nature of contemporary Chinese political 
                                                 
12 Here the notion of “historical roots” most certainly refers to recent history.  As Shue (2004) argues, 
there are important linkages between dynastic legitimation and the maintenance of stability and order.  I, 
however, wish to emphasize the more proximate roots of the centrality of stability and order as key 
values in contemporary Chinese political economy.  One need look no further than major Maoist 
political campaigns that emphasized upending the old political order, beginning with the revolution 
itself and progressing through the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, to know that 
“stability” is not a constant political value in China. 
13 As quoted in MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006:461). 
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 economy, the very flexibility and ambiguity of these concepts allows them to function 
as powerful, if imperfect, tools of governance. 
  Because what constitutes “market order,” or just as importantly, what 
constitutes a threat to market order, is open to interpretation, the concept can and does 
come to mean different things to different people.  This, in part, explains why, even 
though there are key common threads that run through the four levels of market order 
understanding that I explain above, there is not only a range of different emphases, but 
also a wide scope for implementation at the ground level.  The two levels with most 
overlap are the official and propaganda levels, although even in the media there is 
potentially a very wide scope for what markets or types of market behavior are seen as 
“disorderly.”  The level of intellectual debate clearly allows for a wide range of 
interpretations about what bolsters and what threatens market order and as I show in 
chapter two we can see ways that arguments generated by these debates filter their 
way into the official understanding of market order.  The most obvious example, again 
noted in chapter two, is that the Hu Jintao/Wen Jiaobao leadership has borrowed 
explicitly from New Left arguments about market order to emphasize its more 
egalitarian understanding of development.
14   
Finally, and most problematically for the central leadership, the ambiguity of 
market order as a concept also allows for wide variation in implementation.  As I 
demonstrate in chapters three and four, various state regulatory institutions have 
invoked the concept of market order to justify their authority over what they claim to 
be disorderly markets and market behaviors but their subsequent enforcement 
behavior and tactics have elicited popular and, more recently, central government 
censure.  In the case of the City Appearance bureau, the central government has thus 
claimed that local government understandings and interpretation of market order have, 
                                                 
14 That is, as compared to the previous Jiang Zemin/Zhu Rongji leadership team. 
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 in fact, deviated from the correct meaning.  In the conclusion I will provide further 
analysis of how the concept of market order and the actual regulatory practice of 
government departments like the City Appearance bureau offer new and important 
lessons for understanding how the Chinese state, at different levels, seeks to establish 
its legitimacy. 
 
Methods and Case Selection 
  This dissertation is based on over three years of fieldwork in mainland China, 
the bulk of that time divided between the cities of Nanjing and Beijing.
15  The 
majority of material presented in this dissertation (see chapter three especially) on the 
relationship between street vendors and the bureau in charge of regulating vendors 
(the shirong, or alternately the chengguan) is based on fieldwork I conducted in the 
city of Nanjing beginning in the fall of 2002 and lasting until the summer of 2004.  
However, most of the interviews presented in chapter three were conducted in the 11 
months from February to December of 2003.
16  My Nanjing fieldwork consisted of 
formal interviews, most of which were with government officials and university 
professors, in addition to a combination of informal interviews with the vendors 
themselves and participant observation.
17  As an important complement to my 
interviews and participant observation, I also collected published and unpublished 
materials.
18  In cases where I had published materials that overlapped with and 
                                                 
15 For a detailed accounting of the field interviews please see the Appendix. 
16 I spent the fall of 2002 preparing my dissertation proposal as well as other funding applications.  
Thus I conducted a number of preliminary interviews, mostly with Nanjing University academics, at 
that time.  Note also that the SARS epidemic struck China during the spring of 2003 during the initial 
stage of my research, which caused serious delays in arranging interviews with what were already 
challenging-to-access local officials. 
17 Almost without exception all interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese.  Due to a strong local 
accent of some interviewees I occasionally conducted interviews with an assistant who would 
“translate” the strongly accented Chinese into more standard Mandarin.   
18 Many of these materials are available on official government internet sites or through Chinese 
newspaper or television media while others I collected from officials and other sources.  All of these 
materials are listed in the bibliography, which is separated into English and Chinese language sources. 
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 corroborated information obtained in interviews, I have consistently chosen to cite the 
written evidence as opposed to the interviews.
19 
For formal interviews with government officials, academics and other 
professionals I always arranged a meeting ahead of time with the interviewee and in 
most cases provided a list of questions that would be asked.  These interviews took 
place either at the interviewee’s work place or sometimes at a tea or coffee shop and 
generally lasted anywhere from one to three hours.  In all instances I agreed to keep 
the interviewee’s identity confidential and kept written notes but never audio 
recordings of the interview.  The informal interviews I conducted with vendors and 
other small business owners can most fruitfully be understood as a general form of 
participant observation, or in a China-specific setting, a variant of what sociologist 
Thomas Gold has referred to as “guerrilla interviewing” (see Gold 1989).
20  In order 
to understand state-vendor relations from the perspective of the vendors I made 
repeated visits to vendor stalls across the city, speaking with and often making small 
purchases from the vendors.  These interactions were unstructured in the sense that I 
presented no formal or written set of questions to the vendors, but instead engaged the
vendors in conversations that allowed them to tell me what they felt to be the key 
aspects of their relationship with government authorities.  Finally, I also engaged 
 
small business owners with fixed retail spaces (as opposed to mobile vendors) to better 
                                                 
19 This preference for citing written versus interview sources is most clear in chapter two.  My reason 
for emphasizing the written sources is because as opposed to interviews the written sources can more 
easily be accessed and reviewed by the reader.  Kevin O’Brien, writing on this topic has said, “I myself 
have never published anything in which written sources were not at least half of the total citations. 
Interviews, as critical as they are for filling in missing links in an argument and identifying frameworks 
that fit, are inevitably partial” (O’Brien 2006:32-3). 
20 For purposes of citation and differentiating between formal and informal interviews, formal 
interviews begin with the capitalized abbreviation of the city where the interview took place followed 
by the number of the interview, after which is the date of the interview (e.g. Interview NJ14, 7/14/03).  
To distinguish informal interviews, and because I kept track of these interactions in my written field 
notes, I cite these as “Fieldnotes,” followed by the abbreviation for the city (in small letters), again 
followed by the number and date (e.g. Fieldnotes nj73, 10/19/03).  Again, a full listing of all interviews 
is provided in the index, where I also note the unit, title or business type of the interview. 
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 understand how they viewed the relationship between the mobile vendors and state 
officials. 
  While the specific dates and affiliations of both my formal and informal 
interviews are detailed in the appendix at the end of the dissertation and the written 
sources are detailed in the bibliography, here I will provide an overview of the way in 
which I approached the fieldwork in Nanjing.  In terms of the formal interviews with 
government officials I targeted a comprehensive list of officials that included all major 
administrative levels and all regulatory bureaus that could ostensibly have a role in 
vendor management.  Given that Nanjing is a provincial capital I was able to get 
access to all of the major administrative levels of government from the peak to the 
base, conducting interviews with officials from the provincial, city, and district 
governments down to the street offices (jiedao), including interviews with street office 
enforcement team (jiancha and zhifa dadui) members.
 21  Aside from these official 
state units I also conducted interviews with members of “mass organizations” like 
local residence and housing committees (jumin weiyuanhui).
22  At the same time I 
interviewed officials from the Industrial and Commercial Administration (gongshang), 
Construction (jianshe), City Planning (chengshi guihua), Sanitation (weisheng), 
Quality and Technical Supervision (zhijian), and, most importantly, City Appearance 
(shirong) bureaus.  In addition to interviewing officials from these bureaus at various 
administrative levels, I also had direct access to a provincial level research unit that 
provided me specific and detailed (if frequently off-the-record) information about the 
workings of various other government bureaus and bodies related to my research.  The 
                                                 
21 In chapter three I discuss the importance of the street committees and note how their importance to 
urban market regulation has largely been overlooked. 
22 See Bruun (1995) and Read (2000) on the difference between street offices and residence committees 
as the most basic level state versus “popular” units of governance in China.  
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 research I conducted in Nanjing culminated with a conference paper presented at 
Hong Kong Baptist University in December of 2003 (Ferchen 2003).   
  While the bulk of my research on vendor-state interaction was centered on my 
case study of Nanjing,
23 I also conducted limited formal interviews with shirong and 
other government officials in Shanghai, Beijing and Yangzhou (Jiangsu), and Xinji 
(Hebei) as well as carrying out more informal interviews with vendors and other 
merchants, mostly in Beijing but also in Jilin City (Jilin Province).  In addition to my 
research on vendors, I also conducted research on other similarly-regulated markets, 
with special attention to counterfeit and pirated goods.  The results of this comparative 
research appear in chapter four and are also based on a combination of official and 
unofficial interviews conducted in Nanjing, Shanghai, Yiwu (Zhejiang) and Beijing. 
  Upon completing my research about the state regulation of vendors in Nanjing 
I then moved to Beijing in the summer of 2004 where I spent until the early spring of 
2006 conducting another full case study, this time on different Chinese understandings 
of “market order.”  In Beijing my focus was on researching elite intellectual and 
policy debates about how the state should maintain “order” and “stability” while 
relying on markets as the main engine of economic growth.  My fieldwork in Beijing 
consisted of a combination of formal interviews with academics, journalists, and 
government officials as well as the collection of both Chinese and English language 
publications by those I was interviewing.
24  In addition I collected secondary works 
about contemporary political-economic intellectual and policy debates that would 
inform my interviews as well as provide background for the primary sources I 
                                                 
23 For recent work on the value of case study research see George and Bennett (2005) as well as 
McKeown (2004) and Ragin (2004). 
24 I also conducted formal interviews related to my research on intellectual and policy debates in Hong 
Kong and Shanghai.  See the Appendix for specific dates and affiliations of interviewees. 
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 collected.  My fieldwork in Beijing culminated in a conference paper presented at the 
Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong in January of 2005 (Ferchen 2005). 
  What was the rationale behind my selection of research sites, cases, and 
methods and what are the strengths and potential limitations of these choices?  My 
research originally began by asking the broad question of how the Chinese state 
sought to regulate and maintain stability over informal urban markets that had arisen 
in the wake of economic reforms.
25  I posed this question in light of political economy 
literature that debated whether marketization would enervate or strengthen state 
capacity to govern markets.
26  I made the decision that in order to understand this 
tension between the growth of urban informal markets and the state’s capacity to 
govern those markets I would gather the most specific and local information I possibly 
could and then try to locate those specifics within the context of both Chinese national 
politics and in relation to larger theoretical questions in political science.
27  This meant 
(at least) a two-step process where I would first collect the most local of local 
knowledge (again, often at the level of street markets and government street offices) 
and then move to a more general, elite, and in some senses theoretical, level of 
intellectual and policy debates in Beijing. 
  To collect that local knowledge I chose to immerse myself in a type of 
ethnographic study of street vendors and the relationship between those vendors and 
the local state.  My decision to pursue this aspect of the research in Nanjing, and to 
                                                 
25 In chapter four I provide an extended overview and critique of the concept of economic informality. 
26 Refer to my discussion in this chapter as well as the conclusion for more on the issue of state capacity. 
27 On the linking of the specific and the general in studies of Chinese politics see Shue’s comment in 
The Reach of the State on the importance of “a method of research and writing…that involves the 
analyst in continually juxtaposing the finest of complex local detail with the most sweeping of 
discernible social trends and patterns” (Shue 1988:4).  In a recent publication on conducting field work 
in China, Kevin O’Brien also stresses the need for researchers to constantly engage in a dialogue 
between general theory and the detailed information gleaned from field work in China.  O’Brien says 
“Research (re)design involves locating whatever theory might be helpful (some of it beforehand and 
more of it afterwards) to make intelligible what we find on the ground, and then immediately using 
one’s fieldwork to suggest inadequacies in the theories and concepts themselves” (O’Brien 2006:38). 
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 write about it as a detailed case study, was driven by both practical and theoretical 
considerations.  First, Nanjing offered an important advantage for me over other 
potential research sites in China because it was there that I had a network of personal 
and institutional contacts as a result of having studied at a joint Sino-American 
academic and research program in the city’s Gulou district.
28  As an alumnus of this 
program, the Chinese faculty and administration not only provided their expert 
opinion on topics related to my research, but even more importantly helped me to 
arrange contacts that led directly or indirectly to the vast majority of interviews with 
government officials that I conducted while in Nanjing.  The importance of personal 
connections and entire networks of these connections (often simply referred to in 
Chinese as guanxi) has been well documented in research about China and about how 
to conduct research there.
29  Therefore, from a practical point of view as a foreign 
researcher in China, Nanjing offered by far the most advantages in being able to 
immediately launch into my field research. 
  Just as importantly, it was as a student in Nanjing that I had first witnessed 
what was to be the focus of my field and case study research: the (often-troubled) 
interaction between street vendors and local government officials.  While it is entirely 
possible that I might have witnessed similar interactions in other cities (and indeed 
later in the dissertation I cite evidence about vendor-shirong interactions in other cities 
as well), it was the specifics of the vendor-state relationship in Nanjing that first drew 
my attention.  Moreover, it was far from obvious when I began my research who the 
key actors in this drama even were: who were the vendors and who exactly were the 
officials responsible for managing street markets and street vendors?  These were 
                                                 
28 The Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies. 
29 On the importance of guanxi in conducting fieldwork in China see chapters by Sæther, Heimer, 
Solinger and Thunø in Heimer and Thøgersen (2006).  For more on the debate about the persistent 
importance of guanxi as a central concept and phenomenon in contemporary China see Gold, Guthrie 
and Wank (2002) and for a more general overview of guanxi relations in China see Yang (1994). 
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 questions that arose out my specific experiences in this very specific place: Nanjing.  
If it were not for my first-hand, personal observations and curiosity about these groups 
and their interactions there would have been no “case” to study.   
As I explain further in chapter three, practically nothing in the English 
language academic literature had been written about mainland Chinese street vendors 
(or China’s “informal economy”) and even less about what branch(es) of the local 
state had authority over vendors in particular.
30  Therefore it was my first job to 
identify who the relevant actors were and it was through this process that I learned 
about the creation of the shirong and their almost-exclusive responsibility for 
regulating street vendors.
31  Again, it is entirely possible that had I originally begun 
my language and area-studies preparation in another city I may have witnessed similar 
(or possibly quite different) vendor-state interactions, but it was the specifics of the 
Nanjing setting that initially attracted my attention and it was there that I had the 
resources to explore more in-depth this relationship.  It was directly as a result of 
being on the ground in Nanjing and having a set of questions in mind that I was able to 
begin the process of “extracting new ideas at close range” (Collier 1999:4).
32 
                                                 
30 For very brief references to the City Appearance/City Administration bureau see Solinger 
(1999:67;71) and Yang Dali (2004a:177-78). 
31 As the first Cornell graduate student delegate to the Institute for Qualitative Research Methods in 
January of 2003 I had the opportunity to present my (recently-defended) dissertation proposal to some 
of the foremost authorities on qualitative research design in political science and sociology.  The 
unanimous response among faculty and other graduate students who read and critiqued my research 
proposal was that my topic involved such unknown quantities that the most appropriate research 
“method” was to go out and discover first hand (and “at close range”) who the relevant actors were and 
what drove their patterns of interaction.  
32 David Collier, in his capacity as president of the comparative politics section of the American 
Political Science Association, emphasized that much of the best work in Latin American studies and in 
the field of comparative politics in general began with in-depth case studies that allowed the researcher 
to become intimately familiar with new phenomena and to apply that knowledge to larger theoretical 
debates.  Collier notes that “These scholars are deeply engaged both with theory and with the close 
analysis of cases, giving them an unusual capacity to see the general in the particular” (Collier 1999:4).  
This sentiment is very much in keeping with Kevin O’Brien’s (2006) admonition to constantly relate 
the particulars of detailed field work to more general theoretical concepts and debates. 
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 “Extracting new ideas at close range” is, however, easier said than done.  The 
process of locating a suitable place to live so that one becomes part of a community 
and is consistently exposed to the phenomena one is investigating is no 
straightforward task.  Looking out one’s window onto a make-shift morning street 
market, not to mention making sense of what is happening, may seem an almost 
passive activity unless one is aware of the challenges of finding and obtaining just that 
apartment in that housing complex (where no other westerners live), along that alley 
and in that neighborhood.  Earning the trust of people from very different walks of life, 
from officials who have very little to gain and possibly much to lose from interacting 
with a foreign researcher, to migrant vendors recently arrived in the city to university 
academics, is a long process that at the very least requires patience and not a small 
amount of humility.  Ultimately, however, the rewards of this method are hopefully 
seen in a form of analysis that reflects a genuine “feel” for at least some significant 
portion of what one has seen and tried to understand “at close range.”    
  Nevertheless, once I had identified the key actors in the Nanjing vendor-local 
government relationship I then set out to compare local Nanjing actors and units of 
governance to see whether and how vendor-state interaction varied and why.  As I 
explain in detail in chapter three, it became clear that not only did the background of 
the vendors themselves matter, but so did jurisdictional boundaries at the most local 
level of state governance play a key role in state-vendor interaction (e.g. local street 
offices were largely responsible for carrying out the day to day work of regulating 
vendors).  Once I had completed the Nanjing portion of my research, I then had the 
important task of deciding on the most interesting way to proceed.  One possibility 
was to carry out a more detailed comparison of vendor-state interaction across 
different cities.  I decided against that path for a number of reasons.   
20 
   First, after collecting a great deal of detailed information about vendor-
government relations in Nanjing I reassessed how this information impacted the larger 
theoretical and substantive issues that had originally motivated my research.  I decided 
that to pursue a number of similar vendor-local government case studies in other urban 
centers was less important and less theoretically interesting than following up on two 
lines of investigation that I thought would be more productive in light of my original 
research questions about state regulation of the informal economy and how this 
impacted state capacity.  Therefore, I chose to look at other examples of state 
regulation of informal markets, with special attention to the regulation of counterfeit 
and pirated consumer goods.  At the same time I felt it crucially important that I 
investigate the way state regulation of informal markets was connected to larger 
academic and policy debates taking place in China about the role of the state in 
promoting and protecting “market order.”  I felt it was only in this way that I could 
take that very specific knowledge that I learned on the ground in Nanjing and relate it 
not only to larger, national questions of China’s state-economy relations but also to 
relate my findings back to broader theoretical questions about state capacity and 
legitimacy. 
  What are the potential tradeoffs of the decisions I made regarding case 
selection and research methods?   First, in terms of my Nanjing case study, the 
findings must remain limited in scope since any attempt to generalize about vendor-
state relations based on my research there may in fact be very specific to that place.  In 
chapter three I show how many of my findings, especially in terms of popular 
disapproval of the shirong, have presaged more current and very similar criticisms of 
the bureau in other cities, yet it is highly likely that many variations of vendor-state 
relations exist in different settings across the country.  At the same time, my focus on 
formal and informal interview methods, as opposed to, say, survey research, has 
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 potential limitations in that even the in-depth case study research in Nanjing may not 
fully reflect all of the variations or patterns of vendor-state interaction there.
33  
However, conducting a survey of the Nanjing vendors, especially given their 
precarious legal status, combined with intimations from local officials that I was 
already dealing with a potentially “sensitive” topic, I decided that my chosen methods 
were more ethically responsible than the alternatives and would yield equally 
important kinds of insights.  Finally, one potential weakness of the decisions regarding 
methods I have made is that the comparative discussion of different types of “marginal 
markets” both in China and in other countries in chapter four is yet too limited in 
scope.  That is, I discuss other types of markets, including counterfeits, informal 
finance, and prostitution, among others, and intimate how Chinese government 
regulation of these markets differs from other countries, but none of these receive as 
extensive a treatment as my case study of Nanjing-shirong vendors.  This weakness is 
partially offset by the insights yielded from the comparative discussion of the utility of 
the concept of “informality” in China and other developing countries, but to be of true 
comparative value this line of research will clearly require more extensive treatment in 
the future. 
  Despite these tradeoffs, there are key benefits to the methodological choices 
made.  Being on the ground and becoming intimately familiar with vendor-state 
relations in Nanjing as well as with the participants and their arguments in national 
intellectual and policy debates about state-economy relations provided a number of 
insights.  I was able to identify and provide a detailed portrait of a unit of the 
                                                 
33 For an instance of fruitful and insightful research on street vendors that combined qualitative methods 
with survey research see Roever’s (2005) work on vendor-state relations in Lima, Peru.  Key 
differences between Roever’s research setting and mine are that vendors in Lima have the right of 
association and are, in fact, courted as part of the democratic political process there.  Both of these facts 
mean that survey research about this group was more feasible and less potentially hazardous for both 
the respondents and the researcher. 
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 government, the shirong, about which relatively little was understood.  I was also able 
to explore the complex relations between this bureau and the little-studied mainland 
street vendors.  Moreover, my research in Nanjing and Beijing drew me to what I view 
to be the largely-overlooked but crucial concept of “market order” and its relevance to 
both national and local Chinese politics.  Through detailed familiarity with the 
specifics of local and national Chinese political economy I was able to draw 
implications for larger theoretical questions in political science including debates 
about informality, state capacity and legitimacy.   
 
Theoretical and Empirical Contributions 
This dissertation makes a number of theoretical and empirical contributions to 
political science in general as well as to the study of Chinese political economy.  Its 
theoretical contributions lie primarily in two interrelated areas: state capacity and 
legitimacy.  First, the dissertation makes a contribution to comparative understandings 
of Chinese state capacity by demonstrating that agents of the Chinese state actively 
govern what are considered in most settings to be informal, and therefore unregulated, 
markets.  However, the evaluation of state capacity is complicated by the fact that 
even though state agents have a regulatory presence over so-called informal markets, 
in practice those agents often facilitate the continued existed of formally prohibited 
market behaviors.  Ultimately, I argue that state capacity is simultaneously weak and 
strong in different sectors of the economy, but also that definitive judgments about 
state capacity are rendered difficult because of the difficulties involved in knowing the 
“true” nature of state goals.  
Closely tied to questions of Chinese state capacity are issues of state and Party 
legitimacy.  In chapters two through four I demonstrate the different levels at which 
the concept of market order is used as an instrument of state legitimation as well as a 
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 (flexible) guide to policy.  I demonstrate how both central and local officials make use 
of the concept to justify their authority and market governance behavior.  In the 
conclusion I draw broader implications for the role of market order as a central 
legitimizing concept.  Ultimately, I argue that it is a highly flexible and powerful, if 
imperfect, tool of governance. 
In addition to these two contributions to major theoretical discussions in 
political science, this dissertation draws attention to two important concepts, one of 
which will be new to most readers and another that will likely be more familiar.  One 
of the key conceptual contributions here is to place the idea of “market order” at the 
center of contemporary Chinese political economy.  While potentially specific to 
China, it nonetheless is vital for understanding Chinese political economy and yet has 
received little to no extended analytical treatment in or outside of China.  In addition 
to the concept of market order, I apply and critique the widely-used concept of the 
“informal economy” to the Chinese setting, ultimately showing that the concept does 
not travel well to the Chinese context. 
  Empirically, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of a number of 
little-studied markets, state regulatory bodies and places in China.  In particular, there 
are very few if any specific studies, in English or Chinese, of mainland Chinese street 
vendors or of the government bureau in charge of regulating vendors: the City 
Appearance Administration (or, alternately, the City Management Bureau).  Likewise, 
there are very few contemporary academic studies, political or otherwise, on the city 
of Nanjing, despite its status as the capital of China prior to the establishment of the 
People’s Republic in 1949, let alone its size of almost six million people and current 
status as the capital of the mainland’s third wealthiest province.  Additionally, while 
there are many studies of state regulation of “commanding heights” sectors of the 
economy as well as others about Chinese workers, peasants, and migrants, there are 
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 few if any studies of governance of what Margaret Pearson (1996) has called “low 
tier” sectors of the economy.  Even if the concept of “informality” is flawed as a tool 
for understanding state-market relations, the numbers of urban Chinese workers who 
fall into the category of “other” in major studies on Chinese employment is staggering.  
Barry Naughton, in his new textbook on the Chinese economy, cites evidence that 
approximately 115 million of a total 2004 urban workforce of 265 million are 
“migrants and unregistered businesses,” the major focus of this study (Naughton 
2007:190).  This dissertation offers a novel analysis of all of these issues and areas.  
 
Literature Review: The Regulatory State and Its Critics  
The purpose of the following literature review is twofold.  First, by bringing 
together a rather wide range of scholars, some of whose work is not typically 
mentioned in relation to the others, I will show how they are in fact engaged in a 
common project.  This project involves a comprehensive overview of the 
distinguishing characteristics of China’s contemporary political economy.  While each 
author tackles a specific and discreet aspect of this project, each is nonetheless 
interested in painting a broader picture about the nature of state economy relations in 
China.  Here I have focused exclusively on the viewpoints of scholars writing in 
English for a mostly western academic audience to the exclusion of Chinese mainland 
based scholars writing primarily in Chinese.  I have done so because while the 
literature I focus on in this chapter is primarily meant for academic consumption and 
seeks primarily to forward academic knowledge, the Chinese intellectual debates that I 
explore in chapter two, while also often written by academics, are aimed more directly 
at influencing government policy.  If one of the primary tasks of this chapter is to 
provide a map to understand the current intellectual landscape of Chinese political 
economy, a second is to draw out the continuing gaps in the overall debate and in 
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 specific arguments and assumptions in particular.  After describing and critiquing each 
of the key arguments in the debate I will then conclude with an overview of how my 
own research provides a corrective to these analytical and substantive gaps.  
  I will argue that while proponents of the regulatory state argument are correct 
in identifying a general long-term trend toward state efforts at the formal creation of 
Weberian ideal-type regulatory institutions, these arguments at best miss the complex 
reality behind actual enforcement patterns of these newly reformed institutions and at 
worst fail to analyze the political interactions that drive the relationship between 
regulators and those they seek to regulate.  Specifically, by stressing formal, structural 
changes in regulatory institutions some of the authors in the regulatory state debate fail 
to follow up on whether or how such reforms translate into actual changes on the 
ground. 
On the other hand, while I agree with regulatory state critics in their more 
explicit focus on the political motivations for regulatory reform, I find arguments that 
focus on China’s attempts to create a developmental state (whether at the central or 
local level) often conflate Chinese efforts to mimic Japan or South Korea with actual 
regulatory outcomes (i.e. effectiveness), which often differ dramatically from official 
policy goals.  Just as official claims about the creation of modern and efficient 
regulatory institutions may differ from actual regulatory outcomes, it is one thing to 
aspire to be a developmental state and it is another to be successful.
34  Indeed, while 
regulatory state theorists ascribe too much objectivity and benevolence to regulatory 
reforms, their developmental state critics ascribe too much planning and strategic 
acumen to state regulatory officials.  Both proponents of China’s regulatory state and 
                                                 
34 As I will discuss below, assigning the label “developmental state” has frequently implied successful 
state intervention to promote economic development.  Important exceptions to this teleological use of 
the developmental state concept include Evans (1995), Kohli (2004), and Sinha (2005) as well as 
China-focused research by Segal and Thun (2001). 
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 their developmental state critics focus too much on formal, procedural changes in 
China’s regulatory institutions (even though they come to very different conclusions 
about the nature of these changes) and not enough on the substantive impact of the 
reforms.  I find much more plausible and accurate arguments that demonstrate the 
limitations of efforts at creating a developmental state (Thun 2004) or that testify to 
the complexity of regulatory outcomes that are themselves the result of specific 
struggles between state agents and those who operate in the markets those agents seek 
to govern (Mertha 2005; Kennedy 2005).  Indeed, my own research as presented in 
this dissertation shows that strengths and weaknesses may co-exist and that efforts to 
try to enhance state legitimacy may in fact by undercut by the actions of the state’s 
own regulatory institutions. 
As for my own positive contribution to this debate, aside from assembling the 
key existing arguments in a unique format, I will offer a more complete understanding 
of the role of contention over ideas about how the state should properly govern the 
economy.  I will argue that the regulatory state debate in China fails to fully account 
for the level of contestation over how the state should govern the economy and the 
role this debate has in shaping the emerging system of state-economy relations in 
contemporary China.  Specifically, even though certain authors claim to examine how 
ideas about the nature of markets, and how government can and/or should control 
markets, shape state-market relations, there are two faults in their approach. First, they 
too often assume a fixity and stability to the ideas (sometimes too casually referred to 
as “norms”) about the nature of markets and the proper role of the state in governing 
those markets.  In fact, China’s reforms over the past quarter century have been 
accompanied by intense intellectual and policy debates about the direction of reform.  
These debates are themselves informed by different domestic and international 
understandings of state-market relations.  Just as importantly, the regulatory state 
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 debate literature fails to account not just for the potential of competing ideas about 
proper state governance of the economy, but maybe even more imporantantly it fails 
to account for the very specific and crucial debate over “market order.”  The second 
chapter of this dissertation will serve to address this gap. 
  The other gap that becomes apparent upon review of the Chinese regulatory 
state debate is that too little attention has been paid to the proliferation of a variety of 
market behaviors that are officially prohibited and to the way the state selectively 
enforces regulations related to these behaviors.  One problem lies in the fact that much 
of the analytical attention of the authors reviewed in this chapter is spent on the 
commanding-heights of the economy and/or on high-profile sectors and industries.  
This focus is understandable and necessary as far as it goes, but it leaves a large and 
important array of day-to-day interactions between agents of the state and a range of 
economic actors unexplored.  In China a great many interactions between agents of the 
state and market actors, interactions that are crucial not only to the functioning of the 
economy (some would say to its dysfunction), but also to the maintenance of social 
stability, happen at a level far below the commanding heights and are only accessible 
through the most local form of research.  Moreover, we should understand that a great 
deal of state-economy interaction involves systematic deviation from the rules of the 
game, rules that are in fact daily renegotiated between state and market actors.  In the 
third and fourth chapters I will explore in detail this important realm of informal, 
urban politics and link it to the regulatory and ideational debates explored in this and 
the second chapter.  First, however, I will set the stage with an overview of the 
Chinese regulatory state debate. 
As noted above, the principal debate about the nature of China’s state-
economy relations is between those who see China as an increasingly modern and 
rational regulatory state and 1) those who explicitly reject this regulatory state 
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 argument in favor of a developmental state model and 2) those who claim that China is 
better understood as a case of stalled or partial reform.
35  The wide range of 
approaches among critics of the regulatory state does not diminish the importance of 
this debate.  Despite its importance, a skeptic may question whether the scholarly 
discussions analyzed here have reached the level of a full blown “debate,” especially 
given that only a few of the scholars have actually engaged one another directly in 
writing on the issue of the regulatory state.   
Such skepticism would be misplaced for two important reasons.  First, a 
number of prominent publications as well as conferences have focused directly on the 
question of the regulatory state and more generally with Chinese state-economy 
relations.  Among the key publications, Yang Dali’s 2004 Remaking the Chinese 
Leviathan, in which he fully elaborates the case for an emergent regulatory state in 
China, was a catalyst for critical book reviews (Kennedy 2004/05; Yang and Kennedy 
2005; and Pearson 2005a) and more complete counter-arguments in prominent 
journals like World Politics (Pearson 2005b).
36  Second, at least two academic 
conferences have been held on the topic of the Chinese regulatory state and the nature 
of Chinese capitalism: the first, held at the University of Maryland in April of 2004, 
was entitled “Transforming Institutions in Global China: Past Lessons, Future 
Challenges,” and the second, held in May of 2006, was entitled “Capitalism with 
Chinese Characteristics: China’s Political Economy in Comparative and Theoretical 
                                                 
35 An earlier version of this chapter included a third group that examines China’s sub-national regional 
and sectoral variation and argues that China is a complex mixture of different types of state-market 
interaction.  However, very few in this group directly engage the core issues of the regulatory state 
debate, but instead focus on much narrower issues of political economy.  This work provides key 
insights into larger patterns of state-economy relations, but because they most often do not attempt to 
link their specific research issues to those larger patterns I have not included them in this discussion.  
Many, including Tsai (2002) and Mertha (2005), will appear again later in the dissertation in relation to 
specific regulatory issues. 
36 While Yang’s regulatory state argument is most complete in Remaking the Chinese Leviathan, he had 
been making similar arguments well before then (see Yang 2001, 2003 and 2004b). 
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 Perspective.”
37  These two conferences brought together many of the best scholars of 
China’s political economy to discuss the key issues in this chapter: the first involved 
applications of the regulatory state concept to various issues in Chinese political 
economy and the second highlighted questions about how contemporary Chinese 
capitalism compares with other forms of capitalism across the globe.  While these 
publications and conferences clearly show the vitality of the regulatory state debate, in 
this chapter I will also include scholars who do not directly confront the regulatory 
state argument but whose scholarship is nonetheless clearly related to the core issues 
at stake in this debate. 
My goal in laying out the various arguments about the type of state-market 
interaction that predominates in China is first to provide a picture of this important and 
increasingly large body of literature.  It is precisely because so much of what is being 
written about in state-economy relations in China today does not acknowledge the 
larger debate, in part because there has been too little recognition among themselves 
that these scholars are engaged in a common enterprise, that it is crucial to understand 
these various arguments in relation to one another so that progress can be made.  By 
the end of this chapter it will be clear that in important respects the quality of the 
debate is hampered by participants who are critical of one another but who are, in fact, 
simply speaking past one another rather than engaging each other on the substantive 
issues at stake. 
 
China as a Regulatory State    
What is a “regulatory state?”  And of specific importance to this overview, 
what do China scholars mean when they argue for or against the claim that China is 
                                                 
37 For more on the Indiana conference see the conference web site at 
http://www.polsci.indiana.edu/china/default.htm.  
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 becoming a regulatory state?  The concept of a regulatory state has long been 
associated with the American system of economic governance and more recently with 
changes in state-economy relations in western Europe.  A regulatory state is one that 
governs the economy by establishing rules about proper market behavior and then 
creates independent bureaucratic institutions to enforce those rules.  As one prominent 
regulatory state scholar, Michael Moran (2004), has noted, “the modern regulatory 
state is an American invention” (p. 13).  According to Moran, the American regulatory 
state developed over three distinct periods: the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and the 
1960s period of social regulation (e.g. Johnson’s Great Society programs).  In contrast, 
most scholars agree that the emergence of the regulatory state in western Europe has 
been a post-1970s phenomenon.  Due to the crisis of the Keynesian state, where the 
model of economic regulation was based on control of state-owned enterprises and a 
high degree of direct state intervention in the economy, western European 
governments have increasingly privatized state-owned enterprises and decentralized 
economic decision-making.
38  It is then left to autonomous regulatory authorities, the 
hallmark of “regulatory capitalism” (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005:102), to enforce the 
rules of market behavior, and thus promote market competition.
39  According to some 
of the most prominent regulatory state scholars, even though this model originated in 
the United States and has become dominant in western Europe as well, the rules and 
institutions that make up the regulatory state have recently begun to spread globally 
(Levi-Faur 2005). 
                                                 
38 The normative connotations of the regulatory state are markedly different in the US and Europe. As 
Moran (2004) points out, much of the scholarship on the American regulatory state laments the rise of 
an increasingly intrusive federal government while scholars of the European regulatory state often tie its 
rise to a right-of-center, neo-liberal agenda in which the state has retreated too dramatically from its 
former regulatory position. 
39 A common image used to describe the difference between the Keynesian and regulatory states is the 
juxtaposition of rowing versus steering a boat.  The Keynesian state, during which “welfare capitalism” 
predominated in Europe, both steered and rowed, but the newly emergent regulatory states have 
concentrated solely on steering, leaving the rowing to the private sector.  For more on the steering and 
rowing analogy see Moran (2004) and Levi-Faur (2005). 
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   In recent years a number of China scholars have begun to argue that the global 
diffusion of the regulatory state has also impacted China.  However, in borrowing the 
concept of the regulatory state from the literature on the advanced capitalist economies, 
China scholars have often adopted a restricted and often narrowly historical 
understanding of the concept when applying it to the Chinese case.
40  Despite the 
voluminous and growing literature about the role of the regulatory state in advanced 
industrialized countries, the application of the concept to the ever-changing and 
complex relationship between the Chinese state and economy has been a relatively 
new phenomenon.
41  Scholars who have applied the concept of the regulatory state to 
describe the current relationship, or at least the prevailing trajectory, between the 
Chinese state and economy often rely not on contemporary studies of the US and 
western Europe upon which the concept of the regulatory state is based, but instead on 
an ideal-typical historical model of regulatory reform drawn from one particular place 
and historical period: the US during the Progressive Era.  They argue that the creation 
of government institutions to regulate the US economy during the Progressive Era was 
grounded in the perceived failure of unrestrained markets to provide for “orderly” 
economic development (Yang 2004a:8-9).
42  Proponents of the argument that China 
                                                 
40 Below I provide specific examples of this historical focus.  In the following section I focus in 
particular on the work of two of the most prominent regulatory state scholars, Yang Dali and Wang 
Shaoguang.  Yang argues that China has become (or is becoming) a regulatory state because “most 
reforms have a public goods aspect in that the center has to step in where the local authorities are likely 
to shirk. This is clearly the case in the reforms of the central banking system (macroeconomic policy), 
but it is equally important in the enforcement of laws for environmental protection, quality, safety, and 
intellectual property. In other words, I argue that much progress has been made toward the construction 
of a regulatory state” (Yang 2004b:121-122). For Wang a regulatory state is one in which “public 
ownership thins out and state planning makes way for market forces but the state is sill intensively 
involved in economic and social affairs visa standard-setting, supervision, monitoring, and enforcement, 
shortly summarized as ‘regulation’” (Wang 2006:1). 
41 The literature on the Chinese regulatory state is almost completely dominated by western-trained 
scholars writing in English.  While there is no shortage of Chinese-language scholarship about 
regulatory reform and state-economy relations, articles or books that rely on the concept of the 
regulatory state, in Chinese jianguan (监管), guanzhi (管制), guizhi (规制), or guiguan zhengfu (规管
政府), are few and far between.  See, for instance Da and Kong (2004). 
42 Key Progressive Era institutions include the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887), the Food and 
Drug Administration (1906), the Federal Reserve Board (1913) and the Fair Trade Commission (1914). 
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 too is not only in need of new institutions to govern its often-unruly markets but is, in 
fact, witnessing a clear transition in this direction openly draw on this narrowly 
historical US model for lessons in how to ensure stable, equitable growth.
43  
One of the most prominent champions of the case that China is becoming a 
regulatory state along the lines of the Progressive Era United States is the political 
scientist Yang Dali.  While Yang does not provide an extensive comparison of 
contemporary Chinese regulatory reform with the US during the Progressive Era, he 
does, however, explicitly allude to the comparison.  Quoting Fligstein (2001), Yang 
notes that market-led development has historically been accompanied by efforts to 
“stabilize markets” and that post Civil War America in specific, due to challenges 
from convergent pressures of “nationalization, industrialization, mechanization, and 
urbanization,” was engaged in “a search for order” (Yang 2004a:8).
44  He goes on to 
argue that during the Progressive Era in America a new kind of state was necessary to 
deal with the stresses of industrialization and that what emerged was “a managerial 
and regulatory state” that “arose to tackle problems ranging from poor public health to 
monopolies” (Yang 2004a:9).
45  The ultimate importance of the comparison between 
Progressive Era American political development (as opposed to contemporary 
America or western Europe) and China since the 1990s is to highlight the fact that 
China too is in the early stages of creating its own regulatory state. 
                                                 
43 As noted above, academic work on the rise and spread of the regulatory state model in the United 
States and western Europe also makes reference to the importance of the Progressive Era for the 
foundations of modern regulatory regimes.  However, the focus of these works is primarily about post-
1980s institutional and regulatory reforms that have arisen in the wake of welfare state retrenchment.  
The nascent literature on the Chinese regulatory state largely ignores the literature on contemporary 
welfare state arrangements in the United State and Europe and instead implies that China is more like 
the US at the turn of the 20
th century. 
44 Yang cites American political development scholars Bensel (1990 and 2001) and Skowronek (1982), 
drawing on Bensel’s 1990 Yankee Leviathan for the title of his own book. 
45 Yang does not claim that America ever perfected its own regulatory state, noting the more recent 
regulatory challenges presented by the Enron and Worldcom scandals (2004a:9).  It is however quite 
clear that Yang sees China following in the footsteps of America’s Progressive Era regulatory 
revolution and that this is a very positive move indeed. 
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 From the outset of his book entitled Remaking the Chinese Leviathan,
46 Yang 
is clear about what he sees as the essence of regulatory reform in China today.  He 
argues that  
 
The Chinese leadership has been in a marathon quest for institutional 
development, rationalizing existing institutions and building new ones to cope 
with the unruliness of markets and bring about a regulative economic order. 
(Yang 2004a:1)   
 
Yang makes a classic Weberian modernization argument for China, presenting 
evidence to show how Chinese officials are creating a set of professional bureaucratic 
institutions to promote economic development and correct for market failures through 
rule-based regulation.
47  Yang’s answer to his own question, “can the Chinese state 
remake itself into a regulatory state, offering sound laws and regulations and enforcing 
them in a reasonably impartial manner?” (2004a:16) is a qualified “yes.”  Yang sets up 
his own regulatory state argument against two other contending schools of thought 
about the relationship between the Chinese state and economy.  The first he calls the 
“Developmental School,” which draws mainly on research connecting robust 
economic growth to the largely positive impact of the local state (e.g. Oi 1999) and the 
second he refers to as the “Distorted Market School,” whose proponents claim that a 
combination of local protectionism and interference in markets by what should be 
                                                 
46 While Yang makes his argument for China’s emerging regulatory state most forcefully in his 2004 
book, he also makes the case in other writings including a book chapter (see Yang, 2004b) and an 
article for a special version of the Journal of Democracy devoted to questions of Chinese democracy 
(see Yang, 2003). 
47 While the regulatory state literature, as it applies to the United States and western Europe, is very 
clear that the key institution of the regulatory state is the independent regulatory body, Yang does not 
emphasize the independence of China’s newly reformed regulatory bodies per se.  Independence might 
be implied in Yang’s emphasis on the increasingly “rational” and “modern” (terms he uses again and 
again) character of China’s regulatory institutions, but he does not make an extended case for 
independence. 
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 objective and autonomous state regulators creates market distortions (Yang 2004a:11-
14).
48   
In Remaking the Chinese Leviathan Yang is primarily concerned with 
demonstrating how the Chinese state has set about to reform itself to cope with the 
range of challenges presented by the Distorted Market School scholars.  The breadth 
of regulatory reforms that Yang tackles in his book is impressive, ranging from efforts 
to improve the regulation of consumer safety to cracking down on smuggling all the 
way to fiscal reform.  As for what has driven these reforms, he mainly advocates the 
importance of exogenous shocks (as in the case of post-East Asian Financial Crisis 
anti-smuggling efforts and the divestiture of businesses owned and operated by the 
People’s Liberation Army)
49 and the general change in economic conditions that 
prompted officials to make “rationalizing” reforms across a multitude of regulatory 
bodies from the most local (e.g. The Nanjing City Appearance Bureau) to the peak of 
central power (e.g. the National Development and Reform Commission).  In the end, 
Yang’s main concern is less with explicating the political and economic mechanisms 
driving reforms than with cataloging the myriad transformations in China’s formal 
bureaucratic structure since the early 1990s in an effort to show that there is a clear 
trend toward the creation of a modern, rational, regulatory state in China.  For him, the 
centralization of authority with certain bureaucratic units, the downsizing and 
streamlining of bureaucracies often associated with this centralization, and efforts to 
extricate the state and military from direct ownership and management of for-profit 
                                                 
48 Yang’s “Developmental” and “Distorted Market” schools roughly approximate my own 
categorizations in this chapter although as I explain below the developmental school has both national 
and local variations. 
49 PLA divestiture plays an especially important part in Yang’s overall argument. He claims that “the 
divestiture of myriad businesses run by or affiliated with China’s party and state institutions, 
particularly the armed forced, was not a simple ad hoc move but part of the overall trend toward the 
rationalization of the state and of government-business relations” (2004a: 148-49) and that the 
divestiture was a key catalyst for a massive wave of reform starting in 1997.  
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 enterprises constitute the core achievements of China’s emerging regulatory state.  
Yang also includes the improvement of “market order” as a primary goal of the 
Chinese regulatory state, a topic I will take up more fully in later chapters. 
While Yang Dali provides the clearest and most extensive elaboration of the 
China regulatory state argument, there are also other important examples that help fill 
out important aspects of the regulatory state school and here I will present one of the 
best and most recent.  A long-time proponent of the need to check centripetal forces 
associated with economic reform and to reinvigorate efforts to rebuild and reconstitute 
state capacity, Wang Shaoguang has also begun to speak of China’s emergence as a 
regulatory state.  Wang takes the example of coalmine safety reform as indicative of 
Chinese state efforts to reconstitute the bureaucratic apparatus and to halt negative 
patterns of state-market interactions that have been largely responsible for China’s 
alarming rate of coalmine-related deaths and injuries.  In his article “Regulating Death 
at Coalmines” (2006), Wang makes the case that the twin processes of 
denationalization of ownership and the liberalization of markets contributed 
significantly to the deterioration of coalmine safety in China.
50  In specific, the 
proliferation of small coalmines operated by township and village enterprises (TVEs) 
led to a situation in which local officials who were in charge of enforcing safety 
standards in the mines also had a financial and political interest in extracting 
maximum revenues from the mines, often leading to a conflict of interest (Wang 
Shaoguang, 2006: 6-7).  In far too many cases, this conflict of interest meant reduced 
safety oversight and underreporting of mining accidents.  To make matters worse, 
prior to 1999 the national mine safety regulatory system covered only state owned 
mines, excluding TVEs (Wang Shaoguang 2006: 19).   
                                                 
50 This would then be the flip side of the same decentralizing reforms that some associate with dynamic 
local economies. 
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   Wang’s argument for the emergence of a Chinese regulatory state rests on the 
government’s response since the mid 1990s to the problem of coalmine safety.  As 
with Yang Dali, Wang’s focus is not so much on the specific mechanisms that have 
been driving regulatory reform in the coal mining sector as it is to enumerate the 
formal bureaucratic reforms that have been enacted to enhance coalmine safety and to 
tie this in to a larger trend of regulatory reform in China.
 51  Key among these reforms 
has been a spate of new legislation dealing with coalmine safety and the consolidation 
of the previously fragmented regulatory bureaucracy, culminating in the creation of 
the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety in 2000 and its elevation to full-
ministerial level status in 2005 (Wang Shaoguang 2006:24-5).
52  For Wang, the 
passage of new coalmine safety laws and the creation and elevation of a new coalmine 
safety regulatory body is evidence of the larger trend toward the creation of a 
fundamentally new kind of state apparatus in China.   
  Unlike Yang Dali’s focus on the debate between the “Developmental School” 
and the “Distorted Market School,” Wang argues that “what replaces China’s 
‘totalistic state’ in the wake of denationalization and marketization is not a Hayekian 
night-watchman state, but a regulatory state” (2006:30).  While Wang leaves the 
concept of a Hayekian night-watchman state unexplained,
53 he argues that under Mao, 
                                                 
51 The essence of Wang’s argument about what prompted safety reforms is that increased state-owned 
media coverage of mining accidents, combined with a growing public awareness of and outcry over 
deplorable mine safety conditions, eventually led to the spate of mine safety reforms that began in the 
late 1990s and continues today (Wang 2006:23).  While the argument that increased public 
dissatisfaction with mine safety is what prompted reforms is highly plausible, Wang provides little to no 
evidence for this actually being the case.  What’s more, Wang chooses a difficult case to prove his point 
about increased government regulation of the economy.  As Wang (2006) himself notes, “While 
China’s [coalmine] safety performance has improved, its present safety levels are arguably the worst in 
the world” (p. 13). 
52 The regulatory body has been renamed the General State Administration of Work Safety/State 
Administration of Coal Mine Safety and as the unwieldy new moniker shows, this institution is now 
charged with general work safety regulation, not just in coalmines (Wang 2006:25). 
53 This is significant because what a Hayekian night-watchman state is is not self-explanatory.  
Moreover, Wang’s reference to Hayek is not incidental and is instead a symbolic salvo in the on-going 
war of ideas between the New Left and neo-liberals in China.  For further evidence that Wang is 
making an undeclared case against neo-liberal scholars and their champion Hayek, he later notes that 
37 
 China was a totalistic state in which administration of the economy took place through 
comprehensive administrative decrees, that regulations and rules were applicable only 
to those being regulated (as opposed to the regulators themselves) and that 
enforcement was carried out through persuasion and “administrative chastisements” 
(2006:30).  In contrast to the totalistic state that preceded it, Wang argues that the 
essential economic management activities of China’s regulatory state include 
standard-setting, supervision, monitoring, and enforcement (2006:1).  His claim is that 
the reform of the administrative framework for governing coalmine safety is indicative 
of a larger trend in China whereby the state has largely withdrawn from direct control 
of the economy and is now trying to both “set general economic parameters” and at 
the same time to offset the natural tendency of unfettered markets to exacerbate human 
misery.   
  Before moving on to analyze the key criticisms of and alternatives to the 
regulatory state approach, let me first conclude with a brief summary of the main 
regulatory state arguments as presented above.  To begin, both Yang and Wang see 
Chinese regulatory reform as following a clear trajectory toward professional, rational, 
law-based regulatory institutions where the priorities of state economic regulation and 
the means of doing so have changed fundamentally from the preceding period.  In this, 
they see China as following a global trend, one that primarily proceeds along the path 
of the advanced industrialized countries but also increasingly appears to describe 
developing countries in the South and the East as well.
 54  For example, in a footnote 
exploring the vast literature on the regulatory state Wang states that,  
                                                                                                                                              
the demise of China’s totalistic state has not ushered in the “rise of self-regulating society” (2006:29).  
For more on the New Left versus neo-liberal debate, see the following chapter.   
54 In a long footnote on his understanding of the regulatory state, Wang refers to the historical American 
origins of the regulatory state, the adoption of regulatory governance in Europe since the 1980s and an 
ongoing wave of regulatory reform that has since engulfed developing countries from Latin America to 
East Asia.  He then remarks that “What has happened in China is apparently a part of this global wave 
of regulatory reform” (2006:2).  Here, as elsewhere in the nascent literature about the emergence of a 
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 For almost a century the regulatory state was just one of the distinctive features 
of American Exceptionalism: what the United State regulated, other countries 
often nationalized…But since the mid-1980s governance through regulation 
has ceased to be a peculiarity of the American administrative state but has 
become a central feature of governance reforms in the OECD countries…, 
Latin America…, East Asia…, and developing countries in general. (Wang 
Shaoguang 2006:2, fn3)  
 
While neither author says so directly, it is clear that they both see this trend as 
not only natural, but positive: a regulatory state is a good state.  Part of this normative 
judgment comes from the authors’ shared interest in enhanced rather than diminished 
Chinese state capacity, something both have written about elsewhere.
55  Not only 
Yang and Wang, but other like-minded scholars have also expressed concerns about 
the ravages of unconstrained markets and venal officials that have been a product of 
China’s reform process.
56  For instance, in a call for enhanced state capacity in China 
Wang writes, “Collected in the name of the state but subject to fewer controls than 
formal revenues, informal revenues [like the type discussed here in chapters two and 
three] furnish ample opportunities for official graft and corruption” (Wang Shaoguang 
2003:39). It thus follows that they would see the creation of more professional 
regulatory institutions staffed by impartial bureaucrats committed to the promotion of 
fair competition and equitable outcomes as a highly positive trend.  Ultimately, it is 
only in choosing who they are arguing against that Yang and Wang different 
significantly, Yang primarily aiming to show those in the “Distorted Market School” 
                                                                                                                                              
Chinese regulatory state, greater emphasis is placed on the creation, and not the efficacy, of a range of 
regulatory institutions. 
55 See, for instance, Wang (1995 and 2003), Wang and Hu (2001) and Yang (2003 and 2004b).  Pei 
Minxin, on the contrary, has made it clear that he sees Chinese state capacity as decreasing.  For 
instance, Pei titled a chapter to an edited volume to which he contributed “Rotten from Within: 
Decentralized Predation and Incapacitated State” (Pei 2003). 
56 Here I refer to the ongoing intellectual and policy debate between the New Left and neo-liberals in 
China.  Wang is especially close to this debate and an active participant in it.  Another prominent 
overseas Chinese academic associated with this school of thought and who is also actively concerned 
with issues of state capacity is Zheng Yongnian, whose work I discuss at more length in the following 
chapter. 
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 that the situation is changing dramatically, while Wang chooses no direct intellectual 
battle but instead aims to show that China has made a definitive move away from a 
totalistic state towards becoming a regulatory one.   
  
The Critics of the Regulatory State 
The National Developmental State 
As noted at the outset of this chapter, the relatively recent growth of writing on 
the regulatory state in China has been the catalyst for a growing debate, with Yang 
Dali serving as the main target of criticism and analytical reflection.  The critics of the 
regulatory state argument, while in agreement on certain issues, are, however, far from 
reaching a consensus about their alternative understandings of how to portray state-
economy relations in China today.  I divide critics of the Chinese regulatory state 
literature into two groups, both of which largely correspond to Yang’s categories 
above: 1) the Developmental State School, which I further divide into national and 
local varieties and 2) the Partial Reform School.  These two groups directly criticize 
the regulatory state literature, although primarily for quite different reasons.  While the 
developmental state advocates warn that the regulatory state approach overlooks key 
aspects of strategic political decisions that continue to fundamentally shape patterns of 
institutional reform, those in the Partial Reform School stress that ever-rising 
corruption and the lack of political liberalization have left China stalled on the road to 
true reform.  In many ways, the different findings of these critics of the regulatory 
state approach are very much a function of the questions asked, just as they are for 
scholars like Yang Dali and Wang Shaoguang.  One of the main bifurcations in the 
regulatory state debate comes between those who focus primarily on changes in 
formal institutional structures and those who are principally concerned with on-the-
ground changes (or lack thereof) in relations between state regulatory bodies and those 
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 they seek to regulate.
57  It is also clear that basic predispositions and normative 
commitments of the authors involved play a large role in the questions asked and the 
type of conclusions drawn.  Here I will flesh out the arguments made by each of the 
different challenges to the regulatory state case. 
Margaret Pearson of the University of Maryland has emerged as the primary 
critic of the regulatory state approach, especially as it is presented by Yang Dali.  In a 
review of Yang’s Leviathan book and in a subsequent World Politics article, Pearson 
takes Yang to task for a number of misplaced analytical assumptions that lead to 
factual inaccuracies and overlooked patterns of state regulatory behavior.  Pearson 
begins her review of Yang’s book with the blunt observation that it “is at the same 
time highly valuable and deeply flawed” (2005a:64).  While she praises Yang’s 
detailed attention to the changes in China’s regulatory structure, especially given 
many other China watchers’ largely ineffectual search for China’s illusory democratic 
transition, she disagrees with Yang’s portrayal of the fundamental nature of regulatory 
reform, claiming that he overlooks key changes in the form and mission of top-level 
regulatory institutions (2005a:65).  By focusing on structural bureaucratic reforms and 
arguing that China is witnessing the emergence of a minimalist and neutral state 
regulatory apparatus, Pearson claims that Yang misses the strategic and political 
nature of regulatory reform.  To the extent that champions of China’s emerging 
regulatory state predict convergence toward (perceived)  norms of good governance, 
Pearson challenges these claims with an alternative framework for understanding 
China’s ongoing regulatory changes.  
Pearson provides a much more thorough presentation of her own alternative 
argument in her full-length World Politics article, contending that in many key 
                                                 
57 While advocates of an emergent Chinese regulatory state want to make a connection between 
improved formal regulatory reforms and regulatory implementation, they too often assume formal 
reform will lead to improved implementation rather than proving their case.   
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 respects China more closely resembles an East Asian developmental state than a 
regulatory one.
58  Her primary focus is on the norms and institutions at the heart of 
China’s governance model.  While Pearson acknowledges the wide array of reforms in 
China’s regulatory institutions, she argues that the resultant institutional structure 
reflects the state’s strategic goals and normative commitments.  Unlike Yang, who 
sees China’s bureaucratic reforms as progressing along a path toward rationality and 
normalcy, Pearson fixes her attention on the commanding heights of the Chinese 
economy, providing examples from the telecommunications, electric power, civil 
aviation, and financial services sectors to argue that the state is anything but a neutral 
bystander in its approach to regulating these sectors.  Indeed, she argues that it is 
precisely because the state sees these sectors as strategic to the maintenance of its own 
authority that it cannot create wholly independent and objective bodies to regulate 
them.  Far from establishing neutral, autonomous regulatory bodies for the oversight 
of these sectors, she emphasizes that the state has shown a desire to retain the “power 
of comprehensive agencies…to foster national champions, and…to actively structure 
and limit competition in favor of incumbent firms” (2005b:302).  In this sense Pearson 
argues that China, rather than becoming a regulatory state, more accurately resembles 
a developmental state along the lines of East Asian late developers like Japan and 
South Korea (2005b:300-02).
59  The state’s primary goal in terms of regulatory reform, 
                                                 
58 Despite her highly critical take on the regulatory state, the subtitle of the article, “Institutions and 
Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State,” seems to acknowledge the existence of this dubious entity. 
59 The concept of a developmental state was largely pioneered by and continues to be associated with 
Chalmers Johnson and the rapid rise of a number of East Asian economies in the post World War II era. 
In his 1982 MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Johnson was intent on showing that Japan’s post war 
development model offered an alternative between western laissez faire capitalism and socialism.  The 
key aspects of the developmental state model included the existence of a professional bureaucracy that 
was largely independent from direct political interference; state intervention in the economy in a way 
that was “market conforming” (Johnson 1982:317), which often meant state control over allocation of 
credit; the creation of a super-ministry like MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) to 
co-ordinate industrial policy; and the creation of national champions in select industries.  The two 
countries most closely associated with this model are Japan and South Korea, but Johnson and others 
have also pointed to its applicability to Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong as well in what is sometimes 
known as the “flying geese” model of East Asian development.  In a recent retrospective on the history 
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 then, is not to create independent regulators but instead, through active intervention 
and guidance, to enhance its control over the commanding heights’ sectors thus 
enhancing its own position and allowing it to avert destabilizing social dislocations. 
  The other component of Pearson’s argument is ideational: in addition to 
pursuing a set of institutional arrangements that in many respects resemble a Japanese-
style developmental state, Pearson claims that Chinese regulatory reformers have also 
shown a clear set of normative preferences about the state’s developmental goals and 
the means of achieving those goals.  She argues that these preferences act as a 
formidable obstacle in the creation of a regulatory state.
 60  According to Pearson, the 
Chinese leadership holds a set of normative preferences, including the desire for 
“orderly” competition and, as part of this, for the maintenance of only a small number 
of dominant, state-owned firms in strategic sectors (2005b:312, 314).  According to 
this line of thought, some competition is healthy for increased efficiency, but fears of 
excessive price-cutting that might eat into state revenues have prompted a preference 
by state officials for limited competition.
 61  Tied to domestic concerns about 
diminished revenue streams and fear of unemployment that might be the result of 
excessive competition, state officials have also expressed their desire to create 
                                                                                                                                              
and controversy surrounding the developmental state concept, Johnson is also clear that the 
developmental state was one that was successful at generating rapid economic growth.  Summing up the 
main point of his 1981 book, Johnson (1999) says, “The essence of the argument is that credit for the 
postwar Japanese economic ‘miracle’ should go primarily to conscious and consistent governmental 
policies” (p. 37).  Johnson’s research on Japan was followed by a number of other important works that 
also relied on the developmental state concept, especially as it applied to East Asia, including Amsden 
(1989 and 2003), Wade (1990), Deyo (1987) and Evans (1995).  Two more recent additions to this 
literature that seek to understand why some countries (or parts of countries) are more effective in 
creating a developmental state are Kohli (2004) and Sinha (2005), while Herring (1999) seeks to 
explain India’s failed developmental state.  
60 Pearson interchanges the concepts of regulatory state and “independent regulator model.”  She says 
that despite not being reflected in the actual results of regulatory reform, the “desirability of adopting 
the independent regulator model is entrenched in the political and scholarly discourse” in China 
(2005b:301).   
61 Scott Kennedy has written specifically on the politics of price floors in connection with attempts to 
control competition (see Kennedy, 2003 and 2005).     
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 “national champion” industries that can be internationally competitive and 
technologically innovative.
62  
  By focusing on the importance of commonly held assumptions about how 
markets operate and the state’s proper role in governing those markets, Pearson has 
introduced an important topic into the regulatory state debate.  Pearson has also hit on 
a vital theme with her stress on the key role that state officials place on the 
maintenance of market order and stability.  However, I would argue that Pearson 
overplays the level of consensus (what she refers to as a “normative preference”) that 
exists about what policies are most likely to produce this sought-after orderliness.  
Moreover, the very definition of what constitutes orderly competition or a stable 
market is itself a subject of heated debate.  Finally, though a focus on the state’s 
strategic decisions in commanding heights’ sectors is undoubtedly of great importance 
in understanding China’s contemporary political economy, it is equally imperative to 
understand the less-than-commanding nooks and crannies of Chinese state-economy 
relations in order to more fully comprehend all the dimensions of the struggle over 
market order. 
 
The Local Developmental State 
  For Margaret Pearson, then, one of the key attributes of regulatory reform in 
China is that the state, far from simply rationalizing or normalizing its role in the 
economy and creating autonomous regulatory institutions, has been engaged in a 
profoundly political effort to reconstitute its authority and control over the economy 
by actively intervening in the regulation of strategic sectors.  An important variant of 
the national level, commanding heights type of developmental state argument as 
presented by Pearson is the case for local developmental states.  While writing on the 
                                                 
62 For more on China’s attempts to create national champions in the auto sector see Thun (2006). 
44 
 local developmental state has been a staple of China studies scholarship for quite some 
time, its proponents have as of yet not actively entered into the larger debate about the 
broad scope of state-economy relations that has been the focus of the Yang-Pearson 
dialogue.  Yet it is important to briefly discuss the local developmental state as a 
variant of the national-level version because it sheds a slightly different light on the 
issues raised by Pearson and at the same time presents a number of puzzles about 
central-local relations and whether one can actually hope to place such a complex 
entity as China into any neat, all-encompassing analytical category.
63 
  The concept of a local developmental state is almost uniquely deployed in the 
study of Chinese development.
64  With the beginning of the reform era in China, 
scholars were granted long-denied access to localities all over China.  Based on this 
research these scholars began to classify local state-economy interactions in a variety 
of ways.  One of the key variants was the local developmental state, a category 
designed to describe the way local officials had begun to take on many of the key roles 
of national developmental states by  
 
interven[ing] indirectly in the economy, “helping to plan, finance, and co-
ordinate local projects, investing in local infrastructure, and promoting co-
operative economic relations with external agencies. (Blecher and Shue 
2001:368, fn. 1)
65   
                                                 
63 I distinguish between two types of local regulatory state arguments.  The primary difference is that 
the first type of argument tends to assume, along with its national variant, that local developmental 
states are successful at promoting local development whereas the second variant leaves the question of 
what leads to developmental success or failure as an open question.  
64 One important exception is Aseema Sinha’s (2005) work on comparative local developmental states 
in India. 
65 In a helpful overview of varieties of local state-economy interaction, Richard Baum and Alexei 
Shevchenko and also Marc Blecher and Vivienne Shue have argued for four basic local state forms: 
developmental, entrepreneurial, clientelistic and predatory (see Baum and Shevchenko, 1999 and 
Blecher and Shue, 2001).  Here I deal primarily with the challenge the developmental and predatory 
(which I place in the category of “partial reform”) models present to the regulatory state case.  The 
entrepreneurial state ideal type (see Duckett, 1999), as much as it captured the important phenomenon 
of government bureaus spinning off private and semi-private businesses, has not really received much 
subsequent attention.  To the extent that bureaucratic entities continue to spin off private enterprises, 
this clearly poses a challenge to the regulatory state thesis, but on the other hand Yang Dali may have 
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 In the sense that local officials also see certain sectors as strategically important and 
seek to create or support “local champions,” they too actively intervene in markets to 
produce desired outcomes.  Yet another variation on the largely positive 
developmental role played by the local state is Oi’s (1999) description of “local 
corporatism” in which local state and Party officials coordinate government and 
business activities along the lines of a private corporation.   As with Pearson’s analysis 
of central state intervention in commanding heights sectors, arguments about the local 
developmental state are also fundamentally at odds with claims that China is headed 
toward becoming a regulatory state. 
  The change of scale from the national to the local makes for a dramatic 
increase in the number of potential cases of state-market interaction.  To the extent 
that the policies of local developmental states converge with those of the central 
government, there is no problem logically in accepting the compatibility of local and 
national forms of the developmental state.  However, there is the very high possibility 
for central and local developmental policies to diverge.  What for some may be a case 
of local developmentalism may for others be a case of local protectionism or outright 
corruption.  There are at least two variants of the problem of diverging central-local 
interests in terms of development promotion.  In the first case, local officials seek to 
promote a local champion, be it the leather industry or the automobile industry or 
whatever local officials choose,
66 and in so doing protect local firms from competitive 
                                                                                                                                              
been correct that the PLA divestiture marked the beginning of an overall crackdown on these types of 
enterprises.   
66 See, for example, Blecher and Shue (2001) and Thun (2004).  Recent scholarship has used the local 
developmental state paradigm to explore the comparative efficacy of local governments to champion 
certain industries.  Eric Thun and Adam Segal, in a comparative study of Shanghai and Beijing local 
governments’ efforts to promote the auto and electronics industries (2001), respectively, ask under 
which conditions local governments can succeed in creating champion industries.  Unlike much of the 
developmental state literature, whether in the national or local variants, Thun and Segal do not assume 
that efforts to create a developmental state will necessarily prove successful.  Despite their research 
design that allows for failed developmental state experiments, Thun and Segal do find that both the 
Beijing and Shanghai city governments were successful in their promotion of their chosen sectors, but 
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 pressures, discriminating against non-local competitors.  In the second, closely related 
case, local officials, also in an effort to promote local development, collaborate in the 
production and/or commerce of goods or services that the central government has 
formally forbidden.  In either scenario, local developmental state policy may be at 
odds with national policy.
67  In this sense, while the existence of local developmental 
states certainly provides evidence against an emerging regulatory state, it also poses a 
problem for the argument that China is a smoothly oiled developmental state.  So even 
though both national and local variations on the developmental state argument are 
antithetical to claims that China is becoming a regulatory state, in large part because 
they disagree with regulatory state claims about the purpose of institutional reform in 
china, they share a similar focus on formal, bureaucratic changes and tend to 
downplay questions of regulatory implementation.  The following two groups of 
regulatory state critics have a very different orientation, instead choosing to 
concentrate on patterns of regulatory enforcement. 
 
Partial Reform  
  The other main group of critics of the regulatory state thesis argues not that 
China is becoming a developmental state that strategically intervenes in markets 
(national or local) in order to promote development and maintain political authority, 
but claims instead that China is a case of stalled or partial reform.
68  Here I will briefly 
explore three variants of this argument, one which argues that corruption undermines 
                                                                                                                                              
these successes were dependent on a number of variables specific to each industry and the unique 
endowments of each region. 
67 Scholars of the local development state would most likely claim that the second scenario more closely 
resembles a simple case of corruption or illegal behavior and that the former may simply go against 
economic rationality in terms of scale of production.  But from the perspective of central authorities 
both scenarios pose a problem of local policies that run counter to the creation of a unified national 
market or the enforcement of national laws that themselves, like Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
legislation, are part of global treaties. 
68 For the classic study on post-socialist “partial reform” see Hellman (1998). 
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 regulatory reform and economic development in general, a second that also stresses 
the negative impact of corruption but places it within the context of incomplete 
economic and political reform, and a third that relies on cultural and ideational factors 
to explain what many see as sub-optimal financial and enterprise reform.  While it is 
only in the first corruption-oriented argument that there is a direct critique of the 
regulatory state case, all three variants of the partial reform argument draw attention to 
negative aspects of China’s reform process by focusing on what they perceive to be 
the failure to successfully implement policy reforms based on a rule-based regulatory 
system. Put differently, partial reform scholars like Pei Minxin and Lü Xiaobo in 
particular, see a major lack of state capacity in China whereas their regulatory state 
and developmental state counterparts see at least improving state capacity. 
  The first variant of the partial reform school shares much in common with 
what Yang Dali has called the “distorted market school.”  These scholars see many of 
the problems associated with regulatory reform rooted in corruption.
69  Two scholars 
associated with this perspective are Huang Yanzhong and Lü Xiaobo.  Huang in 
particular directly attacks the regulatory state argument for contradicting the plentiful 
evidence of official venality.  One of his key points is that even with regulatory reform, 
and sometimes because of it, many officials function as both referee and player in 
market competition.  According to Huang,  
 
bureaucrats at almost every level, from central government ministries to local 
authorities, can assure themselves a privileged position in the emerging 
market economy by being the owners of key corporations and/or the 
regulators of market competition. (Huang 2004:40)   
 
                                                 
69 What constitutes a “problem” for the partial reform scholars is not always immediately apparent.  
While corruption is often the focus of their work, the question of what specific difficulties corruption 
itself leads to, economic, social or otherwise, quite often go unexplained. 
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 Moreover, he argues that bureaucratic promotion policies continue to have perverse 
incentives built in such that advancement is not necessarily tied to actual regulatory 
improvements (say in health or sanitation standards) but is instead a function of 
pleasing one’s superiors (Huang 2004:41, 49).  Finally, Huang directly contradicts 
Yang Dali when he concludes that “despite the restructuring and reorganization of the 
country’s bureaucracy, the reform has failed significantly to rationalize or revamp 
China’s state apparatus.” (Huang 2004:58). 
   Lü Xiaobo takes the corruption argument to another level, arguing not only 
that reform has failed to rationalize state institutions, but also that it has led to what he 
calls “organizational corruption.”  Lü defines organizational corruption as  
 
actions of a public agency that, by exploiting its power in regulating the 
market or its monopoly over vital resources, are aimed at monetary or 
material gains for the organization. Such gains often violate official rules or 
regulations, at the expense of both the public and the state. (Lü 2000b:275) 
 
He is particularly concerned about four different kinds of practices that for him 
constitute organizational corruption: the collection of extra-budgetary funds, the 
misuse of regulatory power, the illegal use of public funds and the “profit-generating 
activities of government agencies” (2000b:276).  According to Lü then, many of the 
types of behavior described in the local developmental state and entrepreneurial state 
models as key to dynamic local development would have to be considered 
organizational corruption.  Ultimately, for both Lü and Huang, economic reform in 
China has opened up the floodgates of corruption and many government officials, far 
from helping to create modern, Weberian regulatory institutions or acting as local 
developmental state planners, have instead abused their power to enrich themselves or 
their entire organization, thus leading to stalled economic reform.   
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   Taking the corruption-based partial reform case one step further by extending 
the argument beyond economics to the realm of politics is Pei Minxin of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace.  In Pei’s 2006 book, China’s Trapped Transition, 
he argues that corruption goes hand-in-hand with a state apparatus that is increasingly 
unable and unwilling to enforce its own rules and regulations and which has become 
increasingly “predatory” toward its own citizens.
70  Directly contradicting the 
assertions of the regulatory state scholars, Pei (2006a) argues that China is 
experiencing extensive “institutional breakdown” (13) and that “various measures of 
governance confirm the underdevelopment of key public institutions in China” (5).  
Pei finds that neither the media nor public opinion serve as a useful check against the 
Party’s single-minded efforts to maintain a stranglehold on power.  According to Pei, 
the Party’s failure to allow for political opening has 
 
Stunted the development of an effective legal system, constrained the 
constitutional role of the legal branch, obstructed the growth of rural self-
government, and restricted the emergence of civil society. (2006a:7) 
 
Pei argues that the Party’s unwillingness to place any constraints on its own power or 
that of the state more generally has weakened state capacity in a variety of ways, from 
the enforcement of contracts to the protection of property rights to “policing the 
marketplace” (2006a:14).  In essence, Pei takes the partial reform case one step 
beyond simple economic corruption to claim that economic elites and party officials 
(often one-in-the-same) have not only contributed to incomplete reform, they have 
purposely manipulated reform to enrich themselves and to increase their stranglehold 
on political power.  For Pei, the ultimate goal of Chinese reform should be the creation 
                                                 
70 For more on Pei’s “decentralized predation” argument see Pei (2003).  Although he makes no 
reference to it, in some ways this predatory state argument recalls Duara’s (1988) historical analysis of 
“state involution” during the first half of the 20
th Century in China in that both emphasize the growth of 
rogue local officials who exploit their official positions to extract resources from rural citizens. 
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 of a market democracy, but as it stands “China seems to be on a Long March to 
nowhere” (2006b:17).   
For Pei this “Long March to nowhere” is anything but benign.  Instead he sees 
a vicious circle of corruption and state predation that persists and worsens due to the 
lack of institutional checks and balances and causes ever-decreasing institutional 
capacity.  Pei thus reasons that China, unlike other East Asian countries that achieved 
rapid development under authoritarian leadership, will not transition to democracy and 
for him this is truly the crux of China’s partial transition. 
A final version of the partial reform argument relies on cultural and ideational 
arguments to explain stalled reform.  Ed Steinfeld, in a 2004 Political Studies article 
sets out to explain the lack of success in reforming the Chinese financial and 
enterprise sectors.
71  Steinfeld says that many other partial reform theories offer a non-
economic rationale for stalled financial and enterprise reform, such as fears over social 
instability, state deference to politically powerful social groups or intentional 
government distortion of markets to maximize control.
72  He in turn dismisses each of 
these non-economic, or what might more simply be seen as political, explanations.  
His alternative explanation is that cultural understandings of how markets function, or 
what he calls “market visions,” predispose Chinese policy makers to continually prop 
up large underperforming state owned enterprises (SOEs) by relying on bailouts from 
the financial sector.  He argues that most of the Chinese officials whom he has 
interviewed view the poor performance of some SOEs as a sign not of those firms’ 
failure to compete effectively in the market but instead reflects the flawed nature of 
                                                 
71 As with many corruption-based partial reform arguments, Steinfeld does not specify what a fully 
reformed financial market would look like in China.  He does however argue that state-owned banks 
over-supply credit to large state-owned enterprises and that state credit policy has led to over-
investment in real estate markets. 
72 These are all arguments that Pearson uses in one form or another and are all political arguments.  
Why Steinfeld, as a political scientist, is worried about providing an explanation that doesn’t violate the 
assumptions of economic rationality, is unclear. 
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 the market itself.  Rather than viewing the market as an instrument for selecting out 
uncompetitive firms, many Chinese officials hold that large firms underpin the market 
itself and if those firms are underperforming it reflects only that the market has failed 
to accurately assess the real value of these firms.  What is crucial here is that it is ideas 
about how the economy functions that shape the behavior of officials.  As Steinfeld 
puts it: “in the case of China today, virtually all citizens are believers in the market, 
but the question is what kind of market they actually believe in” (2004:653). 
It is his stress on market “beliefs” that truly distinguishes Steinfeld from the 
others in the partial reform camp.  Steinfeld notes in the abstract to his article 
 
that institutional change and resultant economic outcomes are driven less by 
contestation than by societally held assumptions regarding the nature of 
economic causation in market contexts. (Steinfeld 2004:643) 
 
Thus it is broadly shared understandings about the nature of markets, and, one would 
assume, the proper role of government in regulating those markets, that underpins 
China’s still-incomplete financial market reforms.  Steinfeld argues that such shared 
beliefs about cause-effect relationships in markets play an especially important role 
during times of uncertainty and/or complex change (Steinfeld 2004:644).  It is these 
shared understandings, what others might recognize more readily as cultural beliefs, 
which have led to partially-reformed financial markets in China during the uncertain 
years of the reform period.  As to where these understandings came from Steinfeld is 
silent and whether or not they are as widely held and uncontested as he leads us to 
believe are issues I will explore in more detail in the following chapter.
73  
                                                 
73 In yet another iteration of the partial reform argument Victor Shih (2007) directly contradicts 
Steinfeld’s ideational argument by claiming that stalled Chinese financial reform is the result of 
technocrats aiming to enhance their own power even if this results in unhealthy long-term public policy.  
As for Steinfeld, what is curious about his definition of a “market vision” is that he concedes that there 
is debate over economic policies in China. His point is that certain assumptions about how markets 
work, and presumably then the role of the state in governing markets, are so ingrained, so much a part 
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   The authors explored here offer a vision of the glass of Chinese reform as half 
empty at best.  For scholars like Huang, Lü and Pei, what drives this pessimism is a 
strong distaste for what is seen as pervasive official corruption and skewed systemic 
incentives.  But whether it is corruption or a pre-existing ideational/cultural 
framework that leads to suboptimal outcomes (at least identified as such by these 
scholars), what is sure is that for them China has not only not become a regulatory 
state, but it has also veered very far off of that trajectory.  Certainly one part of the 
explanation for why scholars like Yang Dali and Pei Minxin have such diametrically 
opposing views about the direction of Chinese state capacity, for instance, is that each 
is looking at a different part of the proverbial elephant, and in this case the elephant is 
Chinese regulatory reform.  Yang is mostly interested in formal, institutional change, 
from which he assumes regulatory performance will improve, whereas Pei burrows 
into the still very messy world of regulatory implementation without often stepping 
back to gauge long-term, relative changes in the overall regulatory system.  Both 
arguments prove, however, to be highly teleological: for advocates of China’s 
emerging regulatory state China is now firmly set along a path toward normal, good 
government whereas partial reformers see China as missing the route to true and 
proper reform and instead heading toward economic and political turmoil. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
of the culture as it were, that they are off the table in terms of debate. I find this to be highly 
problematic, especially as it applies to the Chinese case. By claiming that certain elements of the 
Chinese “market vision” are permanently in place, and that they are known to him, Steinfeld directs our 
attention away from those very elements (or ideas or visions) that may indeed not be so permanent or 
assumed. Ultimately, I do not disagree with Steinfeld that certain “ideas” may be deeply ingrained in 
Chinese ways of understanding the economy (or at least certain sectors like finance that are his 
specialty), but I argue that the realm of debate about how markets work and what the state’s role is in 
governing those markets is more open to change, debate and political contention that Steinfeld allows. I 
also argue that Steinfeld misses the more important, overarching, and ultimately more politically 
relevant and interesting “market vision,” which is that of “market order.” 
53 
 An Analysis of the Regulatory State Debate: Where Do We Go from Here? 
  In this literature review I have argued that recent scholarship about the 
emergence of a regulatory state in China has been a catalyst for a variety of critical 
responses.  What has emerged is an array of perspectives about how best to understand 
not only the nature of the relationship between the state and economy in China but 
also its general direction.  This distinction between the current status of state-economy 
relations and where they may be headed is key, for even though there are serious 
disagreements about whether China currently most closely resembles a regulatory 
state, a developmental state or a case of partial reform, most would agree that there is 
a wide range of governance challenges that China faces.  Despite this agreement, some 
would have us believe that the state is not up to the task of managing the myriad 
challenges it faces while others argue that it is already well on its way to doing so.  In 
Table 1-1 below I have attempted to summarize the main findings of the regulatory 
state debate so as to allow comparison across a number of key issue areas. 
Up until this point, I have mainly traced the debates between regulatory state 
scholars and their critics, allowing their arguments to speak for themselves and 
withholding my own critical judgments.  But here I want to make a final assessment of 
the debates and to set the stage for the remainder of the dissertation by offering my 
own alternative views on how best to make sense of certain under-studied and 
overlooked aspects of state-economy relations in China. 
First, the case for the emergence of a Chinese regulatory state provides a 
number of useful insights into the evolving relationship between the state and the 
economy in China.  Yang Dali provides a useful reference for the formal changes in 
regulatory institutions across a variety of sectors and at various levels of government.  
The fact that China is undergoing an important wave of institutional reform is 
certainly true; the passing of new legislation, the streamlining of existing bureaucra- 
54 
  
Table 1-1: Varieties of Chinese Political Economy 
Developmental State    Regulatory 
State  National Local 
Partial Reform 
Level of 
Analysis and 
Subject 
No clear 
preference; 
Includes 
national and 
local regulation 
of range of 
markets 
National-level, 
commanding 
heights sectors 
like industry and 
finance 
Local industrial 
promotion 
Mostly local 
corruption or 
national finance  
State and 
Market 
State is far-
sighted and 
benevolent and 
an increasingly 
objective and 
neutral 
observer; 
Frequent state 
intervention 
necessary to 
correct market 
failure 
State a strategic 
actor that 
intervenes in 
“market-
conforming” 
ways to promote 
industrial 
development 
Effective local 
state intervenes 
to promote 
targeted 
industrial 
development 
Corruption and/or 
wrong “market 
vision” leads to 
state incapacity; 
State failure 
outweighs market 
failure 
Form versus 
Content 
Focus on 
formal 
bureaucratic  
changes, often 
assume 
effective 
implementation 
Focus on formal 
commanding-
heights 
institutional 
change, often 
assume effective 
control and 
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 cies and the creation of new ones are certainly phenomena worthy of further study.  To 
the extent that such institutional transformation represents a new role for the Chinese 
state as the custodian of a largely market-based economy as opposed to an owner and 
producer in a planned economy, the regulatory state literature is on safe analytical 
ground.  Moreover, the continued interest in changes in state capacity that is often 
associated with the regulatory state literature most certainly constitutes a welcome 
research agenda. 
  But it is precisely on this question of state capacity that the regulatory state 
argument begins to falter.  For all of their emphasis on enhanced Chinese state 
capacity, there is a strange lack of follow-up by regulatory state scholars on the 
resulting on-the-ground changes that are presumed to follow from the modernization 
and rationalization of regulatory institutions.  In far too many instances one is struck 
by the fact that Yang Dali relies on the formal mouthpieces of the Party or of a given 
government agency to tell us how successful professionalization of the bureaucracy 
has been.  Just because the People’s Daily reports that a given regulatory reform has 
been a success does not mean one should immediately reject it as an outright 
falsehood, but one should view such statements with a healthy dose of skepticism by 
at least accounting for the political motives that may have prompted the issuing of 
such reports.  Yang’s strongest evidence of actual change (for Yang, this means 
“improvement”) in regulatory performance is drawn from the case of military 
divestiture and related improvements in smuggling in the wake of the East Asian 
Financial crisis, but he fails to follow up on most of his claims that formal institutional 
reforms translate into better governance.  Equally, Wang Shaoguang’s study on 
coalmine safety is a hard case to say the least: does the move from having the worst 
coalmine safety record anywhere in the world to having marginally improved safety 
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 standards but still the world’s most dangerous coalmines really mean China is now a 
regulatory state? 
Just as important, the regulatory state literature on China reviewed here fails to 
take the political processes of regulatory reform seriously and far too often fails to 
explicate the causal mechanisms at work.  Why are some regulatory institutions 
streamlined while others are expanded or given new guidelines?  Who stands to gain 
by such reforms and who to lose?  What are the material and ideational resources that 
different actors bring to bear in their attempts to impact the reform process? How do 
non-state actors impact these debates? If new regulatory standards are set, do they 
benefit certain state or private entities more than others?  These are all crucial 
questions of reform but ones that are almost completely ignored in the regulatory state 
literature.  It is as if regulatory reform is progressing along a path, and a path free of 
politics at that, toward some mythical land of modernity and good government.   
Aside from the inherent teleology of the Chinese regulatory state literature, and 
a problem associated with some of its critics as well, is the superficial nature of any 
comparisons that are made, if they are made at all.  The regulatory state literature, 
which primarily focuses on the advanced industrialized countries, often draws 
extended comparisons between different patterns of regulatory politics in different 
countries.  As I explained above, there is not simply one type of regulatory state, but 
many, with the American model different from the British model, which in turn is 
different from the German model, and so on.  So when China scholars speak of China 
becoming a regulatory state they basically do so only in reference to a single ideal type, 
failing to account for the possibility of different types of regulatory state with very 
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 different implications for how we understand China’s evolving state-economy 
relations.
74  
As Pearson has pointed out and as will become clearer in the next chapter, the 
idea that China is becoming a regulatory state (although one with uniquely Chinese 
characteristics) is in fact exactly the image that the Chinese Communist Party and 
central government authorities want to project.  This is not merely propaganda; as 
Yang’s work clearly shows the Chinese government is undertaking dramatic and 
large-scale efforts to create laws and regulations about how specific markets are to be 
governed and it has created new institutions or reformed existing ones in order to carry 
out these new rules.  But even though Chinese authorities frequently produce long lists 
of the successes connected to their efforts to create and enforce new rules, even they 
do not go as far as Yang and others in arguing that their efforts have resulted in the 
successful creation of a full-blown regulatory state.  In fact, quite the opposite is true.  
As I will demonstrate, one of the key governance strategies employed by both central 
and local government authorities is to point out all of the many problems with markets 
that remain to be solved.  As I argue in the next chapter, it is precisely by emphasizing 
its role in “rectifying” what are considered to be “disorderly” markets that the Party 
and specific bureaucratic entities often seek to legitimate their regulatory authority and 
actions.  The state’s emphasis on the importance of stability and market order serve to 
underline its vital, yet in many ways quite ambiguous, role in ensuring that stability 
and order.  So yes, China is involved in efforts to create a regulatory state, but we 
should not assume that the new rules or institutions that have been created as a result 
will in any clear or direct way line up with state-market interactions on the ground. 
                                                 
74 The most extreme example of oversimplifying the definition of a regulatory state comes in Wang 
Shaoguang’s extended footnote on the concept where he notes that the number of regulatory agencies in 
Latin America has expanded dramatically in recent years, providing evidence of emerging regulatory 
states there.  Certainly there is more to the concept that simply adding or subtracting regulatory 
institutions. 
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 The developmental state and partial reform critiques provide an important 
corrective to certain flaws in the regulatory state thesis.  Developmental state 
arguments of both the national and local variety take the political nature of regulatory 
reform more seriously.  They note that state authorities view certain markets and the 
revenue streams they provide to the state as strategic assets and then attempt to explain 
institutional reform as the outcome of a process of political contestation.  However, a 
flaw in the developmental state argument, especially as presented by Pearson here, is 
that it may vastly overestimate the state’s ability to exert the type of control over 
certain markets that it would like.  This has always been part of the critique of 
developmental states in general, and may be especially applicable to markets where 
China is a price taker, like global energy markets for instance.  In connection to this, 
the partial reform critics, especially by pointing out the potential for bureaucratic 
corruption, draw our analytical attention to the possibility that even in redesigned 
regulatory institutions the enforcement of new or existing regulations may deviate 
significantly from the formal rules.
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Economic Ideas, Market Order and Marginal Markets 
One of the most fruitful, yet underdeveloped aspects of the critique of the 
regulatory state argument is the focus on the importance of ideational frameworks and 
their impact on the politics of regulatory reform.  Pearson, Steinfeld and Kennedy all 
note the impact of ideas, or for them “normative preferences,” “metapreferences,” 
“market visions,” or “norms of competitions.”  This is a step in the right direction, 
                                                 
75 Here I refer to recent discussions, including those by Yang Dali (Tam and Yang 2005) about the 
newly reformed food safety and pharmaceutical bureaucracies where the new institutions have not only 
failed to solve key regulatory problems but have themselves added to those problems through what 
appears to be classic predatory behavior.  The question is, at what point does “corruption,” or simply 
the deviation from the rules by enforcement officials, promote outcomes that are acceptable politically, 
economically and socially and when does it produce results that are unacceptable? 
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 because as Mark Blyth (2002) has powerfully argued elsewhere, changes in economic 
ideas were at the core of the 20
th century’s major institutional reforms and we should 
expect nothing less in China as well.   
However, the treatment of ideas in the Chinese regulatory reform literature 
discussed above leaves much to be desired and much room for improvement.  One 
should not, as some of the works discussed above do, assume that ideas about how 
markets do or should operate are a given or part of a pre-existing and unchanging 
cultural construct.  Ideas about how markets operate are themselves both open to 
political contestation and are frequently powerful weapons used in the effort to reform 
regulatory institutions and in debates about how to govern the economy in general.  As 
such, we must place ideas about markets as objects of political study at the center of 
our understanding of state-economy relations in China.   
One of the most important ideas in contemporary Chinese debates about 
economic reform is that markets and competition should be “orderly” and that state 
regulation of markets should foster “stability.”  Pearson touches briefly on these issues, 
but her treatment is too cursory and confined to how ideas of “orderly competition” 
operate at the commanding heights level of the economy.  In the following chapter I 
provide an extended analysis of the importance of contestation over ideas about how 
the state should properly regulate the economy, how different ideas about “market 
order” are the focus of this contestation and how the state strategically highlights the 
ubiquity of “disorderly” markets (which in turn are part of a larger “neoliberal” 
menace) as a major cornerstone of its legitimation efforts. 
Beyond the role of ideas about markets, recent work by Margaret Pearson on 
“social regulation” and “low-tier” economic regulation point to the primary empirical 
case studies in this dissertation: state regulation of marginal markets.   Pearson (2006) 
has ventured into new territory in a conference paper where she argues that it is not 
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 just the commanding heights that matter for understanding Chinese political economy, 
but that a focus on different “tiers” is necessary.  Pearson argues that we should 
envision the Chinese economy as having three tiers: the first being the commanding 
heights that she has written about elsewhere, the middle tier she admits may only exist 
of one case, pillar industries like the automobile sector and the third, or low tier, is 
made up of private and collective firms that produce consumer goods.  She claims that 
government oversight of the low tier is about “social regulation” rather than 
“economic regulation,” which is the aim of governing the top and middle tiers.
76  For 
Pearson, social regulation differs from economic regulation because it is focused on 
the protection of consumers from market failure and on worker safety rather than 
merely on competition policy (2006:3-4).  Pearson has hit on something important by 
stressing the need to understand different levels and types of state-market regulation, 
but I take these recommendations in a different direction with a focus on “marginal 
markets.” 
Specifically, I will focus on the regulation of economically, legally and 
socially marginal markets in urban settings.  That such markets are marginal means 
that they exist in a physical and/or legal space that makes their daily existence highly 
tenuous and subject to discretionary official enforcement, not that they are in some 
sense of only minimal importance to the Chinese economy and as a source of 
livelihood for many Chinese citizens.  In fact, they are quite the opposite and the type 
of state regulatory behavior that helps create and maintain marginal markets may be 
much more ubiquitous that what we witness in state regulation of commanding heights 
sectors.  In the conclusion I will more fully explore the implications of this research 
for better understanding Chinese state capacity and its links to legitimacy.  
                                                 
76 Wang Shaoguang has also begun to speak of the Chinese state’s increasing focus on social versus 
economic regulation as part of the overall creation of a regulatory state (see comments by Wang in 
Hook 2007). 
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 Outline of the Study 
  This introductory chapter has focused on the question of how best to 
understand contemporary Chinese state-economy relations.  I have provided a 
comprehensive overview of the “regulatory state debate” that has emerged within the 
western literature on Chinese political economy.  The focus of this debate has been on 
how best to characterize the status and direction of the state’s efforts to regulate the 
economy and I have pointed to various holes in the debate that I seek to fill.  The rest 
of the dissertation is aimed at first, explaining the relevance of debates about and 
understanding of “market order” and then demonstrating how concerns about how 
disorderly markets lead into patterns of governance via the marginalization of certain 
markets and market activities. 
  Chapter two is a case study on the central role of the concept of “market order” 
in contemporary Chinese political economy.  Although the debates explored at the 
beginning of chapter two have important linkages to the regulatory state debate 
discussed in this introductory chapter, the debates and understandings of market order 
analyzed here are all directly aimed at influencing Chinese state policy.  The chapter 
begins with a discussion of the role of ideas in political economy.  I then proceed to 
explain how the idea of market order has come to serve as the focal point of 
contemporary debates in China about the proper role of the state in governing the 
economy.  I demonstrate how three different groups, neoliberals, the New Left and the 
State have come to understand the basis for and threats to market order.  While in 
some ways this discussion of Chinese intellectual and policy debates serves as a 
complement to the literature review I present in the introductory chapter, the ideas 
presented in chapter two are born out of a fundamentally different intent, which is to 
influence rather than merely describe Chinese state-economy relations.  This chapter 
concludes by highlighting how the state has begun to strategically criticize the idea of 
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 disorderly markets, or markets that in some way pose a threat to market order, as a 
method of legitimating state regulatory authority and behavior.   
  Chapter three is my case study of state-street vendor relations in the city of 
Nanjing.  I identify the City Appearance Administration (shirong) as the primary city 
bureau responsible for regulating street vendors.  I identify key patterns of interaction 
between the shirong and various types of Nanjing vendors, noting that the shirong 
provides privileged access to street vending licenses to laid-off city residents and 
denies licenses to migrant vendors.  I then explain the range enforcement policies 
adopted by the shirong toward unlicensed vendors, including not only migrants but 
also other city residents who choose not register.  I conclude by demonstrating that the 
often conflictive relationship between street vendors and the shirong has become an 
increasingly prominent topic among the Chinese public and press while the shirong 
itself has come under heavy criticism for its approach to regulating vendors. 
  In chapter four I extend my argument about street vendors to show that street 
vending is but one type of “marginal market.”  In this chapter I first look at cases from 
the last century of urbanization in China and the efforts of urban reformers to create 
institutions to regulate new market forces and social groups.  I then look briefly at 
state-street vendor relations in two other Chinese cities and then proceed to discuss a 
number of other marginal Chinese markets, including counterfeiting, prostitution, the 
recyclables trade and migrant garment manufacturing, among others.  I conclude with 
a discussion about the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of informality, which 
frequently serves as the framework for analyzing street vending in other parts of the 
world.  I show that informality is fundamentally flawed as a concept for understanding 
state regulatory behavior and instead offer my own concept of marginal markets as an 
alternative. 
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  Finally, in the concluding chapter I revisit the different intellectual approaches 
that I have explored in this introductory chapter in light of the theoretical and 
empirical arguments that I have made throughout the dissertation.  In particular, I 
explore more fully the implications my research presents for understandings about 
Chinese state capacity and legitimacy.  Lastly, I briefly discuss directions for future 
research prompted by the arguments and evidence presented in this dissertation. Chapter 2 
 
The Battle for Market Order: 
Neoliberals, The New Left and the State 
 
 
 
 
By gaining more organizational control, the central government is able to 
improve the implementation of laws and regulations and thus promote market 
order.  
(Yang Dali 2004b:100; my emphasis) 
 
 
If the regulatory state debate that I have just analyzed and critiqued takes place 
primarily in English-language publications and among scholars based in western 
academic and other research institutions, then its domestic Chinese equivalent is the 
intellectual and policy battle over “market order.”
1  Just as scholars writing for a 
primarily western academic audience maintain a wide range of perspectives about the 
status and direction of Chinese state-economy relations, so do mainland-based 
scholars, some of them tied to government think tanks, stake out a range of opposing 
positions about the state’s appropriate role in governing the economy.  At stake are no 
less than the great and enduring questions of political economy: What is the nature of 
market society and how should the state regulate China’s emergent market economy?  
Despite engaging in a heated and ongoing contest over some of the most fundamental 
and longstanding questions of political economy, questions that have and continue to 
                                                 
1 There are, however, significant exceptions in each case.  Important contributors to the regulatory state 
debate, including Wang Shaoguang and Zheng Yongnian, are based in Hong Kong and Singapore 
respectively.  Yang Dali also relocated from the University of Chicago to the University of Singapore.  
Also, the work of a number of participants in the Chinese market order debate has appeared in English 
translation (see, for example, Zhang 2001; Wang Hui 2003a and Wang Chaohua 2003).  In addition, 
key new left figures have recently received significant western press coverage (examples include 
Mishra 2006 and Hook 2007). 
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 be at the heart of political contention in developed and developing countries alike, the 
Chinese debate takes place within a specifically Chinese historical and political setting. 
In this chapter I argue that within China itself debates over fundamental 
questions about the nature of markets and the proper role of the government in 
regulating a market economy are all centered around one key concept.  Debate is 
based on different understandings of how to create and maintain “market order,” or, 
alternately and often more frequently, how to identify and deal with threats to market 
order.  I define market order as the balance between promoting market-driven 
economic development and ensuring stable economic and social outcomes.  In this 
chapter I will refer to the idea of market order in two ways.   
First, I have appropriated the term for my own analytical framework to argue 
that all of the viable ideas about how the state should regulate the economy in China 
accept that markets, rather than state planning or radical voluntarism, should be the 
basis for economic development.  However, it is common sense that such market-led 
development must ensure economic and social stability.
2  How to define stability and 
thus to identify threats to it are at the heart of China’s market order debate.  Here I use 
the concept of market order to frame the three key positions (neoliberal, New Left, and 
state) that I will outline below, arguing that each promotes a particular understanding 
of the proper relationship between the state and economy that will best facilitate 
economic development with stable outcomes.   
The second way I refer to the term is in the written or spoken use of the term, 
usually in Chinese (shichang zhixu or shichang jingji zhixu) but also in English, 
among a variety of different groups.  As I will demonstrate in the final section on state 
                                                 
2 Below I devote an entire section to the centrality of “stability” in contending Chinese ideas about how 
the state should govern the economy.  “Order” and “stability” are terms that predominate in thinking 
and writing about state-economy relations in China and in important ways are interchangeable.  Yet 
there is no reference in Chinese to “market stability,” only to “market order.”  
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 understandings of market order, the term has found its way into official use in a 
number of ways.  Moreover, it appears frequently in a variety of academic and 
journalistic writing about state regulation of the economy.  Importantly, both official 
government use of the term as well as academic and media use, correspond highly 
with concerns about regulation of the “disorderly” markets that are the focus of the 
following two chapters.
3   
  Focusing on market order as the focal point of ideational debate in China, this 
chapter will proceed as follows. To begin, I will specify my own understanding of 
what economic ideas are, how and why they are politically significant, and specifically 
how and why they are politically significant in the case of contemporary Chinese 
political economy.  In particular I will draw on the work of Blyth (1997, 2002, 2003a, 
2003b and 2007) and Hirschman (1986) to explore the politics of ideational 
contestation, especially as it relates to ideas about how the economy works. The rest of 
the chapter will then be devoted to analyzing the ideational battle over how to 
understand and promote market order in China. 
I begin with a discussion of why conceptions of stability and order are so 
fundamental to any viable economic ideas in China and explain why Friedrich Hayek 
is such a central figure in competing understandings of the basis of orderly market 
outcomes.  I then proceed to show how three different perspectives of market order 
have been promoted by neoliberals, the New Left, and the state.  Each presents its own 
                                                 
3 That the idea of market order, a term I had never heard of and suspect will sound unfamiliar to native 
English speakers reading about it here for the first time, might be important to understanding Chinese 
political economy came to me when in 2002 I first saw propaganda posters in Nanjing urging vigilance 
over “market economic order” (shichang jingji zhixu).  I then began to see the term used in newspaper 
and journal articles, government documents, on television programs and on signs posted in front of 
outdoor markets.  Later I saw it used in English academic writing about China (often in articles or 
books written by scholars who had grown up in China and for whom Chinese was their native language).  
See, for example, Wu Fulong (2002:1084) and Yang Dali (2004a and b), who devotes a section of 
chapter three of his Leviathan book to “The Quest for Market Order and the Remaking of the 
Regulatory Institutions.”  Only later did I learn that there was a specific bureaucratic entity under the 
State Council in charge of enforcing this thing called market order. 
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 contending vision of the nature of markets and the proper role of the government in 
regulating the market economy. In doing so, they not only offer distinct conceptions of 
how to create and maintain “market order,” but just as importantly, and often more 
clearly, they make distinct claims about what the threats to market order are and how 
those threats should be treated. 
In this chapter I will demonstrate that anyone wishing to understand 
contemporary Chinese state-economy relations who ignores ideational debates, and in 
particular debates about market order, does so at a significant cost.  I am not the first 
nor will I be the last to emphasize that “stability” is a central theme of contemporary 
Chinese politics.  However, observers of Chinese politics tend to equate threats to 
stability with protest movements, usually from laid off workers or peasants angered by 
venal officials, environmental degradation or any host of other reasons.
4  I do not wish 
to refute that such types of popular protest are of critical concern to Chinese officials 
at all levels of the Party and government, but in this chapter I will show that the 
politics of stability (here it might be helpful to think of market order as a sub-type of 
stability) are much more subtle and of much greater consequence than this simple 
equation would indicate.   
The ability to determine what constitutes a threat to stability in general, and to 
market order in particular, is a tremendous source of power.  I will show that very 
different neoliberal and New Left understandings of the main threats to market order 
contend for official influence and that official visions of market order are themselves 
closely tied to shoring up the legitimacy of the Party and the state’s role in governing 
the economy.  Finally, I will show that problems of disorderly or chaotic markets are 
                                                 
4 In a similar way, “policing” is argued to be primarily aimed at controlling the outbreak of such 
protests as well as other crimes.  However, just as stability cannot be simply equated with protest events, 
policing is as much about controlling markets as it is about controlling more typical, non-economic 
crimes.  For an example of the tendency to focus on protest movements and policing see Tanner (2004).   
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 often equated with unregulated, hidden or underground markets, which leads directly 
into my argument in the following chapter that such markets are frequently neither 
hidden nor unregulated.   
 
Ideas about Ideas 
As I note in the previous chapter, participants in the regulatory state debate pay 
very little attention to the various different ideas among Chinese scholars and officials 
about what the condition of state-economy relations is and where that relationship 
should go, let alone how these ideas may ultimately affect state efforts to regulate the 
economy.  Granted, scholars like Pearson and Steinfeld note that certain “norms” or 
“visions” have an impact on state regulatory patterns.  However, their treatment of 
ideas is inadequate because they fail to specify how, why and when ideas matter.  In 
addition, and here there is clear overlap with the first issue, scholars involved in the 
regulatory state debate largely fail to note the existence, let alone the importance, of 
the contest among Chinese intellectuals and policy makers to promote fundamentally 
different understandings of how the economy works and therefore how the state 
should regulate it.  Finally, even though some scholars pick up on the importance of 
ideas about “orderly competition” or stability more generally,
5 none sufficiently 
realize that the idea that underpins the great contest over how the state should regulate 
the economy in China is market order.  In what follows I will offer my own definition 
of economic ideas, explain how and when such ideas matter and then proceed to 
explain contestation over the focal idea of market order. 
  I define economic ideas as differentially shared mental frameworks of how the 
economy works.  These frameworks include descriptive and prescriptive elements. 
That is, economic ideas entail a combination of statements about how the economy 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Pearson (2005ba and 2007) and Kennedy (2002 and 2003). 
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 does work and how it should work.  Economic ideas are also inherently political in 
that they almost always imply judgments about government policy, policies that often 
have distributional consequences.  Here I will first discuss the recent rise of “ideas” in 
comparative and international political economy and talk in more detail about how and 
why ideas matter. 
For my understanding of how and why ideas matter I draw from Blyth’s (1997, 
2002, 2003a and 2007) extensive and ground-breaking work on the role of ideas in the 
study of comparative and international political economy.
6  Blyth points to some of 
the key reasons why economic ideas have important political effects.  Referring to the 
prescriptive element of economic ideas, Blyth notes that  
 
Economic ideas are scientific [what I term descriptive] and normative in so 
far as all positive statements about the causal order of the economy 
necessarily imply value trade-offs and hence different patterns of distribution. 
(Blyth 2002:11, fn 21)  
 
The “distributional non-neutrality” (Blyth 2007:3) of economic ideas means that they 
are inherently political.  Different economic ideas entail different distributional 
consequences and to the extent that one set of ideas comes to guide and justify the 
work of key institutions of economic regulation these distributional effects will have 
society-wide consequences.  Just as importantly, Blyth argues that economic ideas 
                                                 
6 For my own definition of economic ideas I draw on Blyth (2007), who in turn uses language similar to  
Denzau and North (1994), and his description of ideas as “shared mental models.”  Blyth’s own work 
focuses almost exclusively on the advanced industrialized countries and macro-economic policy ideas.  
The application of his “ideational” approach to political-economic phenomena in non-western and/or 
developing countries has been limited until now (for two exceptions see Hall 2003 and Chwieroth 
forthcoming).  Blyth’s own work is part of the literature on the political economy of comparative and 
international institutionalism.  Blyth argues that two distinct strains of institutional analysis, historical 
institutionalism and rational institutionalism, became interested in “ideas” in the 1980s and 90s (see 
especially Blyth 1997 and 2003a).  He argues that both historical and rational institutionalists began to 
reach for ideational arguments in order to compensate for gaps in their theories but Blyth argues that 
such ad hoc use of ideas misses the causal nature of ideas in constituting what agents interests are in the 
first place.   
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 have a political impact by making (collective) political action possible by framing a 
given phenomenon or set of phenomena as a particular type of problem that then 
necessitates a particular type of (government) solution (Blyth 2007:8).  Finally, going 
a step beyond these two key points, I would also argue that economic ideas play an 
important political role in state legitimation strategies, especially as they relate to 
perceptions about the state’s proper role in governing the economy. 
Looking toward the Chinese case and building on Blyth’s work I will show 
that ideational contestation in China is based on the differential identification of 
threats to market order (i.e. constituting different threats to market order as “the 
problem”), and once having identified the threat, advocating specific institutional 
arrangements and modes of regulation, both of which can be seen as types of what 
Blyth calls “intervention.”  In China, then, competition between different economic 
ideas is focused on the identification of the “true” threats to market order and the 
specification of policies and institutional frameworks to overcome these threats.  Not 
only do key institutional arrangements hang in the balance, but just as importantly for 
everyday politics is the question of how ideas impact what forms of government 
behavior constitute legitimate regulatory practice, and, in turn, what types of market 
behaviors are considered legitimate.  
I argue that China is currently in an “unsettled time” because different ideas 
about how the government should regulate the economy, based on what principles, 
and toward what ends, are vying for dominance and have a plausible expectation of 
succeeding.  Nothing shows this plausibility more clearly than when neoliberals and 
their counterparts on the New Left each accuse one another of pernicious influence on 
state policy (i.e. proponents of rival economic ideas accuse their rivals of already 
having succeeded in implementing their wrong-headed and harmful economic ideas).  
China is thus in the midst of a battle over what the relationship of the government to 
71 
 the economy should be, what principles should underscore regulatory policy and what 
the threats to development and stability actually are.  We do not have the advantage of 
hindsight to say which one of these sets of ideas will triumph or whether there will 
ever be a definitive victory by one or the other.  My focus here is thus not on what 
effect economic ideas did have over an event with a known outcome, like a crisis or a 
critical juncture, but on how these ideas are affecting policy, behavior and patterns of 
contestation today and will likely continue to shape state-economy relations into the 
near future. 
It is important to note that the very nature of markets and the proper way in 
which the state should regulate them has been debated across the globe for centuries.  
Many of the ideas embodied in the different economic ideas that we see contending 
for supremacy today in China reflect a range of long-standing ideational perspectives 
about the fundamental nature of markets and their impact on society and politics.  One 
of the most important historical perspectives on the different types of thinking about 
markets and their impact on society and politics is Albert Hirschman’s work on 
competing understandings of “market society” (Hirschman 1977, 1982 and 1986).  In 
his 1986 essay “Rival Views of Market Society,” Hirschman details the progression of 
different understandings of the role of markets on society from the 18
th century on, 
showing that at different times and places the market was argued to have a positive, 
moralizing effect on society, at others that it had a tendency toward self-destruction 
and at yet others that market forces were practically helpless in the face of 
overwhelming social and historical constraints.  Hirschman termed these, in turn, the 
“doux-commerce” thesis, the “self-destruction thesis” and the “feudal-shackles” 
thesis.
7   
                                                 
7 In addition Hirschman adds the “feudal-blessings” thesis, which is reserved for the special case of the 
United States to argue that it was exactly the lack of a feudal past that allowed markets to flourish and 
drive development there.   
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 In a very recent and compelling update to Hirschman’s work, Fourcade and 
Healy elaborate on Hirschman’s original typology and expand it in ways that have a 
direct bearing on the types of ideational debates that we see in China today.  Building 
on Hirschman’s original typology, Fourcade and Healy argue that there are three main 
frameworks that explain the nature of markets and their impact on society.  The first 
they dub the “liberal dream.”  The liberal dream perspective is largely driven by 
economists who emphasize the positive effects of markets on society and culture.  
This includes the classic Smithian liberal idea that the pursuit of individual interests 
leads to net positive social outcomes.  This idea ultimately is expanded to argue that 
markets are a source of both economic and political freedom.  As the authors sum up: 
in the market dream:  
 
market exchange [is] variously seen as a promoter of individual virtue and 
interpersonal  cooperation, the bulwark of personal liberty and political 
freedom, and the mechanism by which human creativity can be unleashed and 
its products made available to society at large. (Fourcade and Healy 2007:8) 
 
In opposition to the liberal dream is what the authors dub the “commodified 
nightmare” view.  This corresponds with Hirschman’s “self-destruction thesis,” which 
is maybe most famously articulated by Marx, but that also finds another prominent 
voice in Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.  At some basic level 
both Marx and Schumpeter argue that capitalism contains the seeds of its own demise.  
Aside from Marx and Schumpeter, a key element uniting the commodified nightmare 
critiques of the market is that they all argue that markets “undermine social relations, 
corrupt social life and corrode character” (Fourcade and Healy 2007:8).  In the 
following discussion of contemporary Chinese intellectual debates echoes of these 
long-standing traditions of thought about how markets affect social order will be heard 
frequently, if with distinctly Chinese variations. 
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 Before moving on to discuss the specifics of the Chinese market order debate, 
it is important to note that these more long-standing differences about how to 
understand market society were also played out throughout the 20
th century.   In a 
number of ways the contemporary Chinese market order debate echoes the debates 
surrounding large-scale state-economy restructuring in the West in the 1970s and 80s.  
In this second of what Blyth calls the 20
th century’s two “great transformations,” a 
range of neoliberal ideas came to predominate and were tied to the retrenchment of 
welfare state policies on both sides of the Atlantic (Blyth 2002).  China obviously also 
began a profound change at the end of 1970s, but this involved the transition from a 
Chinese version of socialism (a mix of planning and voluntarism) to a type of Chinese 
“market socialism.”
8  However, by the 1990s the debate in China had become more 
similar to the western debate of the 1970s and 80s because now the questions in China 
came to revolve around what kind of market economy China will have.  The Chinese 
market order debate is about whether China should adopt a “neoliberal” or 
“democratic-socialist”
9 model of market governance and how this choice of model 
will affect economic and social stability. 
 
Ideational Contention in Reform Era China 
China’s experiment in “Opening and Reform,” now almost 30 year long, has 
witnessed a staggering array of social, economic and political changes.  In an effort to 
both understand and influence these changes an array of what Blyth would call 
“ideational entrepreneurs” have presented a wide array of economic ideas, many of 
                                                 
8 The idea of market socialism is most often associated with experiments in market reform in socialist 
east Europe, including Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia.  For more on these east European cases see 
Aslund (1991) and Swain (1992); for comparisons between market socialism in east Europe and China 
see Nolan (1995 and 2004) and Csaba (2003). 
9 Note that challenging the Party’s monopoly on political authority is not part of either of these 
ostensibly “liberal” platforms. 
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 which bear an uncanny resemblance to the “liberal dream” and “commodified 
nightmare” visions of market society explained above.  Contemporary Chinese debates 
about the role of markets in society and the state’s proper role in governing those 
markets is then very much part of a longer, global tradition of competing political 
economic ideas.  Yet within China these ideas are framed by the country’s own 
immediate as well as more distant past and by the incorporation and transformation of 
strands of western thought.  What has emerged during this “unsettled time” is nothing 
less than a struggle over the future and very nature of China’s political, economic and 
social system: the battle over market order. 
 The great paradox of China’s post-1978 reforms is that the leadership’s 
embrace of markets as the engine of economic development and modernization has 
resulted in the proliferation of various real and perceived threats to social and political 
stability, threats that are themselves often directly associated with markets themselves.  
Promoting a market-led development model while at the same time promoting and 
maintaining social and political stability is thus the essence of market order.  But how 
market order is conceived, what the threats to it are and how to promote and maintain 
it are vigorously contested. This and the following two chapters explain the political 
economy of market order in China by first exploring the elite intellectual and policy 
debates about the ideas underscoring different conceptions of market order and then 
analyzing the connections between this broader ideational debate and “on-the-ground” 
struggles to regulate order over marginalized markets.   
The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows.  First I will provide a brief 
history of the contest among different economic ideas in the reform period from the 
beginning of reform in 1978 until the watershed year of 1992 when Deng Xiaoping 
called a halt to overt intra-party ideological debate.  In this section I place special 
emphasis on the increasing centrality of “stability” in all the different contending 
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 ideational frameworks.  I will then discuss in detail the three principle variations on 
the idea of market order in China, beginning with China’s neoliberals, then proceeding 
to the New Left and finally to an official idea of market order.  I will demonstrate that 
all three perspectives, despite having different descriptive and prescriptive elements, 
must and do conform to the key elements of market order.  They must do this by 
offering a plausible explanation of how their particular idea will lead to stable, orderly, 
market-driven growth.  In order to demonstrate the centrality of market order as the 
key idea around which China’s rival views of market society revolve, I will show that 
in contemporary Chinese ideational debates, the way one characterizes the work of 
Friedrich Hayek serves as a litmus test of one’s understanding of the basis for, and key 
threats to, market order.  Finally, I will argue that understandings and portrayals of 
market order, and the threats to market order, are crucial to the central leadership’s 
efforts to justify and articulate the Party and the state’s role and mission. 
For each perspective, I will explain 1) its key characteristics, including its core 
principles, 2) how it identifies the threats to and supports for market order and 3) its 
main proponents and institutions.  My aim here is to identify the core components of 
the competing ideas of market order.  I will note key variations within each competing 
perspective, but my aim is to capture the core ideas within each perspective in order to 
paint a clear contrast between their descriptive and prescriptive element 
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 On the Importance of Stability 
 
Stability overrides everything. 
—Deng Xiaoping to Richard Nixon, October 1989
10 
 
The concept of market order is underpinned by the widespread acceptance that 
China’s development path requires social stability.  Here I will explain why questions 
of “stability” are so paramount in contemporary Chinese political economy.  Since the 
late 1970s, China’s post-Mao leadership has fundamentally rejected Mao’s model of 
continual political struggle based on class contradictions and in its place has revived 
and reinvented the state’s historical focus on the maintenance of social stability as a 
fundamental basis of legitimacy.     
Underlying China’s economic reform has been the idea that market-led 
economic development can only thrive within a socially and politically stable 
environment.  The initial and immediate backdrop for understandings of stability, or 
more precisely for understandings of the chaotic antithesis of stability,
11 was the 
experience of the Cultural Revolution from which Deng Xiaoping and the country had 
just emerged.  China’s post-Mao development model was in part intended to re-orient 
the energies of the Chinese people away from destabilizing class conflict and toward 
market-based production and consumption.
12  At the same time, Deng emphasized that 
                                                 
10 Quoted in Fewsmith (2001:34). 
11 In general usage and especially in writing about a range of social problems, the Chinese terms for 
“stability” (wending) and “order” (zhixu) are often posed against their opposite, “chaos” (luan or 
hunluan).  That these concepts come in paired opposites does not mean that there is not room for 
infinite gradations between stability and chaos, or that there are actual states of perfect stability and 
order or chaos. But ideational entrepreneurs attached to the different economic ideas discussed here 
frequently resort to extremes of language when making their arguments. 
12 For more on Deng and the question of reform and stability in relation to the Cultural Revolution see 
Fewsmith (2001) and Saich (2001:chapters three and five).  And for more on Deng’s strategy of using 
market incentives, or more specifically new contractual obligations, to re-direct the Party’s self-
destructive mass mobilizing policing methods, see Dutton (2000 and 2005). 
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 China’s new development model necessitated a stable social and political environment 
in which to prosper.  As I will discuss below, the political necessity of maintaining 
stability became increasingly entrenched in China as a result of both the traumatic 
events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European 
socialism. 
No matter how much the need for social stability has become common sense in 
China, the very definition of stability itself,
13 the questions of what economic, social 
and political forces are seen as destabilizing and what proper remedies and institutions 
for maintaining stability are envisioned, have all been an evolving source of debate 
and political conflict.  Throughout the 1980s there were vigorous intellectual and elite 
political debates between “conservatives” and “reformers.”  Much of the official 
debate focused on the sources of stability, with Deng arguing that market-led 
economic development was the foundation for stability while his opponents on the left 
claimed that the roots of stability were to be found in a strong state role in promoting 
and supporting development and also in the continuing importance of Marxist 
ideology (Petracca and Mong 1990; Fewsmith 2001; Zheng 2004; Misra 2003).   
At the same time there was a spirited intellectual debate about the most 
appropriate type of political system for managing China’s rapidly-changing society 
and economy.  On the one hand liberal intellectuals, adherents of what came to be 
called the “New Enlightenment,” advocated increased economic and political 
                                                 
13 Very infrequently if ever is there a clear definition of stability or order in either the Chinese or 
English language literature.  In this sense it has become a common sense concept: you know it when 
you see it.  But more accurately, you know it when you see its opposite or can identify a threat to 
stability.  Indeed, destabilizing or disorderly events or influences are a constant theme in the Chinese 
and western media not to mention official Chinese government documents.  The western press and as 
well as many academics most clearly associate questions of stability with the outbreak of public protests, 
often by laid-off workers (see Hurst 2004 and 2005) or, increasingly, by environmental protesters (Jun 
Jing 2000). I would argue that it is much more fruitful to understand threats to stability and order as 
highly dependent on the ideas through which one understands how the economy does and is supposed 
to work.  For a thoughtful overview of various approaches to understanding questions of stability and 
instability in China see Shambaugh’s (2000) edited volume on the topic and for a more recent overview 
of potentially destabilizing social problems see Fewsmith (2004).  
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 liberalization (Wang Hui 2003a; Xu Jilin 2004).  On the other hand, more politically 
conservative advocates of “neo-authoritarianism” (xin quanwei zhuyi), citing what 
were perceived as the successful development models of the “Mini-Dragons” like 
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, stressed the need for a strong central government 
role in ensuring the success of market-based reforms in the face of stiff leftist 
resistance. (Petracca and Mong 1990; Sullivan 1994; Chen 1997; Fewsmith 2001).  
Neo-authoritarian thinking became closely associated with a number of advisers 
surrounding then-Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang and drew directly from Samuel 
Huntington’s 1968 Political Order in Changing Societies. Neo-authoritarian thinkers, 
with Shanghai scholar Xiao Gongqin key among them, were drawn to Huntington’s 
emphasis on the use of strong state power to implement economic reforms while 
maintaining social and political stability (Sullivan 1994).
14   
If questions of stability were an important part of official and academic debates 
about reform before 1989, they became, as the quote from Deng Xiaoping above 
attests, paramount thereafter.  Domestically, the politically tumultuous events of 
Tiananmen abruptly sidelined intellectuals who had continuously promoted New 
Enlightenment ideals and those in the official leadership who had been advocating or 
at least willing to entertain greater political change as a logical and desired companion 
of market liberalization.  Indeed, a conservative backlash against political liberalism 
involved a self-criticism of China’s own Enlightenment tradition.  This criticism stated 
that over the course of the 20
th century, with the events of Tiananmen being only the 
latest example, ostensibly democratic social movements in China inevitably tended 
toward radicalization and continuous revolution (Sullivan 1994; Chen Feng 1997; Gan 
Yang 甘阳 1998). Just as the neo-authoritarians of the late 1990s incorporated strands 
                                                 
14 For some of Xiao’s works on Chinese neo-authoritarianism and neo-conservatism see Xiao Gongqin 
萧功秦 (1994 and 1997).  For a collection of the original works on neo-authoritarianism see Liu Jun 刘
军 and Li Lin 李林, eds., 1989. 
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 of western political thought from Huntington, so too did the neo-conservatives of the 
early 1990s incorporate western thinking. This time the key figure was Edmund Burke, 
who some Chinese scholars relied upon to argue that Chinese intellectuals have been 
mistakenly enamored of a radical French, rather than a gradual English or American, 
model of political development and reform (Gan 2001).  Neo-conservatives argued 
that rapid economic growth in the 1980s had been partly responsible for a variety of 
social dislocations that had fed into the 1989 crisis, therefore the need for a strong 
government hand in maintaining order and stability was increasingly paramount. 
Finally, beginning in 1989 and continuing into the early 1990s, China was 
faced with the shocking demise of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  
Not only did socialist regimes fall, but in the post-socialist environment a number of 
countries also experienced inter-ethnic wars and the near collapse of the state itself.  
Given these domestic and international shocks that highlighted the real possibility of 
regime and/or state collapse, maintenance of stability was seen not only as a necessary 
precondition for economic growth, but indeed as foundational to the survival of China 
itself.
15  Thus by the early 1990s the imperative of central state and Party authorities to 
promote and maintain stability had deep roots beginning with a reaction to the Cultural 
Revolution, progressing through the 1989 domestic crisis as well as the subsequent 
collapse of international socialism, and ultimately exacerbated by a range of social 
problems that were born out of the reform process itself. 
However, at the same time that the center of intellectual opinion had taken a 
definitive move in the direction of conservatism, market-based reforms, after being 
                                                 
15 Misra (2003) notes that the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was of 
special concern to those on the left.  As I will explain later, the New Left continues to point to the 
collapse of socialist states elsewhere as an example of the dangers of market reform in general and of 
radical decentralization of political and economic authority in particular.  A concern for stability has 
continued to be of keen interest to a range of Chinese scholars (see He 1998 and 2003; and Zhao 
Dingxin 2001 for but a couple of key examples).  
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 given the clear go-ahead by Deng Xiaoping in 1992, continued ahead full-steam 
throughout the decade, culminating in China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.  
Moreover, at least in the field of economics, a range of liberal ideas, which provided 
theoretical and philosophical justification for deepening market reform and for 
restructuring the state’s role in promoting economic development and regulating the 
economy, were becoming increasingly dominant.  How can we make sense of these 
two seemingly contradictory trends: increasing political conservatism accompanied by 
renewed demands for a greater government role in managing the potentially 
destabilizing consequences of marketization on the one hand and the continuation and 
deepening of market-oriented reforms and the popularization of neoliberal economics 
on the other?  Below I will demonstrate that it is this very tension that animates 
contemporary Chinese ideational debates. 
 
Three Views of Market Order: Neoliberals, The New Left and the State 
  By the late 1990s concerns about how best to promote continued economic 
development and at the same time ensure stable social outcomes increased in intensity 
and became the focal point of a debate between two opposing intellectual groups: 
neoliberals and the New Left.  The proximate spark for this debate was an essay 
written by a Tsinghua University literary historian, Wang Hui, who was sharply 
critical of what he saw as the western, “neoliberal” modernization path that China had 
blindly embraced and that was, he argued, at the root of a range of destabilizing social 
problems.
16  Scholars critical of Wang’s portrayal of the nature of the problems China 
faced and how best to handle them soon launched counterattacks and thus began the 
great neoliberal – New Left battle of ideas.  In what follows I will first describe the 
core elements of the neoliberal and New Left ideational perspectives on market order 
                                                 
16 See Wang Hui 汪晖 1997. 
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 and then proceed to explain the official state perspective.  For both the neoliberal and 
New Left perspectives I will first provide an overview of the key figures and 
institutions associated with each and then explain their core principles and how they 
understand the basis of and main threats to market order. Within both the neoliberal 
and New Left sections I will emphasize how the way that each perspective responds to 
the work of Friedrich Hayek highlights their very different understandings of the 
underpinnings of market order. 
 
The Neoliberal Perspective: Libertarians in the People’s Republic? 
  The very labels of the two non-state perspectives in the larger debate about 
market order, neoliberals and New Left, carry a great deal of ideological baggage that 
make any kind of neutral description challenging from the outset.  Not just in China 
but in many global circles critical of the wide-ranging market reform policies that have 
spread across the industrialized and developing worlds since the 1970s, the term 
“neoliberal” has become synonymous with stalled economic growth, international 
financial crises, and the failure of governments to provide basic public goods and 
services.
17  Thus, in China, when New Left critics of neoliberal ideas and influence 
employ the term, is it not meant as a neutral marker but involves an implied critique.  
On the other hand, neoliberal critics of the New Left know full well that in reform era 
China, especially after 1992, “leftism” is at best associated with opposition to the 
general trend of Dengist market reforms and at worst with a reverence for the chaos of 
the Cultural Revolution era.  But despite these implied criticisms, I will continue to 
use the terms “neoliberal” and “New Left” to describe these two competing 
perspectives because, despite some efforts by participants in the debate to create 
                                                 
17 If during the mid 1990s the term neoliberalism was positively associated with the height of post-Cold 
War, end-of-history triumphalism, it has subsequently become a term of derision. 
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 alternative labels for their own viewpoints, these are the terms that those involved on 
each side use to refer to the other and that “third party” observers, both Chinese and 
non-Chinese, frequently use to evaluate the content and merits of the debate.   
  I will argue that China’s neoliberals, aside from being villainized by their New 
Left critics, are bound together by a common set of principles and similar 
understanding of the basis for and threats to market order.  Neoliberals profess a faith 
in markets, rather than the state, as the basis for economic growth.  They argue that 
markets, unburdened by the heavy “foot” of state intervention, are the basis for the 
universal values of freedom and justice.  They stress that the proper role of the state is 
to ensure property rights and are especially concerned with state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) reform and the value of competition in leading to efficient use of society’s 
resources.  They rely on classic western libertarian as well as more recent neo-
classical economic arguments that equate individual pursuit of self interest with the 
public good and frequently refer to the work of Friedrich Hayek as the basis for a 
critique of state planning and a market-based vision of “spontaneous order.” 
  Few, if any, of the Chinese scholars that I refer to here as neoliberals would 
necessarily refer to themselves with this term (in Chinese, xin ziyou zhuyi).  Instead, 
most would simply refer to themselves simply as liberals, or, among the many 
economists who are part of this perspective, they may refer to themselves as part of a 
neo-classical liberal, (xin gudian ziyou zhuyi) economic tradition.
18  Yet despite 
                                                 
18 Xin gudian ziyou zhuyi is also synonymous with the English term “libertarian.”  Note that in Chinese 
the term neoliberal (xin ziyou zhuyi) and “classical liberal,” or “libertarian” (xin gudian ziyou zhuyi 
literally: new classical liberal), are separated only by the word “classical.”  Thus, those identified 
derogatorily as neoliberals by their critics often view themselves as instead either part of a venerable, 
classic tradition of liberalism that involves a range of liberal economic but also social and political 
principles, or as part of a new and more specific New Classical tradition in economics.  As Liu Junning 
notes: Chinese liberals of today, unlike their counterparts of an earlier generation, prefer “liberalism of 
the unadulterated, classical variety” (2000:54).  For more on the distinction between different traditions 
within the discipline of western economics see Snowdon, et. al. (1994) and for a Chinese take on the 
different types of neoliberal economics see Yang Chunxue(杨春学 2006). 
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 variation in how they may refer to themselves or how their critics seek to name them, 
those that I refer to here as neoliberals have a common understanding that China’s 
development path must be based on the productive and liberating power of markets, 
that the state’s primary role in regulating the economy is to ensure and protect 
property rights, that arbitrary state restrictions and interference with markets are the 
source of instability and injustice (and therefore disorder), and that a properly 
regulated market economy will naturally produce its own orderly economic and social 
outcomes.  
  China’s neoliberals are thus a rather diverse group, including scholars drawn 
from a range of social science academic disciplines, foremost of which is economics 
but also including political scientists, historians as well as legal scholars.  Key among 
them include the economists Mao Yushi, Wang Dingding and Steven Cheung (Zhang 
Wuchang), the liberal historians Qin Hui and Zhu Xueqin and the outspoken political 
scientist Liu Junning.  Key neoliberal research institutes include The Unirule Institute 
of Economics (Tianze Jingji Yanjiusuo) and the China Center for Economic Research 
at Beijing University while important publications representing the neoliberal 
perspective include Caijing Magazine.  With this very brief introduction in mind, let 
me proceed to more fully explain the key principles of China’s neoliberals and their 
particular vision of market order.  I begin with an overview of the neoliberal embrace 
of the symbol and substance of Friedrich Hayek. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 Hayek as the Face of  Neoliberalism 
 
Liberal economists are “hot” in China. In particular, there has been a lot of 
attention focused on the ideas of the late Friedrich Hayek.  Even the prime 
minister [then Zhu Rongji] of China has Hayek’s works on his bookshelf. 
 
  —Liu Junning at the Cato Institute’s “Whither China” Conference, 1999 
 
  If there is one figure whose economic ideas should not be popular in the 
world’s last remaining major socialist power, it is Friedrich Hayek.  Hayek is arguably 
the most famous (or infamous) critic of government economic planning in general, and 
socialism in particular, of the last 100 years.  Yet as the quote above highlights, 
Hayek’s works are not only widely read in China, but in many circles extremely well 
received.  In fact, how one views Hayek and what he stands for is arguably one of the 
clearest litmus tests for where one stands in China’s ongoing contest of economic 
ideas.  Put simply, neoliberals often have high praise for Hayek while their New Left 
critics rarely miss an opportunity to denounce what they see as Hayek’s misguided and 
corrosive ideas.  Here I will use the popularity of Hayek among China’s neoliberals as 
an introduction to some of the core neoliberal ideas in China and also by way of 
explaining the particular neoliberal understanding of market order.  I will begin with a 
brief background on Hayek himself and then proceed to more fully explain the key 
components of neoliberal thinking in contemporary China. 
  I argue that Hayek’s popularity, and alternately, the animosity directed at him, 
are connected to his argument against economic planning and for a natural, or 
spontaneous, order that emerges from the unhindered operation of the “market 
mechanism.”  First, Hayek’s criticism of economic planning rests on his philosophy of 
knowledge.  Hayek argued that economic planners delude themselves when they 
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 believe they can abstract from the highly complex and specific knowledge possessed 
by individual economic agents.  In Hayek’s own words:  
 
The knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists 
in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of 
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate 
individuals posses. (Hayek 1945a:519) 
 
For Hayek the price mechanism, or what he referred to as the “telecommunications 
system,” in tandem with historically-derived and culturally-specific “rules of conduct” 
(what sociologists might call norms) provide the basis for a “spontaneous socio-
economic order.”
19  In Hayek’s view, the creation of a spontaneous order is 
characterized not so much by any tendency toward equilibrium as it is an organic and 
evolutionary process for providing signals to economic agents that then allow them to 
coordinate expectations.
20  Hayek always juxtaposed “spontaneous order” with what 
he called “constructivist” or planned order, by which he meant attempts by planners 
and economists to artificially coordinate the behavior of individual economic agents 
and entire economic systems. 
  While Hayek is known for his theoretical contributions to fields ranging from 
economics (for which he won the Nobel Prize in 1974) to philosophy to 
communications theory, he is equally or more famous for being a polemicist, a key 
representative of the Austrian school of economics, and icon of the anti-Keynsian, 
                                                 
19 For more specifically on Hayek’s theory of “spontaneous order” see Fleetwood (1995) and Petsoulas 
(2001). 
20 As Fleetwood stresses, for Hayek “The possibility of overall spontaneous order…can only arise 
because there is continual disorder; at every point in time, some agents are inevitably in a situation of 
disorder in the form of having disappointed expectations” (Fleetwood 2001:154).  That Hayek’s 
concept of spontaneous order rests on a recurrent disorder is ironic given Chinese neoliberals’ high 
regard for the stabilizing outcomes they attribute to Hayek’s theories.  Note that Schumpeter and his 
theory of “creative destruction” is not taken as the model of western economic thinking in China.  On 
the other hand, during his lifetime and afterward Schumpeter had a significant impact on Japanese 
thinking about the government and economy (see Bassino 1998). 
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 neoliberal revolution that many would argue is still at high tide.
21  The Road to 
Serfdom, published in 1945, has established Hayek as maybe the most famous 
intellectual critic of socialism and state planning.  At the time of its publication, 
Hayek’s critique of socialism was distinctly opposed to the prevailing intellectual 
orthodoxy given that the Keynesian revolution and “embedded liberalism” were in 
their ascendancy.
22  But with the inflationary crisis of the 1970s Hayek’s ideas came 
to play a central role in the “disembedding” of liberalism and the second “grea
transformation” of the century that led to the rise of neoliberal economics.
t 
                                                
23  Nowhere 
was this more clear than in Margaret Thatcher’s effusive praise for Hayek, who 
became the intellectual godfather of her reforms.
24  Equally or more interesting for the 
case of contemporary China was that Hayek proved to be extremely popular among 
socialist and post-socialist reformers in central and eastern Europe as well as the 
former Soviet Union.
25  
What then is Hayek’s appeal in China and why have he and his ideas come to 
serve as a principle point of contention in the ideational battle between Chinese 
neoliberals and New Leftists?  Moreover, how does the centrality of Hayek’s 
intellectual legacy and his value as a symbol help us better understand the core ideas 
of both China’s neoliberals and their New Left critics?  Hayek’s body of work and his 
prominence as a critic of socialist planning are of both symbolic and theoretical value 
to Chinese neoliberals.  First, Hayek, just as he did for leaders like Thatcher, Reagan 
 
21 To give but one example, the book and accompanying DVD series Commanding Heights argue that 
the two most important economic idea men of the 20
th century were John Maynard Keynes and 
Friedrich Hayek.  See Yergin and Stanislaw (1998) and The Commanding Heights (2002). 
22 For more on the legacy of The Road to Serfdom see McInnes (1998).  This is not to say that there 
were not those to whom Hayek’s ideas had a strong appeal.  For more on this see Blyth (2002:77, fn 97). 
23 Ironically, for all of Hayek’s notoriety as a neoliberal critic of socialism and central planning he was 
equally or more critical of many of the positivist neoliberal economics with which his name is today 
often associated.  For more on this see Caldwell (2004) and Boettke (2004).   
24 America’s Ronald Reagan and Germany’s Helmut Kohl were also notable fans of Hayek. 
25 Hayek was reportedly a popular figure among socialist reformers like the Czech Republic’s Vaclav 
Klaus, Poland’s Leszek Balcerovicz and Estonia’s Mart Laar.  See “F.A. von Hayek” (2004). 
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 and Kohl in their efforts to transform the relationship between the state in the 
economy in the 1970s and 80s, serves for many in China as a symbol of classical 
liberal ideals and the importance of market versus state-based developmental models.  
For those who feel that China’s experiment in socialism exposed an inherent tendency 
on the part of the state to increasingly plan more and more aspects of economic and 
social life,
 26 with often disastrous results, Hayek offers an off-the-shelf explanation 
and alternative set of ideas.  As Liu Junning, one prominent Chinese exponent of 
Hayek notes, Hayek “is probably more popular in China today than in the West” 
precisely because “he is the most anti-socialist economist around” (Liu 2000:49).   
As Wang Dingding, one of China’s leading scholars of Hayek commented,  
 
There is a tendency among many of those who write about Hayek to 
oversimplify his ideas and work.  I call this ‘simple neo-classical liberalism’ 
[jiandan gudian ziyou zhuyi].  Only a very few scholars really explore the 
details and complexity of Hayek’s thoughts about economic and political 
liberty.  I refer to this type of work as ‘sophisticated neo-classical liberalism’ 
[fuza gudian ziyou zhuyi]. (Interview BJ5, 11/21/04) 
 
As Wang explained, the former tend to invoke Hayek’s name simply for the soundbite 
value of criticizing state planning and to laud the merits of markets while the 
sophisticated libertarians delve more carefully into Hayek’s scholarship and legacy in 
order to draw more practical policy-oriented solutions from his work.  In a similar vein, 
it seems clear that neo-liberal scholars see in Hayek not merely his symbolic value as a 
critic of socialist economic planning and champion of liberalism but also someone 
                                                 
26 Mao Yushi in particular builds directly on Hayek when he argues that state efforts to compensate for 
various problems associated with free markets create an inertia that leads to an increasingly wider scope 
and scale of planning. Mao says, “There are a number of problems in a liberal economy like blind 
competition, swindling, income inequality and environmental pollution, so how can that not call for 
regulation?  The calls for proper regulation of the economy become increasingly intense.  These types 
of demands for economic regulation all too naturally turn into demands for the creation of a planned 
economy” (Mao Yushi 茅于轼 1996). 
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 whose scholarship provides a theoretical bridge between liberal market reform and 
social stability.  
One of the most important theoretical appeals of Hayek’s work for China’s 
neoliberals is his understanding of the market mechanism, which is based on his 
concept of “spontaneous order.”  Hayek’s work on the market mechanism and 
spontaneous order provides a built-in explanation for the connection between 
“organic” market function and economic and social stability.  An example in point is a 
lengthy article by Fudan University professor, Wei Sen, on the applicability of 
Hayek’s theory of spontaneous social order to China’s economic reform (Wei Sen 韦
森 2000).
27  Wei argues that “since the 1960s, in they eyes of many writers, Hayek’s 
‘spontaneous social order’ social theory has been considered his ‘core concept’” (Wei 
Sen 韦森 2000).  Wei argues that the concept of “spontaneous social order” goes a 
long way toward explaining the success of China’s reform policies.  Wei says,  
 
Since 1978 the impressive gains of China’s economic reforms, in particular the 
successes of China’s agricultural reforms at the outset of the reform period, can 
from a particular angle be understood in light of the logic of Hayek’s theory of 
‘spontaneous social order.’ (Wei Sen 韦森 2000) 
 
Wei says this is because reform decentralized political and economic authority and 
tapped into the power of market incentives (namely through the “contract 
responsibility system” in the countryside) and also because it allowed for piecemeal, 
organic change.   
                                                 
27 By the mid-1990s translations of some of Hayek’s key works, including The Road to Serfdom, The 
Iron Cage of Liberty, and Individualism and Economic Order, among others, had made a prominent 
appearance in bookstores and in university classrooms across the country (for more on the Hayek craze 
see McGurn 2000 and Liu 2000).  The Chinese language scholarship on Hayek is voluminous and 
growing.  For but one recent example that directly takes up the question of Hayek’s theories as they 
relate to the government’s role in regulating the economy see Zhao Hongyan 赵宏燕 and Xu Shiqian 许
诗倩 (2006). 
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 Wei relies on Hayekian ideas to critique not only the previous mode of state 
economic planning and to praise the power of market incentives, but he also 
juxtaposes China’s gradual reform with the “big bang” marketization that he claims 
was so destabilizing in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
28  Wei argues 
that 
 
The reason for the economic difficulties facing Russia and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States is that unlike China they did not base their reforms on 
the spontaneous [zifa] reform of their economic institutions, including in 
agriculture.  China’s reforms created a solid foundation and smooth road from 
which the rest of successful reforms have followed. (Wei Sen 韦森 2000) 
 
Thus, for Wei, not only is China’s contemporary reform process superior to China’s 
own previous socialist development model as well as other socialist reform 
experiences but because it is a “spontaneous market order” it is inherently more stable 
than alternative models. 
For China’s neoliberals, Hayek is a symbol of the inherent superiority of the 
market mechanism over state planning.  China’s own transition away from state 
planning and toward a greater reliance on markets as the engine of economic growth 
attests to the value of Hayek’s ideas.  Moreover, in comparison with other models of 
transition from economic planning to the market, China’s more gradual, “natural,” 
transition has proved to be more politically stable (i.e. the Party and the state apparatus 
have remained intact).  China’s reform and opening process thus attests to the fact that 
market reforms can and do produce a “spontaneous order.”   
                                                 
28 McInnes argues that followers of Hayek in other post-socialist settings have come to similar 
conclusions.  One Hungarian professor “says that in Hungary at least it is now understood that Hayek 
showed that capitalism must evolve slowly, organically; it cannot be bestowed by social engineers on 
societies suffering institutional void, insecure and uncertain property rights, and coordination failures” 
(McInnes 1998:60).  Wei Sen also published an article in the important, but now defunct, journal 
Strategy and Management, specifically applying Hayekian thought to the case of Eastern Europe’s 
transition from socialism (Wei Sen 韦森 2001). 
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 The Chinese Neoliberal Dream 
While Hayek as symbol and theoretical inspiration plays a central role in the 
creation and promotion of Chinese neoliberal ideas, the Chinese “neoliberal dream” 
involves more than just a Hayekian critique of planning and a belief in the 
spontaneous order created by markets.  China’s neoliberals espouse a core set of 
principles, key among them a particular vision of freedom, social justice and property 
rights.  They argue that these principles will best ensure fair competition and therefore 
provide efficient outcomes.  After further explaining these core neoliberal principles I 
will then show how they serve as the basis for a particular neoliberal understanding of 
the foundations of and key threats to market order in China. 
China’s neoliberals promote justice and freedom as their core principles and 
argue that a properly functioning market mechanism, which relies on a restricted role 
for the state, must provide the foundation for what they consider to be these universal 
values.  Citing the Maoist era as a period when the Party/state took it upon itself to 
interpret and implement a particular vision of the common good that often resulted in 
the unjust and arbitrary abuse of state power, neoliberals argue for restrictions on state 
authority.  They claim that a limited, rule-bound role for the state will allow for a more 
just and efficient distribution of society’s resources.  In response to critics who argue 
that markets are the source of injustice in contemporary China, Zhu Xueqin argues 
that it is the weakness, not the strength of markets that is the true source of injustice.  
He argues:   
 
On the surface it seems the market is unclean and sinful, when in reality it is 
the power structure behind it that is practicing deception.  In China 
today…social injustices…should be attributed more to the violent ‘foot’ [of 
the state state] than the dirty ‘hand’ [of the market]. (Zhu Xueqin 2003:107) 
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 Other scholars like Tsinghu Univiversity’s Qin Hui offer extensive defenses of liberal 
visions of social justice that emphasize that despite pronouncements of lofty intentions 
of ensuring equality and social justice, the state all too often abuses its power and 
creates unjust outcomes.  Qin Hui argues that “in history, ‘an ideal society with equal 
results’ has always been the prime intellectual stock-in-trade all kinds of leftists used 
to criticize the market economy” (Qin 2005:81; see also秦晖 2002).  Qin counters that 
the state should instead focus on what he calls “procedural justice” (guocheng 
gongzheng) or “equality at the starting point and equality in rules and regulations” 
rather than the “result equality” (jieguo pingdeng) sought by those on the left (Qin 
2005:94).
29    
Other neoliberal scholars, on the defensive against New Left critics, claim that 
their understanding of justice as based on well-functioning markets and upon 
constitutional limits on state authority is not a cover for the promotion of big business 
interests.  Rather, they argue that policies that support well-functioning markets are 
the most appropriate way to resolve a range of social problems that have accompanied 
reform.  As Liu Junning argues, neoliberals believe  
 
that nothing else can be more efficient than a market system in improving the 
resource allocation and economic efficiency. To establish an efficient market 
system is the only solution that can help the poor to improve their situation. 
(Liu Junning刘军宁 2000:51, quoted in Zheng 2004:167) 
 
So, far from being the intellectual handmaidens of large capitalist interests and their 
government cronies, neoliberals like Liu counter that he and his colleagues provide the 
                                                 
29 In this same article Qin, in part coming to the aid of fellow liberal He Qinglian (何清涟 1998), also 
makes an extended case for a defensible theory of social justice in Hayek’s thinking (Qin 2005:86-94 
and Qin Hui 秦晖 2002). 
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 ideational underpinning for policies that will have the widest positive effect on all 
levels of society. 
Despite their claims to be the most authentic representatives of universal 
liberal values and to have a more correct understanding of how to ensure justice than 
their critics, China’s neoliberals often emphasize liberal economic principles to the 
exclusion of certain liberal political principles.  That is, neoliberals tend to promote 
those liberal values that emphasize that market freedoms rely on a restricted role for 
the government in managing the economy while at the same time downplaying any 
demands for greater political freedoms such as open, competitive elections.  If the 
1980s “New Enlightenment” liberals were committed to dual-track economic and 
political liberalization (i.e. increasing marketization of the economy and pluralization 
of the political system), the neoliberals of the 1990s and 2000s are more narrowly 
focused on economic liberalization.  Neoliberal ideas on political reform tend to 
emphasize procedural issues regarding the rule of law and “constitutionalism” and aim 
to enhance procedural justice, but downplay any direct calls for political pluralization 
or the end of one-Party politics.
30   
One recent example of this neoliberal focus on legal and procedural reform is 
an essay by Beijing University political scientist Pan Wei.  In an article originally 
published in Chinese in 1999 and then reprinted again in English (Pan Wei潘维 1999 
and Pan 2003 and 2006) Pan argues for the creation of what he calls a “consultative 
rule of law regime” in China.
31  Pan argues that an emphasis on the creation of rule of 
law in China can serve as an effective substitute for democratic elections, noting that 
                                                 
30As I demonstrate in the following section on China’s New Left, neither end of the political spectrum 
makes any kind of direct call for regime change.  Clearly both sides understand the limits of pushing 
their liberal claims too far politically (i.e. calling for open political competition) and instead tend to 
limit themselves to various and competing liberal economic and social claims. 
31 In the conclusion I again take up Pan’s argument, detailing some of the key critiques of Pan’s claims 
and offering my own as well. 
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 “checks and balances belong to the domain of law, not electoral democracy” (Pan 
2006:11).  Again, emphasizing the importance of stability, Pan notes that his proposed 
consultative rule of law regime “provides for reliable social stability since the linkage 
between law and order has endured the test of time” (Pan 2006:37).  Thus, even when 
calling for a form of overt political and institutional reform, many core liberal ideas 
are employed to demonstrate their overall importance to preserving social, economic 
and political stability.       
More often, though, Chinese neoliberals confine themselves to narrower 
economic questions, in particular questions of SOE reforms and property rights reform 
more generally, and how the state should focus on coordination of the macroeconomy.  
A principle concern of Chinese neoliberals is the connection between property rights 
and reform of the state owned enterprise (SOE) sector.  As Liu Junning argues, 
“Chinese liberalism today gives special attention to property rights” and that “it is 
much easier for the Chinese people to understand the value of property rights and 
economic freedom than it is for them to penetrate the obscurity of…high-minded 
leftist ‘discourses’” (Liu 2000).  Neoliberals tend to argue that the state must 
guarantee clear property rights in order to facilitate the transition of SOEs from state 
control to some form of more market-based ownership and management structure.  As 
Zheng Yongnian notes, “Liberal economists claim that the difficulty of China’s 
economic reform lay in the fact that private property rights were not protected” and 
that “private property rights are a precondition to the emergence of entrepreneurs  and 
a sufficient and necessary condition for economic efficiency” (Zheng 2004:173).  
Thus the promotion and protection of private property rights as one of the most 
important, if not the most important, task of the state in China’s reformed economy is 
central to neoliberal arguments. 
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   In general neoliberals are supportive of enhanced decentralization of political 
and economic authority and responsibility.  It seems clear that rather than stressing 
individualism per se, they argue that overall order, stability and efficiency can derive 
from a source other than a state-controlled or mandated notion of equality or justice.
32  
In this light, one type of neoliberal argument is that restrictions on direct state 
management of the economy will allow for the growth of “civil society,” or at least of 
forms of organization that derive their effectiveness from more of a society-based 
rather than state-imposed form of authority.
33  Again, even when promoting the 
importance of a concept like civil society that is often seen by western scholars as 
foundational to the growth of a participatory, democratic political system, the 
importance of stability is at the forefront of neoliberal concerns.  As Zheng Yongnian 
argues, “For new liberals, the political significance of civil society lies in that it can 
help the state maintain social stability on one hand, and constrain state power on the 
other” (Zheng 2004:171-172). 
  The work of Zhao Shukai (赵树凯 2001) demonstrates one way of thinking 
about how “order” and stability can derive from non-state forms of social organization.  
Zhao emphasizes that, unlike much western writing about forms of “civil society” that 
are independent from and often challenge state authority,
34 the state must learn how to 
rely on non-state forms of social organization in order to better govern urban centers 
and incorporate migrants.  Zhao, a researcher at the State Council’s Development 
                                                 
32 Indeed neoliberals like Unirule’s Mao Yushi argue that economic liberalism is about social as well as 
individual “liberty.” Mao states that “Liberalism stresses social liberty precisely by protecting the 
freedoms of all individuals” (Mao Yushi 茅于轼 1996).  On the other hand, scholars like Liu Junning 
place the importance of individual as opposed to collective freedom at the forefront of their arguments.  
Liu argues that “The task of liberal intellectuals in China is to do everything in their power to make the 
case for individual freedom” (Liu 2000:56, my emphasis). 
33 For more on society-based solutions to questions of incorporating migrants into urban areas see Zhao 
Shukai赵树凯 (2001)  In the text below I offer a more complete account of Zhao’s argument. 
34 Margaret Pearson argues that “the term ‘civil society’ broadly conceived refers to bourgeois society 
of the sort that emerged in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Western Europe, in which social forces, 
economic and non-economic, act separately from and often against the state” (Pearson 1997:25). 
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 Research Center, while not mentioning Hayek by name, nevertheless draws directly on 
the language of “spontaneous order.”  In his article entitled “The Conflict of Social 
Orders and Governance Change,” Zhao (赵树凯 2001) argues that for the government 
to more effectively administer urban migrants it must rely on two complementary 
forms of order: “spontaneous order” (zifa de zhixu) and “governed order” (guanli de 
zhixu).
35  Zhao argues that when it comes to the regulation of migrants in urban 
centers, local officials too often rely on outdated forms of governance that were better 
suited to the planned economy than to a market economy.  Zhao notes that  
 
Urban Public Security Bureau officials prioritize guarding against [migrant] 
criminality.  This type of administrative management system has its roots in the 
era of the planned economy with its self-enclosed social structures…but during 
this time of heightened population mobility this form of management very 
obviously is not sufficient. (Zhao Shukai 赵树凯 2001:21-22)    
 
Zhao argues that too often local government bureaucracies charged with the 
management of migrants rely on the tactics of “governed order,” in which non-urban 
hukou holders are constantly kept on the margins of the city’s economic and social 
existence.  Zhao makes a case that too many of the tactics used to maintain this 
governed order have the potential to create social instability, especially in cases where 
local officials indiscriminately fine or are physically abusive toward migrants (Zhao 
Shukai赵树凯 2001:27).
36 
Zhao argues that while there must still be a place for governed, or state-
centered, order in which social stability has its roots in police and other local 
bureaucratic oversight, to promote fairness (gongzheng) and “free competition” (ziyou 
                                                 
35 These are Zhao’s, or maybe an editor’s, own translations, presented in the English abstract for his 
paper. 
36 Here Zhao makes direct reference to the physical abuse and unofficial fines imposed by “enforcement 
teams” like those that I describe in greater detail in chapter three (see Zhao Shukai赵树凯 2001:24-29).  
For an English language version of Zhao’s research on migrant criminality and state regulatory practice 
see Zhao (2000). 
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 jingzheng) officials must make room for and nurture spontaneous order.  By this he 
means that local officials, in their attempt to manage migrants and incorporate them 
into the local economy and society, should rely to a greater extent on the self-
organizational capacity of migrants.  Zhao says,  
 
I believe the key is to channel the migrants’ own strong demands and 
enthusiasm for order into the construction of a more comprehensive social 
stability.  From the regulatory point of view, it’s a question of how to turn 
negative control into positive participation. (Zhao Shukai 赵树凯 2001:5)  
 
Reliance on hierarchical and other authority arrangements that already exist within 
migrant communities, he argues, will not only foster the goodwill of migrants toward 
city officials but also be more effective in maintaining social stability.
37  So while 
Zhao does not see spontaneous order as deriving from markets per se, he nevertheless 
makes a clear case for the utility of non-state forms of order that should complement 
government imposed forms.  
  Ultimately, then, what is the neoliberal vision of market order? To answer this 
question let me ask two others: 1) what do neoliberals see as the supporting 
foundations of market order and 2) what do they see as the principle threats to it?  For 
China’s neoliberals, healthy markets, which rely on limited, rule-based government 
intervention in the economy, are the primary engine of economic growth and source of 
social justice and stability.  Many neoliberals agree that China is confronting a range 
of difficult social issues, including unemployment, urbanization and rural and urban 
property rights disputes as well as education and health care reform, among others, but 
for them the solution to these problems does not lie in greater government intervention 
in the economy, but instead in an enhanced role for markets and a problem-solving 
                                                 
37 Zhang (2001) provides an in-depth ethnographic account of how these two versions of “order” really 
were at odds in the management of Wenzhou migrants in Beiing’s Zhejiang Village. 
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 role for institutions and ideas that originate outside of the state.  For most neoliberals, 
the greatest threats to social stability and continued economic development stem from 
outdated and overly intrusive government intervention in the economy and, 
increasingly, from the New Left itself, which some neoliberals argue exacerbates 
social tensions through populist rhetoric and appeals to curtail market reform.
38 
Ultimately, then, for China’s neoliberals market order rests on the support and 
expansion of currently still weak, but naturally growth-producing and socially stable 
markets while at the same time limiting the scope of arbitrary and/or abusive state 
intervention in the economy. 
 
 
Debunking the Neoliberal Dream: The New Left Critique of Neoliberalism 
 
China’s problem is that our lives have been too closely controlled. We need 
more autonomous space. We can’t have our lives controlled by the market 
 
 –Wang Hui (Hook 2007:11-12) 
 
  If China’s neoliberals are concerned that too much of the wrong kind of 
government regulation of the economy is the key threat to market order, then their 
adversaries on the New Left make almost the opposite argument: too little state control 
over markets constitutes the main threat to market order in China.  For China’s New 
Left, neoliberal ideas underpin a social and economic system that has become highly 
inequitable, corrupt and ever-more unstable.  New Left intellectuals maintain that 
unconstrained and unregulated markets have laid waste to China’s social fabric as the 
state has retreated from its socialist ideals.  They claim China’s workers and peasants, 
                                                 
38 Chen Feng notes that “Concerns are already raised about the possible role of leftism in mobilizing the 
disgruntled segment of population who have strong grievances against economic polarization and 
rampant corruption” (Chen Feng 1999:448). 
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 the backbone of the post-1949 socialist paradigm, have borne the weight of China’s 
market reforms while capitalists and corrupt officials have colluded to manipulated 
reforms in their favor.  Moreover, for the New Left, neoliberalism poses a dual threat 
not only because of the domestic crises it has fostered but also because it serves the 
interests of global capitalism in general and of the United States in particular. 
If the term “neoliberal” is top-heavy with now largely negative connotations, 
towards which many on the New Left contribute, the term “New Left” is equally 
fraught with normative baggage.  To be on the “left” in China has meant many 
different things over the years, but what does it mean in the 21
st century?  The term 
New Left, also often used for negative effect by critics, serves as an umbrella concept 
to distinguish these critical socialists from the Old Left.  Depending on whom one asks, 
the Old Left might simply include those who disapprove of market reforms and 
advocate a much more prominent role for the state in economic planning, or given the 
official Dengist version of history, it could more damningly point to Cultural 
Revolution-era radical leftists who emphasize continual revolution as a necessary 
force behind social and political transformation.  Few if any on the New Left call for a 
return to state planning per se and certainly not for the self-destruction of the Party 
witnessed during the Cultural Revolution, but instead support a broadly market-based 
development strategy while advocating a greater state role in controlling markets so as 
to better ensure social justice and overall stability.  While some of those associated 
with the New Left, in particular Wang Hui, largely eschew the term and instead prefer 
the term “critical intellectuals” (Mishra 2006 and Hook 2007),
39 as with the term 
                                                 
39 Mishra (2006) cites Wang Hui’s thoughts on the New Left label: “Intellectuals reacted against 
‘leftism’ in the 80s, blaming it for all of China’s problems…and right-wing radicals use the words ‘New 
Left’ to discredit us, make us look like remnants from the Maoist days.”  Mishra also notes that Wang 
“doesn’t care to be identified with the radical intellectuals of the 60’s in America and Europe, to whom 
the term New Left was originally applied.”  Nevertheless, Wang has periodically published interviews 
and articles in the prominent English language journal New Left Review (see Wang Hui 2000 and 2006). 
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 “neoliberal” I will continue to use the New Left moniker because it is the term most 
often used by Chinese and non-Chinese participants in, and analysts of, the debate.   
  Who are the key figures and what are the key organizations and publications 
that comprise China’s New Left?  There has been a tendency to see the New Left as 
made up largely of scholars and intellectuals from the humanities disciplines, some of 
whom have studied in the West and who are heavily influenced by post-modernism.  
As Fewsmith argues,  
 
a number of young scholars, including Wang Hui, adopted a variety of 
postmodernist and critical methodologies by which they hope to move beyond 
the enlightenment critique of the previous decade.  In China, this group is 
usually referred to as the ‘New Left.’ (Fewsmith 2001:114) 
 
This understanding is not incorrect in identifying a key non-social science, post-
modern element within the New Left, but it is incomplete.  There are also a number of 
important New Left thinkers who come from a more positivist, social science 
tradition.
40   
Among those drawn from the humanities are Wang Hui, who is also probably 
the most well-known New Left thinker in both China and abroad, Gan Yang and 
Zhang Xudong, to mention only a few.  From the social sciences prominent names 
include Wang Shaoguang, Cui Zhiyuan, Zheng Yongnian and Hu Angang.  There are 
also some economists, who refer to themselves as “heterodox economists” (fei zhuliu 
jingji xuejia), like Han Deqiang and Zuo Dapei, who self-identify with the core 
principles and policy recommendations of the New Left.
41  Publications that have 
often served as a venue for publishing the writing of New Left scholars include Dushu 
                                                 
40 For a detailed analysis of the differences between New Left scholars from the humanities versus the 
social sciences see Xiao Gongqin (萧功秦 2003).  
41 For more on China’s heterodox economists see Mao Zengyu (毛增余 2004).  The Hong Kong based 
economist Larry Lang has also been very critical of China’s neoliberals and of SOE reform in particular, 
but he largely remains independent of New Left label. 
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 (Reading), where Wang Hui was an editor, as well as Tianya (Frontiers) and Ershiyi 
Shiji (Twenty-first Century), among others.
42  Finally, while there is no one central 
New Left research organization or think tank, Tsinghua University is home to a 
number of key New Left scholars like Wang Hui and Cui Zhiyuan, to name only a 
few.
43  Below I will show how strong reaction against Hayek’s popularity in China 
highlights some of the key New Left positions and will then proceed to more fully 
explain the key New Left principles as well as their understanding of the foundations 
of, and threats to, market order. 
 
Hayek: New Left Enemy Number One 
As much as Friedrich Hayek is the personification of the Chinese neoliberal 
dream, for the New Left he symbolizes the global dominance of neoliberalism and all 
that is wrong with the acceptance and implementation of neoliberal ideas in China.  
Hayek represents neoliberal faith in the efficacy of a market-led development strategy 
and in market-based solutions to economic and social problems that have followed in 
the wake of reform.  However, the majority of those on the New Left see Hayek as an 
anti-socialist ideologue and a symbol of misguided belief in the mystical power of the 
market that is at the heart of what they consider to be destructive and destabilizing 
neoliberal thinking.  Here I will demonstrate how criticism of Hayek and his 
popularity among Chinese neoliberals is central the New Left conceptions of market 
order.  I will then proceed to more fully explain the key principles of the Chinese New 
Left and their understanding of the key threats to and supports for market order.   
                                                 
42 It should be noted that while some of these journals are edited by New Left scholars, they frequently 
publish the work of their critics and thus serve as a forum for the type of ideational contention that is 
the focus of this chapter. For a more comprehensive listing of left-oriented publications see Misra 
(2003). 
43 Cui is associated with the National Conditions Research Group at Tsinghua, which is headed by Hu 
Angang.  For more on the changing role of research institutions and intellectuals in China in general 
and on the Tsinghua Research Group in particular, see Fewsmith (2003).   
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 New Left criticism of Hayek highlights a number of key New Left concerns.  For 
the New Left Hayek not only represents the specific dangers of Chinese neoliberalism 
but also the more general threat of global neoliberal “hegemony.”
44  A staple of New 
Left writing on neoliberalism is to criticize the pernicious impact of Hayek on Chinese 
thinking about the relationship between the state and economy.  In a critique of 
neoliberals and their devotion to Hayek, Wang Hui makes the following observation:  
 
A good many of our liberals represent a contemporary Chinese Right.  This is 
especially true of the economists who advocate privatization and 
marketization without any doubts or limits, without the slightest critical 
distance.  They have taken the idea from Hayek that the market is a 
spontaneous economic order.  In China, they maintain, marketization is the 
only route to prosperity and democracy—not that they care greatly whether 
there is a democracy or not, but it is required as a rhetorical add-on. (Wang 
Hui 2000:78) 
 
Here Wang seeks to associate Chinese neoliberal praise for Hayek with what he refers 
to as “market extremism” (shichang jiduan zhuyi) and a fundamental conservatism 
that belies neoliberal claims to be China’s only legitimate advocates of liberalism.   
Wang and others on the New Left emphasize that neoliberals, following Hayek, 
maintain an unhealthy and unrealistic vision of the market as the one institution 
capable of producing orderly economic growth.  New Left critics dismiss neoliberal 
faith in the organic ability of markets to produce stable and efficient outcomes as 
idealistic at best and at worst as a cynical justification for the domestic and foreign 
capitalist interests the neoliberals are seen to represent.  In the introduction to Wang 
Hui’s 2003 English language collection of essays Theodore Huters argues that  
 
                                                 
44 New Left critics, including Wang Hui, often refer to the threat posed by the neoliberal “hegemony.”  
Wang, for instance, has argued that “the fundamental existential character of the state…is now 
supplemented by the ideological hegemony of the market” (Wang Hui 2006:41).  Wang goes on to 
specify how this hegemony operates along three different dimensions globally and also specifically 
within China (Wang Hui 2006:41-43). 
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 What Wang Hui is actually saying, however, is this: the notion that China is 
heading toward an American—or ‘posthistorical’—future is precisely what has 
justified a series of moves creating social destabilization and injustice in 
Chinese society, and that some (sic) notion can only continue to do so.  The 
neoliberal end that justifies these unhappy means is, strictly speaking, utopian, 
in that it can never be brought into existence.  This, then, is the fundamental 
difference between Wang Hui and the neoliberals.  While his critics might 
accuse Wang of utopianism…the accusation of utopianism can be even more 
powerfully made against the neoliberal vision. (Wang Hui 2003:38)   
 
New Left intellectuals dispute neoliberal claims that, a la Hayek, markets are naturally 
self-regulating and produce a “spontaneous order” that mitigates against state 
intervention in the economy (Wang Hui 王晖 1997 and 2001; Wang Hui 2000 and 
2003; Wang Shaoguang 2001).  It is no accident that Wang Hui’s 2003 English 
language book is entitled China’s New Order.  Wang both seeks to emphasize the 
wrong-headed Hayekian understanding of “order” that he says predominates in China 
and also to challenge this view with his own version.   
The New Left objection to neoliberal faith in the spontaneous order of markets 
feeds into a broader criticism of neoliberal “worship” of markets and the “myth” of 
competition (Han Deqiang 韩德强 2000 and 2002; and Li Yunlei 李云雷 2006).  Gan 
Yang, in his assessment of the contributions of different New Left thinkers notes that 
Wang Shaoguang and Cui Zhiyuan in particular share the aim of “demystifying” the 
market (pochu “shichang shenhua”) in order to show how and why markets need to 
be “regulated and controlled” (tiaokong) by a strong state (Gan Yang 甘阳 2003:116-
117).   Much of the New Left agenda involves shining a bright light on the workings 
of the market and demonstrating that markets are more often than not a space for 
corruption and exploitation and generators of inequality.
45  Summarizing the New Left 
                                                 
45 See also Han Deqiang (韩德强 2000 and 2002) for an extensive New Left critique of “market 
mythology.”  On the cover of Han’s 2000 book, Collision: The Pitfalls of Globalization and China’s 
Realistic Choices, is a circle with a WTO symbol with a slash through it, below which is written 
“expose the myth of competition” and “do away with market worship.” 
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 agenda Wang Hui states that “Our primary aim is to deconstruct the illusion of neo-
liberalism in China” (Aiyar 2005). 
Certainly the visceral New Left antipathy toward Hayek is primarily aimed at 
exposing what those on the New Left see as the wrongheaded and dangerous faith that 
China’s neoliberals place in the market.  At the same time, the New Left’s criticism of 
Hayek and his neoliberal followers in China is part of a larger, global critique of 
neoliberal ideas and policy that they argue have dominated international political 
economy since the end of the 1970s.  As I will discuss below, there is a clear 
economic nationalist element of the New Left position that is highly suspect of 
western free market ideology and of globalization in general, but here I simply seek to 
point out that China’s New Left thinkers are part of a broader trend of criticism about 
neoliberalism in general and Hayek in particular.   
One of the clearest examples of this type of criticism comes from David 
Harvey, whose 2005 book, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, prominently displays the 
pictures of four key “neoliberal” world leaders: Augusto Pinochet, Margaret Thatcher, 
Ronald Reagan and Deng Xiaoping.  Harvey, arguing from a Marxist perspective, 
cites Hayek and the Mount Pelerin Society as the flag bearers of neoliberalism who 
were waiting in the wings during the period of “embedded liberalism” from the 1940s 
to the 1970s (Harvey 2005:19-20).
46  Harvey argues that neoliberalism was the 
preferred ideology that the “business class” used to regain the power that it had lost 
under the embedded liberal framework.  Neoliberalism soon came to define economic 
orthodoxy in such institutions as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and at the same time the business class created “neoliberal states” to support 
their preferred policies.  Harvey, citing the works of some key Chinese New Left 
                                                 
46 For more on the Polanyian perspective of “embedding” and “disembedding” liberalism in the 
1930s/40s and 1970s/80s, respectively, see Blyth (2002). 
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 thinkers like Wang Hui, argues that China, with a few peculiar quirks that he calls 
“neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics” (Harvey 2005:120), has followed in the 
footsteps of the global trend toward neoliberalism.
47  While many New Left thinkers 
in China eschew the kind of direct Marxist, class-based analysis like that employed by 
Harvey, they nonetheless echo his concern over the influence of Hayekian “free 
market fundamentalism” (Harvey 2005:29).
48 
 
New Left: Key Principles  
  If China’s neoliberals are primarily concerned with the economic freedoms and 
efficient outcomes that originate in a market mechanism unconstrained by what they 
view as misguided state intervention, their New Left critics claim that a strong state is 
necessary to do battle against the deleterious effects of unconstrained markets while at 
the same time ensuring social justice.  New Left intellectuals are drawn together by a 
mutual concern for the principles of social justice and equality and at the same they 
emphasize their own claim to the liberal values of freedom and democracy.  They 
juxtapose these principles against what they say are the neoliberal priorities of 
efficiency, the protection of private property and a fundamentally conservative 
understanding of the liberal tradition.  Intellectuals on the New Left also emphasize 
the virtues of a strong central state and worry about the negative effects of 
                                                 
47 Harvey’s argument that the trend toward global neoliberalism was the result of the concerted efforts 
of the business class in various countries to influence official state policy is strained at best in the 
Chinese case.  Even the strongest critics of Dengist reforms do not argue that reforms themselves were 
driven by some kind of pre-existing “business class.”  After all, the Chinese Communist Party has been 
the primary sponsor of the reforms and in many ways itself remains highly critical of “neoliberalism” 
per se, as I will discuss in the following section.  Even if, as surely is the case, Party officials in addition 
to their friends and relatives have often been most well positioned to reap substantial material benefits 
from reform, it makes little sense to categorize this group as a pre-existing business class that simply 
sought to “restore” its previous position. 
48 For his understanding of the Chinese case Harvey notes his reliance on the work of Hart-Landsberg 
and Burkett (2005).  There is also a substantial amount of western reporting that uses a critical 
perspective on “neoliberalism” to assess a range of China’s social problems (see, for instance, Petersen 
2003; Chen and Churchill 2005; and Kwong 2006).  
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 decentralization of political and economic authority.  They argue that a strong central 
state is necessary to rein in the destabilizing effects inherent in markets and to ensure 
equality and social justice.  Below I will more fully elaborate on the New Left 
argument for state capacity as a pillar of market order.  I will follow this up by asking: 
state capacity to do what? 
New Left concern with social justice and equality is usually particularly 
focused on the plight of “workers” and “peasants.”
 49 Of particular concern to the New 
Left is the way in which the Chinese state and Communist Party seem to have 
abandoned workers and peasants to the fate of the market without, in turn, creating 
pension, unemployment, health care and reeducation programs and policies to assist in 
the transition (Wang Shaoguang 2001; Wang Hui 2000 and 2003; Zheng 2004; Aiyar 
2006; Mishra 2006; Hook 2007).  While New Left scholars address a range of issues 
under the rubric of social justice, including those just mentioned and sometimes also 
including other social issues like environmental protection (Wen 2007), their 
understanding of social justice tends to focus on these two particular groups.  At the 
same time the New Left emphasizes the state’s failure to provide these groups with 
social benefits and not on their status as, say, participants in new, sometimes 
marginalized markets or as consumers.
50  These are issues I will address more 
thoroughly in the following two chapters.  
                                                 
49 In some important ways these categories are holdovers from a class-based system of social and 
political categorization and in reform era China it is not always clear how well these categories fit with 
social reality.  For instance, are rural hukou (residence permit) holders who have emigrated to the cities 
to be counted as peasants?  And are workers only those who do or used to work for mostly urban state-
owned factories?  The categories of worker and peasant are often used by the New Left for rhetorical 
purposes to refer to those who were supposed to be the primary benefactors of the socialist system and 
who, since reform, have largely been disenfranchised. 
50 Wang Hui even goes out of his way to disparage “consumer nationalists” (Mishra 2006).  Zhang 
Xudong (cited in Hook 2007) also claims a general New Left concern for the “underprivileged” but I 
would argue New Left understandings of who the falls into this category is highly constrained by their 
understanding of old class categories.   
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   Directly related to the issue of social justice, China’s New Left intellectuals are 
particularly concerned with questions of social and economic equality (Hu Angang 
2003; Hu Angang 胡鞍钢 2004; Xie Yue谢岳 2003; and Zuo Dapei左大培 2002).  In
particular they are concerned with the rise in inequality that has accompanied 
economic reforms.  In their book The Political Economy of Uneven Development, 
Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang argue that the central government must do more to 
reduce rising inequality among different regions of the country (Wang and Hu 2000).  
Other New Left work has also emphasized inequalities between rural and urban areas 
and among different social groups (Wang Shaoguang 2001; Zheng 2004; and Wang 
Hui 2003).  Some scholars focus on the role of the central government in establishing 
a more equitable mechanism for the collection and redistribution of tax revenues 
(Wang and Hu 2000 and 2001), while others stress the need for a more “democratic” 
way of reforming the ownership structure of state owned enterprises (Cui 2001 and 
Wang Hui 2003).
 
                                                
51  
Through their discussions of social justice in general and remedies for social 
and economic inequality in particular the New Left seeks to lay claim to the western 
liberal tradition that many of them feel has been hijacked by their neoliberal 
counterparts.  In place of neoliberal understandings of justice and freedom as rooted in 
the market, the New Left emphasizes their own understanding of the core liberal 
themes of “freedom” and “democracy.”  Core members of the New Left, such as 
Wang Hui, Cui Zhiyuan, Wang Shaoguang and Gan Yang, argue that neoliberals focus 
 
51 See also Fewsmith (2005) on Larry Lang and the managed buyout (MBO) debate of 2004 when Lang 
directly criticized a number of China’s most successful corporate heads for unfair acquisition of state 
assets. Lang, whose views would place him squarely in the category of New Left, was the panel chair 
for a paper I presented (Ferchen 2005) on the role of Hayek in contemporary Chinese intellectual 
debates and in the talk he gave directly before my own repeatedly pointed out the evils of Hayekian 
thinking among Chinese neoliberals.  
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 on a very narrow, indeed conservative, part of the liberal tradition.
52  Gan Yang, in 
particular, has written extensively about how the New Left understanding of freedom 
is closely aligned with what Isaiah Berlin refers to as “positive freedoms” versus the 
neoliberal emphasis on “negative freedoms” (Gan Yang甘阳 1998; Gan Yang 2001).  
Gan argues that “the current talk of negative freedom in China often means freedom 
from any economic regulation; however, those who advocate direct national elections 
and political democracy are seeking positive freedom” (Gan Yang 2001:98, fn. 1).  
Here, Gan is referring specifically to neoliberal arguments against state intervention in 
the economy to protect market freedoms as opposed to New Left emphasis on freedom 
for social and economic equality.   
Through his emphasis on “economic democracy,” Cui Zhiyuan of Tsinghua 
University has contributed another key element of the New Left claim to a more 
progressive form of liberalism.  Cui argues that China should focus on two different 
elements of economic democracy.  In the first, more macro-level claim, he emphasizes 
the need for an enhanced effort by government authorities to understand the needs of 
the people when designing economic institutions and regulations.
53  Here, Cui argues 
that  
From the macro perspective, “economic democracy” points to the modern 
democratic principle of ‘popular sovereignty’ and applies it to the economic 
realm.  This means taking into consideration the interests of the majority when 
designing and restructuring society’s economic institutions. (Cui Zhiyuan崔之
元 n.d.) 
                                                 
52 To emphasize this point, Wang Hui (2000) notes that “[i]n the mid-nineties, the group around Liu 
Junning publicly claimed that true liberalism is a form of conservatism, because of its belief in order” 
(84).  For a more thorough treatment of the inherently conservative nature of western liberal arguments 
about “order” see Zhu Demi (朱德米 2004).  
53 At some level this resonates with the Maoist era notion of the “mass line.”  Mao described the “mass 
line” thus: “In all practical work of our party, all correct leadership is necessarily ‘from the masses to 
the masses’. This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and 
concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the 
masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace then as their own” (In Saich 
2001:41).  Saich notes that “In theory, the ‘mass line’ is about consultation, education, persuasion and 
eliciting an enthusiastic response.  It is not, however, concerned with democracy” (Saich 2001:41). 
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 At the second, more micro-level, Cui focuses on the transfer of ownership of state-
owned enterprises where he stresses the need for a greater role for workers in 
structuring ownership changes and having a financial stake in the new enterprises or 
dividends from sales (Cui Zhiyuan崔之元 n.d.).
54  Cui, however, advocates going 
beyond European style social democracy when he argues that “We need more radical 
institutional innovations like Labor-Capital Partnership to make up for the deficiencies 
of conventional social-democratic policies” (Cui 2005).  Through his focus on 
economic democracy, Cui also seeks to expose the neoliberal emphasis on overly 
simplistic understandings of property rights by showing that there are more egalitarian 
ways in which state owned property can be restructured in terms of management and 
ownership (Cui 2001).
55   
Through its focus on positive freedoms and economic democracy, the New 
Left thus claims to be a “liberal new left” (Gan Yang甘阳 2003; Ren Ze 任赜 2003; 
and Wang Hui 2003:100).  Both of these elements of New Left liberalism rely on a 
strong central government to protect against the harmful effects of markets and are 
part of a more general effort by many on the New Left to position themselves as a type 
of social democratic movement.
56  Zhang Xudong, a New Left scholar based at New 
York University, has stated that the types of systems that might serve as positive 
examples for China include “a Scandinavian social model, the British welfare 
                                                 
54 For a more extensive treatment of different Chinese conceptions of economic democracy see Cui 
(2001:111-113).  For the perspective of a western scholar whose own work has touched on the Chinese 
case and who has participated in recent discussions about the role of economic democracy in a Chinese 
model of development, see Schweickart (2006).  See also Zheng (2004:183-184) for how the New Left 
links issues of economic democracy to a reevaluation of the Cultural Revolution. 
55 At the same time, Cui seeks to draw on a uniquely Chinese form of communitarianism (Zheng 
2004:182-83), especially when it comes to questions of rural reforms (Interview BJ23, 10/15/06). 
56 Li Xiaoke (李小科 1996) wants to make very clear the Chinese language distinction between “new 
liberals,” by which he basically means members of a western social democratic tradition and 
“neoliberals,” by which he means those who adhere to the Chinese neoliberal dream (Li wants the 
standardize the translation of “new liberal” to be xin ziyou zhuyi and “neoliberal” to be ‘xin’ zhiyou 
zhuyi).  He says there tends to be some confusion in Chinese translations of these terms, but when the 
term “xin ziyou zhuyi” is used in Chinese it almost without question refers to Hayekian-type classical 
economic liberal arguments.   
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 approach, or the U.S. model, the New Deal” (Hook 2007:11).
57  However, it should be 
clear that if the New Left sees certain components of western social democracy as a 
viable model for China’s future, there is also a conspicuous absence of certain 
elements of that model. 
If New Left understandings of positive freedoms and economic democracy 
correspond with a European form of social democracy, their faith in a strong central 
government under continued single party rule presents a clear and substantial 
departure from western conceptions of social democracy in particular and democracy 
more generally.  As Zhang Xudong argues,  
 
Democracy is not about procedure only…When you talk about democracy you 
have to talk about it in substantive terms like democratic distribution of wealth, 
or democratic distribution of social power…In China opponents of the new left 
tend to say, let’s have rule of law, let’s have elections, let’s play by the rules.  
That is a partial understanding of democracy. (Hook 2007:13) 
 
The periodic competition for political power embodied in competitive elections does 
not figure into New Left conceptions of social democracy.  From the perspective of 
any viable political theory or policy in the context of China’s one party system this 
focus on the substance rather than the procedural aspects of democracy is politically 
astute.  Yet for the leaders or citizens in any of the countries cited as positive examples 
of western social democracy, it is hardly conceivable that political competition (i.e. 
procedural democracy) could be removed from their model and still be considered 
“democratic.” 
 
 
                                                 
57 Note the similarity with regulatory state claims that lump together western regulatory regimes as 
embodying all that is positive without any mention of the important differences among the countries 
mentioned as examples. 
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 The New Left and Market Order 
 [T]he expansion of markets brought about social fragmentation and disorder. 
 –Wang Hui (2003: 118) 
 
  For the New Left, questions of orderly and stable social and economic 
outcomes are no less central than they are for neoliberals.  However, unlike neoliberals, 
for the New Left the primary threat to market order is “unregulated” and inherently 
destabilizing markets.  Therefore, for the New Left the key pillar of market order is a 
strong, far-sighted and benevolent state.  In practice this means support for central 
government authority to rein in a variety of harmful centrifugal forces.  Here I will 
first analyze what the New Left views as the key threats to market order and then 
based on this discussion proceed to describe New Left arguments about what policies 
and institutions are necessary to maintain market order. 
My previous discussion of the New Left’s passionate dislike of Hayek and the 
arguments made in support of Hayek by Chinese neoliberals foreshadows many but 
not all of what the New Left understands to be the key threats to market order in China.  
For the New Left, insufficient central government control over what are seen to be 
inherently unstable markets and the local officials who impede proper regulation, has 
bred a range of social problems that threaten market order.  For the New Left, not only 
has the state ceded too much ground to the “invisible hand” of the market through 
decentralization of economic and political authority and the abandonment of socialist 
welfare policies, but what role the state does play in governing markets tends to enrich 
corrupt officials and a rising business class while exacerbating social and economic 
inequality.  While most New Left scholars are concerned with the destabilizing 
outcomes of marketization, centrifugal forces in general and a retreat from egalitarian 
social policies, some are equally as concerned about the implications of China’s 
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 openness to international trade and investment and what this means for China’s 
position in the international arena and its ability to control its own economy.  
Ultimately, then, for the New Left the ideas and policies associated with neoliberalism 
itself, in both its domestic and international forms, are the key threats to China’s 
market order. 
China’s New Left believes that too little central government control and 
regulation of markets has been the root cause of a variety of social ills that threaten 
stability.  New Left scholars have little patience with neoliberal claims that rely on 
classic Smithian or neoliberal Hayekian claims that markets are naturally self-
correcting and tend toward a “spontaneous order.”
58  Wang Hui blames exactly this 
kind of thinking, espoused by what he calls “right wing radicals,” for a variety of 
socially destabilizing problems connected to “mass privatization” (Mishra 2006).  
Wang says,  
 
Beginning in the late 1990s, the neoliberals revised the radical political 
platform of the 1980s into a ‘movement for constitutional revision’ that 
focused on establishing the right to private property.  In effect, it sought to 
legitimate the irrational distribution of property through a legislative process, 
including the legitimization of illegal expropriation of public property. From 
this historical standpoint, the denial of social equality and democratic 
affiliations became inevitable. (Wang Hui 2003:80-81)   
 
New Left scholars see radical devolution of political and economic authority, and a 
faith that markets will provide for an entire range of goods and services that used to be 
within the purview of the state, as the principle threats of China’s neoliberal 
“orthodoxy.”  Rather than adopting the neoliberal view that markets are naturally self-
correcting, the New Left is highly skeptical of the so-called “invisible hand” and 
                                                 
58 As an alternative to neoliberal economists like Hayek and Friedman, both Wang Hui and Cui Zhiyuan 
proclaim an interest in the theory of the economist George Akerlof’s concept of the “lemon” to describe 
what they see as the systematic looting of the Chinese economy (see Pocha 2005).  For Akerlof’s 
classic account see Akerlof (1970). 
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 instead see market failure and social dislocation as the result of market competition as 
the norm.  Han Deqiang argues,  
 
Economic competition is fundamentally brutal and double-sided.  Huge 
corporations wipe out thousands of small and medium-size corporations.  But, 
today, Chinese economists and media try to make competition into something 
‘really good.’ (Tennenbaum 2000)   
 
Ultimately, the New Left maintains that the Chinese state has largely abandoned its 
role as the provider of key “social guarantees” to the whims of the market and the 
result has been increasing inequality, unemployment and social tensions.   
Scholars on the New Left are not only concerned with the domestic 
implications of unconstrained market forces but are equally worried by the threat 
posed by China’s openness to international trade, finance and investment.  As Zheng 
Yongnian notes, there are three interrelated components of what many on the New 
Left refer to as the key threats of globalization and western neoliberal hegemony 
(Zheng 2004:175).  First, some scholars express economic nationalist concerns.  These 
include a variety of arguments, including that China has been exposed to quickly and 
too broadly to international competition and must provide strategic protection to 
certain industries and that China relies too much on foreign investment and technology, 
which may harm domestic innovation.  Other types of economic nationalist arguments 
include fears of over dependence on foreign trade and concern that liberal investment 
and finance policies will expose the country to international financial crises (Han 
Deqiang 韩德强 2000 and 2002).  Zheng Yongnian describes New Left nationalist 
concerns about globalization in the following way: “Even though China can benefit 
from economic integration with other countries, China’s political independence and 
national security will be undermined” (Zheng 2004:175).   
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 In addition to these concerns about economic openness leading to competitive 
weaknesses, some on the New Left are also deeply concerned by how openness to 
international investment exacerbates the range of domestic problems that have already 
been unleashed as a result of domestic neoliberal ideas.  They worry that the Chinese 
state, in order to comply with international trade and investment commitments, has 
deepened the plight of farmers and workers and that rural-urban and regional 
inequalities have worsened due to Chinese state promotion of urban, coastal 
development that in part is aimed at facilitating international trade and investment 
(Fang Ning 房宁 1999; Zuo Dapei 左大培 2002).  As one New Left scholar remarked, 
“the globalization of the Chinese economy has led to the sacrifice of inland 
development and the enriching of the coastal provinces, all in the name of comparative 
advantage” (Interview BJ13, 8/12/05). 
Finally, many on the New left are concerned that China’s embrace of 
international trade, finance and investment has opened the door for western (especially 
American) neoliberal dominance.  They argue that by signing on to international 
economic treaties like the WTO China gives up important aspects of sovereignty and 
just as importantly that adoption of western neoliberal ideas diverts China from 
creating its own, unique path towards development.  As Wang Hui has noted, “We 
have to find an alternate way. This is the great mission of our generation” (Pocha 
2005).
 59  Ultimately, we must understand this New Left set of anti-globalization 
arguments as part of a larger concern that the state and the Party should under no 
circumstances abdicate authority in favor of destabilizing markets or under the 
                                                 
59 For more on the effects of global neoliberalism on other parts of the world see the chapters on Latin 
America and Russia in He Bingmeng何秉孟, ed., 2004.  Han Deqiang (2000) was one of the most 
vocal and prolific critics of China’s WTO accession and remains critical of the effects of globalization 
on China in general.  For more general English language overviews of the nationalist strain of thinking 
within the New Left see Fewsmith 2001, Chapter five and Zheng 2004:174-77). 
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 influence of western neoliberal policies that simply serve as a Trojan horse for foreign 
dominance. 
  If unconstrained and under-governed markets, both domestically and 
internationally, are the key threat to market order for the New Left, then the basis for 
building and maintaining market order is a strong central government that firmly 
controls markets in the name of the main principles outlined above.  For the New Left, 
a strong central government with high “state capacity” is the foundation upon which 
market order rests.  Wang argues that  
 
[T]he state should play an active role in China’s transition to a market 
economy.  This argument is built on three observations.  First, even in mature 
market economies, state interventions are indispensable for remedying market 
irrationalities and for organizing efficient markets.  Second, market institutions 
cannot be properly installed without the support of the state.  Especially if 
China is to establish a ‘socialist market economy,’ the state is obliged to 
mitigate the hardships and cruelties caused by transition to the market.  Third, 
as a giant country, China faces many development challenges that cannot be 
settled through voluntary transactions. (Wang Shaoguang 2001:123)   
 
Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang are two of the scholars most closely affiliated with 
arguments for the need to check centrifugal forces with strong central government 
action.  Wang and Hu have argued that fiscal reform was necessary if the state was 
going to have the ability to maintain control over economic and social policy in the 
provinces, and in particular if it was going to counter the increasing problem of 
regional inequalities (Wang and Hu 2000 and 2001).
60  Ultimately then, New Left 
scholars maintain that China must have a strong central government to maintain 
market order, which means the state must reduce social and economic inequality, 
                                                 
60 Wang is the premier theorist of state capacity in China (see Wang Shaoguang 王绍光 1991 and Wang 
Shaoguang 1995).  In fitting with his stance on the regulatory state, Wang stressed that “even more 
important than centralization of the state’s administrative capacities is the rationalization of 
administrative methods.  Only in this way will the state have the resources necessary to regulate the 
economy” (Interview HK7, 1/13/05). 
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 provide a range of public goods such as education and health care, reduce or eliminate 
corruption, regulate markets in a way that harnesses their productive capacity yet 
tames their destructive tendencies and finally establish a “fair and democratic world 
order” (Wang Hui 2003:130). 
 
Conclusion 
There is a key tension in New Left criticism of radical decentralization and 
“market fundamentalism.”  On the one hand, as the quote at the beginning of this 
section clearly demonstrates, scholars like Wang Hui decry what they call 
“deregulation” and the “withdrawal” of the state from basic market oversight and the 
provision of a range of public goods and welfare policies designed to maintain social 
and economic equality (Wang Hui 王晖 1997 and 2001; Wang Hui 2003).  As Wang 
Hui notes, “[t]he radicalization of the process of the devolution of political and 
economic power runs the risk of causing the state to completely lose its power to 
regulate, and consequent loss of the basic conditions underlying social guarantees 
(Wang Hui 2003:201-02, fn 34).
61  Yet at the same time that they claim that the local 
state has “lost its power to regulate,” the New Left decries local protectionism, 
corruption and lack of fairness in the SOE reform process resulting from “bureaucratic 
privatization” (Hu Angang 2003:223).
62   
There is an inconsistency here that is of major importance for this dissertation 
and that I will take up more fully in the following chapter.  That is, representatives of 
                                                 
61 Gan Yang likewise argues that one of the “negative liberties” emphasized by the neoliberals is 
“freedom from regulation” (Gan Yang 2001:98, fn 1). 
62 New Left scholars further argue that local government officials, often in collusion with business 
interests, corrupt the market.  On this, they seemingly should be in agreement with the neoliberals who 
also decry the lack of clear divisions between regulators and the regulated.  The key difference seems to 
be that the New Left looks to the Central government to provide solutions in the form of government 
social policies and restrictions on markets in general while neoliberals want a clearer specification and 
enforcement of the rules and regulations themselves, leaving distributive outcomes up to the results of 
“fair competition.” 
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 the state at the local level are the state.  They are certainly no less representatives of 
the state than the central state and party leadership and maybe more so because of their 
day-to-day interactions with Chinese citizens.  Moreover, local agents of the state are 
“regulating” an entire range of markets, including those that I refer to as marginal 
markets, in the sense that daily, in their capacity as agents of the state with vast leeway 
to interpret laws and regulations, they embody state policy and interact with a range of 
market actors.  Whether they do so in accordance with central government mandates is 
another question, but to argue that China has undergone a process of radical 
“deregulation” tells us too little about how to understand the fact that agents of the 
state are aware of and are involved in regular contact with exactly those markets that 
are supposedly unregulated.   
There is also an important tension at the center of New Left thinking about 
deregulation, a tension that I will show also pervades scholarship on marginal markets.  
On the one hand New Left scholars want to say that the state has both abandoned the 
Chinese people (in particular the workers and peasants) to the cruel vicissitudes of the 
market through its deregulatory practices and at the same time that a vast array of 
markets are poorly and unfairly regulated by the agents of the state.  That is, the state 
is accused at once of both failing to regulate markets and regulating them poorly.  For 
those on the New Left proper regulation relies on the central government to overcome 
protectionist and corrupt local officials who exacerbate the already destabilizing 
tendencies inherent in markets in order to ensure egalitarian and “democratic” 
outcomes.   
For the New Left, then, just as with proponents of the regulatory state, the act 
of “regulation” is equated with good governance while “deregulation” and “free 
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 markets” are associated with corruption, inequality and social injustice.
 63  Thus for 
both the New Left and regulatory state perspectives, “regulation” is ultimately an act, 
or a zone state-economy relations, that is apolitical by definition because to regulate is 
simply to govern the economy “correctly.”  It is clear that through their scholarship 
and public advocacy New Left thinkers seek to prompt the Chinese government to 
remember those social groups at the heart of Chinese revolution, namely peasants and 
workers.  At the same time they seek to provide both a rationale and guidance in how 
revitalized central state authority can be directed toward what they see as what should 
be the main motivational principles of social equality and justice.  The result is that a 
great deal of faith is placed in the central government to not only know what the 
“correct” principles are, but in its ability to put them into actual practice.  
 
 
The State: Neoliberalism and Other Dangers on the Road to a Chinese Model 
  Just as Chinese neoliberal and New Left intellectuals have very different 
conceptions of market order, including what the key threats to market order are and 
how best to maintain it, so too does the state.  For the purposes of discussion in this 
section I will largely treat “the state” as the central Party and government leadership, 
concentrating on the Hu/Wen leadership’s critique of neoliberalism and support for the 
                                                 
63 Wang Shaoguang, referencing Polanyi, notes approvingly that this is the beginning of a “re-
embedding” of social and economic policies (Hook 2007).  This emphasis on two types of government 
regulation, social and economic, recalls similar comments by Pearson and Yang Dali in the previous 
chapter.  Although there is some scholarship within regulatory economics that makes this distinction, as 
in others areas these scholars fail to cite it.  As a result, they all define the terms differently.  For 
Pearson and Yang the distinction between economic and social regulation seems to be one of scale and 
focus: economic regulation takes place at the commanding heights and focuses on producers (and 
regulation of competition) whereas social regulation takes place at what Pearson calls the “low tier” of 
the economy and is directed at consumers.  What Wang seems to mean by social regulation is is state 
action aimed at reducing economic and social inequalities and general efforts at improving health and 
education policies.  This distinction is underspecified.  Economic regulation has always had a social, 
and more importantly a political, dimension.   
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 idea of a “Beijing Consensus” or “Chinese Model.” I will then look in more detail at 
the State Council “small leading group” specifically created to deal with questions of 
market order.  Finally, I will argue that a state-backed rhetoric of “market order” 
pervades the public and private consciousness about the nature of markets and the role, 
indeed necessity, of the state and Party in maintaining market order.  Ultimately, 
however, there is an ironic tension involved when the state, and state-backed media, 
consistently point out pervasive threats to, and problems with, market order.  This is 
because once such threats have been highlighted, not only might this establish a 
rational for a strong state role in “rectifying” these disorderly markets, but a public 
consistently exposed to such constant reminders of market disorder might reasonably 
begin to question how such chaos persists if the state is actively remedying the 
situation.   
 
Official Critique of Neoliberalism 
  The Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao leadership team that took over from Jiang Zemin 
and Zhu Rongji in late 2003 and early 2004 has made a number of policy changes, at 
least rhetorically, that closely correspond with certain concerns of the New Left.  At 
the most basic level, the current leadership has been critical of China’s narrow focus 
on development as primarily a function of GDP growth rates.  They insist that the 
definition and understanding of development must be broadened to include a variety 
of social factors and promote the idea that a “harmonious society” and “scientific 
development” must be built on a broad set of social as well as economic 
foundations.
64  One of the key components in this shift has been a public critique of 
                                                 
64 These twin concepts were enshrined as the official centerpieces of the Hu/Wen leadership team at the 
17
th Party Congress held in October of 2007.  See Hu Jintao’s official report from the Party Congress 
(Hu Jintao 2007). 
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 “neoliberalism” and a corresponding support for the idea of a Beijing Consensus, or a 
China Model, in its place. 
rict 
                                                
  The official critique of neoliberalism got its start with a Study Group on 
Neoliberalism created at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 2003 
(Fewsmith 2005:2).  In the summer of 2004 the Study Group’s findings appeared in an 
edited book entitled Analyses of Neoliberalism.  Later in 2004, key members of the 
CASS research group as well as scholars from a number of major universities 
published a high profile Guangming Daily article, provocatively entitled “Be on Guard 
Against the Ideological Trend of Neoliberalism” (Li Ruiying 李瑞英 2004b).
65  Here I 
will focus on this article and select chapters from the 2004 book to relate the basic 
points of the neoliberal critique.   
There is ample evidence that the work of this Study Group and the subsequent 
publication of their findings reflect an official position of the current leadership team.  
As Fewsmith (2005:2-3) clearly shows, at the launch of the CASS book publication 
and in a related article (Li Ruiying 李瑞英 2004a), members of the research team 
clearly pointed out that their critique of neoliberalism was sponsored by the “Party 
center,” including support from key Party think tanks like the Central Party School (Li 
Ruiying 李瑞英 2004a).
66  As the title of another article critical of neoliberal ideas 
and policies clearly states: “The Party center explicitly wants to criticize and rest
neoliberalism” (Fewsmith 2005:8, fn 6).  Finally, one of the project participants, 
Cheng Enfu, in a later interview in the official People’s Daily also notes that “the 
 
65 By chance this particular article was published the same day that I met with a prominent neoliberal 
economist who handed it to me in disgust noting that it was an indication of the beginning of a difficult 
period for him and like-minded scholars (Interview BJ3, 11/10/04). 
66 Fewsmith also notes that an array of Party and government officials attended the book launch.  For 
more on the Central Party School as one of the key state think tanks see Fewsmith (2003) and for more 
on the evolution of the School’s overall role within the Party see Wibowo and Fook (2006). 
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 Central Leadership’s proposal to research and criticize Neo-Liberalism is correct” 
(“The ‘Washington Consensus’” 2005).
67   
What, then, is the content of this officially-sponsored critique of neoliberalism?  
In many ways the state attack on neoliberalism echoes New Left critiques of 
neoliberalism, but in other ways manifests key differences.  As with the New Left, the 
statist critique sees Hayek (in addition to thinkers like Milton Friedman and Karl 
Popper) and his belief in the self-regulating (ziyou tiaojie) nature of markets as the 
symbol of a global neoliberal movement.  Scholars in the Guangming Daily article 
argue that 
 
from the perspective of economic theory [neoliberalsim] emphasizes 
liberalization, privatization and marketization; from a political perspective it 
emphasizes three ‘negatives’: public ownership, socialism, and state 
intervention; from a strategic and policy point of view it strongly supports 
superpower-led economic, political and cultural globalization, namely global 
capitalism. (Li Ruiying 李瑞英 2004b)
68   
 
As with the New Left critique, the CASS research team and their collaborators 
emphasize the international dimensions of neoliberalism, but with a more class-based 
type of analysis and even harsher condemnation of neoliberalism as an ideological tool 
of American power and “monopoly capitalism” (Wang Liqiang 王立强 2004).  
According to one of the scholars interviewed for the Guangming Daily article, Yang 
Bin (杨斌),  
 
America seeks global hegemony through its shady promotion of ‘soft warfare’ 
in the ideological, political-economic, and cultural spheres.  At the core [of this 
                                                 
67 Criticism of neoliberalism in the Chinese press and academic journals is now widespread.  For two 
examples aimed at the pernicious effect of neoliberal thought on university students and military 
academy students, respectively, see Liu Lihua (刘利华 2006) and Xiao Hao (肖浩 2006). 
68 Cheng Enfu offers a slight variation on this list of attributes: neoliberalism is for “deregulation,” 
“market fundamentalism,” privatization, global liberalization and individual welfare and opposed to 
“government interference” in the economy and state-provided welfare (“The ‘Washington Consensus’” 
2005). 
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 effort] is the promotion of neoliberal ideology, the tool which it uses to assault 
socialist and Third World countries. (Li Ruiying 李瑞英 2004b)   
 
According to the authors, the core of neoliberal thought is captured by the Washington 
Consensus, the effects of which have been globally disastrous.  The idea of a 
“Washington Consensus” is associated with a paper written by John Williamson (1990) 
of the Institute for International Economics in which he detailed ten economic policies 
that Latin American countries had begun to pursue more or less in common in order to 
recover from the debt crisis of the 1980s.
69  In many ways the Washington Consensus 
has now become synonymous with neoliberalism. 
The 2004 CASS book includes sections devoted to detailing the effects of the 
Washington Consensus and neoliberalism on Latin America and Russia.  Echoing the 
New Left critique, the officially sponsored judgment of neoliberalism stresses the 
chronic problems of income inequality, state weakness and threat of financial 
destabilization that have resulted from capital account liberalization in a number of 
developing and post-socialist countries.  By means of a warning against these 
particular evils of neoliberalism the term “Latin Americanization” (lameihua) has 
increasingly appeared in Chinese media and academic writing.
 70  Key is that the 
United States, through the Washington Consensus and control over the IMF and 
                                                 
69 Williamson’s original ten points were as follows: fiscal discipline, reordering of public expenditure 
priorities, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, foreign 
direct investment liberalization, privatization, deregulation of market entry and exit barriers (here he 
stresses that this never meant the elimination of “safety or environmental regulations,” and property 
rights (see Williamson 2003:10-11).  As Williamson later acknowledged (2003), there were certain 
components of the Washington Consensus that were disputed (including the desirability of market-
determined as opposed to fixed exchanged rate policy).  Williamson is critical of how opponents of 
certain or all aspects of the Washington Consensus willfully misrepresented his original arguments in 
order to bolster their anti-globalization agenda.  He notes that under the George W. Bush administration 
the correspondence between official US policy and the policies of the international financial institutions 
is far from complete and has since revised his own viewpoints about the reform package presented in 
his original 1990 essay (see Williamson 2003 and Kuczynski and Williamson 2003).  
70 See, for example, Zheng Bingwen 郑秉文 2004; Zheng Jianghuai 郑江淮 2006 and Ma Sai 马赛 
2006.  Western China scholars have also noted the possibility that China may be becoming “Latin 
Americanized” (see Gilboy and Heginbotham 2004). 
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 World Bank, forced neoliberal policies on the countries that adopted them.  These 
destructive policies included privatization of state-owned enterprises, increased 
openness to trade and finance, increased price flexibility domestically, all of which led 
to increases in corruption and inequality, decreases in state capacity and ultimately to 
financial crises.
71  According to one of the authors in the anti-neoliberalism edited 
volume, Yang Bin, “Twenty years after its rise to popularity, neoliberalism has created 
increasingly disastrous economic and social results; across the world it has resulted in 
increasingly more protests and boycotts (Yang Bin 杨斌 2004:86).  In fact, even worse 
than its role in causing Russia’s financial crisis, and indeed preceding it, was 
neoliberalism’s role as the root cause of the collapse of Russian socialism itself (Li 
Ruiying 李瑞英 2004b).
72 
In order to combat the pernicious global effects of neoliberalism, the authors of 
the Guangming Daily article argue that China must be on guard against the “socialist 
market economy” mutating into a “capitalist market economy” (Li Ruiying 李瑞英 
2004b).  In order to do so, the state must take a clear and leading role in controlling 
the destabilizing effects of markets and at the same time China must seek to create its 
own model of development that does not blindly follow either western or other Asian 
(e.g. Japanese) models of development.  Just such a formulation came pre-packaged in 
the form of “the Beijing Consensus.”  
 
Is There an Alternative?: The Beijing Consensus or Chinese Model 
The centrally-sponsored critique of neoliberalism just reviewed offers very 
little in the way of alternatives.  Much of the argument rests on negative examples 
compiled from Latin America and the former Soviet Union.  The official neoliberal 
                                                 
71 For the Argentine case see Fang Ning 房宁 (2004) and on Russia see Zhang Shuhua 张树华 (2004). 
72 Three full chapters of the CASS book are dedicated to demonstrating the corrosive effects of Russia’s 
adoption of neoliberal policies. See Tian (田 2004), Zhang (张 2004) and Qi (亓 2004). 
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 critique does, however, briefly mention the example of Latin American countries 
coming together to form what the authors refer to as “the Santiago Consensus.”  The 
Santiago Consensus stressed the social dimensions of development and, importantly 
for the Chinese, “social stability” (Li Ruiying 李瑞英 2004b).  That such principles 
sound similar to those espoused by the Hu/Wen leadership and to the broader 
promotion of what has alternately come to be known as the Beijing Consensus, or the 
Chinese Model, is no coincidence.  Here I will elaborate more fully on what 
proponents of a Beijing Consensus, or more recently the Chinese Model, mean by the 
term and how it fits with an official understanding of market order.  Ultimately, the 
idea of a Beijing Consensus serves not only to extend the critique of the Washington 
Consensus and neoliberalism but also to offer a largely positive vision of a Chinese 
alternative. 
  The original case for the existence of a Beijing Consensus corresponds directly 
with both New Left and official Party critiques of neoliberalism.  For its proponents, 
the Beijing Consensus contains both a clear repudiation of the Washington Consensus 
and at the same time offers an explanation and defense of a Chinese developmental 
and foreign policy alternative that is increasingly attractive to other developing 
countries.  The Beijing Consensus, a concept first proposed by the former Time 
magazine editor, Joshua Cooper Ramo, and later receiving official public support,
73 is 
defined by China’s unique approach to economic development, including the 
country’s role in international affairs, and China’s increasing status as a model for 
other developing countries.   
                                                 
73 In 2004 on a trip to Europe Hu Jintao’s advance team became aware of Ramo’s work on the idea of a 
Beijing Consensus and afterwards scholars at the Party School were directed to look further into to the 
concept (Interview TJ, 6/02/06).  According to Arif Dirlik, the idea of a Beijing Consensus had been 
around since the late 1990s but only became popular with the publishing of Ramo’s 2004 monograph 
(Dirlik 2005).   
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   In his 2004 monograph, The Beijing Consensus, Ramo argues that the 
Washington Consensus has been fully discredited both because it was force-fed to 
unwilling countries and because of its failure to produce economic growth.
74  Ramo 
says that the Beijing Consensus  
 
replaces the widely-discredited Washington Consensus, an economic theory 
made famous in the 1990s for its prescriptive, Washington-knows-best 
approach to telling other nations how to run themselves.  The Washington 
Consensus was a hallmark of end-of-history arrogance; it left a trail of 
destroyed economies and bad feelings around the globe. (Ramo 2004:4)   
 
According to Ramo, unlike the Washington Consensus, which spread only through the 
power of coercion, the Beijing Consensus has a natural appeal due to China’s 
developmental successes and rising influence in international affairs.  According to 
Ramo, “What is happening in China at the moment is not only a model for China, but 
has begun to remake the whole landscape of international development, economics, 
society and, by extension, politics” (Ramo 2004:3).   
The Beijing Consensus, Ramo argues, functions at two levels.  At one level is 
China’s domestic development model and at the second is China’s novel approach to 
international affairs.  At the level of China’s domestic development model, Ramo 
argues that China, despite being a developing economy, has created growth through 
the use of cutting-edge technology rather than borrowing second generation or older 
technology (Ramo 2004:12).  At the same time, and of more relevance to questions of 
market order, Ramo claims that the Beijing Consensus  
 
demands a development model where sustainability and equality become first 
considerations, not luxuries.  Because Chinese society is an unstable stew of 
                                                 
74 This formulation is at odds with Williamson’s own perspective that his original ten points were 
merely a reflection of policies that Latin American countries had already adopted to overcome the 
disastrous “lost decade” of the 1980s. 
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 hope, ambition, fear, misinformation and politics only this kind of chaos-
theory can provide meaningful organization (Ramo 2004:12).
75 
 
Ramo thus credits China with having found the long-sought (alternative) formula to 
successful economic and social development, a formula that others are eager to learn 
from and copy.  Finally, for Ramo, the other key aspect of the Beijing Consensus is 
that China has begun to serve as a model for other developing countries not only in 
terms of its own domestic development strategies and institutions but also because of 
its novel and independent approach to international relations.  As Ramo says,  
 
the Beijing Consensus contains a theory of self-determination, one that stresses 
using leverage to move big, hegemonic powers that may be tempted to tread on 
your toes…China’s very emergence is remaking the international order.   
Chinese officials’ interest in the country’s Peaceful Rise is rooted in their 
worry that current acceleration to international power may shake the world too 
much, undermining the country’s ability to grow and to maintain a stable 
internal and external balance. (Ramo 2004:12)  
 
  What kind of reception has Ramo’s Beijing Consensus met with and why do I 
see it as a compatible element of an official understanding of market order?
 76  Ramo’s 
2004 monograph has been translated into Chinese (Huang and Cui 2005) and in the 
spring of 2005 Ramo was one of a series of international and Chinese commentators 
invited to Tsinghua University by the New Left scholar Cui Zhiyuan to a conference 
to speak on the Beijing versus Washington Consensus.
77  The conference included 
western economists like Joseph Stiglitz and a range of Chinese scholars, many, like 
                                                 
75 Here Ramo accurately points to China’s overriding concern for stability but as both Partial Reform 
and New Left scholars point out, China is facing a range of challenges in terms of increasing social and 
economic inequality. 
76 In addition, an increasing number of Chinese language scholarly and newspaper articles have been 
published on the topic (see, for only a small sample, the Cui, Hu and Yu articles in Huang and Cui 2005; 
Qin 2004; Tian 2005; and Wang Zi n.d.).   
77 See Professor Cui’s web site, http://zhiyuancui.ccs.tsinghua.edu.cn/, for more details of the various 
Beijing Consensus-related talks he has sponsored. 
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 Cui, associated with the New Left.  In Ramo’s evaluation of the impact of the concept 
of the Beijing Consensus he says:  
 
I have been surprised by the reception of the Beijing Consensus. In China it 
has been taken up for serious discussion and debate, helping in some small 
way to fill in an already diverse and interesting debate about the country and 
its future. In the rest of the world the paper has been seen as “required 
reading” for officials, businessmen and others who are trying to understand 
the country. For this unexpected wide audience I am very grateful. (Tianjin 
Normal University 天津师范大学 2005:2) 
 
However, one noticeable difference between the first and second of two edited books 
about the Beijing Consensus is the move away from the term Beijing Consensus and 
toward the idea of a “Chinese Model.”
78  Even among those who broadly supported 
the original formulation of the Beijing Consensus, many were less convinced by the 
replicability of China’s rapid economic growth than by the appeal of an alternative to 
a dominant US-based neoliberal model of development. 
  Ultimately, the idea of a Beijing Consensus or a Chinese Model has cross-over 
appeal to both the New Left and the central leadership for similar reasons.  Through its 
critique of the Washington Consensus, the Beijing Consensus reinforces the New Left 
and official critique of neoliberalism, but it goes a step further by arguing that China 
offers an appealing and powerful alternative.  At the same time, the critique of 
neoliberalism in the Beijing Consensus implies a strong role for the central 
government in protecting China from both domestic and international neoliberal 
threats.   
                                                 
78 The title of the first edited volume, published in 2005, was China and Globalization: The Washington 
Consensus, the Beijing Consensus, or What while a subsequent 2006 volume is entitled The China 
Model and the “Beijing Consensus”: Beyond the “Washington Consensus.”  The “or what” part of the 
first title is not in the Chinese title, which only pits the Washington Consensus against the Beijing 
Consensus. 
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 But it is on this point of equating neoliberalism with marketization per se 
where I would argue that the New Left and official appeal of the Beijing consensus 
diverges.  As I explained above, the New Left equates neoliberalism with laissez faire 
market extremism and is highly suspect of the very nature of markets themselves.  The 
statist critique, however, focuses primarily on neoliberalism as a threat to Chinese 
economic strength and sovereignty, and as a threat to the state’s leading role in 
governing the economy, but it does not go so far as to attack the nature of markets 
themselves.  After all, the Deng-led market reforms were championed, if not always 
directly led, by the party-state itself.  The official critique is thus careful to point out 
certain specific dangers of neoliberalism but less willing to engage in either 
condemnation of markets per se or in a general critique of government abandonment 
of workers and peasants to the whims of the market.  Ultimately, the official critique 
of neoliberalism and support for the idea of a Washington Consensus or Chinese 
model can also be seen as a way of providing a convenient scapegoat and diversion 
from criticisms that link a host of economic and social problems that might otherwise 
be linked back to the state itself.
79  
 
Market Order Leading Group and the Official Understanding of Market Order 
  The official critique of neoliberalism in general and of the Washington 
Consensus in particular, in addition to broad support for a Beijing Consensus or a 
Chinese Model of development, point to a number of important components of a state 
or official understanding of market order.  This understanding includes skepticism 
about the ability of markets to self-regulate without the guiding hand of the state (and 
                                                 
79 There is similar language in some party publications about the need to debunk the myth of the market 
– it is as if for the state the “market” might have some autonomous power above and beyond the state, 
which is different than the New Left critique, which sees markets more starkly as inherently 
inegalitarian and destabilizing.   
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 views with apprehension any mystical power or sense of legitimacy attributed by some 
to the “market mechanism”) and at the same time views global neoliberal ideas, with 
their call for state retreat and the maintenance of a US-dominated international 
economic regime, as a threat to the stability of the Chinese economy.  One final 
component of the official view of market order, and one that is ultimately more 
concrete in many ways in terms of state institutions and policy recommendations, 
comes from units of the state bureaucracy itself charged with the maintenance of 
Market Order.  Here I will discuss the role of the State Council “leading group” in 
charge of the promotion and maintenance of Market Order and also discuss the state’s 
larger project of ensuring the its role as the final arbiter and guarantor of what 
constitutes Market Order. 
  On December 11, 2001 the State Council, China’s highest administrative organ, 
created the “National Office [leading group] on Rectification and Standardization of 
Market Economic Order” (quanguo zhengdun he guifan shichang jingji zhixu lingdao 
xiaozu bangongshi).  That December 11
th, 2001 was also the date of China’s official 
accession to the WTO was no coincidence as the Market Order Leading Group, as I 
will refer to it from here on,
80 was created to centralize and coordinate a number of 
market oversight and regulatory functions directly related to China’s WTO accession 
(State Council国务院 2001:Section III, 1 and National Rectification and 
                                                 
80 The above translation comes from the State Council itself, but leaves out that the portion of the 
Chinese title that makes clear that this is, in fact, a “leading group.”  State Council leading groups, or 
“leadership small groups” are relatively opaque (even by Chinese central leadership standards) 
bureaucratic entities and have not received a great deal of western scholarly attention.  I have found no 
studies or mention of the Market Order Leading group in any English language scholarship.  For a 
relatively recent study on leading small groups in general, see Kim 2003, but even this study was 
published before the creation of the Market Order Leading Group.  Kim explains that the leading small 
groups are “central-level nonstanding policy deliberation and coordination bodies in charge of all major 
issues of the country” and argues that the importance of any given leading group is associated with both 
its leader and the current status of its policy portfolio (Kim 2003:121-22).  For an older study on leading 
small groups see Hamrin (1992). 
129 
 Standardization Office 全国整规办 2007).
81  From the beginning, the Leading Group 
has been run by a member of the Party’s Politburo Standing Committee, beginning 
with Li Lanqing (李岚清), who was a close associate of Jiang Zemin, and is now 
under the direction of China’s most powerful female politician and Vice Premier of 
the State Council, Wu Yi (吴仪).  Here I will briefly review the official 
responsibilities of the Market Order Leading Group as outlined in the Group’s own 
official founding charter and history as well as from information gathered during a 
formal interview (Interview BJ24, 7/02/07).  I will then supplement this with an 
analysis written by Tsinghua professor Hu Angang, whose work has appeared in both 
New Left and Beijing Consensus contexts, in his capacity as the director of a CASS 
research center on contemporary China. 
  The State Council’s Market Order Leading Group coordinates a large number 
of government regulatory bodies (36 total) over a range of markets and issue areas.
82  
Rather than offering a clear and definitive official definition of “market order,” the 
Leading Group focuses on the government’s role in reducing or eliminating the key 
threats to Market Order. Upon its initiation, the primary tasks of the Leading Group, in 
relative order of importance, included cracking down on the production and sale of 
“fake and shoddy” (jiaomaoweilie) goods, “rectification” of the construction and 
financial services markets, fighting against local protectionism and enhancing 
workplace safety regulation (State Council国务院 2001).  Public information relating 
to the Leading Group’s work lists the following areas as requiring improved market 
                                                 
81 Yang Dali notes that in the spring of 2001, preceding China’s WTO accession, “the central leadership 
decided to pool the initiatives of the individual regulatory agencies into a unified national drive to 
rectify market economic order. As was the case during the Progressive Era in the United states, this 
drive…was designed to alleviate widespread public concerns about product quality, safety, financial 
fraud, and similar issues and was timed to help prepare the Chinese economy for entry into the WTO” 
(Yang Dali 2004a:104).  
82 Within the office there are a number of different sections including: 1) the comprehensive group, 2) 
the policy and regulations group, 2) the intellectual property rights group, 3) the supervision and 
research group, 4) the credit management group, and 5) the propaganda training group.  
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 order: food and medicine, intellectual property rights, commercial fraud, illegal blood 
collecting, illegal sale of rat poison, and many more (The National Office of 
Rectification and Standardization of Market Economic Order 全国整顿和规范市场经
济秩序领导小组办公室 2007).  Ultimately the key point of the Group’s foundational 
document and subsequent updates is more to list the problems with market order and 
to clearly affirm that the Market Order Leading Group is actively responding to those 
various problems than it is to explain why there is a problem with lack of “market 
order” in the first place or to offer clear-cut solutions.
83   
However, after providing a list of successful crackdowns in all areas, the 
Leading Group charter document provides a telling explanation of the state’s role in 
ensuring market order across this diverse set of obstacles.  The charter states that 
market “rectification” and “standardization” are processes that must be led by the 
unified and coordinated leadership of the central government and that in order to be 
effective, local governments and various enforcement bureaus must strictly follow 
central guidance.
84  In his work report that followed shortly after the founding of the 
Market Order Leading Group, then-Premier Zhu Rongji noted that in order to make 
this type of coordination a reality, major changes to regulatory agencies budget 
incentives, as well as general “modernizing” changes, would need to me made (Zhu 
Rongji 2002:Section X, E).   
                                                 
83 A formal interview with a representative from the Market Order Leading Group revealed little about 
the foundations of the concept of “market order” itself (Interview BJ24, 7/02/07).  The office was at the 
time inundated with work relating to the public relations disaster associated with a variety of food and 
product export crises.  However, one official did make the following statement that clearly resonates 
with the foregoing discussion about the relationship between “market order” work and stability: “The 
Leading Group is dedicated to establishing standardized and fair market practices.  It is only by 
preserving comprehensive market order than we can ensure healthy markets that in turn foster overall 
social stability.” 
84 The language used in this section of the Market Order Leading Group charter stressing 
standardization and rectification sounds strikingly like the type of bureaucratic “rationalization” that 
Yang Dali points to in his case for the emergence of a regulatory state.  “Rectification” and 
“standardization,” these seemingly innocuous, bureaucratic words, are by no means neutral terms but in 
actual practice are at the heart of the regulatory battles happening across all markets, including and 
especially in marginal markets. 
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   While official documents from the Market Order Leading Group point to a 
wide range of markets and behaviors that threaten market order more generally, and 
while they often supply laundry lists of amounts of confiscated fake goods and 
smashed smuggling rings, they provide very little sense of why these threats exist or 
how exactly they are to be handled.  Here I rely on a 2001 document written by Hu 
Angang (胡鞍钢 2001), whose name has appeared in connection with New Left state 
capacity arguments as well as in discussions about the Beijing Consensus, to shed 
light on some of these issues.
85  Hu notes that the work of promoting and protecting 
market order goes back at least to the year 2000 when then-Premier Zhu Rongji gave a 
speech at an economic work conference in which he stressed problems related to the 
“present state of economic order chaos” (dangdai jingji zhixu hunluan de zhuangtai 
shi).  Hu notes that Premier Zhu originally emphasized problems with many of the 
same issues that are on the agenda of the Market Order Leading Group.  Hu asks, 
“What are China’s biggest social problems?”  He responds, “The first is corruption, 
the second involves the production and sale of fake and poor quality goods, smuggling 
and the growth of the sex and pornography industry” (Hu Angang胡鞍钢 2001).  Hu 
then proceeds to discuss why the maintenance of market order is important, what is 
behind threats to market order and what should be done to promote market order.   
  In defending why the state must maintain market order, Hu argues that China 
faces two possible developmental paths: one that constitutes “a chaotic, disorderly, 
grey and black market economy,”
86 and another in which “a high quality, orderly 
                                                 
85 Hu, at the time the article was published, was the director of a CASS research group on China’s 
domestic political economy.  This article, because of its correlation with China’s WTO accession during 
the summer of 2001, because of Hu’s association with CASS, and because of the way it is written 
(including the title, which uses the same language as the Leading Group and sounds very much like an 
official propaganda slogan, not to mention that the article is hosted, among other places, on the official 
Occupational Crime Prevention – zhiwu fanzui yufang – web site) and the issues it addresses, can 
reasonably be argued to closely reflect official thinking on the nature of the challenges to a state 
conception of market order. 
86 The original Chinese: “一个混乱的、无秩序的、带有灰色经济、黑色经济的市场经济.” 
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 market economy ensures fair competition and fosters growth (Hu Angang胡鞍钢 
2001).  That Hu ties “grey” or “black” markets to problems of market order is key to 
his overall argument and is directly related to my discussion above of New Left 
concerns about “unregulated markets.”  Here I will discuss the importance of Hu’s 
formulation of “market order” as in large part a problem of hidden or what have 
elsewhere been referred to as “informal” markets. 
Hu sees these darkly hued markets as part of what he also calls the 
“underground economy” (dixia jingji).  He argues that there are three types of 
underground economy, each of which includes activities that cannot be controlled or 
regulated by the government.
 87  The first type of underground economy consists of 
what he calls illegal underground activities.  The second type is made up of legal, but 
unreported income and/or consists of unregistered businesses.  These first two are of 
primary concern for the government’s “standardizing and regulating” work, while the 
third is made up of forms of non-wage labor such as household work or rural barter 
and exchange transactions, that few if any countries include in their GDP statistics.  
Here I will not dwell at length on Hu’s presentation of these three levels, but instead 
seek to emphasize that what is meant by “illegal,” and to what extent such activities in 
the first two categories are actually hidden and therefore uncontrolled or unregulated 
by agents of the state, is very open to debate. 
  Hu continues with an explanation of the causes of “market order chaos” (weihe 
shichang zhixu ruci hunluan).  First, he attributes problems in China’s market order 
more generally to the transition process itself.  Here he cites Russia after the collapse 
of socialism as an extreme example of how the transition between different types of 
                                                 
87Hu’s exact phrasing is that these activities “belong to an economy that can’t be controlled or 
regulated” (属于不能够控制和管理的经济). 
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 economic systems can lead to a near-collapse of strong central authority and the 
subsequent chaos that can ensue.  Hu says,  
 
Although the ‘illicit economy’ constitutes a smaller percentage of overall GDP 
in China than in Russia, if China does not take effective measures against the 
underground and illicit economies, we will not be able to build a competitive, 
fair and healthy market economy, but instead will develop into a huge 
underground economy even to the point of becoming a completely black 
economy following in Russia’s footsteps. (Hu Angang胡鞍钢 2001)  
 
Hu thus equates “problems of transition” to decentralization of economic and political 
authority and the attendant difficulties of local protectionism and underground 
economic activities that can result.  Local protectionism is, in turn, fed by a kind of 
chronic focus on short-term gains.  This failure to think in terms of longer time 
horizons is what leads many local businesses to produce fake and low quality goods 
and to fail to properly register their businesses and is also responsible for the frequent 
collusion of local officials in such behavior.  Hu argues that short-term thinking harms 
the overall developmental potential of places and businesses that engage in such 
activities and may lead to longer term economic and social instability.   
  Finally, Hu argues that “during the period of market transition an “information 
[alt. credit] gap can lead to chaos in the market” (Hu Angang胡鞍钢 2001).  When 
speaking of a credit mechanism or system of credit Hu is not speaking necessarily of 
credit in a western financial sense (bank credit or credit cards), although it certainly 
might include that aspect, but instead he is speaking more generally about how 
producers and consumers, as well as the government, can access and evaluate 
information about goods and services throughout the economy.
88  Here Hu relies on 
the concept of “imperfect information.”  His basic argument is that the state can play a 
role in helping to set and enforce regulations that will increase and improve 
                                                 
88 Hu alternates between the terms “information” (xinxi) and “credit” (xinyong) system. 
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 information about product quality, price differentials and service quality.
89  Hu sees 
the government’s role as helping to set standards of information transparency, 
publicizing the standards themselves, and finally enforcing the standards. 
  The Market Order Leading Group and Hu Angang’s assessment of the 
problems of market order have a great deal in common in that they both point to the 
same range of issues, key among them the proliferation of fake and poor quality goods, 
and to a general lack of standards or at least standards-enforcement.  These problems 
are in turn seen to be fueled by local protectionism and a short-sightedness on the part 
of local businessmen and officials.  But the official understanding of problems of 
market order is much broader than just concern over some general need to enhance 
product standards and quality, it covers a vast range of market areas and is 
fundamental for legitimizing not just the need but the absolute imperative for the state 
to provide order over these disorderly markets.   
At its most basic, the state-sanctioned idea of “market order,” the one 
enshrined in the Leading Group and in countless official statements, academic journal 
articles and in the press, functions to highlight a perceived lack of order or stability 
associated with markets.  Why does “disorder” persist?  A number of reasons are 
usually offered, from the often tautological claims that transition itself is the cause of 
chaos, to arguments about the lack of a functioning legal system, to general charges of 
“corruption.”  What this all adds up to is market after market sector being labeled as 
less than “orderly,” and therefore, more often than not, requiring state intervention (or 
its appearance) to fix the problem.   
As the rest of this chapter has made clear, just because there is general 
acceptance about the desirability of markets (as opposed to state planning or 
                                                 
89 The question of the government’s role in standard setting and regulating prices and information about 
prices are both extremely important political processes and also at the very center of the state’s efforts 
to ensure “market order.” 
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 continuous radical revolution) as the main engine of economic development and about 
the need to maintain social and economic stability while promoting market-led 
development, there are very different understandings of the role markets and the state 
are to play in promoting these goals and what is more, there is a great range of opinion 
about how to recognize a stable outcome (or process) when it does exist.  One of the 
reasons the idea of market order is so important in China is that while it functions at 
the level of common sense it is open to diverse interpretation.  For Pearson to argue 
that there is a “norm” of orderly competition in China is both to put her finger on 
something very important and at the same time to say far too little.  Unless we 
understand how “order” is interpreted and acted upon, we know very little and if this 
chapter has shown anything, it is that ideas such as order and stability are very much at 
the heart of political and economic competition in China.  Ultimately it is one thing for 
the highest levels of the Party/state to declare that problems of market order are 
pervasive, but it is quite another to control the range of interpretations for how and 
why a given market lacks order and what should be done.  In the following section I 
will explore concrete examples of the politics of enforcing market order. 
It may be helpful to understand the official critique of neoliberalism and 
general support of the idea of a Beijing consensus as part of the Hu/Wen leadership’s 
efforts to distinguish their own kinder, gentler understanding of development from 
what some perceive as the Jiang Zemin/Zhu Rongji administration’s embrace of a 
more narrowly growth-oriented and subsequently harsher view of development.  But 
even if this is the case, both the critique of neoliberalism as well as the official 
promotion of Market Order should be understood more generally as efforts to 
highlight the absolute imperative of the Party and state as the guarantors of stability.  
“Neoliberalism” provides a convenient enemy and the more extreme the portrayals of 
neoliberalism as standing for, say, the complete withdrawal of the state from market 
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 regulation and the promotion of full-scale privatization or for western economic and 
ideological hegemony, the more obvious and absolutely imperative become the Party 
and the state’s role in counteracting these clearly harmful ideas.   
Again, however, it is crucial to note that neither the official critique of 
neoliberalism nor the high-level creation of a body to coordinate the work of 
promoting and maintaining Market Order are aimed at delegitimizing the role of 
markets as the fundamental engine of development per se.  Yes, there exist problems 
with disorder across a whole range of markets and economic sectors, but through the 
critique of neoliberalism and the creation of bodies like the Market Order Leading 
Group the Party leadership demonstrates not only that it recognizes that these 
problems exist but that it is actively working to resolve them.  The ultimate message is 
that China needs markets for its drive toward modernization and development but the 
Party/state is responsible for ensuring the orderly and stable functioning of markets.   
 
Neoliberal and New Left Influence on the State 
How can we understand the influence of neoliberal and New Left ideas on the 
state?  Any definitive statement about how any given idea or set of ideas influence 
Party and state officials and policy outcomes is especially difficult given the opaque 
leadership process in China.
90  Of course, both neoliberal and New Left intellectuals 
accuse each other of having tremendous and harmful influence on the state and 
actively seek to promote the superiority of their own ideas in order to influence policy 
                                                 
90 In an article titled “Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?,” Joseph Fewsmith (2003) provides an 
important account of the various types of think tanks and research organizations that the state and Party 
leaders rely upon for a range of ideas and policy options.  His primary conclusion is that while some 
organizations like the Central Party School or the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences have a 
consistently important role in providing the Party leadership with ideas, the sources of ideas tend to 
shift with changes in leadership.  At the same time, personal connections often explain why some think 
tanks, research organizations or individuals can influence the thinking of a given leader or group of 
leaders. 
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 (see Xiao Gongqin 萧功秦 2003).  In interviews with both neoliberal and New Left 
scholars I have asked about how they understand the impact of their own work and 
that of others in the neoliberal-New Left debate on state policy.  Their general 
response reflects a basic skepticism about any direct influence from either side.  As 
one New Left scholar cynically remarked, “A scholar’s influence comes and goes.  
The new [Hu Jintao] administration uses phrases that sound like ours, but really 
leaders pick and choose from the ideas that suit them at any given time” (Interview 
BJ13, 8/12/05).
 91   
This would seem to imply that somehow state and Party officials have 
“interests” that exist independent of the lenses through which they understand how the 
world works (i.e. independent of the economic ideas they hold) and simply choose 
ideas that fit their interests.  I would argue that there are indeed important influences 
that work both ways between official policy and various ideas espoused in intellectual 
debates.  I would further argue that intellectuals on both sides of the debate are very 
careful to claim any kind of direct influence on policy for fear that the political winds 
may shift and also because any official patrons they may have would be loath to admit 
that they are influenced or controlled by any force other than the public good in 
general. 
The New Left, in addition to a number of western scholars, argues that China’s 
market reform policies, especially the retrenchment of key socialist policies like state-
provided employment, education, health and pension services as well as China’s full-
scale entrance into the international economy, reflect the dominance of neoliberal 
ideas on China’s leaders.  They, of course, see this as a bad thing.  But stepping aside 
from the normative accusations for the moment, it seems obvious that the state’s 
embrace of markets is clearly based on a set of ideas about how markets, again as 
                                                 
91 See also Chua (2006) for a similar view.   
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 opposed to state planning or a vision of continual revolution, are the most powerful 
and efficient drivers of growth, development and national strength.  The allowance of 
massive rural to urban migration and the increasing acceptance of high levels of 
unemployment associated with SOE restructuring as well as the promotion of private 
business as the means to employment creation are clearly driven by economic ideas 
central to neoliberal thinking.  Again, if there is a tension between the Party’s embrace 
of markets and the current administration’s attacks on neoliberalism, it is driven not by 
the idea that markets per se are a problem, but by worries that the extreme position of 
both domestic and international variants of “neoliberalism” constitutes a threat to the 
legitimacy of state oversight of the economy. 
  For the New Left, on the other hand, many lament their lack of influence and 
wish for greater impact, while yet others claim that both in the past and especially with 
the current Wen Jiaobao/Hu Jintao administration certain New Left recommendations 
have had a major impact on actual policy (see Wang Shaoguang in Hook 2007).  Here 
I will argue that there are some key overlaps with New Left ideas and state policy and 
rhetoric, especially under the current administration, but that there remains a key 
tension between the state and New Left over who gets to define what the proper 
meaning and content of “socialism” is in China.  Regardless of the difficulties of 
actually tracking the direct influence of New Left ideas on state policy, one issue is 
clear, which is that it is hard for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to completely 
ignore criticisms from the left.  Given the Party’s status as official representative and 
interpreter of Chinese socialism, critiques that claim that the Party has abandoned its 
commitment to socialist ideals and has actually caused hardship for the masses 
(workers and peasants in particular) are not easily wished away by Party officials.  As 
Chen Feng (1999) notes,  
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 The historical paradox is that while Chinese reform initially succeeded by 
breaking the leftist ideology, its deepening tends to provide the soil for the 
latter to grow as a critical force, as society witnesses increased social problems 
that are supposed to be linked to capitalism. (Chen Feng 1999:448)   
 
The Party itself, beginning with Deng, has sought to temper ideological debate 
by declaring that “markets” themselves are neutral and can be part of a socialist 
system just as much as they are part of capitalist systems (Fewsmith 2001; Zheng 
2004).  But ultimately the Party, especially under Jiang Zemin’s watch, has found 
itself on the defensive in relation to New Left criticisms in large part because the Party 
itself has been the primary sponsor of market reform.  As one western China scholar 
observed: “In essence, the economic reforms were an attempt to re-establish the 
hegemonic authority of the Communist Party on a different basis” (White 1993:11).  
Whether or not the Party actively adopts certain policies because of the influence of 
New Left ideas or criticism, it must seek to protect its status as the final arbiter of how 
state policy reflects socialist ideals.   
  As is clear from the discussion above of the official critique of neoliberalism 
and support for the Beijing Consensus, there are some significant areas of overlap 
between New Left ideas and the rhetoric of the current Hu Jintao/Wen Jiabao 
administration.  As I have shown, the Hu/Wen leadership has made a concerted effort 
to distance itself from “neoliberal” policies and their critique of neoliberalism overlaps 
in significant ways with New Left criticisms.  At the same time, Hu and Wen have 
tried to expand the definition of “development” to be less narrowly and directly 
associated with GDP growth figures and more inclusive of a range of social issues, 
including questions of inequality, that are important to the New Left.  A Party web site 
dedicated to the results of the 17
th Party Congress, which was held in Beijing in 
October of 2007 and where the concepts of “scientific development” and “harmonious 
society” were the centerpieces of Hu Jintao’s official report, notes at the outset that, 
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 “The Scienctific Concept of Development means putting people first and aiming at 
comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable development” (“Scientific Concept of 
Development and Harmonious Society 2007”).  The same site goes on to list the six 
key elements of “Harmonious Society,” a concept that was equally elevated at the 
Party Congress, as follows: “1. Democracy and the Rule of Law, 2. fairness and 
justice, 3. integrity and fraternity, 4. vitality, 5. stability and order, 6. and harmony 
between man and nature” (“Scientific Concept of Development and Harmonious 
Society 2007”).  At the very least, some on the New Left have expressed satisfaction 
with this change of direction.  Wang Shaoguang has recently noted his approval of 
what he refers to as the government’s transition from focusing narrowly on “economic 
regulation” to a new emphasis on “social regulation” (Wang Shaoguang 王绍光 2006; 
and Hook 2007:8).  In general, then, a range of social ills, or what the New Left has 
considered challenges to market order, are at least now being rhetorically addressed by 
the state and Party.  No longer can Liu Junning remark that the Chinese prime minister 
has Hayek’s work prominently displayed on his bookshelf.  
 
Conclusion 
  In the spring of 2006 the lead story on the New York Times web site 
proclaimed: “A Sharp Debate Erupts in China Over Ideologies” (Kahn 2006).  The 
article was referring to a brewing controversy over a new property rights law being 
considered by China’s National People’s Congress (NPC).  The article focused on 
opposition to the law by a Beijing University law professor and to other “socialist 
leaning scholars” in general.  Opponents of the law claimed that it represented a move 
toward capitalism and would further disenfranchise the country’s workers and farmers, 
while supporters argued that the law was necessary to create healthier markets that 
would fuel further growth.  The author of the article claimed that the Hu/Wen 
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 leadership supported this debate as part of their emphasis on the need for a more 
socially-conscientious approach to development.  Ultimately the law failed to pass at 
the 2006 session of the NPC but passed a year later at the 2007 session, but not before 
there was more debate and another round of western press reports declaring the sudden 
emergence of long-dormant ideological debates (“Caught between right and left” 2007 
and Aiyar 2007). 
  The western reporting on the new property rights law and the debate 
surrounding the law itself are important for a number of reasons.  First, given the story 
I have told in this chapter about ongoing and fundamental economic ideational debates, 
that these media reports claim to have discovered some sudden and unexpected 
outburst of ideological debate seems short-sighted at best.  Just as the participants in 
the regulatory state debate largely failed to recognize the intense and fundamental 
debate taking place over very different ideas of how the Chinese market economy 
functions and what role the state should play in governing the economy, so too do 
these press reports fail to recognize the broader background behind the opposing 
opinions about the new property rights law.  Failure to recognize the deep-seated and 
ongoing nature of the market order debate has thus inhibited a deeper understanding of 
how these debates both reflect and influence the various ways in which the state is 
attempting to regulate the economy. 
  In this chapter I have filled a major hole in the regulatory state debate by 
showing that China is involved in its own debate about the very nature of markets and 
what the state’s proper role in governing those markets should be.  I have also shown 
how this debate reflects not only differing centuries’ old and global understandings of 
the nature of market society but also that it takes place in a very specific Chinese 
historical and policial context.  Neoliberal, New Left and official state and Party 
participants in China’s ongoing ideational debates all present very different 
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 understandings of one idea in particular: market order.  I have demonstrated that any 
viable vision of China’s state-economy relations must offer an explanation of how the 
government can best regulate the economy so as to produce stable and orderly results.  
Central to each vision is thus a narrative about what constitutes the key threats to 
market order and what actions and forms of state-market relations are necessary to 
prevent those threats.  To paraphrase Mark Blyth, the ability to define a threat as a 
threat, and as a certain kind of threat, is a key part of what makes these different ideas, 
and the outcomes of this debate, so powerful. 
  In addition to overcoming the failure of participants in the regulatory state 
debate to note the existence of ideational contestation in China, let alone to recognize 
the centrality of the idea of market order to this contestation, I have also highlighted a 
number of important themes within the debate itself (see Table 2-1 below).  First, all 
of the parties involved make claims to some element of the liberal tradition. As I have 
shown, neoliberals emphasize freedoms for the market and insist that justice rests on 
limitations on state authority, especially when it comes to intervening in the economy.  
For the New Left, social justice relies on a central state commitment to promoting 
economic and social equality.  Importantly however, for all of their jostling over what 
constitutes the true nature of liberalism and how best to apply liberal principles to 
China’s state-economy relations, neither the neoliberal nor New Left understanding of 
liberalism includes calls for what many in the West would consider the most 
fundamental of liberal traditions: regular and open elections.  This truncated 
understanding of liberalism may simply be a function of the clear taboo nature of 
demands for competition to Communist Party rule, but it certainly fits well with the  
Party’s argument that “upholding the unity of the leadership of the CPC [Communist 
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Table 2-1: Competing Ideas of Market Order 
  Neoliberal New  Left  Central 
Party/State 
Core Principles  Freedom, Justice, 
Efficiency 
Social Justice, equality, 
economic democracy 
Development, 
modernization, 
stability 
Approach to 
Liberalism  
Hayek as ideal; 
Freedom for 
markets and from 
arbitrary state 
authority; Justice 
derives from well 
functioning market; 
Defer political 
liberalization 
Hayek as enemy; 
Embrace “positive” 
freedoms; State must 
ensure social justice; 
Economic democracy 
more important than 
procedural democracy; 
“Democratic socialists” 
minus elections 
Democratic 
centralism; The 
Party represents the 
people so 
democracy rests on 
continued Party 
leadership 
View of Markets  Organic, efficient, 
orderly; Zone of 
freedom; Still weak 
in face of 
government 
intervention 
Destabilizing, 
disorderly; Zone of 
exploitation and 
corruption; Dominant 
and beyond reach of 
government authority 
Tool of economic 
development; Not 
inherent to either 
socialism or 
capitalism; Have 
disorderly 
tendencies for 
which state must 
have sufficient 
authority to correct 
Key Threats to 
Market Order 
Legacy and 
persistence of state 
planning; State as 
both “referee” and 
“player”; New Left 
creates instability 
through populist 
tactics 
Neoliberalism;  Market 
extremism; Inequality; 
Unregulated markets; 
Globalization; 
Corruption; Lack of 
central state capacity 
Any threat to Party 
monopoly on 
power; 
Neoliberalism; 
Local 
protectionism; 
Hidden/grey 
markets 
Key Supports for 
Market Order 
Property rights; 
Natural and 
efficiently 
functioning 
markets both 
domestically and 
internationally  
Strong central 
government; Economic 
Democracy 
Orderly 
competition; Better 
“credit” system; 
Creating national 
markets; Persistent 
threat of disorder 
necessitate state 
role in market 
regulation; 
Creation of 
Regulatory State 
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 Party of China]…is the most important and fundamental principle for developing 
socialist political democracy in China” (State Council Information Office 2005). 
What are the connections between the types of arguments presented by 
scholars in the regulatory state debate and those in China’s market order debate? One 
of the key differences is in terms of motivations.  The regulatory reform debate can be 
seen as more of an attempt to analyze objectively, from the perspective of both social 
science and geographical (and political?) distance, the state of Chinese state-economy 
relations.  Of course, as my discussion makes clear, there are often unstated normative 
assumptions that are packaged in with each of the different perspectives in the 
regulatory state debate and both authors from the regulatory state and partial reform 
perspectives show commitments to certain structural and political changes in China.  
However, in the Market Order debate all of the participants are clearly attempting to 
influence the state and public policy, while of course the state’s is the official 
perspective.  As I have argued, all three of these perspectives have both descriptive 
and prescriptive elements.  Alone among the Chinese efforts to make a broad claim 
about how to categorize and place China’s state-economy relations in comparative 
perspective is joint New Left and official interest in promoting the idea of a Beijing 
Consensus or China Model of development. 
  There are, however, some other noticeable points of overlap as well as 
difference among various regulatory state and market order perspectives.  Most 
obvious are the similarities between a number of regulatory state and New Left 
positions (one reason for this is that Wang Shaoguang is clearly part of both the 
regulatory state and New Left perspectives).  Key among these similar positions is 
support for enhanced central government authority to overcome a range of social 
problems, even though New Left perspective tends to emphasize questions specific to 
workers and peasants more than regulatory state approach).  As I have argued above, 
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 both of these perspectives equate enhanced “regulatory” capacity with apolitical good 
governance.  Partial reform scholars also worry about decentralized and corrupt 
political authority, but unlike the regulatory state or New Left thinkers who emphasize 
the need to rely on enhanced central state authority, partial reform scholars call for 
competitive political system as the solution.  Finally, one can see some linkages 
between partial reform and neoliberal perspectives, since both express a concern for 
greater rule-based governance.  However, the similarities do not extend much further 
since China’s neoliberals clearly do not call for greater political pluralism in the form 
of regular and open elections and partial reform scholars do not necessarily place as 
much unbounded faith in markets as do the neoliberals. 
Finally, returning to questions of market order, I have also shown how the 
official critique of neoliberalism and creation of the Market Order Leading Group are 
connected to the state’s ongoing efforts to connect its legitimacy to its role in ensuring 
market order.  By pointing to the threat posed by neoliberalism and to the proliferation 
of chaotic markets, the state seeks to establish itself as the guarantor of a healthy, 
orderly market economy.  As I explore in the next section, however, the actual day-to-
day task of creating market order over marginal markets is no straightforward task.  In 
the chart above I note that through its emphasis on the proliferation of disorderly 
markets the state seeks the authority to decide what constitutes market disorder.  
However, once having established the existence of such disorderly markets and the 
necessity of state intervention to rectify and standardize such markets, expectations of 
follow-through may create complications both domestically and abroad.  
Related directly to the state’s efforts to create and maintain market order, both 
the New Left and the state itself have pointed to the difficult task of not only taming 
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chaotic markets, but of the challenge of “seeing” them at all.
92  New Left critics point 
to the proliferation of unregulated markets while the official view of market order 
laments the spread of hidden and/or grey markets that often remain beyond the 
regulatory reach of the central government due to local protectionism and an array of 
other forces.  New Left scholars argue that China is rife with unregulated markets, or 
at least markets that are poorly regulated by corrupt local officials.   Here, the New 
Left shares much in common with the regulatory state view, as both associate 
“deregulation” with increased inequality and a lack of central government oversight 
over markets and protectionist local officials.  For both New Left and Regulatory State 
scholars, including some like Wang Shaoguang who have a foot in both camp, the 
creation of new regulatory bodies with strong central backing is necessary in order to 
overcome an entire range of social and economic challenges facing China’s ongoing 
reforms.  
However, as I will demonstrate in the following two chapters of the 
dissertation, neither New Left nor partial reform nor official claims about the 
proliferation of unregulated or hidden markets accurately captures the reality of state 
interaction with what are deemed to be disorderly markets.  At the same time, I will 
highlight the flaws in New Left and Partial Reform claims that equate “regulation” 
with the simple and apolitical process of good governance and also in central state 
insistence that the rectification and standardization of markets simply involves the 
neutral enforcement of proper policies.  Both of these perspectives obscure the politics 
of the regulation of marginal and “disorderly” markets.  In the next chapter I will 
analyze the politics of state regulation of one particular type of marginal market: street 
markets. 
 
92 For China’s neoliberals, problems with disorderly markets would be seen as a function of too much of 
the wrong kind of state intervention.  However, they would tend to argue that properly functioning 
markets are a zone free of politics. Chapter 3 
 
The City Appearance Administration and Street Vendors: 
Regulating Market Order in Nanjing 
 
 
  On August 11
th, 2006, a street-side sausage vendor named Cui Yingjie stabbed 
and killed Li Zhiqiang, a member of the Beijing City Management Department 
(chengshi guanli xingzheng zhifaju – hereafter chengguan).
1  The 36 year old Li was a 
member of an “enforcement team” (zhifa dadui) for the less-than-decade-old 
chengguan, or “minor officials who are supposed to maintain order on public streets” 
(Martinsen 2007).  Cui was a 23 year old army veteran from neighboring Hebei 
Province and had only recently begun to work as a street vendor after the boss of the 
Beijing karaoke bar where he had been working as a bouncer failed to pay Cui’s 
wages.  A Chinese news crew was filming the chengguan enforcement team’s street 
inspection in the Zhongguancun high-tech district when the altercation between Cui 
and Li broke out.  According to reports, Li and the other chengguan officers had just 
confiscated Cui’s newly purchased vending cart that he used to cook and sell sausages 
and when the officers refused to return the cart Cui attacked Li with a small knife, 
leading to Li’s death shortly after. 
  Cui escaped to nearby Tianjin but was quickly arrested and charged with 
murder.  During the trial, which was accompanied by a flurry of popular and official 
media attention, Li was officially declared a “revolutionary martyr” while others saw 
Cui’s actions as a case of self-defense in the face of official brutality.  Finally, on 
April 10th of 2007, and to mixed responses from the public and from the Beijing 
                                                 
1 As I will explain in further detail below, in some cities like Nanjing, which is the focus of this chapter, 
the equivalent of the chengguan is the City Appearance Administration or shirong. 
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 chengguan, Cui was given a commuted death sentence.
2  Why did this story attract 
such a storm of passionate attention within China and what does it tell us about state-
economy relations in contemporary China?  This story of a petty vendor and an 
official from a bureau no one outside of China has probably ever heard of in fact tells 
us a great deal about the state’s efforts to govern the often-unruly urban markets that 
the state has itself unleashed and the social tensions that have arisen as a result.   
  While extreme in its outcome, this confrontation between a street vendor and a 
chengguan official in China’s capital city is part of a larger battle taking place across 
China over who can legitimately participate in what kind of markets and what the 
state’s role should be in governing these markets.  As I have shown in the previous 
two chapters, there is a great deal of debate both within and outside of China about 
how the Chinese state does and should regulate its emergent market economy and with 
what goals in mind.  I have argued that the idea of market order, that economic growth 
and development must be driven by markets but at the same time such growth and 
development must be economically and socially stable, is both central to Chinese state 
efforts to regulate the economy and at the same time is a concept open to contestation, 
various interpretations and differential enforcement.  In this chapter I will tell the story 
of China’s frontline urban market order troops.  
  Here I present a detailed case study of how one recently-created urban 
regulatory bureau, Nanjing’s City Appearance Administration (shirong guanliju – 
hereafter shirong), seeks to govern the city’s various types of street markets and 
vendors, many of which are officially prohibited.
3  I will show that how the shirong 
                                                 
2 Cui was sentenced to death but with a two year reprieve and most press reports speculated that the 
sentence would eventually turn into life in prison.  For Chinese reporting on this case see Wang Heyan 
王和岩 (2007), Zhao Ling 赵凌 (2007) and Pan (2007) and for a western press account see Guo and 
Lim (2007). 
3 Operating an unlicensed street stall is prohibited and in order to attain a license all vendors must go 
through the shirong or chengguan bureau.  Almost all writing on the topic of street vendors in China, 
whether academic or journalistic, in Chinese or English, uses the adjective “illegal” in front of “street 
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 attempts to regulate “order” among street vendors is a function of the conflicting 
incentives facing the bureau.  If the bureau often appears to be less-than-vigorous or 
inconsistent in its treatment of street vendors, then this in part reflects the cross-cutting 
incentives it faces.  At the same time, the shirong’s efforts to govern street markets 
and vendors are often complicated by the evasive and sometimes confrontational 
responses of the vendors themselves.  The results of this interaction, including the 
extreme and tragic story I related above, have increasingly become the object of public 
and official media criticism of the shirong/chengguan.  Much of this criticism is 
directed not just simply at the bureau’s regulatory methods, but at the very legitimacy 
of its authority and the tactics it uses in the name of maintaining “order” over 
“chaotic” street markets. 
  The analysis that follows is based on a series of questions related directly to 
the Nanjing shirong’s governance of the city’s street markets.  First, what government 
institutions, in addition to the shirong, are responsible for regulating street vendors?  
What are the primary responsibilities of the shirong and how is the bureau structured?  
How is the regulatory work of the shirong related to city appearance per se?  What are 
the range of interactions between the shirong and the city’s street vendors?  How do 
shirong officials evaluate the mission and success of the bureau’s work and its 
institutional goals for the future?  In turn, how do the vendors, other citizens and the 
official press evaluate the shirong? 
Without realizing it at the time, in my interest in state regulation of street 
vendors in Nanjing I had stumbled across what would become one of the most 
publicly acrimonious relationships in China’s contemporary urban state-society 
relations.  As I allude to above and as I will explain more fully below, the 
                                                                                                                                              
vendors” or “street vending.”  As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the question of legality is 
determined by the shirong itself. 
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 shirong/chengguan may be among the least popular government bureaus in the 
country, criticized not just by many common citizens but increasingly by the Party 
center itself.  It is nothing if not ironic that this regulatory body that is so clearly 
bound up with the task of bringing order to what some officials see as chaotic and pre-
modern street markets is so increasingly linked to disorderly and destabilizing 
outcomes.  One of my aims here, nevertheless, is to point out the range of ways in 
which the shirong interacts with Nanjing’s street vendors, many of which never make 
the headlines. 
 
Background  
Urban Institutional Change 
The story of shirong-vendor relations in Nanjing takes place against the 
background China’s post-1978 reforms as both the shirong and the vendors they seek 
to regulate are a product of those reforms.  Among the key elements of China’s post-
Mao transformation has been the erosion of the two key state institutions for 
governing urban economic and social life: the work unit (danwei) and the system of 
rigid residency (hukou) restrictions.   As others have described in detail, the danwei 
served as a combined productive, social and political unit that urban residents relied 
upon for everything from housing to health care to permission to marry and that 
functioned as the site of political mobilization and control.
4  The other institutional 
pillar of urban social stability was the hukou system that after the mid 1950s kept rural 
to urban migration at a virtual standstill.
5   
                                                 
4 See, for example, Walder (1986), Lü and Perry, eds. (1997) and Dutton (1998). 
5  See Solinger (1999) for an extensive overview of the hukou system and its changes up through the 
1990s.  Recent research has shown that far from withering away, responsibility over the hukou 
institution has been increasingly decentralized to local units of governance (See Chan and Buckingham 
forthcoming). 
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 China’s market reforms, however, have led to extensive changes in the danwei 
and hukou systems such that they are clearly no longer the main institutions for 
governing urban social and economic life.  The former class/social categories of 
“worker” and “peasant” have also subsequently been transformed into new social and 
economic configurations whose existence continues to prove a challenge for the urban 
governance.  Given the withering away of the danwei and hukou institutions, one of 
my primary tasks is to answer how the state has sought to promote and maintain 
economic and social order over one of these newly emergent markets and social 
groups?  
 
Nanjing 
The story I tell in this chapter takes place in the city of Nanjing.  Nanjing, with 
a population of over 5.72 million residents, is the capital of Jiangsu, mainland China’s 
third wealthiest province (average 2001 per capita income of RMB26,184 or 
US$3,170) after Guangzhou and Zhejiang (Liu and Wu 2006:615; Nanjing City 
People’s Government南京市人民政府 2003).  With an administrative area of 
6515km² and located slightly inland from China’s Central East Coast, along the banks 
of the Yangze River and just under 200 miles west of Shanghai, Nanjing has long 
played an important role in China as both a commercial and political center (Liu and 
Wu 2006:615).  “Since the 3
rd century A.D., ten dynasties and regimes have made 
Nanjing a capital city” (Po 2001:49).  Most recently, Nanjing served as the capital 
during two separate periods of Nationalist Party (Guomindang) rule (1927-37; 1945-
49).  Outside of China, Nanjing may be most well known for the infamous Nanjing 
Massacre (1937-38) that occurred during the Japanese occupation, an event that has 
now been captured in both print and on film.
6   
                                                 
6 See Chang (1997) and the related 2007 film production entitled “Nanking.” 
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 The Nanjing Shirong: Structure and Purpose 
  In the late fall of 2003 I witnessed one of many similar confrontations between 
uniformed officers of the Nanjing shirong and local street vendors.  When I looked out 
of my apartment window I saw a typical morning scene on the street below: students 
on their way to class at Nanjing University, grandparents taking their grandchildren to 
school, the umbrella repair man on his bicycle loudly advertising his services,
7 a few 
migrant vendors selling vegetables on the corner and some retired residents from my 
apartment complex cooking noodles and dumplings for a steady flow of customers at 
their small, makeshift sidewalk breakfast stand.   
This scene of neighborhood street life, which daily brings together friends as 
well as anonymous buyers and sellers through countless personal and small 
commercial interactions, was quickly and violently interrupted by the arrival of 
members of the Nanjing shirong.  Within moments of their arrival, the shirong 
officials had pulled down the awnings over the noodle and dumpling stands, sending 
chairs, tables, dumplings and bowls of noodles onto the street.  All of this in turn led 
to a heated argument between the dumpling and noodle stall owners and the shirong 
officials.  The make-shift street market that formed every morning outside my 
apartment window quickly dispersed and in its place a crowd of onlookers gathered, 
curious to watch the raucous argument between the shirong officials and the vendors.  
In their wake the City Appearance Bureau left a street scattered with food and ruined 
stands as well as a group of irate vendors and other neighborhood residents.   
  What is the Nanjing City Appearance Bureau? Who are the vendors that 
populate the make-shift street-markets across the city?  And what are the kinds of 
                                                 
7 The Beijing district of Chongwen recently announced a special fair where the “cries” of different 
street vendors, such as this umbrella repairman, would be highlighted.  According to the press report, 
such specialized vendor calls have been dying out in the district and across Beijing in general and there 
is a desire to retain the tradition (“Hawkers Cries to Be Performed…” 2007).  As my account here 
attests, these vendor cries are still a part of daily life in Nanjing. 
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 interactions that typify shirong-vendor encounters?  Here I will respond to each of the 
above questions in turn, beginning with an overview of what bureaus do and do not 
share responsibility for regulating the city’s street vendors. 
 
Who Is Responsible for Regulating Nanjing’s Street Markets? 
  When I first began to research the question of how the Nanjing city 
government regulated local street markets I was confronted with the basic question of 
what units had jurisdiction over these markets.  Because of the appearance of their 
uniforms, I initially assumed that the officials in charge of regulating the street 
vendors were, in fact, members of the Public Security Bureau (PSB) or gong’anju.  I 
was, however, quickly disabused of this notion by a Chinese professor who told me 
that “they aren’t the police [gong’an], they’re just street officials in uniform.  Every 
city is China has them” (Interview NJ1, 10/14/00).     
Other friends and professors advised me to look into the role of the Industrial 
and Commercial Administration Bureau (gongshang xingzheng guanliju – hereafter 
gongshang) (Interview NJ4, 9/27/02).  The gongshang was a logical choice since it is 
the government bureau tasked with primary responsibility for the regulation of all non-
state, private (siying qiye) businesses.  As the principal regulatory agency for non-state 
commerce and industry, the gongshang is in charge of licensing and basic regulatory 
oversight of almost all private businesses in Nanjing.  However, gongshang officials 
soon verified that street vendors were not part of their jurisdiction.  The gongshang 
marks its jurisdictional boundary through the distinction between fixed versus non 
fixed-space business ventures, with everything in the latter category falling into the 
regulatory hands of the shirong (Interview NJ11, 4/23/03; NJ18 and NJ19, 9/30/03).
8  
                                                 
8 Indeed the idea of a lack of fixed structure or space is embodied in the Chinese terms for vendor 
(tanfan) and vendor’s stand (tandian).  The verb tan itself means to spread out. 
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 As one gongshang official remarked, “we simply don’t have the resources and time to 
track down and register all of those vendors.  We concentrate on normal businesses.  A 
different department [the shirong] is in charge of monitoring mobile businesses” 
(Interview NJ18, 9/30/03).
 9    
Even if street vending was not considered part of the basic commercial 
licensing and regulating duties of the gongshang, then it still may have been within the 
jurisdiction of the sanitation or food safety bureaus given that many vendors sell food 
products, or equally it could have been on the radar screen of the various bureaus who 
increasingly compete for jurisdiction over intellectual property rights enforcement 
since many vendors specialize in the retail sale of a range of counterfeit goods, from 
clothing to DVDs.
10  However, interviews with officials from these various bureaus 
confirmed that only on very rare occasions during special campaigns would they have 
any direct contact with street vendors.  Instead, the work of regulating Nanjing’s street 
vendors fell almost completely on the shoulders of the city’s newly created City 
Appearance Administration Bureau.   
 
Shirong (Chengguan) Background and Structure 
What are the duties of the shirong and how is it structured?  First, it is 
important to note that the shirong and the chengguan bureau featured in the 
introduction to this chapter are, especially in their relation to street market regulation, 
essentially the same bureaucratic entity.  Since the mid 1990s Chinese cities have been 
                                                 
9 At the same time the gongshang’s complete abstinence from the regulation of street markets seems to 
be at odds with the bureau’s concerns that all businesses be properly registered.  For example, an article 
from a national gongshang journal highlights the importance of registering all businesses and makes 
specific mention of the problem of unregistered mobile street vendors (see Li Zongbai 李宗柏 2001).   
10 For more on the bureaucratic competition to enforce IPR regulations, see Mertha (2006).  Informal 
interviews with fixed-place retailers in Nanjing revealed that officials from the Culture Bureau 
(wenhuabu) as well as from the gongshang and the Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau (QTSB) 
(guojia zhiliang jishu jianduju) all made regular inspections for counterfeit video and audio 
entertainment goods (Fieldnotes nj29, 5/18/03 and nj46, 7/27/03). 
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 required to create a chengguan bureau (Interviews NJ15, 8/22/03; SH2, 3/12/03; BJ7, 
2/22/05; Wang Yijun王亦君 2006) and a select number of cities, like Nanjing, have 
also created discrete shirong bureaus that share regulatory and enforcement duties 
with the chengguan.
11  Prior to 2004, the Nanjing officers in charge of the everyday 
regulation of street vendors and their vehicles bore the “city appearance inspection” 
(shirong jiancha) insignia but since 2004 they have borne the “urban management 
enforcement” (chengguan zhifa) logo.
12  According to interviews with Nanjing 
provincial officials, the city’s shirong and chengguan bureaus now split regulatory 
(guanli) and enforcement (zhifa) responsibilities (Interview NJ31, 6/23/07; see also the 
website that serves both bureaus: http://www.njum.gov.cn).
13  The key point here is 
that for all intents and purposes (here, regulation of street markets) the shirong and 
chengguan are interchangeable in name and function.
14   
The Nanjing City shirong bureau has its roots in the 1993 creation of what was 
then called the Nanjing City Appearance Committee (nanjingshi shirong guanli 
weiyuanhui), an organization that served as a coordinating body but had no regulatory 
authority (“Shirong Guanli 市容管理” 2006; Interview NJ10, 4/16/03).  Then in 2001 
the city created what is today the Nanjing City Appearance Administration 
                                                 
11 Other major cities that have a separate shirong include Shanghai, Guilin, Hefei and Urumqi among 
others.  Based on my research, Beijing does not have a separate shirong, but instead only a chengguan 
(BJ7, 2/22/05).  Interviews with Jiangsu provincial shirong officials (Nanjing is the capital of Jiangsu 
province) revealed that the creation of a separate shirong bureau was often a question of city size and 
even other “medium” size cities in Jiangsu like Xuzhou and Yangzhou have only a chengguan and no 
shirong (NJ30, 11/18/05).   
12 This change in insignia was a response to the 2004 Administrative Licensing Law (xingzheng xukefa) 
that was intended among other things to reform abuses of licensing and fee collection among bureaus 
that regulate commercial activity. 
13 These interviews revealed that even within these bureaus themselves there is still a level of confusion 
about the division of duties among the Nanjing shirong and chengguan.  According to a provincial 
official, “in theory regulatory and enforcement duties should be clearly separated, especially after the 
implementation of the Administrative Licensing Law in 2004.  However, the separation of these powers 
within the Nanjing shirong remains incomplete” (Interview NJ31; 6/23/07).  In any case, it now appears 
that the chengguan, in essence, is the enforcement arm of the shirong/chengguan team. 
14 In discussions outside of Nanjing the default category in discussions about this bureau was most often 
“chengguan” but it was understood that one of the bureau’s chief responsibilities was oversight over 
“city appearance.”     
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 Department (nanjingshi shirong guanliju).  The Nanjing shirong department is 
currently part of the city’s Urban Construction Bureau (chengshi jianshebu) and 
employs a staff of more than 3,000 (Interview NJ13, 6/2/03; Nanjing City People’s 
Government南京市人民政府 2003:52-3).   However, shirong officials also noted that 
in addition to these 3,000 permanent shirong employees, over 2,000 temporary and 
“irregular” (fei zhenggui) staff worked for the bureau out of the local street offices.  As 
one shirong official cryptically noted, “the situation with these [irregular] employees 
is often very complicated [ting fuza]” (Interview NJ10, 4/16/03). 
Nanjing shirong “enforcement teams” (zhifa dadui or jiancha dui), which are 
responsible for the everyday management of street markets and street vendors, are 
largely staffed and administered out of local street offices (hereafter jiedao).  The 
majority (over 2,000) of the city’s shirong officials are hired by and work directly out 
of these sub-district level jiedao, of which there are 42, spread across 8 districts 
(Nanjing City People’s Government南京市人民政府 2003:52; Nanjing City 
Appearance Administration 南京市容管理局 2002; Liu and Wu 2006:616).   In the 
first years of the shirong’s existence the enforcement team members were mostly 
recruited from rural areas of northern Jiangsu Province, often through government-to-
government agreements (Interviews NJ10, 4/16/03; NJ13, 6/2/03; and NJ20, 
10/9/03).
15  However, since the late 1990s, the jiedao have increasingly recruited laid-
off or unemployed male city residents, many of whom are in their late 40s or early 50s 
(NJ13, 6/2/03).   Enforcement team equipment, including the flatbed trucks and small 
vans, known as “bread cars” (mianbao che) for their loaf-like appearance, are housed 
at the jiedao and both before and after conducing an inspection team members will 
gather at the jiedao.
16   
                                                 
15 For more on the role of these types of arrangements in facilitating urban migration see Solinger 1999. 
16 The national chengguan web site advertises the bureau’s distinctive enforcement trucks for sale.  See 
their web site at http://www.chinacity.com.cn/.  
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 That the jiedao, as the lowest official government unit at the urban level, have 
taken on an increasingly prominent role in governing a variety of market actors in 
Nanjing and that they play an important role as the “bases” for shirong enforcement 
teams is one of the original findings of my fieldwork in Nanjing and has important 
consequences for the regulation of street markets in particular.  As Wu Fulong, a 
geographer and one of very few scholars to write about the jiedao argues, just as a 
great deal of political authority has been devolved from the central government to 
local governments, so has administrative power in many municipalities been 
decentralized to base level political organs like street offices and residence 
committees.
17  Commenting on the changing role of street offices as the lowest level 
of urban government, Wu remarks:  
 
Since the mid 1980s, the Street Office has begun to be involved in local social 
security, employment arrangements, administration of migrant workers and 
maintenance of market orders. (Wu Fulong 2002:1084, my emphasis) 
 
Numerous visits to various jiedao across Nanjing verified that they were indeed the 
main control and command centers for shirong operations. 
One jiedao visit, just as the SARS crisis was winding down, was particularly 
memorable.  The office was a beehive of activity as officials from a number of 
bureaus were coordinating various propaganda and household registration tasks in 
order to account for the whereabouts of all of the city’s residents.  During my 
discussion with the head shirong official at the jiedao, he revealed that as a result of 
                                                 
17 With only a few key exceptions, the role of street offices in urban economic governance has received 
scant attention in the western literature.  On the changing role of street offices in urban governance see 
Wu (2002) and Tang and Parish (2000) and on the changing political character of residence committees 
(jumin weiyuanhui) see Read (2000 and 2003).  One other notable exception is Bruun (1995) whose 
case study of a Chengdu neighborhood also sheds light on the employment and economic management 
importance of street committees.  For a Chinese language treatment of the changing role of street 
offices see Jing Yao 敬尧 (2001). 
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 the SARS crisis his bureau’s work had been made especially challenging as many of 
the vendors in his jurisdiction were migrants from nearby Anhui province as well as 
northern Jiangsu.  During the crisis the shirong had been assigned the additional task 
of monitoring the whereabouts of migrant vendors as part of the larger effort to 
contain a major exodus from urban to rural areas.  The official recounted to me that  
 
our department is a service organization [fuwu jigou], and we try to 
communicate to the many mobile vendors in our jurisdiction that during this 
difficult time we need to keep track of their location to protect public health 
and safety.  But usually they scatter very quickly when they see our vehicles.  
We must do a better job educating everyone that we are a service organization. 
(Interview NJ13, 6/2/03) 
 
In Nanjing it is at the level of street offices that we must look for one of the 
significant forms of variation in street market management.  The day-to-day work of 
the shirong, including the hiring of inspection team personnel and the administration 
of vending licenses, are all carried out through street offices.
18  In addition to acting as 
a physical base for the shirong enforcement teams, there are some key differences in 
the ways that different jiedao manage their own shirong teams and as I will explain 
below, at other times street vendors are able to exploit jurisdictional boundaries 
between jiedao to escape the range of the shirong enforcement teams. 
Shirong Duties 
  What are the official regulatory duties of the Nanjing shirong?  The main body 
of regulations governing the Nanjing shirong were drafted first in 1997-98 and then 
most recently revised in 2004 (Nanjing City Appearance Administration 南京市容管
                                                 
18 Part of my research routine involved visiting and observing as many jiedao as I could locate.  
Because jiedao officials in Nanjing (and I would suspect in many locations) have very little exposure to 
academic researchers, Chinese or foreign, they tended to be highly circumspect of my presence.  For the 
most part I therefore observed most jiedao from a distance, keeping track of the comings and goings of 
the shirong inspection teams as I conducted transactions with nearby merchants.  However, with the 
assistance of a close contact at Nanjing University I was able to interview and spend time with the 
official in the jiedao mentioned in the previous SARS era story. 
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 理局 1998 and 2004; Nanjing City People’s Government南京市人民政府 2003).
19  
According to the regulations, the shirong has oversight over the appearance of the 
outside of buildings, roads, public spaces, market places (maoyi shichang), motorized 
vehicles, parks and green spaces, construction sites, advertising, neon lighting fixtures 
and other miscellaneous features of the city’s appearance (Nanjing City Appearance 
Administration 南京市容管理局 1998 and 2004:Item 2; Interview NJ12, 5/24/03).  
The shirong regulations also point out that other bureaus, such as City Planning, 
Construction, Park Administration, Housing Administration, Environmental 
Protection, Public Security and others, should contribute to the city appearance work 
led by the shirong but that they should do so while remaining within their own 
jurisdictional boundaries (Nanjing City Appearance Administration 南京市容管理局
1998 and 2004:Item 5).  Finally, and most importantly for the discussion here, the 
shirong has official responsibility for regulating any form of street vending or street-
side commercial activity, including the construction of non-permanent structures near 
or on the streets (Nanjing City Appearance Administration 南京市容管理局 1998 and 
2004; Nanjing City People’s Government南京市人民政府 2003).
20  
Despite the long list of regulatory duties officially assigned to the Nanjing 
shirong, which includes only brief mention of the bureau’s role in policing street 
vendors, it became clear through multiple interviews with Nanjing shirong and 
gongshang officials (and chengguan officials in other cities including Shanghai, 
Beijing and Xinji, Hebei) as well as through a variety of official documents, that not 
only does the shirong concentrate most of its attention on street market regulation, but 
                                                 
19 The official Nanjing shirong regulations were updated on July 1, 2004, the same date that the new 
Administrative Licensing Law went into effect.  For the original Chinese version of the law see 
National People’s Congress Standing Committee全国人民代表大会常务委员会 (2003).  A translated 
copy of these regulations is provided in the Appendix. 
20 Begging is not considered a form of commercial vending and does not fall under the shirong’s 
jurisdiction.  For more on the history and contemporary status of beggars in China see Fernández-
Stembridge and Madsen (2002).  
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 it is largely alone in doing so (Nanjing City Appearance Administration 南京市容管
理局 1998 and 2004; and “Shirong Guanli 市容管理” 2006; Interviews NJ9, 4/13/03; 
SH2, 3/12/03; BJ7, 2/22/05; XJ1, 5/25/06).  For example, the Nanjing shirong’s own 
official bureau history and overview of key duties states that  
 
The chief responsibilities of city appearance work involve the coordination, 
safeguarding and regulation of the city appearance environment (shirong 
huanjing) as well as implementing the standardized management (guifan 
guanli) of street side vendors. (“Shirong Guanli 市容管理” 2006) 
 
As noted above, Industrial and Commercial Administration jurisdiction does not 
include street vendors, and while it might seem logical that the Public Health, 
Sanitation, Public Security or any variety of other bureaus may also play a part in 
regulating street markets, it is only rarely that any of these agencies interact with street 
vendors.  As I also noted above, the key jurisdictional boundary relies on the 
distinction between fixed places of business, basically a structure with four walls and a 
roof, and mobile vendors who usually operate from a collapsible stand, mobile cart or 
simply by placing goods on a sheet on the ground.   
 
How Does the Day-to-Day Work of the Shirong Relate to “City Appearance”? 
Given the City Appearance Administration’s name, it would seem logical that 
the bureau would have an interest in how the city “looks.”  This is certainly true, but it 
must be clear from the outset that the shirong does not have planning responsibilities 
or authority, which are primarily the purview of the City Planning Bureau (chengshi 
guihuaju),
 21 but is instead tasked with administering and enforcing a set of rules and 
regulations that are connected to varying degrees with those overall plans (Interviews 
                                                 
21 For more on the politics of urban planning in other major Chinese cities see Abramson, et. al. (2002), 
Cartier (1999) and Gaubatz (1999 and 2000). 
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 NJ26, 4/08/04; NJ30, 11/18/05).  That said, interviews and official publications reveal 
a set of interconnected ideas about how Nanjing officials think about how the city 
should appear.  City planning officials emphasize Nanjing’s own historical legacy as 
an ancient city (gucheng)
22 and emphasize the benefits of its location on the Yangzi 
River Delta, a region which in recent years has received considerable central and 
provincial government developmental support (Interviews NJ21, 10/14/03 and NJ11, 
4/23/03).  
Thus as a matter of course, given its official title and portfolio, the shirong is 
engaged in implementing policies connected to the outward appearance of the city, 
especially its streets and store fronts.  To this end, Shirong officials I spoke with, as 
well as bureau publications, repeatedly emphasized the ideas of “orderliness” 
(zhengqi), “cleanliness” (zhengjie), and “beauty” (meiguan) to express how the 
bureau’s work relates to the creation and maintenance of a particular understanding of 
“city appearance” (Nanjing City People’s Government 南京市人民政府 2003:52-53; 
Interviews NJ17, 9/15/03; NJ25, 4/02/04).  Chinese and western media accounts of the 
chengguan in other cities across China, accounts that as I describe below have been 
increasingly numerous, frequently carry a variation of the following description of the 
bureau’s officials and their work: “the minor officials who are supposed to maintain 
order on public streets” (Martinsen 2007; see also “Abuse of Power” 20007 and Lian 
Yue 连岳 2007).  As I describe below, however, what these accounts are pointing to is 
not necessarily just the shirong’s efforts to maintain urban cleanliness or tidiness, but 
how these efforts relate to maintaining control over and regulating the behavior of 
mobile street vendors.   
                                                 
22 For more on the architectural history of Nanjing generally and with special attention to the 
Republican Era see Musgrove (1999).  
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 How is the shirong’s “orderly” vision of city appearance connected to their 
daily work?  Again, it makes sense that the bureau’s administrative tasks would be 
directly linked to questions of urban aesthetics.  In many ways this is true, but not 
unproblematically so and in the case of the shirong’s work in regulating street vendors 
the connection is even more complicated.  Much of the bureau’s portfolio stipulates a 
variety of administrative enforcement tasks related to beautifying the city.  Such tasks 
often revolve around the standardization and rectification work discussed in the last 
chapter.  For instance, the bureau is involved in ensuring that commercial signage and 
advertisements adhere to certain size and appearance standards and that 
neighborhoods install a standard set of lighting on the outside of residential and 
commercial buildings.
23  As one official noted, “Nanjing is becoming a city of lights, 
every business and neighborhood wants to have brighter and flashier signs and lights 
than the next.  But it is our job to make sure these fit with regulations” (Interview 
NJ24, 3/22/04).  The bureau is also involved in the often-daunting tasks of cajoling 
city residents not to hang their laundry out to dry in public places and of preventing 
the ad hoc posting of advertisements, large and small.
24  Bureau officials also spend 
not-inconsiderable effort deterring fixed-place store owners from letting their wares 
spill too far onto public sidewalks or roads.  According to one Nanjing shirong official 
the bureau spends approximately 25% of its time dealing with the outward appearance 
of both private and public buildings (Interview NJ15, 8/22/03). 
However, despite all of these city appearance-related duties, the most time 
consuming and difficult task the bureau faces is the regulation of street vendors.  As 
                                                 
23 The shirong’s work, however, does not extend to the content of such signs, but only their size and 
placement.  In fact, it is the job of the gongshang (Interview NJ10, 4/16/03) to regulate the content of 
advertisements, including overseeing restrictions on the use of the superlatives such as “best” or “most” 
in any advertising claims. 
24 Shirong officials refer to the proliferation of these advertisements as “psoriasis” or niupixuan (see 
Nanjing City Appearance Administration 南京市容管理局 2006). 
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 one Shirong official noted, “well over 50% of our time and manpower is devoted to 
regulating vendors.  Part of this work involves collecting fees from street stall owners, 
but our most challenging job is regulating those vendors without licenses who are 
always on the move” (Interview NJ10, 4/16/03). Understanding the connection that the 
shirong draws between street vending and city appearance is no straightforward task.  
It would be overly simple to say that the shirong views vendors as a (pre-modern) 
blight on the city’s modern and orderly appearance, yet there is some element of truth 
to this.  This attitude is rarely if ever expressed directly in any of the bureau’s written 
accounts, but elements of this type of thinking certainly appeared in various interviews 
with bureau officials who expressed concerns about the presence of vendors not fitting 
with a modern city appearance.
25  As one official offered,  
 
In many ways those who come to the city to work, like bicycle repairmen, offer 
a convenient and helpful service, but often their appearance shows very clearly 
that they are from the countryside.  Their service is very useful, but they should 
be in a designated place and hopefully we can also encourage them to wear a 
standardized uniform. (Interview NJ24, 3/22/04)
26 
 
Beyond issues of “appearance,” Shirong officials and documents frequently stress a 
variety of concrete concerns about street vendors, including their obstruction of 
vehicle and motor traffic, the creation of garbage, and complaints from nearby 
businesses about the presence of vendors blocking passage to their stores (Interviews 
NJ10, 4/16/03; NJ15, 8/22/03; Nanjing City Appearance Administration 南京市容管
理局 1998 and 2004; and “Shirong Guanli 市容管理” 2006).
27 
                                                 
25 See Cross (2000) for an extended discussion about street vending as a pre or post-modern 
phenomenon. 
26 Goldstein (2006) notes that officials in charge of regulating the recyclables trade in Beijing also 
would like to see those involved in this trade wear similar, government-approved uniforms.    
27 Recent Chinese and western newspaper articles reporting on chengguan-vendor conflict have noted 
that one of the reasons officials crack down on vendors is because they may be selling counterfeits or 
questionable quality food (Zhou 2006; “Hundreds Riot…” 2007).  This was never a concern expressed 
to me in official interviews and rarely if ever appears in official shirong/chengguan publications.  The 
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 So at one level, it is certainly true that the shirong connects street vending in 
general with unwanted aesthetic and concrete influence on the city.  Yet the shirong’s 
grudging acceptance and even formal sanctioning of various types of street vendors, a 
subject I will take up at length below, in addition to the promotion of various forms of 
outdoor and non-fixed space commercial venues that thrive on and celebrate the spirit 
of street markets, both demonstrate that street vending per se is not viewed as 
intrinsically detrimental to city appearance.  Moreover, at least certain shirong 
officials recognize that without vending opportunities many urban residents, not to 
mention the shirong itself, would lose a key source of income. 
 
Acceptable Open-Air Commerce 
The existence of a number of other types of very successful, government-
approved, Nanjing outdoor commercial venues that proudly feature historical re-
creations of bustling street markets clearly belies any universal disapproval of street 
markets in general.
28  The first and most well-known of these is called Fuzimiao or 
Confucius Temple.  This sprawling entertainment, dining and shopping area was 
rebuilt with help from the Nanjing city government in the early 1980s and is 
specifically designed to recreate elements of the site’s history going back to its days as 
both an imperial entertainment complex and location for the imperial examinations.
29  
                                                                                                                                              
shirong/chengguan has no jurisdiction over intellectual property rights protection and the Sanitation or 
new Food and Drug administration, rather than the shirong/chengguan, has jurisdiction over food 
quality issues.  For more on IPR enforcement agencies see Mertha (2005 and 2006) and for agencies 
involved with food and drug quality enforcement see Tam and Yang (2005). 
28 The question here is not whether there are a variety of viable, state-approved outdoor commercial 
ventures in Nanjing (or elsewhere in China), but why officials have come to view street vendors as a 
“problem.”  The point here, in part, is to show that the shirong is not responsible for creating a vision of 
what the city should look like, but only enforcing certain rules and regulations that are provided for 
them by those who are paid to have such a vision (of course, these rules are themselves often very 
vague).  These examples clearly demonstrate that the city’s planners and developers have no problem 
with capitalizing on the popularity of open-air street market and their ties to a longed-for (and 
imagined?) Chinese past. 
29 For more on Fuzimiao as a showplace market that draws on historical “old town” imagery as a 
marketing tool see Anagnost (1997:167-70). 
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 Fuzimiao has subsequently become a major tourist destination for both Chinese and 
foreigners looking to see and participate in a piece of China’s imperial past, but is also 
frequently visited by local Nanjing residents who go there to eat, shop or simply walk 
around with family and friends.   
Key for the discussion here is that “the streets of the quarter are filled with the 
semi-permanent booths of a bustling street market” (Anagnost 1997:167).  The area is 
set up as a re-created “ancient” street market, but in fact the goods for sale, including 
numerous counterfeits as well as a variety of questionably sanitary street food, are 
hardly different than one would find being offered by street vendors at numerous sites 
across the city.  The difference is that at Fuzimiao the street vendors are in a state-
sanctioned space that not only does not discourage the image of bustling commercial 
street life, but that celebrates its commercial appeal as part of Chinese history and 
culture.  Visits to Fuzimiao confirmed that those who run the “street market” kiosks at 
Fuzimiao generally receive official business licenses from the gongshang via the 
Fuzimiao management authorities (Interview NJ23, 12/4/03; Fieldnotes nj106 and 108, 
12/07/03).
30   
These officially licensed kiosks serve in stark contrast to the numerous 
unlicensed vendors who set up mobile carts or rove on foot throughout the Fuzimiao 
complex.  Scattered among the two long rows of officially-approved and well-
manicured vending carts that are designed to have the look of a by-gone era are 
various unlicensed vendors who are constantly on the alert for both market security 
guards (bao’an) and shirong officials.  In some cases the unlicensed vendors would 
                                                 
30 Fuzimiao merchants may have gongshang registration permits, but as is so often the case, this seems 
to limit them in no way from dealing in a very brisk trade in a wide range of counterfeit items, nor do 
they feel compelled to provide formal receipts for commercial transactions.  As is the case with many 
businesses in China, owners are reluctant to issue a formal receipt (fapiao), which would make the sale 
subject to government taxes.  However, many shop owners willingly issue the less formal “shouju” 
form of receipt, which is often simply a handwritten account of the sale and which cannot be used for 
Chinese tax purposes. 
166 
 sell similar items, like winter scarves and gloves, to those in the licensed stands.  
However, for the most part, they sold mostly food items not offered by the market 
booths and indeed workers at the licensed booths would often purchase snack items 
from the unlicensed, mobile vendors.  However on a late fall day in 2003 the 
precariousness off the unlicensed vendors’ status came into clear relief when a shirong 
enforcement truck pulled up and officials began to chase down the unlicensed vendors 
and to stack their confiscated carts into the bed of the truck.   Later, when I queried 
one of the registered booth vendors about the raid she said  
 
What, that? That happens all the time.  Every day those guys [unlicensed 
vendors] come here and set up and every now and then the [enforcement] team 
officers and guards chase them away or take their carts.  They don’t have the 
money or connections to set up a booth like us.  My cousin got this booth a 
couple of years ago and I so I work here for her.  She pays a monthly fee to the 
[Fuzimiao] market officials and so we never have a problem with those guys 
[shirong officials]. (Fieldnotes nj107, 12/07/03) 
 
In addition to Fuzimiao, there are two other commercial sites in Nanjing that 
draw on the appeal of China’s (and Nanjing’s) history of lively street life, but in a 
distinctly modern market setting.  The first of these projects, the Lion’s Bridge (Shizi 
Qiao) pedestrian mall, was completed in early 2001 under the auspices of the 
Communist Party secretary from Nanjing’s Drum Tower (Gulou qu) district (Pomfret 
2006).  This area mostly specializes in restaurants, but along with the adjacent Hunan 
Road retail street is as much a draw for its vibrant street life as it is for indoor dining 
or shopping.
31  One of the main attractions of the Shizi Qiao pedestrian mall is the 
“Dapaidang” (literally “food stall”) restaurant, which, although indoors, seeks to 
                                                 
31 Pomfret (2006:chapters 21, 28 and 31) tells the story of the Drum Tower District Party secretary, a 
former classmate of Pomfret’s from his days as a student at Nanjing University in the early 1980s, and 
his plans to create the Hunan Road/Shizi Qiao area as a shopping and entertainment district modeled on 
Las Vegas.  Drawing on memories of a visit to Las Vegas, the Party secretary pushed through the 
creation of the neon-lit Shizi Qiao pedestrian street, at the end of which towers a huge lion that spews 
smoke at regular intervals and is accompanied by a glitzy “light tunnel.”  
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 recreate the feel of a series of lively open-air food stalls from a distinctly by-gone 
era.
32   
Finally, the most recent addition to Nanjing’s historically-themed commercial 
spaces that play directly on the attraction of street markets is the “1912” development 
project.  Similar to the Xintiandi (New Heaven and Earth) development projects in 
Shanghai and Hangzhou,
33 “1912” is a large-scale, high-end entertainment and 
restaurant development project that draws specifically on Nanjing as one of the key 
sites of the founding of post-imperial Republican China.  “1912” was completed in 
2005 and while it does not yet have the bustling atmosphere of either Fuzimiao or 
Shizi Qiao and tends to draw most of its clientele indoors, it too has a series of 
officially sanctioned outdoor food and retail stalls that are meant to mimic street 
markets from an earlier era. 
In each of these commercial developments we see this blending of a cleanly 
packaged “ancient” China that seeks to capitalize on the popularity of outdoor markets.  
In these developments, far from being considered a blight on the “modern” city 
appearance, street markets and street vendors have special commercial value precisely 
because of their connection to a generalized and historic (even “pre-modern”), but 
ultimately very Chinese form of market society.
34  Here it is important to note the 
historical role of street and night markets in Chinese society and its connection to 
current ambiguities about what might actually constitute a modern city appearance and 
market society.  Reports of well-established outdoor night markets go back to at least 
A.D. 836 during the Tang dynasty and  according to famous books of the period 
                                                 
32 The term dapaidang is still commonly used for the make-shift agglomerations of street-side food and 
beer markets. 
33 For more on the creation of the Shanghai Xintiandi development see He and Wu (2005). 
34 Anagnost also places the popularity of this attraction to the “antique” against the background of the 
Maoist era.  In reference to Fuzimiao she notes that “It is easily the largest and most colorful of any 
market in Nanjing, as much a spectacle as it is a place of consumption and production, the heady 
reclamation of something ‘lost’ during the austere years of Maoism” (Anagnost 1997:170). 
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 similar markets appear to have flourished during the Song dynasty (960-1279) as well 
(Yu Shuenn-Der 2004:134).  Street markets have long played both an economic and a 
social role in that they provide not only goods and services but also offer a venue for 
family and friends to come together and to partake in the lively atmosphere of the 
markets.  Indeed, this tension between the idea that street markets are often seen as 
paradigmatic “renao” (a distinctively Chinese concept that means “lively” or “buzzing 
with excitement”) venues by many, but alternately as luan (chaotic) by others, 
continues to play into the seemingly schizophrenic and often contradictory way in 
which the shirong approaches Nanjing’s street vendors.
35 
 
Patterns of Shirong —Street Vendor Interaction: From Licensing to Conflict  
  Based on the discussion above, it is clear that the shirong is the local Nanjing 
government bureau with primary responsibility for regulating the city’s street markets 
and vendors.  At the same time, I have demonstrated that while the shirong is engaged 
in the effort to create an orderly city appearance, there are a variety of factors that 
complicate how the bureau sees the role of street markets in this work.  To the outside 
observer, it is by no means obvious what a shirong enforcement team, looking at any 
given street scene in Nanjing, would choose to act upon in the name of “city 
appearance.”  First I will demonstrate this by painting a picture of one street scene that 
I had the opportunity to observe on many occasions over my period of field work in 
Nanjing.  Then I will take a more extended look at the varieties of interaction between 
the Nanjing shirong and different types of vendors. 
 
 
                                                 
35 For more on this tension between the portrayal of night markets as alternately renao and luan see Yu 
Shuenn-Der (2004:138-40).  
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 Xiaofan Lu 
The approximately 300 meter stretch of what I will call Xiaofan Lu (Vendor 
Street) contains an astonishing variety of commercial ventures, medical facilities and 
residential units.  The street offers an abundant variety of sights, smells and sounds not 
unlike many mixed-use Nanjing communities.  A combination medical center and 
dental clinic is straddled by a shop selling Nanjing duck on one side and a small fruit 
shop on the other, while the floors above house apartments, an internet bar and a 
financial securities office.  Nearby is a privately owned liquor store (as opposed to two 
other nearby state-managed liquor and tobacco shops) a series of DVD/CD stores, an 
open-air fruit and fresh meat and seafood market, above which is an indoor 
supermarket.  Just across the street are a number of hairdressers, a western deli and a 
Chinese bakery.  In addition to the many and varied appearances that these stores 
present, a great many of the products sold and services provided in these small shops 
on Xiaofan Lu are officially prohibited.  From the pirated movie DVDs and music 
CDs to “parallel market”/contraband liquor, tobacco, clothing and cosmetics to the 
hairdressers that also offer sexual services, Xiaofan Lu is awash with illicit products 
and services.  At the same time, the sites and smells that flow out of the open-air 
vegetable and meat market create a marked contrast with the modern supermarket 
upstairs. 
These fixed-space businesses (all of which have attained a business license 
from the gongshang) make up only part of the vibrant market activity of Xiaofan Lu.  
During the day there are a variety of street vendors ranging from the morning jianbing 
(a kind of pancake roll) seller to the fruit and vegetable peddlers who stake out a space 
on the street corner to the roving binocular vendors.
36  At night, after 8 or 9 o’clock, a 
                                                 
36 I was skeptical that anyone would actually want to by a pair of binoculars from a roving street vendor 
carrying a small camouflage duffel bag, but when asked how business was these women responded that 
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 new group of food vendors moves in on the busy corner near one of Nanjing’s large 
universities.  While still mobile (they have carts on wheels but usually also bring small 
tables and chairs for their customers) these vendors usually stay in one spot on the 
corner selling dumplings (jiaozi), grilled squid and a variety of popular street side 
snacks (xiaochi).
37  In addition to these mobile vendors, every evening one side of the 
street is lined with a large night market where vendors who set up and take down their 
stalls each night sell anything from underwear to cigarette lighters to minority batik art.  
Joining these street vendors are always a few beggars who also hope to benefit from 
all the buying and selling going on around them. 
 
Licensed and Unlicensed Vendors 
The shirong interacts with the vendors of Xiaofan Lu (and others across the 
city) in a range of different ways.  The primary distinction in the shirong’s interaction 
with vendors is based on the basic difference between registered and unregistered 
vendors.  This distinction, in turn, is heavily, but not completely, determined on the 
basis of the residency (hukou) status of the vendor.  Generally speaking, the shirong, 
often through the local street committees, will for a one-time start-up payment of 400 
renminbi and thereafter a monthly fee of 140 renminbi (depending on the type of 
stand), provide a vending license (tandian zheng) to local residents (Interviews NJ10, 
4/16/03 and NJ20, 10/9/03).
38  According to a shirong official in Gulou, the most 
populous of Nanjing’s city districts (455,000 residents in 2001; Nanjing City People’s 
Government南京市人民政府), there were approximately 650 such officially 
                                                                                                                                              
it was quite brisk.  One woman noted wryly that “maybe it’s the people living in the high-rise buildings 
around here who want them.  There must be a lot to see from up there” (Interview nj98, 11/18/03). 
37 Yu Shuenn-Der (2004:140-44) argues that at least in Taiwan a night market is not a night market 
unless there are plentiful xiaochi for sale. 
38 At the time of my field research in Nanjing the dollar-renminbi exchange rate was fixed at 1 to 8.26, 
so the start-up fee was equivalent to a little less than US$50 and the monthly fee just under US$20. 
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 registered stalls in 2003, which generated an annual income of just over one million 
renminbi (Interview NJ19, 9/30/03). 
  On the other hand, the shirong will not issue official vending permits to 
vendors without a Nanjing hukou.
39  So a general rule of thumb in understanding who 
does and does not have a vending permit, which in turn is linked to a less or more 
conflictive relationship with the shirong, is based on the very basic distinction 
between local and migrant vendors.  However, there is a secondary market for vending 
licenses and so some non-Nanjing residents are able to purchase the licenses from 
local residents.
40  Based on my research, however, those holding such secondary 
market vending permits constituted only around 10 percent of all permit holders.  At 
the same time, some local residents simply choose not to apply for or pay the fees 
associated with the vending license and therefore fall into the category of unlicensed 
vendors. 
My research in Nanjing involved over 100 informal interviews with both 
licensed and unlicensed vendors as well as fixed-space merchants, selling a range of 
over 20 different goods and services.  Roughly 75% of those I interviewed (many on 
repeated occasions) were unregistered mobile vendors, while the remaining 25% was 
made up of registered vendors and fixed-space merchants.  Of the 75% that were 
unregistered approximately 75% of them were migrants and 25% were Nanjing 
residents who chose not to register.  According to China’s Fifth Population Census, 
conducted in 2000, Nanjing has a migrant population of 750,000, accounting for 17% 
of the city’s total population (Liu and Wu 2006:616-17).  One recent study estimated 
that within the Nanjing migrant population 50,000 were “self-employed street peddlers 
                                                 
39 Shirong officials did not directly acknowledge this policy of basing the issuing of vending 
registrations upon residency status.  However, this became clear as a result of the informal interviews 
with the vendors themselves. 
40 See He Xin (2005) for more on the secondary market for residence and business permits among 
migrants. 
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 or owners of small private businesses” (Po 2001:120).
41  The analysis below of 
different types of vendors and their interactions with the shirong are based on my 
informal interviews with the vendors themselves, formal interviews with government 
officials and on official government documents as well as Chinese media accounts.  
 
The Shirong and Licensed Vendors 
  For those with a shirong vending license, their interactions with the shirong are 
relatively straightforward and free of conflict.  In fact, these shirong-approved street 
vending opportunities are specifically designed to give unemployed or laid-off 
(xiagang) local residents a “market opportunity” to make some much-needed money 
(Zhao Rui 赵锐 and Fan Shiming 范时鸣 2003).
42  Many of these laid-off or retired 
vendors are members of the community where the street committee, through which the 
shirong operates, is located.
43  The shirong vending license allows local resident 
vendors to set up a stall, usually selling food or small consumer items, during a fixed 
time usually in the morning before rush hour or in the evening after 8 or 9pm.  As a 
result of acquiring a shirong-approved vending space local vendors generally have 
                                                 
41 This figure, however, was based on a migrant population figure of 430,000.  This potentially means 
the number of street vendors was also under-reported by a similar percentage, meaning there may be 
closer to 70,000 such vendors. 
42 This is part of a larger scale effort on the part of the state to show that markets, rather than a threat to 
their livelihood, present opportunities for laid-off workers.  See Blecher (2002) and Solinger (2002a and 
2002b) for more on state-backed portrayals of the market as a zone of opportunity for laid-off workers.  
A popular culture example of the state’s effort to put a positive spin on market opportunities is the 
movie Liuyue Nanhai.  The movie, which takes place at a well-off Beijing middle school, is about a 
female student whose mother has lost her job in a state-owned factory but has been given a license to 
operate a road-side fruit stall.  The girl’s would-be suitor is one of the school’s star athletes and after 
helping the track team to win a city-wide tournament he decides to treat the team to fruit.  He goes to 
the fruit stand run by his classmate’s mother and buys 100 renminbi worth of apples and oranges, a 
huge amount.  He does this thinking he can gain the affections of his classmate.  In fact he gets the 
opposite result: his classmate is furious with him when she finds out, sensing that he is patronizing her 
by believing that he can simply buy her affection.  The story ends with a proud and tearful speech by 
the girl who proclaims that her mother, even though she now runs a fruit stall, is still a worker and that 
all workers in the Socialist Market Economy still deserve the same respect they have always earned 
from the Party and the society. 
43 In 2001 it was estimated that-laid off workers accounted for 14.2% of the Nanjing labor force while 
another 3.6% were designated as unemployed (Liu and Wu 2006:616). 
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 little to fear from the shirong enforcement team patrols other than occasionally being 
admonished to make sure that their stands or some goods are not spilling too far out 
onto the street or sidewalk. Ultimately, the question of what these local vendors sell is 
not an issue.  Even if they sell any range of counterfeit products or unsanitary food 
they are still provided with a license.  The shirong’s interaction with the vendors, 
licensed or unlicensed, is not motivated by what the vendors sell but by their 
background and where they set up their stalls. 
 
The Shirong and Unlicensed Vendors 
Unlicensed Nanjing vendors, again many but by no means all of them migrants, 
have a much more tenuous and frequently conflictual relationship with the Nanjing 
shirong.
44  According to interviews with Nanjing shirong officials and bureau 
publications, one of the key strategies the shirong employs against migrant vendors is 
what officials refer to as “scatter and block” (shudujiehe) (Interviews NJ10, 4/16/03; 
NJ13, 6/2/03; NJ20, 10/9/03; NJ24, 3/22/04; Nanjing City People’s Government 南京
市人民政府 2003:52).  On the one hand they see their role as chasing vendors away 
when they set up their mobile carts, especially on the most heavily trafficked streets, 
and on the other they try to ensure that vendors do not establish a presence in a given 
location at all.  Given the shirong’s base-line confrontational approach to unlicensed 
vendors, there are a number of forms of interaction between the bureau and these 
vendors that follow as a result. 
 
 
                                                 
44 Solinger, one of the few western scholars to have written about the phenomenon of street-level 
income-earning activities, gives the impression that in Wuhan most of the vendors and peddlers there 
are laid-off former state workers.  She makes no mention about their interaction with the Wuhan 
shirong/chengguan or whether or not any peddlers are licensed.  See Solinger (2002a and 2002b). 
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 Cyclical Disregard and Enforcement 
The first type of shirong-migrant vendor interaction involves willful shirong 
disregard for the presence of migrant vendors followed by periodic enforcement 
activities.  The most basic characteristic of shirong enforcement behavior is that after 
the main evening rush hour has subsided and/or with the onset of darkness, there is a 
reduced shirong presence on the streets.  During the daytime I noted that 
approximately 3/4 of unlicensed vendors on the streets are fruit and vegetable sellers, 
most often migrants from Northern Jiangsu Province, but they are very aware that at 
any time a shirong team could pass by on patrol.  However, in the evening, as licensed 
vendors set up their clothing or small household goods stands in relatively neat, pre-
assigned spaces, unlicensed vendors, many from neighboring Anhui Province, set up 
food carts as well as small chairs and tables on street corners with heavy pedestrian 
traffic.  At the same time, ceramics vendors from Fujian wheel their carts to busy 
commercial areas or display their goods on sheets placed on the ground.
45  While 
shirong enforcement teams certainly do go on periodic night patrols, they are often 
conspicuously absent during the evening.  One food vendor who I visited and spoke 
with repeatedly during my research estimated that shirong “surprise” night patrols 
occurred at most once a week, except during larger enforcement movements 
(described below) when they happen nightly (Interview nj44, 7/26/03).
46 
While the difference between the frequency and intensity of shirong 
enforcement patrols during the day and nighttime is the bureau’s most obvious and 
consistent regulatory behavior, shirong patrol activity also fluctuates with larger city 
                                                 
45 Most of these ceramic goods could be considered counterfeits since they carried the logo of name 
brand western companies, such as Williams-Sonoma, on the back.  Other unlicensed, non-food vendors 
also sold counterfeit cosmetics, usually on bridge overpasses.   
46 By design the shirong night patrols are random, therefore if there was a clear “pattern” to them the 
vendors would be the first to know and therefore absent themselves when they were reasonably sure a 
raid was about to occur.  My own research, likewise, did not reveal a normal or scheduled frequency of 
enforcement activity beyond the major reduction in shirong presence during the evening hours.  
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 and nation-wide “campaigns” (yundong).
47  During these campaigns it is common that 
neither local nor migrant vendors are allowed to conduct business.  Such campaigns 
may be connected to city-wide beautification efforts that come on the eve of national 
and international conferences or sporting events or they may be related to efforts to 
attain (or renew) a centrally-approved classification or status, or finally, in the case of 
emergencies like SARS.   
For instance, in late August of 2003 the Nanjing shirong spearheaded the city’s 
efforts to attain the status of “National Hygienic City” (quanguo weisheng chengshi), 
an effort that had the principal result of clearing Nanjing’s streets of any form of street 
vendor activity for a week.
48  Similar campaigns were initiated in November of 2003 
on the eve of China’s version of the Special Olympics and then again in October of 
2005 when Nanjing was host to China’s “National Games.”
49  As for emergency-
related campaigns, in September of 2002 when 38 people, many of them children, 
were killed by rat poison at a small street side snack bar in a district within the 
Nanjing municipality and then again during the spring 2003 SARS outbreak, health 
crises prompted similar crackdowns on all street markets.
 50  What all of these shirong 
campaigns have in common, however, is that once the city had been approved as being 
sufficiently hygienic by a national inspection commission or the sports event was 
concluded or the health scare had passed, the normally vibrant street markets sprang 
                                                 
47 During the period of my research in Nanjing from the spring of 2003 to summer of 2004 there were 
three such campaigns, one related to attaining national-level hygiene and beautification standards, 
another related to a large sporting event and the third connected to the SARS crisis. 
48 For more on this particular movement see Li Fang 李芳, Xie Yue 解悦 and Wang Yue 王玥 (2003). 
49 The Central government has declared that the 2008 Olympics will benefit not just Beijing’s 
development, but that of the entire country and of other major cities in particular (The Beijing 
Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad 2003).  Nanjing’s hosting of the 2005 
National Games can be understood as part of this effort to spread the Olympic wealth. Nonetheless, the 
percentage of the US$35 billion or so being spent on preparations for the Olympics that is targeted for 
Beijing itself will certainly dwarf that received by any other cities (see “Inflated by the Olympic Spirit” 
2007). 
50 For more on the 2002 rat poison incident see Renmin Ribao 人民日报 (2002).  On a related note, for 
the increasing use of rat poison as a murder weapon in China see Yardley (2003). 
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 back to life and a different, more routine pace of city appearance administration and 
contestation took over. 
Finally, this mode of on-again, off-again enforcement also extends to what for 
many Chinese citizens is the most perplexing aspect of shirong-vendor relations: a 
type of non-enforcement enforcement.  That is, despite the crowd-gathering, attention-
catching shirong-vendor conflicts that periodically stop traffic, one is more likely to 
witness what are less-than-vigorous shirong efforts to “block and scatter” unlicensed 
vendors.  For the shirong enforcement teams it often appears that their main aim is to 
simply register an appearance, putting the vendors on notice that they are being 
allowed to go on with their business but that at any time this (temporary and grudging) 
allowance could be revoked. 
An example of exactly this kind of interaction took place one afternoon in the 
late spring of 2004 near the main gate of Nanjing University.  For weeks, in front of 
the university there was an almost daily gathering of vendors, split almost equally 
between jewelry, cosmetic and clothing vendors.  Every day the number of vendors 
(beginning with 10 or so but quickly swelling to 30 or 40), and in turn the number of 
customers (usually at least triple the number of vendors) increased.  There was at first 
no shirong presence, but one afternoon, after a week of the daily growth of this market, 
a shirong enforcement team arrived and both vendors and customers quickly scattered.  
No vendors were detained by the enforcement team nor any goods confiscated.  The 
next day the vendors and their customers returned, as did the shirong investigation 
team, but this time the vendors were slower to scatter.  Instead of completely packing 
up their belongings and running (or biking) away, many concealed their goods in a bag 
or suitcase and simply waited as the shirong officials walked up and down the 
sidewalk, talking amongst themselves.  I asked a young male vendor what was 
happening and wasn’t he nervous to have the officials around and he replied, “Oh, 
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 them? They’ll just be here for a while, then they’ll leave again.  Don’t they have more 
important problems to deal with than us?  So many bad people out there and they have 
to bother us?” (Fieldnotes nj115, 4/17/04).  At least on this particular occasion, it was 
enough for the shirong to make their presense felt and after another week of these 
daily “walk throughs” by the enforcement team the small market eventually 
disappeared. 
 
Vendor Self-Protection Strategies 
Aside from the daytime/nighttime cycles and periodic campaigns and the 
sometimes lackadaisical enforcement efforts, the more common Nanjing shirong 
regulatory routine involves regular enforcement team inspection tours and persistent 
pursuit of the unregistered migrant vendors.  Migrant vendors are fully aware that 
being caught by shirong enforcement officials will be costly in terms of both time and 
money and may result in verbal or physical altercations.  Therefore, they have devised 
a number of ways to avoid being caught.  The most basic of these strategies is to 
simply wait until the evening when most of the shirong enforcement teams have 
already gone home.  However, for those who find themselves confronted with the 
imminent arrival of a shirong inspection group, especially for unlicensed vendors who 
brave the streets by day, their first option is often simply to try to outrun the officials, 
whether on foot or on their wheeled carts.
51   
The question is, where to run?  Sometime vendors find ways to protect 
themselves by taking advantage of bureaucratic jurisdictional boundaries.  As noted 
above, the jiedao play a key role as the base for both recruiting and managing shirong 
                                                 
51 One of my first experiences with a Nanjing shirong raid, piquing my interest in who these uniformed 
officials might be, involved a local kebab vendor’s efforts to avoid being caught by the officials.  Upon 
seeing the shirong badges the vendor suddenly and forcefully picked up his long barbeque grill, sending 
burning hot coals flying in all directions, and leaving his customers alone on the sidewalk with the 
shirong officials. 
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 enforcement teams.  However, for as crucial a role as the jiedao play in administering 
the day to day work of the shirong, formal boundaries between jiedao sometimes 
create a space for vendors to thwart shirong inspection teams.  This was certainly the 
case in Nanjing as some districts provided a more hospitable environment for 
unlicensed vendors, allowing vendors to sometimes exploit the differences in 
jurisdictional boundaries.  
  A case from Hangzhou, the prosperous capital of Zhejiang province, provides 
another similar and specific example of how mobile vendors can carve out a space in 
the interstices of bureaucratic authority (Huang Jianying 黄建影 and Wu Jing 吴晶 
2003).  The article, written from the perspective of a Hangzhou resident trying to 
understand the strange behavior of street vendors and street market management 
officials, describes the scene on a bridge near his house.  The author describes how on 
any given day dozens of unregistered, mobile vendors selling fruit and vegetables, 
newspapers and flowers from make-shift carts and stands would ply their wares on one 
of the city’s busiest bridges.  Periodically, a chengguan enforcement team would 
arrive at one end of the bridge in pursuit of the vendors and in response the vendors 
would flee in the opposite direction from the oncoming chengguan officers.  However, 
rather than continuing their pursuit of the vendors, the enforcement team would 
inevitably give up pursuit halfway across the bridge and the vendors would simply 
continue to sell their goods from the end of the bridge unoccupied by the chengguan 
officers.   
According to the authors, the reason the chengguan enforcement team would 
stop halfway across the bridge was because this was the edge of their jurisdiction.  At 
times, a chengguan team with jurisdiction over the end of the bridge to which the 
vendors had relocated would arrive, but this was never coordinated with the 
chengguan officials on the opposite side of the bridge, so the vendors would simple 
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 relocate once again.  The authors concluded by lamenting that coordinated raids 
between the chengguan officials from street offices on both sides of the bridge are all 
too rare and that the city’s street market authorities are frequently no match for the 
mobility of the street vendors. 
Aside from simply trying to avoid shirong inspection teams by setting up their 
stands at night or by working on the boundaries between jiedao jurisdictions, vendors 
also seek out a number of other forms of self-protection.  First, it should be noted that 
migrant vendors frequently gather together in small groups that are connected through 
home-town or family ties.  Small groups of migrant vendors, ranging from 2 to 
sometimes 10 or more, will often post a look-out within shouting distance to warn 
their colleagues of approaching shirong officials (Interviews nj53, 9/03/03 and nj73, 
10/19/03).  Once the warning is given, the vendors’ wheeled carts often allow them to 
disappear before the officials make it to the scene.  One vendor revealed another 
method through which he and his colleagues avoided shirong raids: “I have a friend 
who works in the local jiedao office and sometimes she is able to find out when an 
inspection will happen.  When she finds out she will call me and tell me so that I can 
be prepared” (Interview nj92, 11/10/03).  
Unlicensed vendors, especially those who had migrated from elsewhere in 
Jiangsu province or other provinces, were also keen to protect their vending “turf.”  
This meant keeping a vigilant eye out not just for shirong enforcement officers, but for 
any competitors who were not part of their particular group.  When I asked one 
dumpling vendor from neighboring Anhui what would happen if someone who was 
not a “fellow villager” (laoxiang) were to set up a stall next to him and his compatriots 
he replied without hesitation but with a wry smile that “we would beat him to death” 
(Fieldnotes nj116, 4/23/04).  Such sentiments showed that hometown and familial ties 
play a crucial role in unlicensed migrant vendor self-protection strategies. 
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 Despite these concerns for insider group self-protection, unlicensed vendors 
also often cultivate a range of reciprocal relationships with registered businesses and 
others community members who can provide a form of protective cover from the 
shirong.  For instance, many enclosed residential complexes and narrow-alley 
communities are able to protect unlicensed vendors within the confines of the 
residential complex.  Often, as in the case of the morning breakfast stall that I 
described being raided by the shirong, such vendors are actually local retirees looking 
to earn some extra income, but in the case of the neighborhood where I lived in 
Nanjing the local residents would also provide periodic protection, and serve as steady 
customers, for unlicensed migrant vendors.  For instance, the narrow alleyway near 
my apartment complex was home to a range of both retired and migrant vendors, all 
unlicensed.  While the retirees would set up small breakfast and lunch stalls, the 
migrants specialized in the sale of fruits or vegetables like watermelon or yams.  In 
another instance, for a two month period in the spring of 2004 a mobile chicken 
vendor would show up every morning around 5:30am with live chickens on the back 
of his bicycle.  Local residents would come out, select a chicken and the vendor would 
“process” the chicken then and there. 
Local residence committees (juweihui) sometimes also charge their own fees 
for allowing local and migrant vendors to operate within the residential compounds or 
adjacent streets.  In this way residence committees help provide employment 
opportunities while at the same time ensuring the convenient availability of food and 
other household consumer items for local residents.  There were thus sometimes tense 
discussions between the residence committees and shirong enforcement officials who 
sought to tear down vending stands and/or chase off the vendors.  In the compound 
where I lived, housing mostly retired former Nanjing University faculty and 
employees, there were a number of small food and vegetable stands within the 
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 compound itself.  On one occasion, shortly after the height of the SARS scare in late 
spring of 2003, a shirong inspection team entered the compound (normally they only 
concerned themselves with the streets and alleyways that ran by such residential 
communities) and insisted that the stands be removed.  A quarrel broke out between 
the shirong officials and some of the local residents and after the inspection team had 
departed I approached the group of residents who were still heatedly speaking 
amongst themselves.  I asked what had just happened and one of the older women who 
usually worked at the vegetable stand (she later told me she was a member of the 
complex’s residence committee) said “They told us we couldn’t have these stands here.  
But these [stands] don’t hurt anyone.  Those guys [inspection team] are so uncivilized 
[tai meiyou wenhua le]” (Fieldnotes nj23, 4/27/03). 
In the case of another example of protective arrangements, the Nanjing shirong 
itself reported in an article posted on the bureau’s web site how a small group of 
unlicensed mobile fruit and vegetable vendors had made an agreement with the owner 
of a small snack shop that was located in a building just next to where the vendors 
would usually set up each day.  The store owner made an arrangement with the 
vendors that if the shirong came by on a market inspection that the vendors could put 
all of their goods inside the snack shop and if asked, the owner would simply tell the 
shirong officials that all of the items were his.  In return the vendors agreed to eat each 
day at the snack shop (Fuwu Daobao 服务导报 2003). In a similar story, employees of 
one of Nanjing’s public parks, in an effort to sell more entrance tickets, would 
frequently allow vegetable vendors to buy tickets to the park so that they could sell 
their vegetables within the confines of the park, shielded from the shirong inspectors 
(Qian Hongyan钱红艳 2003). 
While such reciprocal arrangements, which are sometimes motivated by 
altruism and a sense of community and sometimes the result of more material and 
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 utilitarian agreements, can sometimes give unlicensed vendors a modicum of 
protection from shirong enforcement teams, there is one case in Nanjing of a more 
large-scale effort to protect street vendors from the shirong.  In Nanjing, one entire 
residential district (jumin qu) of over 600,000 people, Nanhu, has become notorious 
with city shirong officials, and a kind of urban legend among city residents, for its 
proliferation of street markets and defiance of shirong regulations and authorities.  
One shirong official confided to me that  
 
Nanhu District is a very complicated place for us.  You need to go there for 
yourself and see.  It’s too chaotic [luan], there are vending carts everywhere 
and it’s hard to drive or even walk on the streets.  But when we try to go in 
there it’s not easy. (Interview NJ10, 4/16/03)  
 
A follow-up conversation with a Chinese academic working in Great Britain and who 
had grown up in Nanjing confirmed that Nanhu was notorious among Nanjing 
residents for its defiance of local authority, shirong or otherwise (Interview HK2, 
12/15/03).  Nanhu District’s reputation is in part derived from its history in that there 
is a high proportion of residents who during the Cultural Revolution had been sent 
down to the countryside and who subsequently found re-employment so difficult that 
many now rely on street vending to make an income.
52  Personal visits to Nanhu, 
discussions with district residents and also newspaper reports all verified this image of 
Nanhu as abounding with street markets and not a shirong official in sight.  Clearly, 
Nanhu is the extreme case of unlicensed vendor self-protection. 
 
                                                 
52 One newspaper article, explaining the shirong’s many difficulties in Nanhu noted that the district has 
historically been a problem spot for city authorities primarily because of its long-noted high 
concentration of street stalls (Li Fang 李芳, Xie Yue 解悦 and Wang Yue 王玥 2003:A3).  The article 
maintains that a massive effort to redevelop Nanhu has largely succeeded in changing the physical 
appearance of the area, but on my visits there the newly painted and neon-lit residential blocks and 
mostly empty public park contrasted sharply with the bustling street markets. 
183 
 Confrontation and Conflict 
However, despite all of the ways in which vendors have found to avoid 
encounters with the shirong, such encounters are in fact commonplace and frequently 
result in very public confrontations.  First, it should be noted that although shirong 
enforcement teams tend to have the most conflictual relationship with unregistered 
vendors, they also frequently treat even fixed space business owners gruffly.  For 
instance, if a fixed place business owner places a sign or product on the sidewalk or 
street against regulations (with the shirong officials having the final say on what those 
regulations are and how to enforce them) then members of the shirong enforcement 
team not infrequently yell at the owner and/or forcefully remove the offending sign or 
products.  Compared to their interactions with unregistered vendors, however, shirong 
enforcement team treatment of registered street vendors or fixed space business was 
constrained in comparison. 
Granted, sometimes shirong enforcement officials are content to let their mere 
presence speak for itself as vendors often make a hasty retreat upon catching sight of 
the shirong insignia and grey uniform.  More often, however, it is the case that shirong 
enforcement teams, conducting a routine inspection or a raid connected to a larger 
campaign, come prepared to forcibly confiscate vendor carts and products as well as to 
issue fines.  Enforcement teams usually arrive in flatbed trucks specifically designed 
to transport confiscated items, or less frequently in the “bread trucks” described 
above.
53  Again, upon the arrival of the shirong officials, vendors tend to scatter 
quickly, but invariably a few will be detained.  Almost invariably the demeanor of the 
                                                 
53 A recent addition to the Beijing chengguan’s “blocking” and enforcement tools is a fleet of small 
vans that are rigged with a mobile camera on the roof while a team of chengguan officers monitors the 
feed from inside the van.  The blocking strategy seems to be effective within a very small radius of the 
busy street corner where one of these vans is often perched, but within not even half a block mobile 
vendors set up just outside of the camera’s range.  Meanwhile the officials inside the van, usually five at 
least crowded around the television monitor smoking, seem content to stay in the van and “block” that 
particular corner from vendor encroachment.  
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 enforcement officials is aggressive.  Sometimes detained vendors simply stand by as 
the officials confiscated their cart and products, but more frequently they at least 
heatedly argue with the officials and on many occasions physical altercations would 
ensue.  Inevitably these confrontations, being very much in the public eye, would draw 
large groups of onlookers.
54  Ultimately, if confrontations became too heated the 
shirong official in charge may step in to separate the enforcement officers from the 
vendors, allowing the enforcement team truck, loaded with confiscated carts, food, 
flowers and signs to pull away. 
Any confiscated goods are then sent to a district-level shirong office where the 
owners need to go to pay fines, which officially range from 20 to 200 renminbi, in 
order to retrieve them (Nanjing City Appearance Administration 南京市容管理局 
1998 and 2004:Item 31/32, Number 4).  One Nanjing source provides a 
comprehensive listing of fees and fines, ranging from the cost of using a “mobile” 
public restroom (.5RMB), to monthly garbage collection fees for registered vendors 
(5RMB) to the monthly fees for registered fruit vendors (140RMB).
55  Despite set 
fines and fees for recovering confiscated goods, such rules remain “flexible” and are a 
great source of conflict between the shirong and vendors.  It is extremely difficult to 
ascertain what percentage of the shirong’s overall budget is made up of such non-
budgetary fees and fines, yet vendors claimed that receipts for fines were rarely 
provided them for fees or fines paid and that the amount of such fees and fines was 
almost always open to negotiation.  Clearly, shirong officials themselves had no 
interest in revealing (or even admitting to the possibility of) their exact involvement in 
the collection of any kind of fees or fines that are not strictly allowed under the 
bureau’s operating guidelines.  The closest any shirong official ever came to such an 
                                                 
54 I personally witnessed over 50 of these confrontations in which shirong raids and the ensuing 
confrontations with vendors would draw audiences of up to 100 bystanders. 
55 The original table containing the complete list of fines and fees is included in the Appendix. 
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 admission was when one complained to me about the “quality” of many enforcement 
officers being too low (hen duo duiyuan de suzhi tai di le), implying that some officers 
may be involved in such kinds of off-the-books fee and fine collection activities 
(Interview NJ10, 4/16/03).  Ultimately, however, most vendors I interviewed said they 
would make the effort to retrieve and pay for the confiscated items rather than 
investing in a new stall or cart.  Ultimately, however, most of their products, 
frequently perishable items, were not recoverable.  
 
Summary of Shirong-Vendor Patterns of Interaction  
Before moving on to a fuller exploration of the historical and regional 
comparisons against which we can understand contemporary shirong -vendor 
interactions in Nanjing, I first want to briefly summarize the types of street vendors 
and the various forms of interactions these vendors have with the various units of the 
Nanjing city government.  At the most basic level the key distinction is between which 
street vendors are allowed to attain an official operating license (and the officially 
sanctioned stall space and operating time that accompany this license) and those who 
are not.  Street market operating licenses are reserved for laid-off Nanjing city 
residents.  Unlicensed vendors are divided between migrants without a Nanjing 
residence permit and Nanjing city residents who simply choose not to acquire a license.  
Operating out of street offices, the shirong has the most stable and least conflictual 
relationship with the licensed vendors, while its relations with unlicensed vendors 
range from willful disregard to periodic enforcement to fines, confiscation and 
physical and verbal confrontation.  Through the licensing of shirong-approved 
morning and night market vendors the bureau ensures itself a steady source of income 
while at the same time actively promoting employment opportunities for laid-off 
workers.  As for unlicensed vendors, the shirong relies largely on surprise street 
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 market raids as both a deterrent and as a way of bringing in funds through confiscation 
and fines.
56   
 
Shirong Evaluations of Vendor Relations 
How do shirong officials evaluate their work in terms of regulating street 
vendors?
57  And what are the bureau’s goals, present and future?  Shirong officials 
face a complicated set of incentives and factors when it comes to regulating street 
vendors.  More important than the shirong’s concern that vendors are a visual blemish 
on the city’s appearance, the shirong is concerned with maintaining the employment 
and income-generating aspects of street markets.  This concern exists at two different 
levels.  First, the Nanjing shirong wants to provide differential access to the “market” 
for street vending in a way that privileges local, laid-off Nanjing residents over other 
would-be vendors (often migrants).  It sanctions some street vendors and engages in a 
constant game of cat and mouse with others, but there is seemingly no effort to fully 
and finally rid the streets of all vending activity.  Second, the bureau seeks to 
maximize its own authority and revenue not only through the licensing of some 
vendors and the fining and confiscation measures aimed at others, but also seeks to 
move street vendors into more permanent commercial spaces that would, ideally, be 
administered by the shirong.  Finally, in evaluating the challenge of regulating 
                                                 
56 As I note earlier in this chapter, one district shirong estimated its income from registered vendors at 
just over 1 million renminbi a year.  It remains unclear how the amount of “extra-budgetary” fines and 
fees compares to this amount.  However, based on discussion with vendors whose monthly outlay of 
fees and fines often exceeds that of the 150 paid by registered vendors (many said their monthly 
average in fees and fines paid was up to 200 renminbi), it is reasonable to think that, given that 
unlicensed vendors by far outnumber licences vendors (again, approximates 75% to 25%), shirong 
income from off the record fees and fines exceeds that earned from registred vendors by a significant 
amount.  How much of the shirong budget comes from other governmental sources was not made 
available to me. 
57 I obtained a 2003 report from a shirong official evaluating the results of 6 of Nanjing’s 8 districts in 
terms of their performace in “maintaining city appearance.”  The ranking was as follows: 1) Gulou, 2) 
Baixia, 3) Qinhuai, 3) Xuanwu, 4) Jianye, 5) Xiaguan.  No explanation was provided, only “points lost” 
and “points gained.” See Nanjing City Appearance Administration (南京市容管理局 2003). 
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 vendors and its own performance in carrying out this task, shirong officials often 
adopt an antagonistic, confrontational attitude especially toward unlicensed vendors 
but are also aware that the vendors and other city residents have a generally very low 
opinion of the bureau’s enforcement practices.  Here I will evaluate each of these 
issues. 
First, despite formal regulations that prohibit commercial activities on the 
city’s streets amid general concerns that street vending somehow conflicts with a 
desired city appearance, the Nanjing shirong’s approach to dealing with street vendors 
is influenced by the bureau’s realization that street markets provide income-creating 
opportunities for vendors, no matter what their residence or registration status.  
However, the shirong provides differential access to street vending opportunities.  The 
shirong’s licensing of some local, laid-off city residents (and the clear refusal to 
license migrants) is part of a larger effort by the local government, an effort more 
pronounced by some local jiedao than others, to be seen as pro-actively providing 
“market opportunities” to these residents.   
At the same time, the shirong refuses to grant official operating licenses to 
migrant vendors and often punishes them and other unlicensed vendors with fines and 
confiscations.  Nevertheless, the shirong does not go to the extremes of jailing or 
systematically using physical violence against unlicensed vendors to drive them off 
the streets once and for good.  The shirong approach to licensed and unlicensed 
vendors thus constitutes a compromise solution.  In fact, there is a recognition among 
some shirong officials I interviewed that many of the unlicensed street vendors 
provide products and services that others are unwilling to provide and that are also 
popular among consumers because of their convenience and price (Interview NJ10, 
4/16/03).  Some officials noted that street markets also provide a kind of market 
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 opportunity for unlicensed vendors and at the same time act as a kind of social “safety 
valve” (Interview NJ25, 4/2/04).   
Nevertheless, shirong officials (and chengguan officials I have interviewed in 
other cities – Interviews SH2, 3/12/03; XJ2, 5/26/06) express a universal distaste for 
the job of regulating vendors.  It is important to note, however, there is a noted 
distinction between upper level management officials and members of the 
enforcement teams.  As I discuss below, shirong officials generally expressed their 
wish that the bureau did not have to spend so much time and effort dealing with the 
vendors.  But this did not necessarily mean that they thought ill of the vendors 
themselves.  In fact, as a previous quote about bicycle repair vendors demonstrates, 
some officials made it clear that they respected vendors as hard workers who provided 
goods and services that were very much appreciated by most city residents.
58   
Despite such sentiments of respect for the vendors, which may in no small part 
have been aimed at me as the foreign researcher, a sense of frustration and a type of 
battle mentality seem a fitter description for how the shirong, and the enforcement 
members in particular, view their relationship with the vendors.  One of the most 
prominent elements of the Nanjing and other shirong/chengguan bureaus’ own 
reporting of the their relationship with vendors was the view that day to day 
                                                 
58 Bill Hurst (2004), in his discussion of regional variation in the relationship between local 
governments and laid-off workers and pensioners notes a similar attitude of some city officials toward 
worker protests.  He argues that this is but one “frame” that officials use to view worker protest and that 
other frames, often less sympathetic toward the workers, exist in other regions.  Given my focus on the 
one primary Nanjing case study I do not have my own primary evidence for how shirong/chengguan 
officials view their bureaus’ relationship with vendors in other cities.  Clearly, any efforts to generalize 
from the Nanjing case would be premature, but increased media reporting of shirong/chenguan conflict 
with vendors in cities across the country support my Nanjing findings that whatever shirong/chenguan 
upper-level management officials may think, the relationship between the enforcement officials and 
vendors is generally fraught with conflict and tension.  Hurst’s study on worker protest and official 
attitudes toward worker grievances shows that official “frames” are in part a function of differences in 
regional political economy (Hurst 2004:102-05).  The same may very well be true of 
shirong/chengguan understandings of vendors, but if anything Nanjing likely lies on the “high 
acceptance” range of the spectrum given news reports from cities across the country detailing 
chengguan enforcement team abuse and subsequent vendor protest in response. 
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 interactions with the vendors were in fact battles in an overall “guerrilla war” (youji 
zhan) (Fuwu Daobao 服务导报 2003; and Huang Jianying 黄建影 and Wu Jing 吴晶 
2003).  These reports complained that unregistered and mobile vendors, due in part to 
their high levels of mobility (liudongxing hen qiang), consistently found ways to 
outrun or otherwise evade shirong detection and “standardization and rectification” 
efforts.  That the vendors’ unregistered and therefore legally ambiguous status as well 
as fear of shirong enforcement tactics gave them good reason to avoid confrontations 
with the shirong, or that they might become combative if threatened with having their 
means of making a living confiscated, seemed beside the point in these official 
guerrilla war reports. 
Tragedies like the death of Li Zhiqiang described at the outset of this chapter 
only serve to exacerbate the highly confrontational and siege-like mentality of the 
shirong/chengguan officials.  Shirong/chengguan propaganda posters further serve as 
visual reminders that interactions between unlicensed vendors and the bureau are 
likely to involve conflict and result in fines and/or confiscations.  Given such images 
of the uniformed enforcement officers confiscating vendor carts and physically 
restraining vendors themselves it is clear that the shirong/chengguan are on the front 
line of policing China’s urban streets.   
 
Alternatives: Creating Fixed Space Businesses and Moving on Toward the 
Regulation of Bigger and Better Things 
If the shirong really does see itself as engaged in a war against a guerrilla 
vendor army, does it have a victory or exit strategy?  It is clear that the Nanjing 
shirong finds dealing with vendors to be its biggest regulatory challenge and the one 
towards which it directs the majority of its time and resources.  The Nanjing shirong 
would, however, prefer that this were not the case and officials there instead expressed 
a desire to find some kind of a permanent resolution to what they see as the “street 
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 vendor problem” and at the same time to expand the role of the shirong in 
“appearance-related” areas of city management.  As for their preferred solution to the 
highly conflictual relationship with unregistered vendors, bureau officials claim that 
they would like to see mobile street vendors moved into fixed spaces that are then 
administered by the shirong itself.  Models of the types of commercial centers shirong 
officials had in mind abound in Nanjing and other cities as well.  They tend to be 
multi-story buildings that house numerous small shops that provide low-end retail and 
sometimes wholesale goods.
59  
In essence, moving the vendors into an indoor space administered by the 
shirong would facilitate the “standardization and rectification” of vendors.  From the 
perspective of the shirong, moving vendors into a fixed space would theoretically not 
only ensure continued vendor livelihood but would also facilitate easier, more 
straightforward shirong oversight, including the collection of rental and registration 
fees.  Once in a fixed market space, the shirong would theoretically manage the 
market very much as the Industrial and Commercial Administration (gongshang) does 
similar types of retail and wholesale spaces like those described above.
60  Having 
vendors in a fixed stall space, where they would pay regular registration and 
management fees (presumably to the shirong), would lead to a more regularized type 
of interaction between small private businesses and the shirong, less conflict and a 
                                                 
59 Maybe the most well-known example of exactly this kind of a transition from “street” to “fixed-
space” market is Beijing’s Silk Market where for years a sprawling outdoor market right next to the U.S. 
Embassy was a major tourist attraction specializing in knock-off name brand clothing.  In late 2004 
Beijing authorities shut down the outside market and moved vendors into a new multi-story building.  
Supposedly moving the market into a fixed space was to allow for better oversight of the many 
counterfeit products sold by merchants, but the availability of counterfeit western brand clothing seems 
to have diminished barely at all at the Silk Market or similar markets around Beijing that cater to 
foreign tourists.  For more on moving the Silk Market indoors see Lou Dan 漏丹 and Zhang Jie 张杰 
(2005).  As is the case with shirong motivation to move mobile vendors into fixed-space markets the 
relocation of the Silk Market into an indoor, fixed-space location helps facilitate regulatory oversight 
and income from rental and registration fees. 
60 Other studies also stress the key role of the gongshang in facilitating and promoting the construction 
of fixed market spaces, especially in the case where street markets were seen to have negative effects on 
traffic and commerce (Blecher and Shue 1996:136-38).  
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 more steady income stream.  It is worth emphasizing though that such a move to a 
fixed commercial space would not, presumably, have much at all to do with what 
vendors actually sell in terms of derivation or quality.  That is, the regulatory 
challenge posed by mobile vendors is not based on what they sell or the services they 
provide, but instead on who they are and where they operate. 
  Moving mobile street vendors into fixed space commercial centers may indeed 
be the long-run trend of street market regulation but it also faces a number of 
difficulties.  First, both shirong officials and street vendors themselves recognize that 
part of the appeal of street-side stalls is their accessibility for consumers.  Many 
vendors specialize in the sale of cheap and very popular street foods that are prepared 
on the spot.  If forced indoors into a fixed stall space, food and flower vendors, among 
others, worry that they would lose the majority of their business.  Others set up stalls 
near schools and universities and cater to students with a range of inexpensive 
consumer products and cleaning supplies for their dormitory rooms.  Again, when 
asked about the prospect of moving indoors, these vendors claim that their customer 
base would largely disappear if forced to move to an indoor market further away from 
their target customers (Fieldnotes nj20, 4/23/03; nj33, 5/20/03 and nj48, 8/02/03).   
Patrons of the street markets also express a similarly pessimistic attitude about 
the prospects of moving the vendors indoors.  In addition to these types of business 
concerns on the part of vendors and their customers, shirong officials I spoke to also 
admitted to a lack of funding from within the bureau’s budget for the building of such 
fixed market spaces (Interview NJ17, 9/15/03).  Even more daunting, however, is the 
problem of bureaucratic competition.  In particular, shirong officials recognized that 
even if they were to have the funds to build a fixed-space commercial center into 
which the vendors would be willing to move, such a space would then pass into the 
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 jurisdiction of the gongshang, thus undercutting the shirong’s financial reasons for 
pursing such a project (Interview NJ10, 4/16/03). 
However, the shirong’s expressed interest in establishing and managing fixed 
market spaces is only part of a larger goal of expanding the bureau’s role in a number 
of issue areas related to “city appearance” work.  According to senior Nanjing shirong 
officials, the bureau would like expand authority to include oversight over a large 
range of issues including construction and real estate development, the building and 
maintenance of city green spaces and improving the city’s public sanitation facilities, 
among others (Interviews NJ10, 4/16/03 and NJ20, 10/09/03).  They argue that their 
portfolio already includes a regulatory role over these issue areas, but as things 
currently stand their authority is limited and often trumped by other bureaus such as 
City Planning, Sanitation, and Construction.   These other bureaus do not want to cede 
authority to the shirong in part because the licensing and fining authority in these 
areas is highly lucrative whereas no other municipal bureaus are competing with the 
shirong for jurisdiction over street vendors.
61  However, despite these obstacles, one 
Nanjing shirong official pointed out admiringly and maybe with a bit of jealousy that 
in the southern cities of Guangzhou and Shenzhen the shirong bureaus there had 
successfully expanded their authority to control sanitation (weisheng) and (huanjing) 
environmental duties (Interview NJ25, 4/2/04).  As it is, however, the Nanjing shirong 
continues to spend the majority of its time and energy policing the city’s street 
vendors. 
To anticipate slightly the upcoming discussion of how the shirong is perceived 
in the society at large, among the media and by other elements of the Party/state, I 
want to briefly discuss how the Nanjing shirong evaluated its own performance and to 
what extent it was aware of its negative reputation.  Shirong officials I spoke with in 
                                                 
61 See Mertha (2006) for more on “Bureaucratic Enforcement Markets” and enforcement efficacy. 
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 Nanjing were very aware of the negative opinion that many local residents held of the 
bureau.  Through their own inner-department evaluations and through public feedback, 
much of it through new online evaluations,
62 Nanjing shirong leaders were given a 
clear picture of the strength of negative local sentiment.
63  One Nanjing shirong 
official who has been involved in creating and evaluating the bureau’s own self 
assessment reports candidly noted that  
 
Our bureau has much yet to do to educate the common people [laobaixing] 
about our work and we also need to improve the quality of our service.  Many 
people in Nanjing have criticized our enforcement teams for the way they have 
handled some situations and this has had a negative influence on our reputation 
among the people. (Interview NJ24, 3/22/04)   
 
This official said the main reasons were that enforcement team members were often of 
“low quality” (suzhi di),
64 especially since many of them had relatively low levels of 
education, and at the same time often became frustrated by the evasion tactics of the 
vendors.  He also mentioned that the bureau had been conducting its own district-level 
evaluations and that attempts were being made to improve the shirong’s reputation 
and performance.
65 
 
                                                 
62 For more on the burgeoning forms of electronic communication that citizens in Nanjing and other 
cities can express their opinions directly to local government bodies see Hartford (2005). 
63 Again, see the shirong performance evaluation (Nanjing City Appearance Administration 南京市容
管理局 2003). 
64 This critique of chengguan officers as being of low quality is echoed in some of the scholarship 
describing the troubled relations between the chengguan and street vendors across the country (see 
Wang Yijun 王亦君 2006). 
65 Yang Dali actually mentions the Nanjing shirong as an example of how urban governments in China 
are very much a part of the move toward a regulatory state.  Citing various Nanjing shirong surveys, 
Yang notes, as did my shirong interlocutors, that the bureau was one of the two least liked bureaus in 
the city.  Yang cites shirong reports about how the bureau remedied the problems that made it so 
unpopular, thus showing that China’s regulatory bodies are responsive to public opinion and well on the 
way toward good governance (Yang 2004a:177-78).  This is but one example of Yang’s focus on form 
over substance and his misplaced faith in government propaganda.  My own interviews with shirong 
officials revealed a clear sense that despite attempts to change the situation, the public’s disapproval of 
the work of the bureau ran rather deep.  
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 Views of the Shirong: Vendors, City Residents and the Media     
If the Nanjing shirong harbors a guerrilla war mentality about its relations with 
the city’s street vendors, how can we understand the relationship from the perspective 
of the vendors themselves?  And how do other Nanjing residents and citizens in other 
cities as well as the media view the shirong and the shirong-vendor relationship?  
Although it would not be a stretch to believe that street vendors, especially unlicensed 
vendors who are most often the main target of shirong inspections and raids, view 
their shirong counterparts with contempt, this would be an oversimplification.  
Although when asked, unlicensed vendors often did complain about the excessive and 
often arbitrary fines and fees levied by shirong officials, rarely did the vendors express 
outright animosity toward the shirong.   
More often, rather, the vendors’ primary concern was that they be given the 
opportunity to make a living.  Instead of lamenting heavy-handed shirong tactics, 
many migrant vendors simply wanted the same opportunity as their local vendor 
counterparts to attain a license and have a regular space and time in which to set up 
their carts free of fear of shirong reprisals.  Other non-migrant, but still unlicensed, 
vendors offered a harsher view of the shirong.  For example, one such vendor 
complained of the shirong, “They are thieves.  They are not even a real government 
body [zhengfu jigou].  Besides, all they care about is making money off of us and 
making our lives difficult” (Interview nj73, 10/19/03).  At the same time most 
unlicensed vendors, regardless of their residency status, voiced a desire for changes 
that would allow them a greater sense of stability in being able to practice their trade 
without fear of reprisal.  Ultimately, however, most vendors I spoke with were 
resigned, at least for the short term, to a continuation of the conflictual status quo.  
Often with a bemused expression, migrants would tell me that the constant cat and 
mouse game between themselves and the shirong was simply the way it was (mei 
195 
 banfa) and that being caught, with the attendant fines and confiscations, was 
sometimes unavoidable and part of the cost of doing business on the streets.   
The reserved and practical attitude of migrant vendors toward the shirong 
contrasts rather sharply with the often bitingly critical attitude toward the shirong 
exhibited by other Nanjing residents.  Many Nanjing residents I spoke with saw the 
shirong inspection teams as little more than groups of thugs, venting their wrath on 
defenseless vendors who are already in difficult circumstances.  As one Nanjing 
resident told me back in 2004,  
 
Common Nanjing people really detest those chengguan enforcement officers.  
My family has lived here a long time and we have never liked them.  They are 
shameless [buyaolian].  I have some friends who always call them ‘black dogs’ 
[hei gou] or ‘dog legs’ [gou tui], that’s how much they hate them. (Fieldnotes 
4/23/04) 
 
Both of these epithets were originally used to refer to Chinese who collaborated with 
the former Japanese occupiers.  Such sentiments take on special resonance in a city 
where Japanese atrocities went to such infamous extremes.   
Various fixed-space Nanjing merchants who were witness to the daily 
interactions between migrant vendors and the shirong also made cutting comments 
about the basis for the regulatory legitimacy of the shirong itself.  They argued that 
even the registration permits sold to the local vendors had no “real” official status 
since the shirong itself had no legitimate authority to issue such permits (Interview 
nj68, 10/06/03).  They juxtaposed these fake (jia) permits against their real ones issued 
by the gongshangju.  Moreover, some merchants argued that any claims to regulatory 
authority made by the shirong were undercut by their violent and self-aggrandizing 
behavior.  As one local merchant commented, “They [the shirong] don’t really care 
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 about regulating the city, their main priority is just to give out fines” (Interview nj89, 
11/05/03).   
Within the last year, in part because of the national media storm surrounding 
the Cui Yingjie stabbing death of Li Zhiqiang in Beijing, such criticisms of the 
chengguan have become increasingly pervasive as on-line blogs and even an 
increasing number of official media accounts document patterns of chengguan-vendor 
conflict in other cities as well.  As a result, shirong/chengguan bureaus are under 
intense scrutiny and the bureau has come onto the media and popular radar screen as a 
contender for one of the least popular government bodies in China today.  These 
criticisms fall into three main categories.   
First, there are those who consider the chengguan to be a type of rogue bureau 
that more closely resembles the mafia that the government.
66  One Chinese blogger in 
a posting entitled “The Difference between The Local Government and Mafia 
“Protection Fees,”  argued that a number of Chinese administrative bureaus (e.g. the 
chengguan and the Quality and Technical Supervision Bureau) have come to resemble 
mafia-type organizations that simply extract “protection fees” in return for allowing 
illegal behavior to continue (Shinian Kanchai 十年砍柴 2007).
67  Another media 
article from Gansu province likewise reported in the spring of 2007 that local 
chengguan officials had been charging fees and administering fines that essentially 
functioned as bribes to allow for the continued “chaotic” placement of street carts 
(Xiao Gang 肖刚 2007).  What these reports have in common is a critique of the 
                                                 
66 See Gambetta for more on how the mafia “produces and sells trust” as a commodity (Gambetta 1988; 
see also Gambetta 1996).  For an argument that the state represents a legitimate “protection racket” see 
Tilly (1985). 
67 See also Suyou Tangmian 素油汤面 (2007) for a blog criticism of chengguan violence. This blog is 
hosted on the CCTV (China’s state-owned television) web site and prompted scores of responses, many 
that included stories from across the country of chengguan violence against street vendors. 
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 chengguan for basically taking bribes as protection money in return for not ridding the 
streets of vendors. 
However, a recent string of official media articles and editorials, sounding a 
similar note to the small Nanjing business owners I mentioned above, questions the 
very legitimacy of the chengguan’s authority and is distinctly more sympathetic 
toward street vendors than the “chengguan as mafia” critique.  Beginning in the fall of 
2006, the Party’s most widely circulated English language mouth piece, the China 
Daily, began to publish a number of articles and editorials that, taken together, 
constitute a frontal attack on the chengguan’s regulatory authority.  In these articles 
the chengguan is referred to as an “obscure outreach of local law” and its enforcement 
officers as “quasi-cops” (“Chagrin over Chengguan” 2007; Zhou 2007).  Taking a 
direct shot at the basis of bureau’s authority and explicitly calling into question its 
“legitimacy,” one China Daily commentary notes, “Even if the chengguan is a 
legitimate extension of the law, which remains a major question, this is clearly a waste 
of taxpayer money” (“Chagrin over Chengguan” 2007).  According to another article, 
the chengguan basically usurped its authority from other bureaus.  According to this 
article, the “Chengguan has 14 functions and 300 kinds of power, none of which, 
however, is endowed by law but [was] transformed from those of [the] industry and 
commerce administrations and public security bureaus” (Kwan 2007). 
For local Nanjing residents, or even bloggers, to make such pointed criticisms 
of the shirong/chengguan is one thing, but the appearance of such scathing official 
Party commentaries raises the level of censure to new heights.  It is highly ironic that 
the official, street-level, representatives of “law enforcement” (after all, even the 
Public Security Bureau officers do not have the chengguan’s “law enforcement” – 
zhifa – insignia on their uniforms) are being attacked by the China Daily for 
themselves lacking proper legitimate legal basis for their existence. 
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 Finally, echoing themes that are familiar from the market order debate 
explored earlier in this dissertation, popular and media criticisms point out that the 
shirong/chengguan’s understanding of urban “order” is misconceived.  Again, 
bloggers and media articles have argued that it is not the vendors but the chengguan 
itself that poses a threat to urban order.  As one article states: “Compared with 
unlicensed street hawkers, lawless chengguan may constitute a bigger threat to urban 
life” (“Chagrin over Chengguan” 2007).  Other articles note that the chengguan have a 
wrong-headed idea of what constitutes an orderly and therefore acceptable urban 
appearance and market environment.  One such article begins: “A city’s good-looking 
appearance does not necessarily mean uniformity” (“Abuse of Power” 2007).  In citing 
an example of “standardization” gone awry, this article notes that chengguan 
authorities in Gansu and Hainan province, as well as in Beijing, have forced vendors 
to buy certain brands of refrigerators, protective umbrellas and signboards (“Abuse of 
Power” 2007).  This opinion piece notes that all of this is done in the name of creating 
an “orderly” market, but it really constitutes a set of “kickback” schemes that are a 
result of the chengguan’s abuse of its “administrative” authority.   
Another article titled “Don’t Treat Street Vendors as Enemy” offers a form of 
neoliberal argument that street vendors may constitute the seed of a future market 
success case.  As the author notes,  
 
Many of China’s giant wholesale hubs started some 25 years ago as such 
street ventures.  My hometown had strict rules and stricter enforcement, 
driving most of the early peddlers out of town. The next town was more 
laissez faire.  As a result, it now has a ‘pillar industry’ built on this cluster of 
erstwhile street entrepreneurs. (Zhou 2006) 
 
This and other articles argue that rather than fining vendors and confiscating their carts, 
the chengguan and other city officials should be involved in setting up and subsidizing 
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 new market spaces, including “shopping malls,” into which the more successful 
vendors can be moved (Zhou 2006; Wang Yijun 王亦君 2006).  While not arguing for 
completely dissolving the nation’s chengguan bureaus, these articles stress the 
necessity of a new understanding about where urban stability and order come from and 
what the threats to them are.  Ultimately, these critiques of the chengguan turn the 
logic of “rectifying and standardizing” market order on its head when they argue that 
China’s “harmonious society” relies on limiting and regulating the behavior of the 
chengguan itself. 
  One of the other policy alternatives that is mentioned and supported in some of 
these critiques of the chengguan involves establishing vending zones where mobile 
street vendors can set up and do business with government approval.  City officials in 
Guangzhou, Chongqing, Shanghai, and from one district in Beijing have all put 
forward similar proposals (Zhou 2006; Deng Quanlun 邓全伦 2007; Wu Jiejin吴洁瑾; 
The Beijing Daily新京报 2007).  What this policy would amount to is something s
of moving vendors into fixed commercial spaces and more akin to a less 
discriminatory version of the Nanjing shirong’s licensing of local laid-off residents.
hort 
                                                
68   
However, at least in Shanghai and Beijing, these policy proposals quickly ran 
into roadblocks from the chengguan and other jiedao officials who would be in charge 
of establishing and regulating these vending zones (Chen Weihua 2007; The Beijing 
Daily新京报 2007).  One Beijing newspaper report on the stalled vending zone policy 
proposal offers a particularly illuminating critique of chengguan opposition (The 
Beijing Daily 新京报 2007).  Using language very similar to general Hayekian 
arguments about spontaneously ordered markets and recalling even more specifically 
Zhao Shukai’s (2001) argument in the last chapter about “governed” versus 
 
68 One wonders, however, how much less discriminatory such policies would be in practice. For 
instance, the Chongqing proposal calls for establishing vending zones where laid-off workers, low-
income city residents and migrants, in that order, could do business (Deng Quanlun 邓全伦 2007). 
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 “spontaneous” order, the Beijing Daily article notes the tension between an 
autonomous or self-governing (zizhi) order and a chengguan-created and governed 
order.  The article explains  
 
The intent of this experiment [creating a vending zone] is to give free rein to 
the vendors’ own self-governing spirit [zizhi jingshen], in order to make use of 
the vendors’ own innate self-governing ability [zhixu de neisheng liliang] in 
order to resolve problems of vendor administration. (The Beijing Daily 新京报 
2007)  
 
The article stresses that chengguan opposition originates in bureau officials’ belief that 
allowing street vendors to operate freely in the proposed vending zones will negatively 
impact the chengguan’s legitimate/legal (hefa) right to regulate the vendors.  
Specifically, the article notes  
 
It is said that the reason [for chengguan opposition to the free vending zones] 
is that this kind of self-regulating behavior has a very strong possibility of 
bringing about the loss of the chengguan’s ‘law enforcement’ legitimacy 
[chengguan ‘zhifa’ hefaxing], because to the chengguan either it is legitimate 
[hefa] to set up vending stands on the roadside or it is the chengguan that 
regulates [guanzhi] the vendors, the two cannot exist at the same time.” (The 
Beijing Daily 新京报 2007)  
 
In other words, the chengguan position is portrayed as: any street vending that is not 
subject to, or does not receive the bureau’s direct approval, is illegitimate. Full stop.  
In contrast and much like Zhao Shukai’s earlier study, the Beijing Daily article 
stresses that if allowed to operate free from the heavy-handed influence of the 
chengguan, the vendors would not create disorder, but would largely self-regulate, 
thus making the chengguan’s overall task of regulating the vendors easier. 
The centrality of the Chinese term “hefa” here highlights a key issue in the 
complex struggle over what constitute legitimate government and market behavior.  
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 The chengguan authorities feel as if the very basis of their authority is at stake in 
allowing the vendors to operate without direct chengguan oversight, even if only 
within a very restricted area.  The term hefa has the meaning of both “legal” and 
“legitimate,” but as I will argue in more detail in the following chapter, much of what 
is not necessarily strictly “legal” on paper is nonetheless countenanced either through 
popular practice or negotiation between market and state actors.  That the chengguan 
feels threatened by an alternative, “self-regulating” form of market behavior (and that 
the official Beijing media critique would support this alternative form of order) says a 
great deal about how contingent, and therefore politically important, are various ideas 
about the basis of, and threats to, market order. 
Speaking directly to this question of the sources of regulatory legitimacy, one 
of the most unexpected results of the spreading popular and media criticism of the 
shirong/chengguan is the argument that, of all things, the new property rights law will 
benefit street vendors and protect them from arbitrary chengguan fines and 
confiscation.  Given that the announcement of Cui Yingjie’s commuted death sentence 
(in April of 2007) fell on the heals of the passage of the new property rights law (in 
March of 2007), many bloggers and media editorialists immediately began to argue 
that the new law should in fact be used to protect the vendors from the shirong since 
confiscations amount to illegal seizures of private property (Kwan 2007; Liu Hui 刘
慧).  A Sichuan University law professor quoted in the China Daily argued that “The 
Property Law highlights the infrangibility of private properties [sic], so it goes against 
the new law to confiscate peddlers’ merchandize and dealing wares” (Kwan 2007).  
While one China Daily article (Kwan 2007) expressed optimism that the law would 
indeed work on behalf of street vendors in restricting chengguan property 
confiscations, a variety of experts, including scholars from the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences and China University of Political Science and Law, weighed in with 
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 more varied and skeptical opinions about how the law might actually affect chengguan 
regulatory behavior (Wang Jun 王军 2007).   
Whatever the eventual impact of the property rights law on chengguan-vendor 
relations,
69 the debate and intense interest in this topic on the part of both the 
government and popular opinion highlights the importance of competing 
understandings of threats to and the basis for market order.  For instance, neoliberals 
were supposed to be supportive of the property rights law as part of their interest in 
restricting the intrusive role of the state in the economy while promoting big business 
and state owned enterprise (SOE) privatization, while the New Left was supposed to 
be opposed to the law in the name of the workers and social justice.  As it is, not just 
popular opinion but the official media as well as a variety of legal experts have 
weighed in largely in favor of the law as a way to protect the disadvantaged vendors in 
the face of what is described as an abusive and rogue state bureau (Chen Weihua 2007; 
Kwan 2007; and Zhou 2006).
70  Ultimately, the very neoliberal idea of strengthening 
property rights is being promoted, by among others, the official media, all in the name 
of protecting a “vulnerable” social group that is simply trying to participate in the 
benefits of the country’s burgeoning market economy.  Unlikely as it might seem, the 
                                                 
69 A December, 2007 Xinhua article announced a comprehensive overhaul of the way the Beijing 
chengguan was to go about its regulatory duties.  The article notes that “Beijing…released a set of 
norms for the city’s urban management officers in a bid to promote ‘civilized methods’ of law 
enforcement ahead of the 2008 Olympic Games. The norms, written in the newly-made measures on 
how urban management officers should exercise their power and responsibilities, requires them to 
maintain ‘civilized language’ and ‘dignified conduct’ in the process of law enforcement, and bans any 
abuse of power or verbal and physical assault on others. The regulation, which will be in effect from 
January 2008, also requests urban management personnel to properly keep confiscated properties, 
which will be open for claims from the original owners” (“Norms for Urban Management Ahead of 
Olympics” 2007). 
70 Note that at least official media attacks on the chengguan and support for the property rights in 
limiting chengguan abuse of vendors are not aimed at the Party or the state in general, but on what is 
argued to be an anomalous and “obscure” branch of urban governments.  Some blog accounts of recent 
government failures to protect consumer rights and vulnerable social groups like vendors do, however, 
contain more of a focus on system-wide government critique (see Lian Yue 连岳 2007). 
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 vendors and the chengguan have become front and center in testing the nation’s new 
property law.   
 
Conclusion 
Within a week’s period in early June of 2007 the western press picked up on 
two stories coming out of China about riots in the massive western city of Chongqing 
and in Zhengzhou, the central China capital of Henan province (Chang 2007; “Police 
Assault…” 2007).
71  Of course, there are thousands of similar reports each year about 
various “protest events” all across the country.  Yet the Chongqing and Zhengzhou 
riots were not sparked by the usual causes of disgruntled laid-off workers and peasants 
so often reported in the western media, but instead they were triggered by chengguan-
vendor conflict.  According to the reports, the Zhengzhou riots followed after a 
chengguan enforcement team official beat a local female college student who had set 
up a small make-shift vending stand near the university (Chang 2007 and “Hundreds 
Riot…” 2007).  Fellow students from three nearby universities converged on the scene, 
overturning official vehicles and scuffling with the authorities.  The Chongqing case 
involved a similar scenario as a street-side flower seller was confronted and beaten by 
chengguan officials, triggering anti-chengguan riots (“Police Assault…” 2007).  
Indeed, similar stories have been reported for years,
72 but have increased resonance in 
light of the heightened media and public attention paid to chengguan-vendor relations 
since the summer 2006 killing of Beijing chengguan enforcement official Li Zhiqiang. 
                                                 
71 Footage of the protestors in Zhengzhou is available on Youtube at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1rcUEPqJCxI.  Protestors can be heard clearly in the background 
yelling for the official responsible to show himself (“让他出来，让他出来”). 
72 For example, in 2003 riots ensued after a street vendor in Zoucheng City, Shandong Province was 
killed by a chenggguan enforcement truck when the vendor stood in protest in front of the vehicle as it 
attempted to drive away with his recently confiscated cart (“Thousands Riot” 2003).  The image of this 
lone vendor standing defiantly in front of the chengguan truck stacked high with confiscated goods is 
no where near as famous as that of the 1989 Tiananmen protestor standing alone in front of the tank, yet 
it may be more relevant to contemporary state-society relations than that earlier image. 
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 If the protagonists in the tragic story I told at the outset of this chapter are 
largely unknown quantities to a non-Chinese audience if not within China itself, they 
are increasingly in the spotlight both at home and abroad.  Indeed, the stories I have 
related to bookend this chapter are examples of extreme outcomes of the Chinese 
state’s efforts to build new regulatory institutions and capacities to govern a range of 
market forces that the state itself unleashed.  As I have demonstrated throughout this 
chapter, the shirong in Nanjing and its chengguan counterpart in cities across the 
country is itself but one of many new, or at least newly reformed, institutions designed 
to regulate and govern China’s emergent market forces.  Yet the shirong/chengguan 
bureau is a special type of new regulatory institution.  Among various other duties, its 
primary responsibility is to regulate an officially prohibited form of market behavior: 
street vending.   
At the outset of this chapter I asked how the Chinese state had set about trying 
to create new institutional forms and capacities to replace the key institutions of 
Maoist era social and economic governance.  In particular, I was keen to understand 
what mechanisms, if any, had replaced the Maoist era danwei and hukou institutions 
that were the pillars of urban social and economic order.  If the regulatory or 
developmental state scholars were right, surely some highly effective, if strategically-
oriented, regulatory institutions would be in place.  Or, if the partial reform and New 
Left scholars or central officials concerned with the proliferation of disorderly markets 
were correct, I should expect to find a lack of any state regulatory presence at all, or at 
least corrupt and venal local officials shielding out-of-control markets from proper 
regulatory authority.  A final option, if the Chinese neoliberals were right, was that in 
the absence of state regulation I might find markets that were largely self-regulating.  
What my research shows is that instead, new institutions have been created to govern 
new types of markets and market actors. The resulting relationship between the state 
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 and these markets reflects the contentious process of re-regulating urban order and 
commerce. 
If the shirong are the ground troops of market order in the cities, a view which 
is repeatedly corroborated throughout this chapter in the shirong’s own words and 
documents as well as both popular and media perceptions of the bureau, then the 
results have been decidedly mixed.  The shirong faces a complex mix of incentives in 
its efforts to establish and maintain orderly street markets.  On the one hand official 
regulations prohibit any form of unapproved commercial activity on the city’s streets 
and both the shirong and other municipal bureaus express a sense that haphazard street 
markets present a kind of chaotic and pre-modern blight on the modern city 
appearance they are trying to create.  This goes hand in hand with other negative 
influences attributed to street vendors including blocking vehicle and pedestrian traffic, 
disturbing registered businesses, creating garbage and selling unsafe food or 
counterfeit goods.  In light of this the bureau views itself as engaged in a kind of 
“guerrilla war” and makes various, although uneven, efforts to discourage unlicensed 
street vendors from setting up their stalls, including fining and confiscation measures. 
On the other hand, the shirong faces other countervailing pressures and 
incentives when it comes to ensuring market order.  That is, for all of the negative 
aspects associated with street vending, it is also associated with a number of positive 
attributes.  First, and probably most important, street vending offers incoming-earning 
possibilities with very low start-up costs for those who might otherwise have few other 
sources of income.  As I have demonstrated, the Nanjing shirong seeks to provide 
privileged access to street vending opportunities to local laid-off residents.  Yet while 
it sanctions some street vendors and seeks to “block and scatter” others, the shirong 
remains engaged in a kind of standoff with unlicensed vendors.  These vendors and the 
shirong engage in an almost daily, sometimes comical and sometimes brutal, game of 
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 cat and mouse, but the mice are never definitively driven away.  At the same time, 
through the licensing of some vendors and the income from fines and confiscations 
from others, the bureau ensures a steady source of revenue.
73  Finally, as I have 
demonstrated, any sense that street vendors or street markets more generally are a 
blight on the city’s modern appearance and otherwise create a variety of hazards is 
counterbalanced by a deep-rooted, historical, and popular appeal of such markets.  Not 
only do city authorities and private developers play on the commercial appeal of 
“ancient” forms of outdoor markets, but any visit to Nanjing’s street markets, small or 
large, will quickly demonstrate that there is no shortage of customers, day or night. 
Ultimately, then, the shirong’s efforts to regulate the city’s street markets and 
vendors are buffeted by contradictory incentives and understandings of what underlies 
and what threatens market order.  The result is often an uneasy accommodation of the 
city’s street markets.   In the meantime, the Nanjing shirong and the chengguan 
bureaus in other cities have come under increasing popular and now official attack for 
their attempts to enforce a particular kind of state-imposed rather than “self-governed” 
kind of order.  The bureau is criticized both for allowing and for not allowing the 
continuation of street vending.  Most ironic of all are the withering criticisms from the 
official China Daily itself that have declared the need to reconsider what constitutes 
the greater threat to urban market order: the chengguan as the official agents of the 
state or street vending as an officially prohibited form of market activity.  When 
official press editorials defend street markets as capable of producing their own kind 
                                                 
73 Solinger, in her 1999 book on migrants, provides an interesting table that looks at the incentives of 
different regulatory bodies in relation to their work with migrants (Solinger 1999:67).  For each agency 
she asks if “order” is a goal and if “revenue and/or rent earning” is a “goal or possibility.”  She 
mentions “Urban appearance” as one of the duties of the local government, and while she does not 
provide the Chinese term for the associated bureau, she is most likely referring to the “shirong.”  She 
notes that the urban appearance work does involve order as a goal but that revenue or rent-earning is not 
a goal.  She is correct about order as a goal, and while she is certainly right that in a relative sense urban 
appearance regulation does not offer the same revenue and rent-earning as other regulating other sectors, 
such incentives loom large for shirong bureaus and the officials who work in them. 
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of spontaneous order one is reminded of the ways in which the commanding heights of 
economic ideas can sometimes have a surprising yet powerful influence on the most 
local of state-market relations. 
 Chapter 4 
China’s Marginal Markets in Comparative Perspective 
 
  
In the last two chapters I have shown different ways in which Chinese state 
preoccupation with the maintenance of “market order” plays out at various levels of 
the government with complex and often contradictory results.  In this chapter I seek to 
place the foregoing analysis of state regulation of street vendors in a comparative 
context in order to demonstrate that street markets are but one type of market in China 
that is similarly regulated by the state.  First, I will briefly focus on a number of 20
th 
century historical studies of Chinese government reforms aimed at creating and 
regulating productive yet socially stable urban markets.  I highlight how these efforts 
compare with contemporary regulatory reforms and state-market interactions 
identified in the previous two chapters.   
  Next, I turn my attention to contemporary Chinese comparisons.  In this 
section, I focus on chengguan-vendor interaction in two Chinese cities aside from 
Nanjing: Beijing and Xinji.  Then, I broaden my focus to look at how 
shirong/chengguan regulation of street vendors is but one type of state regulation of 
what are ostensibly illegal markets, and that then become marginal markets as a result 
of state regulatory practice.  I will show how state regulation of the sale of counterfeit 
goods, prostitution, non-state bank finance, the recyclables trade and migrant housing 
and garment production all share key similarities with regulation of street vendors. 
Finally, I will place the regulation of China’s street vendors and other similarly 
regulated markets in an internationally comparative perspective.  My focus here will 
be on the concept of “informality,” which for many scholars and international 
organizations provides the main analytical lens for understanding not only street 
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 vending but a vast array of semi-legal production and service activities in the 
developing as well as the developed world.  I will show how the concept of 
informality has been defined and employed in a variety of international contexts, 
including very recently in China as well.  I argue that the association of informality 
with “unregulated” markets and labor, in addition to containing a series of embedded 
normative assumptions, renders the concept a problematic tool for any study, such as 
this, that seeks to explain patterns of state-market regulation.  However, it is exactly 
by exposing these hidden assumptions and asking in what ways markets in China may 
be unregulated that allows us to shine a bright comparative light on the dynamics of 
China’s own state-market relations.  As an alternative to informality I offer the 
concept of marginal markets, a concept that will more easily facilitate the analysis of 
the state’s role and intentions in governing such markets. 
  I argue that in China, instead of seeing street vending, prostitution, the sale of a 
range of counterfeit consumer items and a range of other formally prohibited (what in 
rule of law system would be considered “illegal”) market activities as part of a 
Chinese informal economy, we should understand them as marginal markets.   I define 
marginal markets as those that are formally prohibited (by laws or bureaucratic 
regulations or rules) but that as a result of state enforcement behavior that blends 
toleration with periodic punishment, exist and often flourish.   One ethnography of sex 
tourism in China’s southwest province of Yunnan captures the essence of marginal 
markets in her description of the flourishing market for prostitution there: “A quasi-
legal business under the gaze of the state” (Hyde 2001:155).  This quote points to the 
ambiguous and flexible legal status of this type of market behavior as well as to the 
state’s knowledge of, and often participation in, its continued existence. 
I argue that the maintenance of marginality constitutes a key method of 
governance that has important implications for questions of state capacity and 
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 legitimacy.  Such a de facto policy of largely allowing these market activities to persist, 
but with the ever-present possibility of crack-downs by authorities, allows regulatory 
officials to balance a variety of competing incentives and goals.  On the one hand, 
periodic enforcement of prohibitions through fines, confiscations and other 
punishments maintains some level of bureaucratic authority while signaling to market 
actors and higher level officials that laws against formally prohibited behavior are 
indeed being enforced.  On the other hand, creating counterbalancing arrangements 
which largely allow these market practices to continue facilitates bureaucratic 
revenue-creation, income-generation for those who operate these markets, and satisfies 
popular consumer demands.  
The result is a kind of delicate balancing act where the rules of the game are 
constantly negotiated and renegotiated.  Paradoxically, when the state decries certain 
practices as threats to market order and then engages in the maintenance of marginal 
markets as a regulatory response, the ultimate result can sometimes be social 
destabilization and accusations of illegitimate state behavior.  I argue that this is the 
trade-off in a system that formally declares rule of law and the creation of a new 
“regulatory state” to govern its new market economy but where the law and 
regulations themselves are not and cannot be universally, systematically and 
consistently enforced because to do so would threaten the Party’s monopoly on power. 
 
100 Years of Governing China’s Changing Urban Markets  
Research on late Qing and Republican-era urban state reforms has highlighted 
various efforts by local state officials to create modern institutions of urban 
governance.  Work by Strand (1989), Wakeman (1995) and Stapleton (2000) for 
example, has focused on the social and political processes of creating modern police 
forces in cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Chengdu.  Here I will briefly reflect on the 
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 arguments made by Stapleton and Strand for what they can tell us about more the 
contemporary relationship between the Nanjing shirong and street vendors as well as 
state regulation of other types of marginal markets.  Then, fast-forwarding to the 
period of socialist urban reforms, I will briefly look at Abrami’s (2002) work on the 
fate of “small traders” in Chengdu during the Maoist era.  Combined, these works 
highlight how the efforts of local governments to create productive and orderly urban 
centers are part of a project that goes back to well before the Communist revolution.  
At the same time, this project shared many of the same challenges of regulating not 
just a range of existing and newly emerging social groups and markets, but also in 
controlling the behavior of those officials charged with ensuring order.  
  Stapleton’s (2000) work focuses on late Qing and early Republican era (1890s 
through 1920s) efforts to turn Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, into a 
“modern” city with well planned commercial, entertainment and residential districts as 
well as a modern police force to maintain order over it all.  City planners explicitly 
modeled Chengdu’s reforms on the city of Tokyo, viewing it as a model of dynamic, 
well-planned and competently-governed urban life.  One of the key lessons that 
Chengdu planners took from urban reforms in cities like Tokyo was that marginal 
markets for, say, prostitution, could be best regulated through the creation of districts 
in which such markets were tightly monitored and controlled by the local government 
authorities.
1  Stapleton also highlights how Chengdu’s urban reformers tried to 
balance the creation of new regulatory agencies with existing institutions like the 
baojia, or mutual supervision, system that was inherited from centuries of dynastic 
rule. 
                                                 
1 Other issues that new urban regulatory and police authorities sought to manage were sanitation, 
medicine and vagrancy (Stapleton 2000:111). 
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   Ultimately, however, Stapleton stresses that the underlying logic of urban 
administrative and policing reforms was to create both a productive and orderly urban 
environment.  As Stapleton argues, the idea of creating a “civilized” urban 
environment in Chengdu was tied to the creation of “an orderly and productive urban 
community” (Stapleton 2000:70).  Yet for all of the reformers’ efforts to create this 
civilized, orderly and productive urban center, they faced many challenges not unlike 
those that confront today’s urban regulatory reformers.  As Stapleton explains: 
 
Most of the men who served on the staffs of Chengdu’s officials were not 
paid from the taxes remitted to the provincial treasurer; they shared in the 
division of the “customary fees” that every person who had dealings with the 
officials was routinely obliged to pay.  Not surprisingly, given their need to be 
entrepreneurial in order to support themselves, runners [a rough equivalent of 
today’s enforcement team members] had very bad reputations in Chengdu and 
throughout China, according to elite writers, who saw them as corrupt 
parasites who fed off the misfortunes of the people and colluded with local 
bullies. (Stapleton 2000:39) 
 
Thus the efforts to create civilized, orderly and productive urban centers was 
complicated, as it is today in many ways, by the presence of a range of marginal social 
groups and markets as well as by the difficulties of not just creating new 
administrative rules and entities, but also by the challenges of regulating the behavior 
of the officials in charge of enforcing those rules. 
  While Stapleton concentrated on the city of Chengdu, a major urban center but 
one far from the seat of central authority, David Strand’s research focuses on the city 
of Beijing in the 1920s.  Granted, Nanjing was the capital of the Republican China in 
which Strand sets his story, yet in many ways Beijing remained one of the most 
important centers of politics and commerce.  As in Chengdu, local Beijing officials in 
the 1920s wanted to promote urban development while at the same time creating a 
police force to maintain control and order over this urban dynamism.  In his book, 
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 titled Rickshaw Beijing, Strand highlights the role of the city’s burgeoning population 
of rickshaw drivers and the often highly conflictual relationship they had with the 
newly created police force.   
In a number of important ways the rickshaw driver-Beijing police force 
relationship of the 1920s foreshadowed important elements of the Nanjing shirong-
vendor relationship.  For instance, rickshaw drivers and the new police force that spent 
a great deal of its time trying to regulate the market for rickshaw services, were often 
drawn from roughly the same pool of newly-arrived and often poor city residents 
(Strand 1989:54).  As is the case with Nanjing’s migrant street vendors and many of 
the shirong enforcement team members, a new urban resident in Beijing in the 1920s 
might just as easily become a rickshaw driver as a policeman who might fine or 
confiscate the driver’s rickshaw.  There was also a notably conflictual relationship 
between rickshaw drivers and the newly created police force responsible for regulating 
the rickshaw market.  In a statement that could as easily apply to today’s shirong 
efforts to regulate vendors, Strand notes that “Policemen, recruited to the task of 
keeping order as pioneer agents of the modern Chinese state, faced in rickshaw men a 
moving target resistant to social control” (Strand 1989:65).  However, again reflecting 
current debates about how the state should best seek to regulate vendors or other 
marginal markets, Strand emphasizes that while the creation and maintenance of an 
“orderly city” was often a commonly agreed upon goal, the “rules and standards” used 
to judge successful attainment of that goal were far from universally accepted (Strand 
1989:98).   
  Finally, in work on China’s more recent Maoist past Abrami (2002) 
demonstrates how “small traders” were slowly but surely pushed to the margins of the 
newly planned economy.  Focusing on the gongshangju, Abrami shows not only that 
small traders continued to operate throughout the height of Maoist efforts to stamp out 
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 and delegitimize their activities but that they emerged from the end of the Maoist era 
well-situated to take advantage of new market openings.  This is so precisely because 
through their own subversion of Maoist anti-market morality and because of state 
efforts to marginalize them, small traders operated within a zone of relative autonomy, 
largely free from the regulatory gaze of state officials.  Abrami’s emphasis on the 
ability of many small traders to disguise their activities as conforming to socialist 
collective ideals while really engaging in private market activity is a precursor to 
many contemporary marginal markets that front as a legitimate, officially approved 
business while really engaging in otherwise officially prohibited market activities.   
My work in Nanjing highlights how such contemporary small traders are now clearly 
much more visible to newly created state bureaucratic entities like the shirong and that 
other marginal businesses frequently engage in officially prohibited activities with the 
full knowledge and sometimes complicit agreement of the regulatory officials.  Yet at 
the same time it highlights how such visibility has not resolved fundamental questions 
about how the state should best regulate this group in order to create orderly outcomes.  
 
Contemporary China Comparisons 
Vendors and the Chengguan: Beyond Nanjing 
  While the primary field site for my shirong-vendor research was the city of 
Nanjing, I also conducted more limited primary research in Beijing as well as Xinji 
City in Hebei province.  Here I will briefly outline some of my findings for those two 
cities to highlight what in many ways are similarities with the Nangjing shirong-
vendor dynamic as well as to point out some relevant differences.  My findings from 
these two sites are much more limited in scope than those from Nanjing, yet in both 
cities I was able to add to the base of knowledge that I built in Nanjing.  Ultimately, 
the findings from these two sites highlight that the shirong/chengguan is the 
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 government entity with primary oversight over vendors and that the bureau spends the 
majority of its resources and time dealing with vendors (as opposed to other of its 
official regulatory tasks).  In addition, chengguan bureaus in other cities also adopt a 
similar regulatory stance toward unlicensed street vendors through the reinforcement 
of marginality. 
  In Beijing, over the course of the three years from 2004-2007, I engaged a 
range of street vendors in informal conversation.
2  One important difference from 
Nanjing, and this may very well be a function of where in the city I have spoken to 
vendors (mostly in Haidian district, which is the home of many of the city’s 
universities and also the high tech center), is that none of the vendors I have spoken 
with are Beijing city residents.  Many are from neighboring Hebei province while 
others are from Anhui or as far away as Tibet, but all of them are migrants and they 
are mobile.  As with migrant vendors in Nanjing, Beijing’s street vendors are denied 
access to registration permits and are therefore prone to chengguan fines and 
confiscation.
3  During the warmer months, Beijing is full of open-air food and 
beverage markets with individual stands, which are sometimes run by non-Beijing 
residents.  However these “dapaidang” are almost always set up in the parking lots or 
open spaces that are part of larger commercial establishments, which allows them to 
gain gongshang licenses.
4 
 The  Beijing  chengguan is similar in many ways to the Nanjing shirong.  
Enforcement team members wear the same uniforms and appear to be drawn from the 
same age range as Nanjing shirong officials.  Flatbed trucks used for confiscated 
                                                 
2 See Appendix for list of these informal interviews. 
3 However, there are day markets, set back from the street itself, that are in fact overseen by the local 
gongshangju and that allow non-Beijing residents to rent stall space.   
4 These dapaidang fall under the jurisdiction of the gongshang and not the chengguan because they are 
not on the sidewalk or street but instead are set up on the grounds of commercial or government 
properties. 
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 goods and carts are less obvious than small trucks and the new, high tech vans 
outfitted with security cameras mentioned above (see footnote 47).  Chengguan 
propaganda posters are ubiquitous and prominently display enforcement officers 
physically confronting vendors and confiscating their carts.
5  In the neighborhood 
where I live teams of mobile vendors will often set out their wares in the shadows 
thrown by the chengguan posters.  Public Security Bureau vehicles pass amongst the 
vendors, warning that if vendors do not allow passage for pedestrians chengguan 
officials will soon arrive and be much less lenient than the PSB.  Ultimately, despite 
being the capital and all of the talk of building a “New Beijing” for the Olympics, both 
of which might lead to a complete eviction of mobile street vendors, the vendors and 
their chengguan counterparts are increasingly ubiquitous.  
  Finally, beyond Nanjing and Beijing, in the spring of 2006 I had the 
opportunity to participate in a research trip to Xinji City in Hebei Province (Interviews 
XJ1-7, 5/25-5/29/06.  This trip involved interviews with local government officials 
across a number of bureaus.  Of particular relevance were discussions with city 
chengguan and gongshang officials.  Our interviews revealed a number of similarities 
and differences between the Nanjing shirong and the Xinji chengguan.  Xinji’s 
chengguan bureau, created in 2003, is newer than the Nanjing shirong, but shares 
many of the key duties (Interview XJ2, 5/26/06).  These include overseeing outside 
lighting and signage, especially for commercial spaces, as well as regulating street 
vendors.  Unlike Nanjing’s shirong, the Xinji chengguan also supervised the city’s 
small public transportation system, which includes a four line bus system.  But as in 
Nanjing, the Xinji chengguan identified street vendor regulation as its most difficult 
and time-consuming task.  
                                                 
5 These propaganda posters seem intent on displaying the antagonistic relationship between the 
chengguan and the vendors.  They show various scenes of chengguan enforcement officials 
confiscating fruit stands and physically confronting vendors. 
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   Our research team’s main chengguan interlocutor noted that most of the city’s 
street vendors were a combination of migrants and laid-off workers and that they 
tended to be “uncultured” (meiyou wenhua) and generally “lack an urban mentality” 
(hai meiyou chengshi gainian) (Interview XJ2, 5/26/06).  We were told that Xinji’s 
chengguan enforcement teams were composed of mostly Xinji residents, many of 
whom were formerly in the military.  The Xingji chengguan official we interviewed 
argued that of course there was tension and conflict between chengguan officials and 
vendors.  He offered that in many ways even though the chengguan only had 
“administrative powers” (xingzheng quan), the bureau’s work with vendors often had 
a great deal in common with the duties of the public security bureau, which he told us 
has “public affairs powers” (gongwu quan) (Interview XJ2, 5/26/06).  Nevertheless, in 
a wish similar to that of the Nanjing shirong, he hoped that the difficult relations 
between the city’s chengguan and street vendors would disappear within a decade as 
the vendors were eventually moved into fixed places of business.   
Finally, the chengguang’s focus on the maintenance of “order” as one of the 
primary goals of the bureau’s work with vendors was clear from both our interviews 
and in the written documentation provided to us by the bureau.  In the section devoted 
to the city’s drive to attain “middle size city status,” the first item listed under 
“Strengthening the Management of City Appearance Order” (jiaqiang dui shirong 
zhixu de guanli) is controlling street-side vendors who operate against the rules (Xinji 
City Chengguan 辛集市城管 2006:5).
6  Given only a listing of chengguan duties and 
goals, one could be forgiven for believing that Xinji (or Nanjing for that matter), was a 
spotless model of Chinese urban modernity along the lines of Singapore.  Thankfully 
                                                 
6 Chengguan propaganda posters in Xinji, with the bureau’s uniformed officers front and center as 
symbols of urban order, clearly link the bureau’s work of regulating the city based on the law with the 
city’s larger goal of attaining “middle size city” status.  See Blecher (2006:22) for a photograph of Xinji 
chengguan propaganda and his analysis of this image. 
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 it remains a much more interesting collection of sights and smells, the small city itself 
a product of the social, economic and political forces at play across the country.
7    
 
Other forms of Chinese Marginal Markets 
  Based on my discussion above about how China’s street markets constitute one 
example of the larger phenomenon of marginal markets, here I will discuss a range of 
other forms of Chinese marginal markets.  I will focus on how state regulation of these 
various markets is part of a governance strategy that seeks to reinforce the marginality 
of these markets by neither completely and officially permitting them nor completely 
seeking to eradicate them.  For each of the examples of marginal markets below I will 
point out how they fit into the basic typology I present in chart 4-1 and note the 
various ways in which each presents a possible threat to market order.  I will then 
show how the response to this threat involves neither the complete eradication nor the 
official authorization of these markets, but instead involves maintaining their 
marginality in order to balance various competing incentives and goals.  The 
information presented for these cases is drawn from a mixture of my own primary 
research as well as secondary sources. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For more on street vendors in Hong Kong see Smart (1986; 1989) and on night markets and 
“informal” employment in Taiwan see Yu (2004) and Cheng and Gereffi (1994), respectively.  As I 
noted in chapter three, scholars have traced the tradition of Chinese street markets back thousands of 
years and anthropological studies of contemporary street markets in Hong Kong and Taiwan emphasize 
that such markets are deeply ingrained in Chinese culture (Smart 1989; Yu Shuenn-Der 2004).  I am 
waiting on a response from Yu Shuenn-Der for a copy of his Ph.D. dissertation (1995), which 
intriguingly highlights the association of Taiwan’s night markets with “disorder.”  
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 Counterfeiting 
As I note in chapter three, some Chinese and western media reporting on street 
vendors in China presumes that one of the main reasons the chengguan has for 
periodically punishing unlicensed vendors is because they often sell counterfeit and/or 
shoddy products.  As I have argued, however, the main threat to market order (as 
interpreted by the chengguan) posed by unlicensed street vendors has less to do with 
what they sell than with where they do business (on the street and not in a fixed 
location) and who they are (often migrants).  Nevertheless, many fixed-place 
wholesale and retail businesses that specialize primarily in pirated products do 
constitute another form of marginal market in China.  Whether they sell counterfeit 
name-brand clothing, cosmetics, designer bags (examples of patent infringements), or 
copied movie DVDs, books, or software (examples of copyright infringements), the 
products sold by these businesses are all officially prohibited as violations of 
intellectual property rights (IPR).
8  Here, because my goal is to highlight various 
forms of marginal markets, I do not attempt to offer a comprehensive analysis of IPR 
infringement and enforcement in China.  Instead, I offer a number of observations 
based on both formal and informal interviews with business owners who specialize in 
the sale of fake or counterfeit goods on how their interactions with state officials 
reproduce marginality (Interviews SH1,3,4,5,6 and 10, 3/10/03-11/16/05).   
As with shirong/chengguan regulation of street vendors, state regulation of 
intellectual property rights involves a combination of the periodic enforcement of anti-
counterfeiting laws and regulations with a range of practices that amount to allowing 
for the continuation of the sale and production of such products.  While there are a 
range of official prohibitions (formal laws as well as administrative regulations) 
                                                 
8 See Mertha (2005) for the most comprehensive analysis of the political economy of IPR in China.  See 
Dimitrov (2004) for a comparison of the effects of federal structure on IPR enforcement that includes 
China. 
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 against both the production and sale of counterfeit and pirated goods, officials in 
charge of enforcing IPR laws often work out a variety of arrangements with those 
businesses who sell these goods that allow for the continuation of their sale of the 
counterfeits.  Often, these businesses are able to attain an official gongshang business 
license, not explicitly for the sale of illicit products, but as a general clothing goods, 
entertainment, cosmetics, etc. store.
9  Once set up with the license, they then proceed 
to sell counterfeit goods.  At this point, state regulation becomes one of 
marginalization through periodic crack-downs, fines and confiscations followed by 
periods of benign neglect.  While all along officials from a range of different bureaus 
may make appearances in order to allow the merchant to continue doing business. 
A couple of examples from Nanjing can help clarify how such arrangements 
are made.  Informal conversations with a range of counterfeit DVD, cosmetic and 
clothing stores revealed that enforcement officials not only knew of the sales of 
counterfeits, but made explicit arrangements that allowed for such sales to continue.  
In the case of one DVD seller, his store had two types of DVDs for sale: legal/real 
(zhengban) and pirated/fake (daoban) (Fieldnotes nj70, 10/14/03).  The small 
selection of “real” DVDs were displayed separately on one wall of the store and cost 
from three to ten times as much as the “fake” DVDs that filled the bins in the middle 
of the store.  The owner of the store revealed to me that the supposedly real DVDs on 
the wall had been sold to him by agents from one of the bureaus in charge of enforcing 
copyright laws and that similar periodic purchases constituted part of the price for 
                                                 
9 On the one hand some of these arrangements clearly fit the most common definitions of corruption: 
using public office for private gain (see Lü 2000a and 2000b as well as Sun 2004).  Yet my 
conversations with gongshang officials (Interviews NJ18 and NJ19, 9/30/03; NJ23, 12/04/03) also 
revealed that often bureau officials were happy just to have locals engaging in entrepreneurial ventures, 
even if they were sometimes in borderline legal enterprises.  Moreover, in lieu of demanding regular 
business tax payments, officials often negotiated in-kind payments (e.g. a certain quantity of DVDs that 
could then be given as presents to superiors) as a substitute.  Many small business owners may indeed 
have associated such official practices as involving corruption, but to the extent that they allowed the 
owners to continue to engage in legally questionable activities those owners sometimes saw it as 
another cost of doing business. 
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 being allowed to continue to sell the fake DVDs.  Moreover, it is not all clear that the 
so-called real DVDs were in any sense officially licensed products from the foreign 
movie company.  Other owners revealed similar stories to me and also told me that 
even when their stores were subject to a raid they could simply hand over a small 
selection of products to satisfy the officials.  Thus the boundary between legal/illegal, 
permitted/prohibited is constantly being negotiated in these marginal markets. 
If arrangements are often made to allow for the continuation of wholesale and 
retail sales of counterfeits, the production of such products remains a somewhat more 
precarious, yet still fully marginal activity.  If the continuation of sales activities often 
relies on arrangements made between business owners and officials, the producers of 
such products often attempt to retain a lower-profile.
10  While similar arrangements 
between enforcement officials and producers that allow for continued production or 
for official cover certainly exist, my own interviews focused more specifically on the 
incentives provided to enforcement officials by mostly foreign firms seeking to crack 
down on counterfeit production of their products.  What these interviews revealed was 
that private anti-counterfeiting agencies based in China have their own investigation 
teams that seek out large-scale counterfeit manufacturing operations.  Once they 
identify such an operation they make an arrangement with the foreign company to 
proceed with negotiations with Chinese enforcement authorities in order to arrange for 
a raid on the production facilities.  What this means in practice is that the foreign (say, 
widget) company pays the China-based anti-counterfeiting consultant to identify 
counterfeit production operations and to inform and provide incentives to local 
Chinese enforcement agents to halt such operations.  In short, the anti-counterfeiting 
consultants get paid to do the Chinese enforcement officials’ jobs of identifying anti-
                                                 
10 Not unlike street vendors, those who sell any range of counterfeits to the public in either a wholesale 
or retail capacity need to be more clearly visible to their potential customers than the producers 
themselves. 
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 counterfeiting operations and in turn pay those enforcement officials to enforce the 
law (Interviews SH3, 4 and 5, 4/18/03).
11 
While only snapshots of a much larger and more complicated pattern of state 
oversight of the production and sales of counterfeit goods, these stories reveal a 
pattern of interaction whereby agents of the state charged with enforcing prohibitions 
against counterfeiting engage in behaviors that neither fully sanction nor fully prohibit 
these markets.  Some would look at the same types of interaction and declare that such 
behavior on the part of the state represents fragmented bureaucratic authority and 
related lack of enforcement capacity.
12  However, I would argue that such claims, 
while certainly containing some element of descriptive accuracy, not only overlook 
the importance of the kinds of arrangements I have just detailed, but more importantly 
tell us very little about the politics that produce these results.  Mertha (2005), while an 
advocate of the fragmented authoritarian/low state capacity argument that I note above, 
does concede that there are certain political elements to these types of counterfeit 
markets that “are tolerated but not officially sanctioned” (Mertha 2005:20).  In 
particular, he argues that allowing for the continued consumption of cheap 
entertainment in the form of DVDs basically serves to keep the masses passive, 
distracted and happy.  This however misses the full range of conflicting political and 
economic incentives and goals facing the state authorities.  Counterfeit production and 
sales are seen to constitute a threat to market order (even to the extent they are 
enshrined in the Market Order Leading Group’s founding document).  However, not 
only do regulatory officials see revenue incentives (personal and agency-wide) from 
                                                 
11 Mertha (2006) notes that this form of foreign, firm-based enforcement incentive has fostered a 
“policy enforcement market.”  That is, various Chinese administrative bureaus now have an incentive to 
engage in anti-counterfeiting work because of the potential revenues involved not only from the foreign 
firms but also from fines and confiscations as a result of raids. 
12 Mertha does not see payments by foreign IPR firms to Chinese enforcement agencies as corruption 
but instead argues that officials are simply acting as if they were agents in a market.  That is, they 
respond to monetary incentives by providing less or more of their enforcement services (Mertha 2006). 
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 both simultaneously enforcing and not enforcing prohibitions against counterfeiting, 
but they and other local officials understand that production and sales of counterfeits 
provides jobs.  Last, and I would argue of least importance, is the motivation of 
keeping consumers happy.
13    
 
Prostitution 
If retail counterfeit businesses hide in open view, with often only a gongshang-
provided business license as a thin veneer of official respectability, so too do various 
forms of prostitution proliferate, mostly under the guise of health and beauty salons or 
entertainment venues.  The quote by Hyde (2001) at the outset of this chapter offers an 
intriguing but frustratingly vague description of the legal status of such businesses and 
their actual relationship with the state.  What does it mean for prostitution to be 
“quasi-legal” and “under the gaze of the state?”  It means very much the same as it 
does for street vending and counterfeiting.  Formally, prostitution is illegal, but as with 
counterfeit sales, prostitution venues often operate under the cover of legitimate 
businesses.  As Hyde (2001) and Pan Suiming (1999) point out, businesses that 
provide prostitution services often operate as both a legitimate business that offers the 
services for which they receive official operating licenses (e.g. barber shops, karaoke – 
or KTV – clubs, tea houses or saunas) and at the same time, within the same 
establishment, provide illicit sexual services.  They frequently do so with the 
knowledge and cooperation of officials from the Public Security Bureau, which is the 
agency with primary responsibility for regulating entertainment venues (yule 
                                                 
13 Asked whether they were concerned whether businesses the bureau had granted operating licenses 
might engage in the sales of counterfeits, more than one gongshang official I interviewed responded by 
saying that the bureau’s overriding concern was with promoting and facilitating business (Interviews 
NJ-GS 9/30/03; XJ-GS 5/28/06).  One official told me bluntly that the bureau promoted the creation of 
any and all business activities short of those that caused death.   
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 changsuo).
14  Indeed, studies of the Chinese sex industry note that most venues of any 
size that house prostitution services do so only with the de facto approval of PSB 
officials (Pan Suiming 潘绥铭 1999). 
As with street vending or counterfeit sales, there are explicit legal and 
regulatory prohibitions against prostitution.  Yet in practice officials neither seek to 
fully prohibit this market nor to officially sanction and permit it.  As with street 
vendors and counterfeit sales, prostitution venues can expect periodic government 
crackdowns, but the final result is often that such businesses flourish.  If the official 
prohibitions against prostitution clearly signify it as a type of disorderly market (or 
alternately as a threat to market order more generally), then the regulatory response of 
maintaining the marginality of the market for prostitution is a response to the 
countervailing incentives and goals that officials face.  As in most societies, in China 
there is a kind social and moral stigma against prostitution, but in practice prostitution 
provides income for the venue owners, for the prostitutes themselves and revenue for 
the officials who allow these operations to exist.  And as with street vendors and 
counterfeiters, the product (or in this case the service) provided is popular among at 
least many male consumers.  Indeed, when a businessman needs to impress potential 
partners or to get approval from government officials (often they are one in the same), 
the setting more likely than not will be one of the country’s ubiquitous KTV rooms 
where the xiaojie’s (girl, or in this case prostitute) are plentiful, the liquor flows and 
the karaoke tunes from pirated music CDs blast away in the background.  After the 
deal is complete they may go out onto the street to get a late-night snack from a street 
vendor.  In this way, marginal markets fuel China’s growth.
15 
                                                 
14 See Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau 北京市公安局 (2007) for a sample listing of the 
Beijing PSB’s official duties in regulating entertainment venues. 
15 Indeed, Tsai (2002) makes exactly this point in her analysis of the role of “informal finance” in China.  
I would argue that this type of private finance, which she classifies as “semi-legal,” is another perfect 
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   Recyclables Collectors in Beijing 
Another type of informal market involves behavior that is neither explicitly 
prohibited nor explicitly approved.  One example of this kind of market involves the 
collection, transportation and sale of recyclables.  Goldstein’s (2006) work on 
recycling markets in Beijing may be the closest to my own research on street vendors 
in Nanjing in that he too traces the details of street-level markets and the role of local 
government bureaus in regulating and policing those markets.  Goldstein divides the 
history of “recyclable” (or feipin in Chinese) collection into three phases.  He argues 
that during the Republican era there was a “stewardship of objects” ethos in which 
material objects would be repaired and re-used rather than easily disposed or sold for 
some commercial value.  Then, during the Maoist era, the state took control over used 
household items with the intent of once again turning those objects into usable goods.   
During the contemporary period of market reform Goldstein shows how many 
household and commercial items are often disposed of as trash, yet at the same time 
markets have appeared for the collection and sale of potentially reusable or recyclable 
goods.  With reform the state largely abandoned its control and direct management 
over such goods and into this void stepped thousands of mostly migrant collectors 
who would purchase scrap items and resell them at collection sites, also run by 
migrants.  Over time the state sought to re-establish a form of control over this new 
market for commercial recyclables and this has led to various forms of conflict as 
officials and collectors struggle for control over the more lucrative aspects of this trade.  
As Goldstein explains it, this conflict is part of a “massive political and economic 
contest in cities throughout China” over control of public space (Goldstein 2006:261).  
                                                                                                                                              
example of a market that the state regulates through marginalization in much the same way it does street 
markets, counterfeiting and prostitution.  I discuss Tsai’s argument in more detail below. 
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 Goldstein presents an array of evidence that highlights state efforts to create 
order over the market for recyclables.  Quoting a document from the Beijing Resource 
Recycling Company – BRRC (Beijing Wuzi Huishou Gongsi), the state body in charge 
of regulating the market for recyclables, Goldstein demonstrates the official view that 
migrant controlled collection points were “dirty, chaotic, and deficient” and that the 
migrant role in the trade in recyclables “disrupts the safety and economic order of our 
capital’s society” (Goldstein 2006:289 and 286; my emphasis).  At the heart of the 
criticism of the disorderly nature of the market for recyclables is that unregistered, low 
quality (suzhi di), and inherently untrustworthy migrants have been allowed unlimited 
control over the recyclables trade.  
What, then, are the keys to regulating this disorderly market for recyclables?  
As with the regulation of other marginal markets, the state response to the threat of 
disorderly recyclables markets involves a mixture of negotiated approval and 
punishment.  In this case of Beijing’s recycling markets, officials have emphasized the 
“standardization” side of the market order work of rectification and standardization.  
The key elements of this process involved targeting the city’s over 100,000 “roaming 
collectors” and “having them use uniform vehicles, uniform scales [because they 
cannot be trusted to use accurate scales], uniform work clothes, uniform service 
standards” as well as “uniform logos, prices, and measurement instruments” 
(Goldstein 2006:292).   
These elements of standardization were only one part of a larger process that 
has similar elements to the Nanjing’s shirong’s regulation of street vendors.  In 
particular, the BRRC sought increased control over who had the right to participate in 
the recyclables trade.  BRRC officials understood that the most lucrative part of the 
recyclables trade was in scrap metals and some sought to limit the allocation of 
licenses for scrap metal trade to those with local residence permits (Goldstein 
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 2006:281).  A more extreme version of providing differential access to the trade in 
recyclables sought to replace migrants “primarily with laid-off BRRC employees and 
excess workers from state industries, and secondarily [with] healthy and capable 
neighborhood residents [hired] as managers” (Goldstein 2006:292).  Finally, BRRC 
authorities sought to shore up their own ability to ensure a steady flow of revenue 
through fees and licenses at recyclable collection points.  Thus control over collection 
points eventually was taken over by BRRC officials across the city.
16 
 
Regulating Migrant Housing and Garment Production in Zhejiangcun  
Another variation on state efforts to regulate via the maintenance of 
marginality involves migrant housing and garment production in Beijing’s 
Zhejiangcun.  This example serves to highlight the central role migrants often play in 
marginal markets.  Zhang Li’s (2001a and b) work ethnographic work on Zhejiangcun 
highlights the tug of war between a range of local authorities and migrants from 
Zhejiang Province who in the early 1990s constructed a bustling commercial and 
residential district on the outskirts of Beijing.  On the one side of this frequently 
tumultuous relationship were not only migrants from Zhejiang but also from a number 
of other provinces who often came to work for Zhejiang bosses.  On the other side 
were arrayed different government official all the way from village government 
bureaus that had immediate authority over the district that became known as Zhejiang 
Village (Zhejiangcun) all the way up to the Beijing mayor’s office.   
Zhang argues that the tumultuous relationship between migrants in Zhejiang 
Village and local officials was often driven by the state’s imperative to control urban 
                                                 
16 Goldstein notes, however, that once the government authorities had re-established control over these 
markets they were content to once again, for a regular fee, turn over everyday management to some of 
the original migrant bosses. 
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 space and to create “order.”
17  Zhang notes that the 1995 razing of Zhejiang Village 
was dubbed the “clean up and reorder” (qingli zhengdun) campaign.
18  She shows how 
officials’ concerns about the disorder presented by the existence of Zhejiang village 
included spatial, social and financial components.  Migrants were often associated 
with an untidy and dirty community appearance as well as with criminal activity 
(Zhang 2001a:138-46).  As a response, and in ways very similar to the shirong goals I 
explored above, many of the Beijing officials with oversight over Zhejiancun sought 
to use their administrative authority to move migrants into commercial spaces that 
were more directly regulated by the authorities through rental and licensing 
arrangements.  Here Zhang notes that “the ultimate intention of the campaign to clean 
up Zhejiangcun was not to erase the community altogether, but to weaken its 
formation of nonstate power and turn it into a regulated regime of private capital” 
(Zhang 2001a:199).  However, Zhang also discovered that there were a variety of 
power dynamics within the migrant community itself.   
She demonstrates how local officials were ultimately often divided as to how 
to best manage this dynamic, and in many ways highly profitable, new community of 
what she calls “migrant entrepreneurs.”  Echoing Lieberthal’s (1992) earlier 
characterization of China’s “fragmented authoritarian” political system, Zhang dubs 
this system of local authority “an internally divided regulatory regime” (Zhang 
                                                 
17 It is common for studies that rely on theories from the discipline of geography (as both Zhang and 
Goldstein do) to stress the “politics of space” or the need for the state to “control public space.”  Books 
with titles like “State/Space” (Brenner, et. al. 2003) offer a tantalizing glimpse at the possibility of 
linking geographic and political processes to state theory, however too often get bogged down in 
descriptions of the details of city planning or veer off into pure theory and I am always left wondering 
how issues of space are concretely linked to power.  Brenner’s (2004) focus on the “rescaling of 
statehood” in the European Union is more concrete in that it stresses the impact of neoliberal economic 
reforms and the devolution of power to municipalities, while at the same time showing how these 
municipalities try to link in with global capital. 
18 Zhang translates “zhengdun” as “reorder” although as noted in the previous chapter, officials 
translations almost always translate the term as “rectify.” 
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 2001a:6).
19  Ultimately, however, despite the internal contradictions of state efforts to 
regulate Zhejiang Village, Zhang is also keen to point out that her work is a clear 
challenge to both “the retreat of the state” as well as to “the triumph of the market and 
capitalism” literatures (Zhang 2001a:5).  As Zhang’s work highlights, while the state’s 
efforts to regulate emergent markets and social groups in and around the country’s 
dynamic urban centers may be full of seeming contradictions, the state is far from 
absent when it comes to governing these markets and groups.  As my own thoughts on 
the maintenance of marginality as a de facto governance strategy highlights, we should 
not be surprised by the built-in contradictions and inconsistencies in state regulatory 
behavior, but should instead understand them as a fundamentally political response to 
complex incentives and goals.   
 
Cross National Comparisons: Informality Versus Marginality 
  Explanations of the political economy of street vending and other markets that 
occupy an ambiguous space in relation to state authority, phenomena that exist across 
the world but that are often particularly prevalent in developing countries, are 
frequently analyzed through the conceptual lens of “informality.”
20  Indeed, 
informality is such a common-sense concept not just in academics but in popular use 
in places like Latin America, that it is almost unimaginable that any analysis or 
discussion of street vending would not at least begin with informality as the basic 
                                                 
19 Here Zhang’s analysis coincides with Mertha’s work on counterfeiting enforcement in that both 
emphasize the uncoordinated and fragmented nature of bureaucratic responses.     
20 Urban centers in developing countries are by no means the only places with large numbers of street 
vendors, many of whom have a less than harmonious relationship with local authorities.  For instance, 
The New York Times has reported on the continuing tension between street vendors, store owners and 
local officials in Times Square (Lueck 2003).  According to this report many Times Square street 
vendors have vending registrations that date back to after the Civil War when city officials issued 
vending permits to disabled veterans in a move not unlike the Nanjing shirong’s provision of 
preferential access to vending licenses for laid-off local workers.  Studies of informality in developed 
countries are by no means limited to street vending as one important branch of this research project 
involves the analysis of “post-fordist,” “flexible specialization” of labor in developed countries (see, for 
example, Piore and Sabel 1984). 
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 theoretical framework.
21  China remains one clear exception, as the number of 
Chinese or foreign analysts who employ the concept of informality to understand
similar phenomena in China are few and far betw
 
een.   
                                                
Here I will describe how the concept of informality is typically defined and 
deployed.  I will show that studies of informality, especially those that focus on 
developing countries, highlight processes of government and market reform very 
similar to those in China that have led to the proliferation of marginal markets like 
street vending.  However, I will demonstrate that linking informality with 
“unregulated” markets and labor is of very limited utility in a country like China 
where the state is intimately involved in regulating many of those markets that it 
explicitly prohibits.  Most analyses of informality attempt to clearly distinguish 
informal from illegal activities, but there are many embedded assumptions about the 
role of rule of law that do not easily transfer to the Chinese case.  Understanding why 
the rule of law cannot be the foundation for regulating the economy goes a long way 
toward explaining why the maintenance of marginal markets in China is a key tool of 
governance.  Ultimately, I will argue that both the strengths and weaknesses of the 
concept of informality can illuminate important comparative aspects of state 
regulation of marginal markets, including street vending, in China. 
 
Definition and Causes of Informality 
The concept of informality was originally formulated by an Africa scholar, 
Keith Hart, in the early 1970s and subsequently sparked a vast wave of scholarship 
that has impacted not only academia but policy-making as well.
22  While there are a 
 
21 Some scholars go even a step further by insisting that “No analysis of contemporary Latin America 
and no policy proscriptions for its future are complete without reference to its informal economy” 
(Centeno and Portes 2006:3). 
22 See Hart’s (1973) foundational essay.  The application of the concept of informality has been 
especially pronounced in Latin America, but has also been used in numerous studies across the world.  
231 
 number of competing definitions of informality,
23 the one that arguably has the 
broadest acceptance and is most often employed in the informality literature is a 
variation on the following: informality “is a process of income-generation…[that] is 
unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which 
similar activities are regulated” (Castells and Portes 1989:12).
24  Despite the wide 
range of definitions of informality, street vendors are in many ways the face of the 
concept and scholarship on the political economy of street vending in places ranging 
from Latin America, to Africa, to the Middle East to South Asia continues to make 
frequent use of the idea of informality (Roever 2005; Tripp 1997; de Soto 2000; and 
Rajagopal 2001).  Here I will demonstrate that the broader scholarship on informality, 
especially as it relates to street vending, asks a number of questions that are of direct 
relevance to understanding marginal markets in China.  Key among these questions 
are how such marginal markets and social groups have come into existence and, once 
in existence, what is the state’s relationship with these markets and social groups?  
                                                                                                                                              
The concept has played an especially important role in the work of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), which sponsors numerous development programs aimed at supporting the informal 
sector across the developing world (see the ILO’s informal economy web site: 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/infeco/).  
23 One need only look at the title of Danesh’s (1991) annotated bibliography of research related to the 
informal economy, The Informal Economy: Underground Economy, Moonlighting, Subcontracting, 
Household Economy, Unorganized Sector, Barter, Ghetto Economy, Second Economy: A Research 
Guide, for a sense of the myriad of ways in which the informal economy concept has been stretched.  
See Sartori (1970) and Collier and Mahon (1993) for more on the problems of conceptual stretching. 
24 Cross (2000:32) and Roever (2005:5) also cite this as the most commonly accepted definition of 
informality.  A great deal of debate has taken place over this concept and the International Labour 
Office (ILO), among others, has worked hard to produce a more nuanced definition, but the lack of state 
regulation as a defining characteristic of informality is still central to many studies that employ the 
concept.  Alejandro Portes, one of the main sponsors of the definition of informality as a lack of 
regulation, notes that there are two other main competing definitions.  One of them, sponsored by 
Tokman (1992), associates informality with a form of production “characterised by low capital 
intensiveness, small size, and pre-modern or less modern methods of production.”  The other, which I 
will allude to again below, is sponsored by the now-famous Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, who 
argues that “informal activities are the popular means to escape the rigid and cumbersome regulations 
of a mercantilist state.”  See Portes (1996) for his description of both of these definitions as well as a 
clarification of his own, “structuralist,” definition.  See Portes and Schauffler (1993) for an overview of 
competing definitions of informality related specifically to Latin America.  
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 Finally, much of the scholarship on informality asks what the existence of the 
phenomenon says about state capacity.       
  Scholars of informality argue that street vendors, as one part of the informal 
economy or informal “sector”, have come to be on the streets as part of the process of 
market reform and welfare state retrenchment that have spread to many corners of the 
world since the 1970s.  They point to market reforms in countries from Peru to 
Tanzania to India that have involved the large-scale privatization of state-owned 
enterprises as well as the weakening of organized labor, both of which have often 
coincided with an ongoing process of rural to urban migration (Portes and Schauffler 
1993; Tripp 1997; Bremen 1996).  These “structural reforms” meant that many former 
SOE employees as well as rural migrants found themselves literally on the streets, or 
at least no longer in their former government-backed jobs, looking for new ways to 
earn a living under much more “flexible” working conditions and without a state-
provided social safety net. 
 
Defining “Unregulated”: Part One 
  It is against this background of economic liberalization that many analyses of 
informality present their arguments about the “unregulated” nature of informal 
markets and workers.  Scholars who employ the concept of informality frequently tend 
to mix two related yet distinct interpretations of what it means for informal markets 
and workers to be unregulated.  The first of these interpretations is tied very closely to 
the processes of structural reform and welfare state retrenchment that I just described.  
Here, deregulation points to the process whereby many former SOE workers as well as 
others who had enjoyed certain labor arrangements in which they had state-backed 
wage, health care, pension benefits as well as workplace safety guarantees, were 
forced into “flexible” employment where the state no longer enforced these 
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 “regulations.”  In this sense regulation is associated with a certain set of state-backed 
welfare policies and labor standards while its opposite, deregulation, is associated with 
welfare retrenchment and limited labor standards.  Many former industrial workers as 
well as migrants who found themselves working as street vendors were thus by 
definition considered to be informal because they were no longer working under 
regulated labor arrangements or with recourse to state-backed social benefits.   
For those who equate “deregulation” with the move away from a more statist 
development model toward, for lack of another word, a neoliberal model, deregulation 
has a largely negative connotation.  Much like China’s New Left scholars, authors 
who stress this understanding of unregulated informality clearly lament this change in 
state-economy relations and associate “regulated” markets and labor with good 
government policy and “unregulated” or “deregulated” markets and labor with bad 
government policy.  For them, any interaction between the state and newly informal 
markets and labor that does not replicate or seek to replicate the kinds of benefits, 
rules and guarantees that existed before the reforms does not constitute regulation at 
all.
25  Ultimately, then, for many authors who write about informality there is a subtle 
and often unspoken component of their understanding of regulation as a normative and 
binary concept.  That is, markets and labor are either regulated, which means that the 
state provides all of these benefits and guarantees described above, or they are 
unregulated, which means the state provides few to none of these benefits and 
guarantees. 
 
 
                                                 
25 I would place ILO understandings of informality as synonymous with poverty in this category.  Also, 
for all of the nuanced scholarship that Portes has produced on informality, his “structural” approach 
offers a very restrictive and confusing definition (one that is more implied that specified) of 
“regulation” that despite its implied critique of welfare state retrenchment is highly limited as a tool of 
political analysis. 
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 Defining “Unregulated”: Part Two 
While this first understanding of the unregulated nature of informality stresses 
a definitive shift away from the state’s commitment to a certain form of production 
and labor arrangements it says very little about how the state interacts with newly 
informal markets and workers once in their new situation.  For those who do take up 
the question of how the state interacts with those who no longer enjoy the protection 
and benefits of “formal” employment there are two primary responses.  These vary 
between the argument that informal markets are simply hidden from the view of state 
officials to the claim that officials know about and can “see” these markets, and may 
not even necessarily be opposed to their existence, but instead “intentionally [do] not 
intervene in an explicit, active, or institutionalized way” (Roever 2005:5).  Either way, 
the thrust of the argument is that the state lacks a regularized, institutional form of 
interaction with those in the informal sector (e.g. those in this sector do not have 
official business licenses nor do they pay taxes or other official fees), whether it 
knows about or in some sense approves of their activities.  
A number of alternative explanations, again often infused with more or less 
explicit normative assumptions, have been offered as to why the state does not 
regulate these informal markets.  The first of these emphasizes informal worker 
motivations and capacity to remain unregistered and otherwise invisible to the state 
regulatory radar.   The principal idea is that street vendors, to take one example of 
those in the informal sector, simply choose not to attain official operating permits or to 
pay taxes or other fees because these all constitute too great of a financial and/or time 
burden.  Authors like Peru’s Hernando de Soto emphasize that despite having escaped 
from the overly rule-bound workplace (either an SOE or a private firm that was 
required by the state to comply with all of the social security and workplace 
guarantees noted above), small-scale entrepreneurs are deterred from registering their 
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 new businesses (e.g. street stalls) because of the vast number of permits and other 
bureaucratic obstacles that stand in the way of becoming legally registered (De Soto 
1989).  While de Soto sees the informal sector as full of heroic small-scale 
entrepreneurs, others argue that informal sector workers seek to limit interactions with 
government officials principally because their survival is already so precarious that 
they cannot afford the fees involved (Rajagopal 2001).    
  The other side of the equation focuses on why the state cannot or does not 
regulate the informal economy.  One variant of this focuses specifically on state 
capacity.  Here the argument is that even if the state wanted to regulate vendors and 
others in the informal sector, it simply lacks the capacity to do so.
26  The existence of 
large squatter communities in large Latin American urban centers (e.g. Brazilian 
favelas) demonstrates an extreme case of state incapacity to regulate a range of 
informal activities.
27  However, even if the state does have the capacity to regulate 
informal activities like street vending, it sometimes lacks the motivation to do so 
either because of the costs involved with establishing regulatory controls or because 
officials do not want to set a precedent of fully and officially sanctioning market 
activities that are seen to have various negative side effects (Roever 2005:8-10).  
Finally, officials may simply choose not to regulate informal markets and activities 
because of the realization that informal activities provide a kind of “safety-valve” 
function for social groups that otherwise have few income-earning possibilities 
(Greskovits 1998:83-84 and 87; Vishwanath 2001).
28 
                                                 
26 Tripp’s (1997) analysis of informality in Tanzania does not so much stress a complete lack of state 
capacity to regulate the informal sector (she largely focuses on street commerce) as it does relative state 
weakness in the face of dynamic informal entrepreneurs. 
27 For Linz and Stepan (1996) this inability for some states to control parts of their own territory is a key 
form of lack of “stateness.”  O’Donnell (1993; 2001) is also concerned about what he refers to as 
“brown areas,” where the state does not reach or at least where it does not offer equal application of 
legal protections. 
28 This “safety valve,” or “social “cushion” (see Centeno and Portes 2006), argument, to the extent that 
it notes state acceptance of informal markets because of their potential to defuse social tensions, 
certainly shares something in common with my argument about the maintenance and reproduction of 
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   Despite the centrality of the idea that informal markets are somehow 
unregulated by the state, which in some sense implies that there is not much if any 
interaction at all between officials of the state and those involved in informal sector 
activities, much of the scholarship on the political economy of street vending in 
particular focuses on the antagonistic relationship between vendors and state officials.  
There is an implicit recognition that even if state interaction with vendors somehow 
does not qualify as being “regulated,” there is nonetheless frequent, if conflictive, 
interaction between representatives of the state and vendors (Cross 1998).  The 
normative assumptions and/or commitments of scholars of informality are often on 
full display in these studies of state-vendor conflict.  Street vendors are often cast in 
extremes as either entrepreneurial heroes pursuing a natural market niche in defiance 
of bad rules (De Soto 1989 and 200; Tripp 1997) or as weak and pathetic losers of the 
market reform process who resort to informality as a survival mechanism (Rajagopal 
2001).
29  Ultimately, whether they are portrayed as heroic or as simply surviving, 
street vendors are almost invariably seen as representing an element of “civil society” 
that has a set of interests opposed to or at least clearly distinct from state authority 
(Roever 2005).
30   State officials who do not “regulate” the informal sector are 
alternately seen as weak and incapable of enforcing bad rules (Tripp 1997) and/or as 
arbitrary and brutal in their treatment of vendors (Rajagopa 2001).  Only rarely do 
                                                                                                                                              
marginality as a governance strategy.  One key difference, however, is that my argument is about an 
active and political regulatory strategy and not a passive policy-as-afterthought.  
29 See Portes and Schauffler (1993) for an excellent overview of these competing portrayals of informal 
sector workers.  
30 Roever (2005) and Cross (1998) both show how state interaction with street vendors in Peru and 
Mexico, respectively, can be tied into electoral politics and vote-buying.  While this same election-
related dynamic is clearly not at work in China, that the Nanjing shirong sees local, laid-off residents as 
a kind of “constituency” is apparent from its willingness to provide vending licenses to these residents 
and not to migrants. 
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 observers of street vendor-state interactions provide a clear political explanation for 
the state’s policies toward and treatment of vendors.
31 
 
Applying the Concept of Informality to China: Three Examples 
  At the outset of this section on informality I note that the concept is rarely 
employed by China scholars.
32  There are a few key exceptions and here I will briefly 
explore their arguments.  Many of the theoretical problems that plague the informality 
literature more generally also apply to the very limited work applying the concept to 
China.  Nonetheless, I will demonstrate below that certain aspects of the literature on 
informality, both in its non-Chinese and Chinese applications and with its various 
strengths and weaknesses, provide a useful jumping-off point for understanding 
Chinese state-vendor relations in particular and state regulation of marginal markets 
more generally. 
  Three exceptions to the dearth of scholarship applying the concept of 
informality to China include work by Solinger (1999; 2002a and 2002b), Tsai (2002), 
and Hu (2006).  Dorothy Solinger has long been a passionate observer of Chinese 
political economy and since the 1990s has been devoted to research focusing on the 
country’s rural-to-urban migrants and the plight of urban laid-off (xiagang) workers.  
Relatively rare among China scholars, Solinger has consistently sought to apply 
theoretical concepts, including informality, drawn from work outside of China to her 
                                                 
31 Roever (2005) is one notable exception as she clearly points to the costs and benefits of formality 
versus informality (by which she mostly means being licensed or not licensed) on the part of both 
vendors and the state. 
32 Moreover, any mention of the term informal economy (roughly, fei zhengshi jingji) usually elicits a 
quizzical look.  As I note above, in his description of threats to market order Hu Angang (胡鞍钢 2001) 
refers to “underground” and “grey” economies but never uses the term “informal.”  Early in my 
research process, discussions with Chinese scholars interested in migrants and laid-off workers revealed 
that “informality” was rarely if ever a principle concept they employed when analyzing various 
phenomena related to these groups (Interviews BJ1, 4/12/02 and NJ4, 9/27/02).  If informality is a 
common sense category in Latin America, it is anything but in China.  
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 research on urban migrants and laid-off workers.  For Solinger, the concepts of 
“informalisation” (2002a) and “informality” (2002b) offer some limited traction on 
explaining the plight of Chinese migrants and laid-off workers.   
Solinger’s understanding of informality fits squarely within the first of the two 
definitions I offer above, which equates a lack of regulation with the process of SOE 
privatization (Solinger 2002a:373, fn 1).  Describing these newly informal former 
SOE workers, Sollinger notes that “the demeaned drudges practising these trades [a 
variety of street peddling services] are city-born and registered citizens, members of 
the once celebrated factory proletariat” (Solinger 2002a:374).   Here she clearly places 
herself within a tradition of scholarship on informality that sees employment in this 
sector as a survival strategy for those workers who were previously protected and 
venerated by the state but who have now been largely cast aside by the Party-state.  At 
the same time, like some other scholars of informality, for Solinger informality in 
more about the loss of a certain kind of connection between the state and workers and 
less about explaining the state’s interaction with this newly informal social group.  She 
argues:  
 
many among the furloughed workforce who operate informally, whether self-
employed, with their own property – a small stall, a pedicab, a miniscule 
patch of turn, a tiny bit of shoeshine cloth, or just their own tired bodies – or 
as menials paid a lowly wage, have become dirt-poor and degraded, and have 
absolutely lost the link with the state that nurtured them for decades. (Solinger 
2002a:410; my emphasis) 
 
Describing the loss of one type of “link” does not necessarily tell us anything about 
new ones that have subsequently been created.
33 
                                                 
33 This is a perfect example of the problem with “state retreat” or “deregulation” arguments that focus 
only on the story line of welfare state retrenchment and not on the political processes that appear in the 
aftermath.  Work by Vogel (1996) and Snyder (1999; 2001) provides a useful theoretical starting point 
for dealing with this shortcoming. 
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 Solinger, despite referring to China’s own “informalisation” processes, has 
read the literature on informality to be an explanation of (and maybe justification for?) 
“natural” market changes.  She thus comes to the somewhat confusing conclusion that  
 
the unregulated economic activity of the [laid-off workers] does not, like 
that of the peasant migrants, represent just a straightforward manifestation of 
the metamorphosis of the Chinese urban economy, some uncomplicated  
consequence of that system’s steadily deepening marketization. Nor do these 
sellers, as do the peasants newly in town, merely symbolize one more instance 
of an ‘informal economy’ resulting from the widespread process of 
privatization that is attending the advance of capitalism. (Solinger 2002b:310; 
my emphasis) 
 
However, as I demonstrated above, the literature on informality in other parts of the 
developing world is quite clear that both peasant migrants and laid-off workers in a 
vast array of countries have come to find themselves in informal economic activities 
largely as the result of state-led policies of marketization and welfare state 
retrenchment.  Ultimately, Solinger’s misreading of the literature on informality as 
well as her insistence that informal economic activity in China, like that in other 
developing countries, is unregulated, requires that we rethink how the concept of 
informality can be usefully adopted to understand Chinese realities.      
 Kellee  Tsai’s  Back-Alley Banking offers another application of the concept of 
informality to China.
34  Tsai’s focus in on “informal finance,” by which she means the 
various ways in which small-scale entrepreneurs, including street vendors, are able to 
gain access to non-state channels of credit.  Tsai argues that this form of finance is 
essentially illegal (or at best “quasi-legal”) since the central government has mandated 
that credit must be channeled through state-run banks (Tsai 2002:2; 35, fn 29).  For 
                                                 
34 As I will argue below, Tsai’s focus on “informal finance” would be more effectively conceived of as 
a “marginal” rather than an “informal” market.  I have chosen to include her discussion of non-state 
finance here rather than above in my listing of other forms of marginal markets because she is one of so 
very few who explicitly use the concept of informality in relation to Chinese political economy. 
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 Tsai then, echoing work on informality in other countries, the uneven proliferation of 
informal finance demonstrates, among other things, a lack of capacity on the part of 
the central government to implement its own policies (Tsai 2002:5;11).  She carefully 
shows how officials in different localities adopt very different approaches to 
regulating non-state channels of credit, and while she does note the potentially 
destabilizing effects of informal finance, she ultimately comes down, opposite 
Solinger, arguing that informal finance fuels natural market demands and the activities 
of many burgeoning petty entrepreneurs (Tsai 2002:2; 264-5). 
  Both a strength and a weakness of Tsai’s work on informal finance is that 
rather than buying into the idea that informal markets are by their very nature 
unregulated, Tsai emphasizes that the rules and regulations governing the world of 
unofficial finance are constantly being renegotiated (Tsai 2002:2-3; 259).  The 
strengths of this approach include the recognition that the state can interact in multiple 
ways with marginal markets and that one of the essential elements of such interactions 
is the way the official rules are open to different forms of interpretation and degrees of 
implementation.
35  At the same time, it recognizes that the state’s unleashing of 
market forces has led to processes of re-regulation at the local level.   
                                                
However, Tsai too easily assumes that central government laws restricting 
private finance necessarily mean that central leaders see all forms of non-state 
channeled finance as negative and a challenge to central authority.  It is very possible, 
that just like many local officials, central officials also see the utility of private finance 
even though there remain pressures to retain formal legal prohibitions.  At the 
beginning of one of her chapters Tsai cites an official from the People’s Bank of China, 
China’s central bank, as offering the following critique “informal finance”:  
 
35 Here I switch to the use of “marginal” rather than “informal” markets because the phenomenon Tsai 
seeks to explain, the variation in state enforcement of rules prohibiting a certain market behavior, is an 
exact fit for my definition of marginal market.  
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 Our country does not permit the establishment of private banks.  We must 
continue to investigate and impose discipline on nonbanking financial 
institutions and other creditors that charge high interest rates.  This is clearly 
one of the most important measures for ensuring order in the entire financial 
system. (Quoted in Tsai 2002:120; my emphasis)  
 
The emphasis on “ensuring order” should immediately draw our attention.  As with 
the other cases of marginal markets explored in this chapter, all of these markets are 
criticized for their disorderly influence.  Yet the response is almost never to seek to 
eradicate these market behaviors completely, but instead to rectify, standardize, or as 
is the case here, “impose discipline,” on them.  In this sense I would argue that what 
Tsai refers to as “informal finance” would be more productively theorized as a form of 
marginal market.   
Ultimately, it is on this question of the distinction between “informal,” “quasi-
legal” and “illegal” that Tsai’s analysis is left wanting.  She often refers in the same 
sentence to the phenomenon she is explaining as variably informal or illegal (Tsai 
2002:2), and in referring to the prevalence of non-state finance notes that “everyday 
people are operating on the margins of legality” (Tsai 2002:3).  Confusion over what 
is in fact marginal and actually “illegal” is a topic I will address in more detail below 
as it is a crucial element in the way that the state regulates marginal markets.  And 
while Tsai largely defends the proliferation of informal finance, just as other scholars 
of informality defend other forms of righteous defiance of bad laws and muddle-
headed officials, one has to ask at what point does operating on the margins of legality 
become something less than laudable? 
Finally, the Tsinghua University scholar Hu Angang, whose name has 
appeared throughout this dissertation, has recently written a report and historical 
overview of China’s “informal sector.”  Hu’s report is notable both for its overt 
reference to larger comparative studies of informality and for the very distinctive way 
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 that he adapts the concept to China.  Elements of Hu’s understanding of informality 
clearly do not fit with some of the core elements of the main literature on informality, 
but his comparative description of the Chinese government’s attitude and regulatory 
stance toward informal markets marks a useful point of departure for my own 
arguments about state regulation of marginal markets. 
Hu says that there are three elements to China’s informal sector: 1) 
“individuals engaged in industry and commerce,” 2) “medium-sized and small 
enterprises,” and 3) “rural migrant labor” (Hu 2006:19).  Indeed, Hu argues that 
China’s informal sector constituted fully 60% of all urban employment in 2004 (Hu 
2006:19).
36  The first and second categories include productive activities that are 
mostly already included in national statistics and therefore known to the government.  
It is purely based on their size and their private, rather than public, status that Hu sees 
fit to include them as elements of the informal sector.
37  It is only the third category of 
largely unreported migrant labor production, what Hu refers to as the “unobserved 
sector,” that fits with more traditional definitions of the informal sector as 
characterized by activities and income that in some sense are hidden from state 
officials.
38  Hu’s insistence that individual as well as other small and medium size 
private firms constitute a key part of China’s informal sector highlights how being 
anything but a large, state-owned firm is still equated in some key sense with 
“irregularity.”   
                                                 
36 Barry Naughton, in his new textbook on the Chinese economy cites similar, if potentially even more 
remarkable figures about the relative size of the informal sector in urban employment.  Naughton 
presents evidence that of a total urban 2004 workforce of 265 million, approximately 115 million fall 
within the category of “other,” which “picks up most of the migrants and unregistered businesses.”  
Naughton goes on to state that “The informal sector, broadly defined to include private, self-employed, 
and ‘other,’ has grown from 48 million to almost 160 million and is now considerably larger than the 
formal sector” (Naughton 2007:190).  
37 In this way he is largely adopting a Tokman (1992) definition of informality that rests on small size 
of the firms and relatively low capital intensiveness.  However, simply being a private firm has not 
traditionally been considered a marker of informality. 
38 Hu cites statistics to show that as of 2004 this unobserved sector’s contribution to “non-agricultural 
GDP” stood at over 15% Hu 2006:24). 
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 Besides presenting a raft of statistics related to his defined categories of 
informality, the other notable aspect of Hu’s study is his characterization of the state’s 
attitude toward informal sector markets and workers.  Here, Hu argues that the 
informal sector is  
 
Subject to the regulation and management by the government, encouraged, 
supported and managed by the government, [and that it is] different from 
illegal activities. It is treated as part of the national economy and encouraged 
to develop together with [the] formal sector of the economy. (Hu 2006:12)  
 
Hu distinguishes this from government treatment of the informal sector in other 
countries where it is  
 
Not subject to government regulation and management, not recognized, 
supported, protected and managed by the government and sometimes subject 
to interference and curtailment by the government as [connected to] illegal 
activities. (Hu 2006:12) 
 
Hu’s comments here are notable not just for the definitive contrast he notes between 
the regulated and unregulated nature of informal markets in China versus other 
countries, but also because he is so emphatic about government support for the 
informal sector in China.  Hu is undoubtedly correct not only about the more extensive 
state oversight over China’s equivalent of “informal” markets but also that in many 
ways various bureaus and individual leaders see the non-state sector as one of the keys 
to providing urban employment and fostering innovation.  However, given Hu’s 
earlier work about the various threats to market order posed by underground and grey 
market activities, not to mention the very rocky relationship between state agencies 
like the shirong and “informal” vendors, it is imperative that we explore more 
carefully the nature and motivations of the state’s relationship with this sector. 
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 Rectifying Disorderly Markets: Governance via Marginalization 
  How can the theoretical and empirical research on informal markets in other 
parts of the world help us to explain state-economy relations China?  In particular, 
what can an understanding of informality tell us about the Chinese state’s relationship 
with street vendors and other similar types of markets?  Here I will demonstrate that 
the focus within the literature on informality on the forces that have given rise to 
certain economic and social phenomena, like the increase in street vending, are of 
direct relevance and structurally very similar to the Chinese case.
39  Just like many 
countries across the world, China has embraced markets and sought to fundamentally 
transform the way the state interacts with the economy.  Just like in other parts of the 
world, the results of these changes have included large-scale SOE lay-offs and, more 
unique to china, a massive wave of rural to urban migration. 
To argue, however, that reform of the state owned enterprise system and a 
major transformation in the government’s role in providing a range of social services 
and guarantees should not, however, be misunderstood as having resulted in 
“unregulated” markets, which implies a complete withdrawal of the state from its role 
in market governance.  While the Chinese government, similar to governments across 
the world, has indeed retreated from its former role as economic planner and the 
provider of a range of public goods as well as social and economic guarantees, this is 
not the same as saying that it has somehow completely abandoned its desire to 
exercise its authority and “control” over markets of all kinds.  Yet if we take the 
example of much of the work on informal markets from other parts of the world (as 
well as from partial reform and New Left scholars writing about China) we would be 
left with the impression that the state has abandoned its efforts to exercise authority 
                                                 
39 In this sense Chinese markets are unregulated just as they are in much of the rest of the world.  That 
is, the state no longer takes primary responsibility for production and employment through a planned 
economy. 
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 over (i.e. regulate) a vast range of markets.  Alternatively, we might be led to believe 
that the state is simply incapable of exercising such authority.  It is therefore clear that 
the Achilles heal of the informality paradigm is that by definition informal markets are 
not regulated by the state.  For any study that seeks to understand any form of 
regularized and institutional relationship between the state and any type of market, 
“informal” or otherwise, the concept of informality cuts off analysis before it can 
begin.  I therefore argue that a different conceptual apparatus is necessary if we are to 
understand the politics of Chinese state interaction with markets like street vending 
and others I have detailed in this chapter.  I will demonstrate that a focus on the 
concept of marginal markets not only allows for a specific understanding of state 
efforts to regulate such markets, but also facilitates an understanding of the politics of 
regulation. 
 
Structural Similarities 
As in other developing countries, many of China’s street vendors are mostly 
made up of former workers from state-owned companies and migrants from the 
countryside.  The political and economic forces behind their appearance as street 
vendors are also similar in key respects.  China’s retreat from socialist planning and its 
embrace of market reforms, while clearly different in its speed and in the particulars of 
certain policies,
40 has broad similarities to the market reforms and welfare state 
retrenchment that took place in Latin America, Africa and Asia throughout the 1980s 
and 90s.  Thus the reasons behind the appearance of former SOE workers and rural 
migrants on the streets of Nanjing and other Chinese cities can be clearly traced to 
reforms that share key similarities to trends in other countries.  As those on the New 
                                                 
40 For instance, China’s reforms are noted for their more gradual and piecemeal nature as well the 
maintenance of strict capital controls, among other differences with reforms elsewhere.  
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 Left, among others, so clearly point out, many of the country’s “workers” and 
“peasants” find themselves without access to socially guaranteed wage, pension, 
health or educational benefits and must find new ways to earn a living in China’s new 
market economy.  Many therefore seek to do business on the streets of China’s 
teeming urban centers, but as I have demonstrated in the case of Nanjing, not all (or 
even most) are necessarily welcome.  In order to explain how the state seeks to 
maintain economic and social order over street markets and a range of other markets 
that are in some sense officially prohibited, we must go beyond the concept of 
informality.   
 
Toward a Typology and Theory of Marginal Markets 
Street Vendors: A Prototype of a Marginal Market 
To take the example of Nanjing’s street markets, it is clear that via the shirong, 
the state is far from absent in structuring who can and cannot have access to vending 
permits and frequently engages unlicensed vendors in a range of ways.  This 
interaction is institutionalized (i.e. there is an agency of the state that has explicit 
duties regarding the regulation of vendors) and regularized (i.e. there are clear and 
relatively predictable patterns of behavior between agents of the state and vendors).  
Shirong/chengguan interaction with street vendors is therefore a form of regulation.  
While there is a clear difference between the way that the Nanjing shirong interacts 
with licensed and unlicensed vendors, there is no doubt that the bureau seeks to 
establish its authority over all vendors and it is equally clear that the preferential 
access to licenses accorded to local residents serves certain political goals and 
pressures related to laid-off local workers. 
Yet as I detailed in the last chapter, street vending in general has a number of 
negative associations, including blocking pedestrian and vehicle traffic, the creation of 
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 garbage, the sale of poor quality goods and unsanitary food as well as lending a 
generally non-modern appearance to city streets.  For all of these reasons, the Nanjing 
shirong and the chengguan in other cities generally adopt an antagonistic attitude 
toward street vendors and establish regulations prohibiting any unlicensed street 
vending.  That the Nanjing shirong issues vending licenses to some city residents 
demonstrates that some forms of street vending are officially approved, but the 
existence of all other unlicensed vendors is in clear violation of official regulations.  
Yet as I demonstrate in the previous chapter, the shirong alternates between strict and 
lax enforcement of restrictions against unlicensed vendors with the end result being 
that despite periodic punishment, unlicensed street vending proliferates. 
What does this on-again, off-again pattern of enforcement against unlicensed 
street vendors tell us about the state?  Does it indicate state weakness or incapacity to 
enforce its own laws?  Does it indicate corruption?  Does it indicate the strength of 
market and/or social forces?  Or does the fact that both state officials and market 
actors ignore or directly contravene the official regulations indicate fundamental 
weaknesses and illegitimacy of the law itself?  One could make a plausible argument 
for any one of these explanations, but I would argue that only a more comprehensively 
political explanation, one that touches on each of these issues, will suffice.   
As I argued in the last chapter, shirong/chengguan patterns of regulating street 
vending involve a delicate balancing act.  First, through the variety of negative 
associations mentioned above, state authorities situate street vending as a kind of 
threat to market order.
41  This then justifies the necessity of state intervention to 
rectify this market.  But this intervention does not involve either the attempt to fully 
                                                 
41 In the previous chapter I demonstrate how the shirong portrays vendors as disorderly.  They may 
simply be responsible for enforcing the law, but given that shirong/chengguan bureaus across the 
country all appear to have a specific focus on regulating street vendors there appears to be some level of 
consensus about the need to control and limit vending in some way. 
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 eradicate (through jailing, repatriation, physical violence, etc) or somehow officially 
sanction the market behavior to conform with acceptable forms of business (through 
granting licenses or creating state-sponsored vending zones or fixed-space markets).   
Instead, subsequent cycles of on-again, off-again enforcement serve as a reminder of 
the state’s authority but also provide revenue for the bureau and reflect pressure
allow incoming-earning opportunities for the vendors and to provide popular servic
to consumers.  Thus maintaining unlicensed vendors in a marginal status constitutes 
primary regulatory strategy.     
s to 
es 
a 
 
Other Marginal Markets: At the Intersection of Law and Enforcement 
  By now the story of the shirong and street vendors is familiar.  In this chapter I 
have also discussed the way that Chinese state interactions with a number of other 
officially-prohibited markets looks remarkably similar to shirong-vendor relations.  
That is, despite official prohibitions in the form of laws, bureaucratic regulations or 
rules, actual enforcement patterns do not reflect attempts to fully eradicate the 
behavior.  Instead, in a logic very similar to that which animates shirong/chengguan 
regulation of street vendors, different state bureaus responsible for regulating officially 
prohibited markets for counterfeit goods, prostitution, non-state finance, recyclables 
trading and others, while periodically enforcing prohibitions, frequently facilitate these 
market behaviors.  As I have argued, this constitutes a de facto governance strategy 
whereby the state seeks to maintain the marginality of these markets and market actors.  
The result is that in the effort to rectify market order, neither state officials nor market 
actors adhere to the law. 
  In order to understand more clearly the interaction between laws and 
enforcement in the production of marginal markets, and in the interests of creating a  
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 typology of marginal markets, I have created the table (4-2) below.  This table 
provides a typology based on the intersection of laws and enforcement.  In a simple 
world, or more accurately, in a setting with a strong rule of law tradition and high 
legal legitimacy, most types of state-market interactions would be confined to what I 
have labeled as Conventional (1) or Prohibited (9) markets.  That is, the legal status of 
a certain type of market would be legal or illegal and it is assumed that in practice, 
 
Table 4-1: Laws, Enforcement Practices, and Marginal Markets 
Legal Status of Market 
  Legal  Neither Legal 
nor Illegal  Illegal 
Permit  
 
(1) Conventional 
Market 
(2) Natural 
Market  
or  
Discretionary 
Market 
 
(3) Black 
Market 
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Enforcement 
 
(4) Marginal 
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(5) Marginal 
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(9) Prohibited 
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 legal markets would be permitted (thus entering into a routine pattern of state 
oversight including collection of taxes and contract enforcement) and illegal markets 
would be penalized.
42  China, however, is neither a simple world nor one with a strong 
rule of law tradition or high legal legitimacy.   
Therefore an understanding of the formal rules or actual enforcement practice 
as falling into binary categories makes much of state-market interaction in China 
unexplainable.  Echoing one of the opening quotes to this dissertation, one China 
watcher has referred to China as “a society that had no rules; or more accurately, 
plenty of rules but they were seldom enforced” (Clissold 2006).  That rules in China 
are not enforced is a common perception among both Chinese and foreign observers, 
but this glosses over the more common reality that those who enforce the rules 
actually have a great deal of discretion in terms of interpreting and enforcing them 
(Peerenboom 2002; 2007; He Xin forthcoming).  Therefore, in table 4-1, under “legal 
status” I have added the intermediate category of “neither legal nor illegal” and under 
“enforcement practice” I have added the intermediate category of “sometimes permit 
and sometimes penalize.”  The table thus shows how the marginal markets I seek to 
explain are the outcome of enforcement practices over markets that are either illegal or 
of ambiguous legality.  
Referring back to some of the examples in this chapter, I will demonstrate 
where they would fit on the table.  Beginning with street markets, I would place 
vendors to whom the shirong officially issues licenses in category (2) as a 
“Discretionary” market.  That the shirong issues a permit allowing these vendors to set 
up a stall space is purely a function of the shirong’s discretionary power to decide 
                                                 
42 Some of the literature on informality seeks to distinguish informal from illegal activities, noting that 
the former involves the production of legal goods but through methods or in a capacity that is 
“unregulated” by the state.  On legal, informal, illegal distinctions within the literature on informality 
see Feige (1990); Böröcz (1992) and Centeno and Portes (2006). 
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 what forms of street vending are and are not permitted (i.e. there are no laws that 
officially allow for the setting up of street stands, only regulations that stipulate that all 
commerce and commercially-related structures must receive the approval of the proper 
authority).  After issuing a license, the shirong then largely leaves these local vendors 
alone except to collect monthly stall fees.  Thus this form of street vending is officially 
permitted though the granting of an operating license and is permitted in actual 
enforcement practice.
43 
  Migrant and other unlicensed vendors would fit squarely under category (6) 
type “Marginal” markets that are essentially illegal (since no unlicensed business is 
authorized).  However, actual enforcement practice is a mixture of permitting 
(sometimes in exchange for “gifts”) vending activities at certain times of the day and 
in certain places and alternately penalizing vendors with fines and by confiscating 
their carts and sale items.  The unlicensed migrant housing and garment production 
described by Zhang Li (2001a and b) and He Xin (2003; 2005) fits almost the exact 
same logic as migrants are unable to attain the necessary licenses and even if they do 
are still prone to selective state enforcement practices.  We can also place much of 
counterfeit sales,
44 prostitution and the non-state finance described by Tsai (2002) in 
this category as all of these are prohibited by laws and regulations but enforcement is 
an active combination of permitting and penalizing.  Here it is important to note that 
part of the “permitting” that takes place comes in the form I described above where 
businesses receive a license for a category (1) “Conventional Market” operation but 
then engage (again, often with full knowledge of oversight agencies) in the sale of 
officially prohibited goods or services. 
                                                 
43 The alternative label for this cell is “Natural Market.”  What I mean by this is a kind of market for 
which there are no formal rules either allowing or prohibiting it and which the state permits in practice. 
44 As I note above, enforcement of counterfeit sales, whether retail or wholesale, is generally more lax 
than it is for counterfeit production, which however is also subject to selective enforcement. 
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   This kind of “front” operation easily shades into category (5) type marginal 
markets.  Here, the formal legal status of a market or of a particular business is very 
much at the discretion of the administrative agency since either there are no rules 
governing a particular kind of market behavior or because the administrative agency 
largely has the power to determine what the formal rules mean in practice.  So even 
though sales of counterfeit DVDs would mostly fit into category (6) as clearly being 
illegal, my example above of one administrative agency selling “legal” DVDs to the 
store manager in exchange for permission to continue to sell “fake” DVDs shows the 
power of administrative discretion to determine what is legal or not (shading it into 
category (5)).  Many of Tsai’s examples of how local governments permit various 
forms of non-state finance also fits this pattern.  Finally, Goldstein’s recyclables 
traders would fit into this category (5) type of marginal market because there appear to 
be no clear rules governing the transportation of recyclables and only at the point that 
the regulatory agency in charge of recyclables decided to intervene to control 
collection points was there any kind of licensing regulation even promulgated.  
Therefore the recyclables market has both an ambiguous legal status and is variably 
enforced.   
  Ultimately then much of my focus on the category of marginal markets falls 
into categories (6) and (5), but often using category (1) legal status as a front or 
relying on administrative discretion where formal legal status is ambiguous.  In order 
to analyze more specifically what marginalization as a regulatory strategy says about 
questions of state capacity and the rule of law, I will focus on categories (3) and (9).  
Given the way I have designed this table, there are three types of markets that result 
from state enforcement practices over officially illegal market activities.  In this 
dissertation I have largely focused on marginal markets that are officially 
prohibited/illegal or at least of questionable legal status and where enforcement varies 
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 between penalization and permission.  What distinguishes these kinds of activities 
from those activities that are illegal but that are in no meaningful sense penalized or 
from those that are illegal and only penalized?  The first category of illegal and 
“permitted,” category (3) “Black Markets,” is better thought of as illegal and not 
penalized.  There are two alternative explanations for market activities that fall under 
this category: either state officials actively collude to allow for such practices to 
continue (e.g. corruption) or, alternately, whether state officials are or not aware of 
such behaviors, they are simply unable to effectively enforce penalties to eradicate 
these behaviors.  Finally, we can look to category (9) “Prohibited Markets,” for those 
markets that are both formally illegal and prohibited in practice with little to no 
permissive enforcement. 
  Still, these categorizations beg the questions of why, if all these activities are 
formally illegal, does enforcement practice differ across markets and why shouldn’t 
any enforcement activity that falls short of the full and complete attempt to eradicate 
illegal market behaviors be a signal of corruption, state weakness, or both?  The 
answers to these questions are by no means straightforward, but this dissertation 
provides the first step toward answering them.  Let me begin by going back to the 
question of rule of law and what it actually means for a market to be “illegal.”  As I 
note above, the status of the rule of law in China is itself highly ambiguous.  The Party 
clearly wants to project the impression that the country is increasingly ruled by laws 
and by regulatory institutions that act in accordance with those laws, but there are 
deep-seated questions about both the legitimacy of the laws that are created and about 
the political difficulties involved in relying on the consistent implementation of those 
laws to regulate the economy. 
  First, there is the question of how any given law or regulation comes into being 
and with what purpose.  Let me look at a couple of examples.  China’s laws against 
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 counterfeiting are, as Mertha (2005) clearly shows, very much a product of pressures 
from the international community.  Yet the extent to which even central authorities 
view the widespread defiance of these laws as a purely negative phenomenon is highly 
doubtful, and it is highly plausible to argue that they too see the very real “positive” 
side of certain counterfeiting activities (e.g. it produces jobs and is popular with 
consumers).  The same argument applies to non-state forms of finance.  Although 
there are official prohibitions and the central government often decries the problems 
with many of the forms of local, non-state finance described by Tsai, it is highly likely 
that central officials see a great deal that is both positive and even necessary about 
non-state forms of finance.
45  The same can largely be said about street vending, 
which has an even more ambiguous legal status since it is unlicensed business 
practices, and not street vending itself, that is prohibited.  Any rules against street 
vending are clearly the result of a very ambiguous and partial decision-making process. 
Moreover, as I argued in the second chapter, the Party’s continual pointing out of 
threats to market order and the need to rectify these disorderly markets provides a key 
basis for its own legitimacy and authority. 
  I would argue that the key difference between categories (3) and (9) on the one 
side and category (6) on the other is that the legitimacy and/or level of shared 
agreement, both at a popular and official level, against market practices in these areas 
is much more complete that it is for those in category (6).  Let me give some concrete 
examples.  There seems to be a high level of popular and official agreement that drugs 
are bad.  This in part is related to the strongly held belief that China’s own historical 
experience in the 19
th and early 20
th centuries with opium addiction was harmful to the 
                                                 
45 This is my main point of disagreement with Tsai’s (2002) analysis.  She wants to state definitively 
that the central government is clearly opposed to non-state forms of finance, but she never shows that 
central pronouncements decrying such practices are anything more than superficial.  In other words, 
whether Central officials really mean what they say when they decry non-state forms of finance is very 
open to question. 
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 Chinese people and nation.  Therefore, laws against trafficking in drugs share a degree 
of legitimacy and strong efforts are made to enforce them completely – category (9), 
whereas any kind of government complicity in facilitating drug trade and sales or 
simply not being aware of these activities – category (3) would be much more open to 
accusations of corruption and state incapacity, respectively.  
  Those market activities in category (6), then, are by definition much more 
ambiguous.  For various reasons that I have explored, the state, at various levels, seeks 
fit to pass prohibitions against these markets.  However, the level of state and popular 
sentiment acceptance of these prohibitions varies greatly.  Moreover, enforcement 
agents and agencies face various economic incentives related not only to their own 
personal and bureaucratic incomes, but also seek to promote income-earning and 
consumption opportunities for the people and areas they administer.  The confluence 
of less-than-full acceptance of the official rules themselves and countervailing 
pressures to both limit and yet allow certain market behaviors leads to a de facto 
outcome of governance via marginalization.  Ultimately, the dividing line that 
separates what market and government regulatory activities should be acceptable in 
word and practice is movable and moving.  The ongoing debate about the regulation of 
street vendors, not to mention the uproar about the regulation (or lack thereof) of food, 
pharmaceutical and other consumer products attests to the highly fluid nature of what 
constitutes a threat to market order and how the state should respond.  
 
Conclusion 
  In this chapter I have proposed that we understand street vending as but one 
type of marginal market.  State officials or regulatory bureaus at various levels portray 
each of these markets as “disorderly” in some sense and therefore in need of state 
authority in order to rectify or discipline these markets.  Yet rectification does not 
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 mean eradication.  Instead, as is the case in each of these markets, actual enforcement 
against officially prohibited (often illegal) market practices involves a mixture of 
permissive and punitive enforcement practices by state officials.  I have argued that by 
thus maintaining the marginal status of these markets, in both a formal sense and in 
terms of actual enforcement practice, regulatory agencies are able to balance goals and 
incentives that include 1) legitimating their own regulatory existence
46 and authority 
through claims about the disorderly nature of certain markets and the necessity of 
intervening in these markets in order to rectify them,
 2) ensuring budgetary and extra-
budgetary revenue for the regulatory bureaus and individual officials themselves, 3) 
maintaining income-earning opportunities for those involved in marginal markets and, 
4) closely connected to number three, allowing for the consumption of often-popular 
products and services provided by marginal markets.  Marginal markets are thus a 
complex product of market behaviors, official rules and state enforcement practices 
and I argue that once in place, the maintenance of market marginality constitutes a 
crucial method of governance in China. 
  What I offer then is a theoretical and political explanation for why everyone 
from state officials to market actors are systematically breaking the rules.
47  I have 
also explained how the maintenance of marginal markets differs from pure corruption.  
I have done so not by offering a normative judgment based on the dictionary definition 
of political corruption, which stresses the use of public office for private gain,
48 but by 
                                                 
46 One factor that needs to be further addressed is that regulatory bureaus like the shirong itself provide 
jobs, often to laid-off urban workers.  If the “street vending problem” were to in some sense be solved 
then what would shirong/chengguan employees do for a living? 
47 Clearly, there are specific patterns of state-market interaction within each marginal market.  One of 
the key patterns in my primary case study is based on the distinction between differential state treatment 
of local and migrant vendors.  Similar patterns of migrant discrimination exist in Goldstein and Zhang 
Li’s research as well and are corroborated by economic studies that attest to the existence of “dual labor 
markets” in urban centers where the primary split is between urban and rural hukou holders (see 
Fernández-Stembridge 2001).  Tsai’s work in differentiating very different patterns of state regulation 
within one type of marginal market attests to the various ways one can approach the governance of 
marginal markets. 
48 See Sun Yan (2004) for a comprehensive study of corruption in China that relies on this definition. 
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 situating the formal rules and their enforcement in context and offering an explanation 
rather than a description.  That is, some laws and regulations have a much higher 
degree of legitimacy than others.  For either officials or market actors to deviate from 
the formal rules is thus not always considered by the public or state officials to 
necessarily be a negative thing, even though they still may claim that such forms of 
rule breaking involve corruption.  I would therefore caution against any judgment 
about what I have just described as being a clear instance of the state being unable to 
enforce its own rules or a form of what Lü (2000b) has called “organizational 
corruption” and therefore clearly a sign of failed governance.  
  To argue that the maintenance of marginal market constitutes a method of 
governance that balances a range of complex goals and incentives is not to deny that 
such a method is not itself very much a precarious balancing act.  In chapter two I 
argued that central Party efforts to decry the pernicious influence of neoliberalism and 
the constant and various threats to market order can serve to justify the Party’s role in 
regulating the economy so as to alleviate such threats.  I also noted that such efforts, 
which rely on calling attention to the great variety and severity of economic and social 
problems the country faces, can also point back to the Party in a negative way if it 
seems that such problems are in fact not being resolved.  Above I argued that the sort 
of rule breaking that defines both official and market behavior in marginal markets 
tends to be centered around activities that have some balance of positive and negative 
attributes.   
However, both state and popular perceptions are open to change.  Increasing 
official media and public criticism of the chengguan and support for vendors is a case 
where there is growing consensus that the rules prohibiting street vending and the 
chengguan’s enforcement of those rules are not appropriate and that street vending 
should be brought closer to a category (1) business in Table 4-1.  At the same time, 
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 recent reports about poor regulation of food and pharmaceuticals sectors, not to 
mention the scandal over slave labor in brick kilns,
49 has set in motion efforts to move 
certain activities that might currently be regulated in a manner very similar to category 
(3) marginal markets into category (9) prohibited markets.
50  This ultimately points to 
the fact that China is still very much in the middle of a process of determining what 
kinds of market as well as state regulatory behavior are legitimate.  In the final chapter 
I will argue that in the absence of the rule of law, which in turn depends upon 
meaningful restrictions on state action, and in the absence of certain institutions that 
can help legitimate the process of rule-making, any faith that the propagation of new 
rules or the creation of new regulatory bodies will necessarily lead to new forms of 
state regulatory enforcement is idealistic at best. 
  I will conclude this chapter with a few comments on the value and potential 
insights of comparing China’s marginal markets with informal economies in other 
parts of the world.  First, I have questioned the value of traveling to China with the 
concept of informality.  Using the concept of informality to understand, say, the 
relationship between the state and street vendors in China, one would begin from the 
basic assumption that the state in no meaningful way regulates vendors.  Any 
relationship between the state and vendors could not, therefore, be characterized as 
regulation, per se.  As I have explained, part of the problem lies in a definition of 
regulation that is overly restrictive and very ill-suited to a study of the institutions and 
power relationships between states and market.  In this sense, I would argue that not 
only is the concept of informality not suited to the study of state-market relations in 
China, but it poses serious limitations the study of political-economy anywhere.  The 
                                                 
49 For more on the brick kiln slave story see French (2007b). 
50 Most likely, government officials will try to portray most of these problems with regulatory oversight 
as belonging to category (3) black markets that are largely hidden to the central government where in 
fact they may be very similar to marginal markets except that it is difficult to imagine anyone arguing 
for the consumer popularity of fake medicine or of the merits of cheap bricks produced by slave labor. 
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concept of informality thus cuts off any study of state-market relations just where 
things get interesting. 
  However, the rather unsuccessful attempt to apply the concept of informality to 
China brings a number of other important issues into relief.  First, it is very clear that 
even if it is true that street vendors and other groups usually associated with the 
informal economy in other parts of the world can be meaningfully said to be 
unregulated, the same is not true of China.  Street vendors are regulated by the 
shirong/chengguan as a marginal market.  Second, the tendency of the literature on 
informality to associate street vendors with a form of civil society that makes claims 
apart from and opposed to the state is clearly not applicable in China.  I found no 
evidence of any sizeable, organized groups of street vendors.
51  The Beijing city 
government’s crackdown on the semi-autonomous migrant settlement of Zhejiangcun 
in 1995 demonstrates that China’s cities will not soon become ringed by the kind of 
self-governed squatter communities that exist in many major developing country 
urban centers.  Finally, as my overview of different forms of Chinese marginal 
markets demonstrates, we should not expect that the formal legal rules governing 
market behavior will match up in any straightforward way with the actual behavior of 
either market actors or state officials.  Such a claim may also be a useful starting point 
for understanding marginal markets outside of China as well. 
 
51 As I described in chapter three, most migrant vendors work in groups that are connected to their 
home town or families.  Any attempt by street vendors to organize as street vendors and without 
explicit government approval would certainly meet a quick end. Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
  
This dissertation has made a number of theoretical and empirical observations 
related to the important concepts of state capacity and legitimacy.  Here I will briefly 
review how each of these terms have been deployed in recent studies of Chinese 
politics, then I will summarize how this dissertation contributes to or challenges what 
is already known about Chinese state capacity and legitimacy.  I argue that the concept 
of market order provides an important new insight into linkages between capacity and 
legitimacy in China and that the concept is in many ways a highly effective tool of 
governance.  However, my research on the shirong/chengguan and other state bureaus 
with oversight over officially prohibited markets, like street markets or counterfeiting, 
demonstrates the challenges still faced by the Chinese state in strengthening capacity 
and legitimacy. 
 
State Capacity 
  In the introductory chapter as well as in chapter two I analyze debates in China 
and the West about the nature and direction of the relationship between the Chinese 
state and economy.  At the heart of the regulatory state debate outlined in the 
introduction is a profound disagreement about the capacity of the Chinese government 
to effectively regulate the economy.  Regulatory state critics claim that the state (by 
which they often mean the central government) has created institutions, or reformed 
already existing ones, in order to enhance its regulatory effectiveness.  Moreover, they 
claim that the state is making important strides in the direction of improved 
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 governance.
1  Developmental state scholars, while critical of the logic regulatory state 
critics say drives reforms, are in basic agreement that strategic governance of certain 
sectors of the commanding heights of the economy reflects strong state capacity.  
However, citing evidence of local corruption, the growth of unregulated markets and 
misguided “visions” of how to govern a market economy, partial reform critics 
strongly disagree.  In direct response to regulatory state-type arguments, Pei Minxin 
has countered, “Although the Chinese state appears to be institutionally unconstrained, 
centralized, and omnipresent, its ability to implement policy and enforce rules is 
severely limited by its incoherence, internal tensions, and weaknesses” (2006a:13). 
  How can we evaluate which of these perspectives provides a more accurate 
description of Chinese state capacity and how does the research presented in this 
dissertation affirm, refute or complicate the existing perspectives?  The first step in 
answering this question is to ask another: whose capacity to do what?  That is, in the 
debates reviewed above, how is state capacity defined and measured?  Definitions of 
state capacity often include the Weberian emphasis on the state’s ability to maintain a 
monopoly on the means of coercion, while other staple measures of capacity include 
extractive and redistributive capabilities (Wang 2003:37-38).  However, to the extent 
that those involved in the Chinese debate over state capacity actually provide any 
                                                 
1 In chapter two I also demonstrate that the New Left has a closely-related perspective to that of the 
regulatory state scholars and that some, like Wang Shaoguang, belong in both camps.  The key 
difference is that the New Left argues that the central government is too weak and needs to strengthen 
central authority, whereas the regulatory state literature makes claims that such centralization has 
already begun and has had a number of important successes.  Wang Shaoguang, in his evaluation of 
coal mine regulation, made the move in print from New Left skeptic to regulatory state optimistic in a 
three year time span.  In 2003 he lamented the state’s “sadly inadequate regulatory capacity” and 
“governing-capacity deficit,” citing the specific example of poor coal mine safety as evidence of “the 
state’s inability to regulate workplace safety” (Wang Shaoguang 2003:39-41).  However, as I explain in 
more detail in the introduction, by 2006 Wang cited falling coal mine fatality rates as part of his claim 
that “the Chinese government is capable of responding to deficiencies in its regulatory performance” 
(Wang 2006:4).  Given that he does not base his change of opinion about coal mine safety regulation 
based on evidence published after his 2003 article, one possible explanation for his more optimistic 
assessment is that Wang is engaged in a dual effort to both emphasize needed reforms and to point out 
positive examples of the kinds of changes he thinks could serve as a model of future reforms.      
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 working definition and measures of capacity at all, the different sides choose different 
measures.  That is, the regulatory state scholars focus on the state’s “regulatory 
capacity” while the partial reform scholars often emphasize the state’s (in)ability to 
control its own agents (Wang 2006; Pei 2003; Lü 2000a and 2000b).
2  Part of the 
confusion about who to believe in this debate is that those involved often appear to be 
speaking past each other by pointing to different parts of the proverbial Chinese 
elephant.   The picture of Chinese state capacity is further complicated by differences 
in emphasis on whether capacity should be judged as a static or dynamic concept. 
  Specifically, regulatory state scholars argue not that state capacity is “high” in 
some absolute sense, but that it has been progressively improving.  They note the 
various challenges to the state’s regulation of different markets as well as labor and 
consumer safety, but stress that the central government has been responding to these 
challenges by increasingly reforming state institutions to effectively improve 
regulatory performance.  Nevertheless, as I show in the introductory chapter, far too 
often there is a lack of follow-up by regulatory state scholars in effectively 
demonstrating that the creation of new rules and institutions necessarily translates into 
actual changes on the ground.  At the same time, partial reform scholars point to 
continued problems of local corruption and protectionism as signs of a low absolute 
level of state capacity.  Yet they also provide too little follow-up in terms of 
explaining the “so what” of low capacity.  The implied argument for scholars like Pei 
Minxin is that China cannot improve state capacity, which in turn is necessary to 
achieve progress toward “true reform,” unless it first liberalizes its political 
institutions. 
                                                 
2 Lü’s (2000b) concept of “organizational corruption” and Pei’s (2003) concept of “decentralized 
predation” both emphasize lack of proper central government oversight over local agents of the state. 
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   A first step toward resolving this deadlock is to situate the concept of state 
capacity relative to the actual goals of the state itself.  That is, one way of judging the 
level and direction of China’s state capacity is to ask whether the state is able to 
achieve the goals that it sets for itself.
3  In this dissertation I have argued that a little 
understood, but crucial goal of Chinese governance is the promotion and maintenance 
of what I have described as “market order.”  One of the issues that has been in 
constant play throughout the dissertation, then, is the extent to which the state has or 
has not been effective in achieving this goal.  As I will argue in more detail below, 
because it is a contested concept and also because governance of market order is so 
closely tied to state legitimation efforts that preclude precise definitions of the concept, 
rendering clear and definitive judgments about the state’s capacity to maintain market 
order is in some ways equivalent to chasing a moving target.  Nevertheless, the 
research presented in this dissertation sheds light on a number of important aspects of 
the state’s efforts to ensure market order.  
  First, at the level of the central government and Party, the state has made a 
clear commitment to the maintenance of market order as one of the state’s core 
governance tasks.  On the positive side of the ledger is the creation of a range of 
government institutions and laws, first and foremost being the Market Order Leading 
Group, but also including new environmental, work safety, and food and drug safety 
administrations as well the creation of the new Administrative Licensing Law meant 
to rein in administrative discretion.
4  In addition to the creation of new institutions and 
                                                 
3 Such a relative understanding of state capacity may provide a complication for cross-national 
assessments of China’s state capacity.  Take taxation for example.  If, as a policy choice, China did not 
rely on a personal or corporate income tax for the majority of state revenue but instead relied on income 
from state-owned firms and business groups (as was the case before the 1994 fiscal reforms) then 
should China be judged to have had a low extraction capacity compared to other countries that did rely 
on those other forms of taxation?  See Naughton for more on the composition of state revenues 
(2007:432). 
4 On reform of the environmental protection bureaucracy see Jahiel (1998), on work safety see Wang 
Shaoguang (2006), on food and drug safety see Tam and Yang (2005), and on the Administrative 
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 legislation, and as Yang Dali chronicles in such great detail,
5 the state is also 
constantly churning out numbers demonstrating the successes involved in myriad 
different enforcement operations connected to these market order-enhancing bodies 
and laws.   
At the same time, however, not only do bodies like the Market Order Leading 
Group highlight the vast range of problems and challenges associated with ensuring 
market order, but the state’s own television and print media are filled with programs 
and stories about a mind-boggling array of market scams, poor product quality, insider 
deals, and asset bubbles.
6  Often included in these programs and stories are portrayals 
of the cold-hearted businesspeople and the corrupt local officials who facilitate such 
“disorderly markets.”  Thus by the state’s own admission the challenges confronting 
its own efforts to ensure market order are daunting indeed.  As I argue below, this 
seemingly curious openness about, if not failures then at least as-of-yet unmet 
challenges to ensuring market order, are explicable only if we understand them as part 
of a larger effort to place market order, and the state’s emphasis on showing that it 
strives toward protecting market order, at the center of state legitimation strategies. 
  As this dissertation has made clear, however, simply focusing on formal legal 
and institutional reforms or central government policies and efforts geared toward the 
protection of market order provides an incomplete picture in terms of level of analysis 
and actual enforcement outcomes.  My work on the Nanjing shirong bureau’s 
                                                                                                                                              
Licensing Law see National People’s Congress Standing Committee (全国人民代表大会常务委员会 
2003). 
5 See, for instance, the section in Yang’s Leviathan devoted to “The Quest for Market Order and the 
Remaking of the Regulatory Institutions” (Yang Dali 2004a:94-106). 
6 CCTV2, one of twelve channels on China’s central television network, broadcasts at least two such 
programs, including “Economics and the Law” (http://www.cctv.com/program/jjyf/01/index.shtml), and 
“Economic News Broadcast” (www.cctv.com/program/jjxxlb/01/index.shtml).  In addition to five other 
related types of shows on CCTV alone, regional and city broadcasts also produce local variants of this 
type of programming.  Any Chinese citizen who turns on the television or opens a newspaper stands a 
very good chance of seeing or reading these types of muckraking reports. 
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 regulation of street vendors and my brief exploration of other related types of state-
market interaction in chapter four, highlights the complex and often-contradictory 
nature of ensuring market order at the local level.  On the one hand this dissertation 
has provided strong evidence refuting claims that the state lacks a regulatory presence 
at the local level.  It is simply incorrect to view street vendors and retail markets for 
counterfeit and pirated goods, among other similar markets with a tenuous legal 
standing, as “unregulated.”  As I have demonstrated, local state regulatory agencies 
know about and have regularized interactions with agents in these markets and 
selectively enforce policies related to these markets.  Although much work remains to 
be done comparing Chinese governance practices and capacities of similarly situated 
markets in other countries, the Chinese state’s regulatory presence over what in other 
settings are considered “informal markets” stands out as relatively strong.  That is, 
especially compared to other developing countries, Chinese state regulatory presence 
over supposedly “underground” markets is impressive.
7  Yet establishing a state 
regulatory presence over such markets, just “being there,” clearly does not equate with 
effective governance, even on the terms of the local bureaus involved. 
  If the City Appearance Administration in Nanjing is one of the state’s own 
institutions charged with maintaining market order “on the ground” then the results of 
its effectiveness are mixed at best.  As I have demonstrated, the Nanjing shirong has 
clearly established a regulatory presence over the city’s street vendors, licensed and 
unlicensed alike.  Yet having established this presence, the bureau’s record of 
enforcing its own rules is less than impressive.  This is, if shirong regulations forbid 
unlicensed street vending then the failure of the bureau to clear the streets of 
                                                 
7 I present initial evidence for this in chapter four in my discussion of informal markets, but more 
remains to be done to fill in the details of this comparative argument.  Tripp’s (1997) argument about 
the power of the local informal sector in the Tanzanian capital Dar es Salaam to “change the rules” 
stands in stark contrast to the Chinese case where, however imperfectly, the state still set the rules.   
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 unlicensed vendors must certainly be evidence of the bureau’s inability to enforce its 
own duties.  Moreover, the shirong’s practices of episodic and cyclical enforcement as 
well as the collection of off-budget fees and fines, which itself contravenes the new 
Administrative Licensing Law, can be seen as an indication of the shirong’s impaired 
governance capacity if not outright corruption.  At the same time, because the bureau 
has elicited such popular resentment, it also must receive low marks for promoting 
“market order.”   
However, as tempting as it may be to judge the shirong as a clear-cut example 
of limited state capacity and corrupt local governance, this dissertation has also 
demonstrated that it is far from clear that the rules governing street vendors (or 
counterfeit and pirated goods, informal finance, prostitution, etc.) reflect in some 
uncomplicated way what the state “wants.”  That is, not only does the shirong find 
itself in a difficult situation whereby it must rely on its own initiative to finance its 
own operations and existence,
8 but the alternative of actually ridding the streets of 
vendors (by relocating them to fixed place markets or through other methods) and 
thereby depriving vendors of a livelihood and city residents of a popular and cheap 
source of consumer goods and services, is clearly unappealing.   
This then brings us back to the role and commitment of the central government 
in ensuring market order.  Here again the judgment of state capacity must be mixed.  
On the one hand, if central authorities are committed to eradicating the existence of 
                                                 
8 Michael Dutton provides a convincing argument that one of the key factors that allowed Chinese law 
enforcement and administrative officials (his particular focus is the Public Security Bureau) to make a 
shift from “policing politics” to instead regulating more market-based, contractual transactions, was the 
ability of those officials to seek personal and collective material rewards through the collection of fines 
and fees.  The result was a proliferation in the collection of fines and fees.  As Dutton argues, “local 
governments…passed on the financial burden to the local police stations, more or less telling the police 
to partially self-fund their activities…Local police stations reacted by extensively exercising their 
powers to levy fines and fees. They did this not as a means of deterrence, but simply to pay the wages 
of their officers…Increasingly, fines began to replace punishment, and nowhere was this more in 
evidence than in those ambiguous administrative areas that lay on the edge of criminality. Prostitution 
was one area subject to ‘administrative sanction’ that lent itself to the extended use of the fine” (Dutton 
2005:280).  
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 unregistered and/or IPR-infringing businesses, then why not make a clearer 
commitment in terms of funding (to reduce incentives to collect off-budget fees and 
fines) and personnel oversight (to reduce corruption and physically abusive 
enforcement practices) so that the enforcement bureaus can carry out their tasks in 
accordance with official policy?  If, on the other hand, central authorities seek to 
support the street vendors and others who are simply searching for a way to make a 
living in the market economy, then why not direct more resources toward funding the 
creation of market venues (e.g. fixed-place markets) that are considered appropriate to 
the goals of “modern” Chinese urban appearance (i.e. why not fund more Fuzimiao or 
“1912”-type markets and provide incentives for unlicensed vendors to operate there 
with official assistance and approval?)?  
Granted, the current status quo of tolerating selective enforcement practices 
over the types of legally questionable markets that I have analyzed in this dissertation 
points in the direction of limited state capacity to ensure its own desired goal of 
providing and maintaining market order.  However, the central government’s recent 
criticisms of shirong/chengguan administrative enforcement practice and announced 
plans to rein in and discipline the bureau reflect the awareness and (time will tell) the 
ability of the central government to identify and prevent certain behaviors, even by 
agents of the state itself, that are seen to undermine its efforts to champion market 
order.
9  Ultimately, I would offer that both central and local responses to such markets 
reflects a “technique of rule” that in many ways reflects a kind of coping strategy 
involved in governing the “lower tier” of what is a vast, complicated and rapidly 
changing economy.
10   
                                                 
9 Certainly that Beijing is the host for the 2008 summer Olympics plays a role in announced reforms to 
the way the Beijing chengguan (and presumably chengguan/shirong bureaus across the country) is 
expected to carry out its enforcement duties in the future (see “Norms for Urban Management ahead of 
Olympics” 2007).   
10 I borrow the term “technique of rule” from Perry (2007:9). 
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 If the argument presented here that the Chinese state shows elements of both 
limited and relatively strong state capacity, at the same time and at various levels of 
analysis, then rather than throwing our hands up in the air in frustration at not being 
able to make a definitive statement about Chinese state capacity, we should embrace 
this complexity as a step toward understanding the multifaceted political challenges 
facing the Chinese state itself.
11  However, we need not leave the analysis of state 
capacity at this.  If market order is central to judgments about Chinese state capacity it 
is also critical to understanding a key facet of state legitimation efforts as well.  If 
making a clear statement about state capacity seems difficult, or at the very least if an 
unambiguous indictment of the effectiveness of Chinese economic governance seems 
rather wide of the mark, maybe this is an intended effect.   
 
Legitimacy and Market Order 
  The concept of political legitimacy, like state capacity, has a long history in the 
study of politics and also like the concept of state capacity has been defined and 
measured in a variety of different ways.  While definitions of the concept vary, the 
essence of the concept revolves around “the right to govern.”  As one study on 
political legitimacy argues,  
 
The problem of legitimacy, which is central in politics, is not the exclusive 
property of any one discipline…one finds, even within a given discipline, some 
major differences. Despite these, there exists a common ground for 
understanding: the idea of legitimacy concerns first and foremost the right to 
govern. Legitimacy is the recognition of the right to govern. In this regard, it 
                                                 
11 Ultimately, the findings of this dissertation also do little to “resolve” the tension in studies of Chinese 
political economy about whether decentralization of economic and political authority should be credited 
with China’s economic growth in the reform era or whether that same decentralization has resulted in 
local protectionism, corruption and poorly regulated markets.  The Nanjing shirong, while clearly not 
an institution designed or intent on promoting local economic development, and despite its sometimes 
“predatory” behavior, nevertheless promotes vending opportunities for local residents and, at the end of 
the day, does not completely force unlicensed and therefore nominally illegal vendors off the street.   
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 tries to offer a solution to a fundamental political problem, which consists in 
justifying simultaneously political power and obedience. (Coicaud 2002:10) 
  
Recent writing about the particular case of political legitimacy in China has also 
emphasized the culturally contingent nature of the concept.  For example, one study 
defines legitimacy as the “belief by the governed in the rulers’ moral right to issue 
commands and the people’s corresponding obligation to obey such commands” 
(Zheng and Liang 2005:186) and another as “the belief of citizens that the nature and  
functioning of national state institutions conform to their own basic political and moral 
values” (Chen Cheng 2005:4).  Here each author stresses the centrality of a kind of 
“moral” authority necessary to govern. 
  Even if it can be agreed upon that the core of the concept of political 
legitimacy relates to the right to govern, that this right is in part a function of particular 
cultural values ensures that in practice there is a proliferation of arguments about what 
constitutes the most important element of legitimacy in a given case and how is should 
be measured.  In the case of China, the question of political legitimacy and the 
challenges to it have drawn significant attention and inspired a number of studies, each 
emphasizing different aspects of Chinese state legitimacy.  Some argue that with the 
demise of socialist ideology the Chinese government relies on economic and 
institutional “performance” to maintain popular support (Zheng and Liang 2005:190).  
A variation on this by Bruce Gilley emphasizes that “as an authoritarian regime whose 
legitimacy rests mainly on a certain subjective perception of performance, preferences 
may be more unstable than in democratic regimes that are judged more by objective 
procedural criteria” (Gilley forthcoming:4-5).  Both of these studies highlight a 
common methodological underpinning of research on legitimacy in that they are based 
on survey results and seek to explain how as an authoritarian state China still 
maintains high marks on such surveys (Gilley forthcoming:4 and Chen Cheng 2005:4).  
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 Other studies emphasize what they see as threats to Chinese state legitimacy 
and seek to analyze the nature of those threats.  Gries (2004) points to the threat posed 
by popular nationalism that has slipped out of the grip of state control while Solinger 
(2004) and Weston (2004) have each emphasized different ways in which rising 
unemployment and urban “informality” challenge Chinese state legitimacy.  Other 
studies have sought to move beyond the threats to legitimacy from such specific issues 
as nationalism or unemployment in order to explain exactly what types of “political 
and moral values” are most salient to legitimacy in China today.  One of the themes 
that has emerged from such studies is the centrality of “stability” and “order” to 
Chinese notions of political legitimacy.
12  As Shue argues,  
 
The maintenance of the conditions in which the economy does develop and the 
people do enjoy more prosperity—this, I believe comes much closer to 
capturing the actual core of the contemporary Chinese state’s claims to rule 
legitimately…Those conditions are, in a word, the conditions of stability – the 
conditions of social peace and order. (Shue 2004:29; italics in original) 
 
Shue goes on to explain that this value placed on stability is related to three elements 
that were historically central to legitimizing dynastic rule: a state monopoly on “truth,” 
“benevolence,” and “glory.”  She emphasizes that in the case of benevolence in 
particular, “legitimation for local officials and members of the elite may have 
depended more, at times, on the display of benevolent concern itself, rather than on the 
actual saving of lives” (Shue 2004:32).  Linking these issues to contemporary issues of 
state legitimation, Shue stresses that the same values that lie at the heart of state 
legitimation strategies (i.e. the “raw material”) can and are, in turn, often used by 
                                                 
12 This emphasis on stability and order as a central value of Chinese society in general and as a specific 
component of state legitimacy is corroborated by Chinese survey research that shows a Chinese 
preference for “order” over “liberty” (Chen and Zhong 2000). The authors of this study also quote 
Lucien Pye that “most Chinese accept completely the need for order” (Chen and Zhong 2000:433; Pye 
1992:123). 
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 citizens to challenge that legitimacy.  Shue concludes that it is when such challenges 
cut to the heart of the state monopoly on these values that the state may lash out to 
defend that monopoly.     
  Throughout this dissertation I have argued that a central but little understood 
element at the center of the state’s repertoire of state legitimation is the concept of 
market order.  Market order, as I have emphasized, marries the goal of maintaining 
social and economic stability with a commitment to market-led development.  The 
state has positioned itself as the primary defender of market order, and as such seeks 
to influence public expectations about the state’s role in regulating the economy.  In 
this sense, then, Chinese state legitimacy is directly tied to the state’s capacity to 
promote and protect market order in that popular expectations are created in 
connection to the state’s efforts and ability to maintain market order.  Yet, as I have 
argued, the concept of market order is not clearly defined and while there is an official 
understanding of market order tied to the central state and Party leadership, there is 
still great room for various and competing interpretations of what market order is and 
should be.  It is in this very ambiguity that lies the significance of the concept of 
market order as a tool of Chinese state legitimation.
13  This ambiguity has also created 
the opportunity for unwanted interpretations and left the door open to challenges to the 
state’s record of effectively maintaining market order.  
  At the level of the central government and Party leadership, the ambiguity and 
flexibility of the idea of market order  are apparent in at least two ways that I have 
explored in the dissertation.  First, the concept of market order is ambiguous enough 
that it allows for potentially very different interpretations within the Party leadership 
itself.  As Hu Angang points out, it was then-premier Zhu Rongji who first stressed 
                                                 
13 I thank Vivienne Shue for pushing me to explore the importance of ambiguity in state legitimation 
efforts related to market order.  Shue points to the role of “productive ambiguity” in Duara’s (1988) 
study on the breakdown of China’s “cultural nexus” (Shue 2004:37). 
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 the importance of promoting market order on the eve of China’s WTO accession in 
2001 (Hu Angang 胡鞍钢 2001).  And yet the current leadership, in what must be seen 
in part as a bid to distinguish its own more egalitarian approach to development from 
that of the Jiang Zemin/Zhu Rongji leadership team, has criticized neoliberalism as 
threatening to market order.  This is true despite the fact that the Party remains firmly 
commited to a development strategy that embraces most of the same fundamental 
market-expanding policies initiated by Jiang and Zhu.  Thus different understandings 
of market order can, and have been, employed by the central Party and state leadership. 
  The centrally sponsored critique of neoliberalism that I analyze in chapter two 
also becomes more understandable if it is clear that market order is a central 
component of state legitimation strategies.  First, neoliberalism is a threat to market 
order because it promotes “unregulated” markets and their attendant chaos.  
Neoliberalism is also painted as a Trojan horse of western capitalist hegemony and if 
allowed to progress too far will lead China to the destabilizing depths of financial 
crises like those faced by countries from Latin America to Russia.  Moreover, 
neoliberalism contains the seeds of an alternative relationship between states and 
markets where markets are naturally “orderly” and where that order is in fact attendant 
on the existence of a mere “Hayekian night-watchman state.”
14  Official criticisms of 
neoliberalism that decry the “myth of the market” and the “blind faith” inspired by 
that myth must be seen as defending the state as the true guarantor and judge of 
market order.
15  This is a clear example of the state defending itself from an 
alternative, and here foreign, claimant to the “Truth.” 
                                                 
14 Wang Shaoguang uses this term as a kind of foil to the regulatory state he sees emerging in China 
(Wang 2006). 
15 As I will argue below, it is not that the state is unwilling to entertain alternative sources of market-
generated “order,” as long as they serve to complement rather than replace state authority. 
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   By not attaching an overly-specific definition to market order the state has also 
made room for contestation over the true meaning of the concept.  This in some ways 
can serve state purposes, but by allowing for alternative interpretations may also open 
the possibility for unwanted challenges by those critical of the state’s vision of market 
order and ability to enforce it.  On the one hand, the type of intellectual contestation 
about different understandings of market order described in chapter two allows 
China’s potentially restive intellectuals a wide berth in which to explore and vent their 
critical opinions on a wide range of issues.  By allowing for contention over the 
meaning and the best way to establish and protect market order, central authorities can 
learn about and even strategically choose from components of ideas generated by the 
debate.  There is a tension here however because if the power of ideas is to frame a 
problem as a problem and to therefore call forth a certain form of response, then the 
ambiguity and flexibility of the idea of market order allows not only the state but also 
its critics to offer alternative understandings of market order that challenge the official 
version.  For now, however, elements of both the neoliberal and the New Left 
perspective have found their way into the official understanding of market order.  So it 
appears that by maintaining elements of both perspectives the state is able to create a 
strategic balance that is, again, fostered by the ambiguous nature of the idea of market 
order. 
  At the level of propaganda, and in particular through the official print and 
television media, the notion of market order as an instrument of state legitimation 
takes on a peculiar aspect that also involves a potentially precarious balance.  On the 
one hand, the state certainly does seek to highlight its own successes in maintaining 
market order.  As I argue above in my discussion of state capacity, the state, through 
official spokespeople and through the media, makes many claims to its successes in 
cleaning up disorderly markets, fighting corruption and local protectionism, and 
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 promoting the public good.  At the same time, this reporting about successful efforts to 
combat disorderly influences involves a constant stream of stories about all of the 
potential threats to market order.  There is an effort to locate the source of these threats 
in the very nature of the markets themselves or in the “uncivilized” behavior of market 
actors or corrupt individual officials.  It is also certainly the case that the state strives 
to be seen combating these threats to market order even if the actual situation on the 
ground still involves the widespread existence of such disorderly influences.  However, 
by constantly calling attention to the ubiquity of disorderly market activities the state 
also opens the door for the criticism that it is somehow failing in its efforts to maintain 
market order.  Again, the ambiguity of the concept allows the state a wide berth in 
claiming to successfully maintain market order or at least to be seen as striving to 
maintain it, but at the same time this same ambiguity opens the door to those who 
might claim that the state is not successfully maintaining order. 
Finally, and most problematically for state legitimation efforts tied to the 
maintenance of market order, is the behavior of certain state regulatory agencies like 
the shirong that are charged with regulating markets with unclear legal standing.  For 
shirong officials, the concept of market order is less a guide to proper enforcement 
practice than an open-ended tool for framing the nature of the regulatory challenge 
they face, for defending their own regulatory authority and, in some cases, for abusing 
that authority.  As I demonstrate in chapter three, Nanjing shirong officials often 
portray unlicensed vendors as opponents in a guerrilla war, constantly moving, 
creating traffic obstacles, creating trash and generally creating a “disorderly” 
appearance.  In the name of “order” the shirong must scatter and disperse the vendors.  
I also provide evidence in chapter three about how some chengguan departments force 
vendors to buy certain products, like refrigerators of a certain brand, from a particular 
seller in order to ensure a “standardized” and “orderly” appearance to their vending 
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 sites.  Lastly, while coming under critical fire from the public and the central 
government, the chengguan has argued that without its oversight vendors will create 
chaotic conditions. 
Ultimately, the shirong/chengguan has come under fire precisely because it has 
come to been seen as a government bureau that threatens rather than maintains market 
order.  It is not the shirong’s selective enforcement tactics that have come under fire, 
or at least not that portion of the tactics that essentially allow for unlicensed, and 
therefore illegal, vendors to continue to largely remain on the streets.  Instead, it is 
both popular and central government criticism of the abusive enforcement tactics used 
by the shirong and their improper understanding of what “order” really is and how to 
maintain it that have been the central issues.
16  Popular criticisms often centered on 
the skepticism about the nature of the shirong’s authority and anger that in the name
“order” the bureau essentially extorted poor, defenseless vendors.  Later, media 
criticisms used this exact same language.  If the shirong claimed authority based on 
the need to maintain order over the naturally disorderly street vendors, and if popular 
opinion reached the point that this justification for shirong authority was completely 
non-credible, then as an agency of the state the shirong ultimately posed a threat to 
state legitimation efforts.  It is thus only in the context of state efforts to defend its 
credibility as the guarantor of market order that the center’s critique of the 
shirong/chengguan makes sense. 
 of 
                                                
In the case of the City Appearance Administration, then, the threat posed to 
state legitimacy came from a unit of the state itself.  As with the concept of state 
 
16 This highlights the problem with arguments about “organizational corruption” and “decentralized 
predation,” which insist on the corrosive influence of local regulatory agencies that deviate from their 
prescribed tasks for corporate or personal gain.  Indeed, given the central government policy of 
requiring local regulatory agencies to provide for a large portion of their own revenue, many if not most 
agencies could be accused of “organizational corruption.”  It is not the failure of these agencies to 
strictly enforce regulations according to the letter of the law, but rather the perception that their 
behavior poses a threat to stability and order that leads to both public and central Party/state criticism. 
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 capacity, political legitimacy is also a moving target in China.  Thus the challenges to 
legitimacy may come from unexpected sources.  Nevertheless, I have argued that the 
concept of market order is ambiguous by design and that Chinese state legitimacy is 
intricately linked to its capacity to maintain market order.  Just as one can find 
elements of strong and weak state capacity co-existing in China, the very ambiguity of 
market order as a central legitimizing concept is both the source of its strength and just 
as potentially the source of its greatest challenges.  Market order may elude easy 
classification, but given its centrality in understanding the crucial issues of Chinese 
state capacity and legitimacy, it deserves our most careful and ongoing attention.   
 
The Future of Market Order and State Capacity: Not Only a Chinese Issue 
  In February of 2007 the International Herald Tribune published a startling 
report on the vast quantities of counterfeit drugs being produced in and exported from 
China to other parts of the world (McNeil 2007).  Some of the fake medicines, 
including anti-malarial medications, are responsible for potentially hundreds of 
thousands of preventable deaths each year, whereas others, such as fake Viagra, may 
only be responsible for marginally lower birth rates in the countries that have imported 
them.  The article noted that very few of these fake drugs had turned up in the United 
States, but instead often went to China’s poorer neighbors in Southeast Asia.  For all 
of its import to world health, the story seemed to drift into obscurity almost as soon as 
it had been reported. 
  But within only a few months, a firestorm of media attention blew up around a 
different deadly export from China: pet food.  By early April, the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) had certified that 16 pets had died since the beginning of 2007 
and suspected the cause was related to tainted wheat gluten that had been added to the 
food during its production in China (Abruzzese 2007).  In the following months, there 
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 was a steady stream of weekly if not daily reports in the western press about the 
dangers of poisonous toothpaste, cancer-causing seafood, and toys coated with unsafe 
paint, all imported from China.  There was tough talk in Congress of the need to take 
immediate measures to protect America’s consumers from this flood of dangerous 
products.  Not to be outdone, the Chinese authorities banned a number of imports from 
the United States as well as other western countries. 
  Setting aside for the moment the rather disturbing fact that western opinion 
seemed to be roused into a flurry of indignation not by the very real human tragedy 
connected to fake pharmaceutical exports but instead only by the deaths of a handful 
of American pets, what are we to make of this story?  This news should come as no 
surprise.  The Chinese media has for years been full of stories practically every day 
about the sales of fake, substandard, and unhealthy products and as I noted in the last 
chapter, foreign companies that specialize in cracking down on a huge range of 
counterfeit goods, many intended for export abroad, have become increasingly 
numerous in China.  Given how deeply integrated China has become into the world 
economy, especially in terms of exports of consumer goods, that China would begin to 
export some of the less salubrious results of its regulatory system was really only a 
matter of time.   
  Not to worry, though, declared Yang Dali.  When Yang was recently 
interviewed by the New York Times about China’s food and drug safety woes and 
asked to compare China’s current situation with the United states, where the FDA had 
taken almost a half century after its creation to gain any regulatory teeth, Yang 
responded: “I’d be surprised if it takes China that long” (Kahn 2007a).
17  This, 
however, begs the question of what Yang thinks will change or how it will change.  In 
                                                 
17 In an article titled “In China’s Safety Woes, Echoes of U.S. History” (Kahn 2007b) Yang Dali and 
Wang Shaoguang would both certainly find verification for their claim that the development of a 
regulatory state in China today is reminiscent of early 20
th century American reforms. 
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 this dissertation I have described the logic of selective enforcement of policies 
ostensibly designed to limit a range of markets and market practices.  In practice, such 
selective enforcement is a technique of governance that often leads to the active 
toleration of such formally prohibited markets and behaviors.   
As I described in the introductory chapter, neither Yang nor other advocates of 
China as a budding regulatory state offer a clear explanation for what they think will 
be the catalyst of regulatory change.  In the case of the international row over China’s 
shoddy exports, the Chinese government, despite an initially defensive position, 
launched a highly publicized campaign to highlight all of the many new efforts it is 
taking to solve problems with food, pharmaceutical and other consumer safety 
concerns (Barboza 2007b).  Included among these was the passage of a raft of new 
laws as well as the highly publicized execution of the former head of China’s FDA 
(Barboza 2007a).   However, even the Chinese press has reported skepticism that these 
reforms will cut to the core of the issue (Huang Fang 黄芳 2007).   
Certainly China feels the immediate diplomatic and economic pressures to 
respond to the numerous claims that its system for regulating food, pharmaceutical and 
other consumer product is broken in some way, but this is not the first time that China 
has been under similar pressures and has responded with the creation of new laws and 
institutions for enhanced regulatory oversight.  Mertha’s (2005) study of international 
initiatives to push China to strengthen its anti-counterfeiting policies shows that such 
pressures had direct influence on the creation of new rules and institutions, but very 
limited effect on actual enforcement.  This dissertation, in addition to studies like 
Mertha’s, demonstrate the various and powerful forces at work mitigating against the 
likelihood that changes in the formal rules and institutional structures will rapidly or 
directly translate into changes on the ground. 
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However, the fact remains that far too little is known about the mechanisms 
that drive changes not just in the formal rules and institutions for governing China’s 
markets, but in how those formal changes translate into actual results on the ground.  
Foreign government pressure is one plausible candidate as a reform catalyst, but as the 
case of IPR legislation and enforcement demonstrates, foreign pressure to create 
certain rules does not necessarily translate into changed patterns of enforcement.  
Another candidate as a catalyst for change is increased domestic media exposure of 
market and state failures.  That the domestic media has a role in exposing key issues 
related to, say, consumer health and workplace safety is certainly true to some extent, 
but the question remains as to why certain issues are reported and many others are not.  
Much work has yet to be done on understanding what social and economic forces 
prompt the Chinese state to respond to perceived threats to market order.  Yet such an 
understanding is of crucial importance not just for the Chinese state and its citizens but 
also for the international community in which China will certainly play an 
increasingly prominent role.   APPENDIX A 
 
Formal Interviews 
 
 
Location Number  Date  Unit  (Level)/Title 
      
Nanjing  NJ1  10/14/00  Nanjing University Sociology 
Department 
  NJ2  4/15/01  Sanitation Bureau (Province) 
  NJ3  5/08/01  District Re-employment Office (Gulou)
  NJ4  9/27/02  Nanjing University Sociology 
Department 
  NJ5  10/14/02  Nanjing University History Department
  NJ6  11/07/02  Nanjing University Sociology 
Department 
  NJ7  2/19/03  Nanjing University Sociology 
Department 
  NJ8  4/03/03  Provincial Government  
Research Unit 
 NJ9  4/13/03  Shirong (City) 
 NJ10  4/16/03  Shirong (Gulou District) 
  NJ11  4/23/03  Provincial Government  
Research Unit 
 NJ12  5/24/03  Shirong (City) 
 NJ13  6/02/03  Shirong (Xuanwu District Street 
Office) 
 NJ14  7/14/03  Public  Security Bureau (Gulou District 
Street Office) 
 NJ15  8/22/03  Shirong (City) 
 NJ16  9/13/03  Shirong (Xuanwu District) 
 NJ17  9/15/03  Shirong (City) 
 NJ18  9/30/03  Gongshang  (City) 
  NJ19  9/30/03  Gongshang (Gulou District) 
 NJ20  10/09/03  Shirong (City) 
  NJ21  10/14/03  Nanjing University History Department
  NJ22  10/24/03  Provincial Government  
Research Unit 
 NJ23  12/04/03  Gongshang  (Province) 
 NJ24  3/22/04  Shirong (Gulou Street Office) 
 NJ25  4/02/04  Shirong (City) 
  NJ26  4/08/04  City Planning Bureau 
  NJ27  4/16/04  Nanjing University Sociology 
Department 
  NJ28  6/25/04  Provincial Government  
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 Research Unit 
  NJ29  7/29/05  Provincial Government  
Research Unit 
 NJ30  11/18/05  Shirong (City) 
  NJ31  6/23/07  Provincial Government  
Research Unit 
  NJ32  9/12/07  Provincial Government  
Research Unit 
  NJ33  10/16/07  Provincial Government  
Research Unit 
      
Shanghai SH1 3/10/03  Security  Professional 
 SH2  3/12/03  Shirong (City) 
 SH3  4/18/03  Security  Professional 
 SH4  4/18/03  Security  Professional 
 SH5  4/18/03  Security  Professional 
 SH6  3/25/04  Security  Professional 
 SH7  4/16/04  Security  Professional 
  SH8  4/18/04  Fudan University History Department 
  SH9  4/18/04  Fudan University History Department 
 SH10  11/16/05  Security  Professional 
      
Beijing  BJ1  4/12/02  Tsinghua University Sociology 
Department 
  BJ2  11/06/04  Beijing University Department of 
Economics 
  BJ3  11/10/04  Unirule Institute of Economics 
  BJ4  11/14/04  Beijing University of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics 
  BJ5  11/21/04  Beijing University Economics 
Department 
 BJ6  11/26/04  Caijing Magazine 
 BJ7  2/22/05  Chengguan (Haidian District) 
  BJ8  4/12/05  Beijing University Economics 
Department 
 BJ9  4/21/05  Caijing Magazine 
  BJ10  5/09/05  Tsinghua University History 
Department 
  BJ11  6/18/05  Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
  BJ12  7/08/05  Beijing University School of 
International Studies 
  BJ13  8/12/05   Tsinghua University School of Public 
Policy and Management 
  BJ14  9/28/05  Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
  BJ15  11/14/05  Tsinghua University Sociology 
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 Department 
  BJ16  3/24/06  Unirule Institute of Economics 
  BJ17  4/08/06  Beijing University Guanghua School of 
Management 
  BJ18  4/17/06  Tsinghua Institute of International 
Studies 
 BJ19  5/23/06  Ford  Foundation 
  BJ20  6/13/06  Tsinghua University School of Public 
Policy and Management 
  BJ21  6/17/06  Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
  BJ22  10/03/06  Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
  BJ23  10/15/06  Tsinghua University School of Public 
Policy and Management 
  BJ24  7/02/07  State Council Market Order Leading 
Group 
      
Yangzhou 
(Jiangsu) 
YZ1  4/10/04  Provincial Government Research Unit 
 YZ2  4/11/04  City  Government 
      
Hangzhou 
(Zhejiang) 
HZ1  10/29/04  Zhejiang University Economics 
Department 
  HZ2  10/31/04  Zhejiang University Economics 
Department 
      
Yiwu 
(Zhejiang) 
YW1 10/30/04  Security  Professional 
 YW2  10/30/04  City  Government 
 YW3  10/30/04  Provincial  Government 
  YW4  10/30/04  Wholesale Market Manager 
      
Xinji (Hebei)  XJ1  5/25/06  Foreign Affairs Bureau 
 XJ2  5/26/06  Chengguan (city) 
  XJ3  5/26/06  City Planning Bureau 
  XJ4  5/27/06  Business Affairs (shangwuju) Bureau 
  XJ5  5/27/06  Civil Affairs Bureau 
 XJ6  5/28/06  Gongshang  (city) 
  XJ7  5/29/06  Development and Reform Bureau 
      
Hong Kong  HK1  12/14/03  HK Baptist University Geography 
Department 
  HK2  12/15/03  University of Southampton Geography 
Department 
  HK3  12/16/03  HK Baptist University Geography 
Department 
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  HK4  1/09/05  Chinese University of Hong 
Universities Service Centre 
  HK5  1/10/05  Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Economics Department 
  HK6  1/11/05  Chinese University of Hong 
Universities Service Centre 
  HK7  1/13/05  Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Department of Government 
  HK8  1/13/05  Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Department of Government 
      
Tianjin TJ1  6/02/06  Nankai  University 
 
 Informal Interviews 
 
Location Number  Date  Business  Type
1
 
                                                
      
Nanjing  nj1  10/8/00  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing nj2  11/14/00  Clothing  Vendor 
Nanjing nj3  4/25/01  Cosmetics  Vendor 
Nanjing nj4  5/18/01  DVD  Store   
Nanjing nj5  9/27/02  Household  Electronics 
Vendor 
Nanjing nj6  10/20/02  DVD  Store 
Nanjing nj7  10/23/02  Book  Vendor 
Nanjing nj8  11/09/02  DVD  Store 
Nanjing nj9  2/16/03  Fruit  Vendor 
Nanjing nj10  2/21/03  Vegetable  Vendor 
Nanjing nj11  3/04/03  Historical  Memorabilia 
Vendor 
Nanjing nj12  3/04/03  Ceramics  Vendor 
Nanjing nj13  3/16/03  Household  Electronics 
Vendor 
Nanjing nj14  3/22/03  Cosmetics  Store 
Nanjing nj15  3/28/03  Fruit  Store 
Nanjing nj16  4/04/03  Restaurant 
Nanjing  nj17  4/09/03  Clothing Store Owner 
Nanjing nj18  4/15/03  Book  Vendor 
Nanjing nj19  4/15/03  Vegetable  Vendor 
Nanjing nj20  4/23/03  Fruit  Vendor 
Nanjing nj21  4/23/03  Jewelry  Vendor 
Nanjing nj22  4/23/03  Cosmetics  Store 
Nanjing nj23  4/27/03  Vegetable  Vendor 
Nanjing nj24  4/27/03  Book  Store 
Nanjing  nj25  4/27/03  Bicycle Repair Vendor 
Nanjing nj26  5/09/03  Jewelry  Vendor 
Nanjing nj27  5/18/03  Fruit  Vendor 
Nanjing nj28  5/18/03  Fruit  Store 
Nanjing nj29  5/18/03  DVD  Store 
Nanjing  nj30  5/19/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing nj31  5/20/03  Cosmetic  Vendor 
Nanjing nj32  5/20/03  Cosmetic  Store 
Nanjing nj33  5/20/03  Flower  Vendor 
Nanjing nj34  5/26/03  Book  Store 
Nanjing nj35  5/28/03  Jewelry  Vendor 
Nanjing nj36  5/31/03  Clothing  Store 
Nanjing nj37  6/01/03  Restaurant 
 
1 Here, “vendor” refers to a non-fixed space business while “store” refers to a fixed-space business. 
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 Nanjing  nj38  7/18/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing nj39  7/22/03  Jewelry  Vendor 
Nanjing nj40  7/22/03  Cosmetics  Store 
Nanjing nj41  7/24/03  Clothing  Store 
Nanjing  nj42  7/24/03  Stuffed Animal Vendor 
Nanjing nj43  7/26/03  Book  Vendor 
Nanjing  nj44  7/26/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing nj45  7/27/03  Clothing  Store 
Nanjing nj46  7/27/03  Clothing  Store 
Nanjing nj47  7/27/03  Clothing  Vendor 
Nanjing nj48  8/02/03  Historical  Memorabilia 
Vendor 
Nanjing nj49  8/05/03  Ceramics  Vendor 
Jilin City  nj50  8/08/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Jilin City  jc1  8/08/03  Clothing Vendor 
Jilin City  jc2  8/09/03  Book Vendor 
Jilin City  jc3  8/09/03  Cosmetics Vendor 
Jilin City  jc4  8/09/03  Household Electronics 
Vendor 
Jilin City  jc5  8/10/03  DVD vendor 
Jilin City  jc6  8/10/03  Restaurant 
Nanjing nj51  8/15/03  Clothing  Vendor 
Nanjing nj52  8/15/03  Household  Electronics 
Vendor 
Nanjing nj53  9/03/03  Clothing  Vendor 
Nanjing nj54  9/06/03  DVD  Store 
Nanjing nj55  9/16/03  Cosmetics  Store 
Nanjing nj56  9/19/03  Clothing  Store 
Nanjing nj57  9/22/03  Historical  Memorabilia 
Vendor 
Nanjing  nj58  9/23/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing nj59  10/02/03  Clothing  Store 
Nanjing nj60  10/02/03  Restaurant 
Nanjing nj61  10/02/03  Book  Vendor 
Nanjing  nj62  10/04/03  Bicycle Repair Vendor 
Nanjing  nj63  10/04/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing  nj64  10/05/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing  nj65  10/06/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing  nj66  10/06/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing  nj67  10/06/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing nj68  10/06/03  Cosmetics  Store 
Nanjing nj69  10/11/03  Household  Electronics 
Vendor 
Nanjing nj70  10/14/03  DVD  Store 
Nanjing nj71  10/14/03  Clothing  Store 
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 Nanjing nj72  10/17/03  DVD  Store 
Nanjing  nj73  10/19/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing  nj74  10/19/03  Bicycle Repair Vendor 
Nanjing  nj75  10/21/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing  nj76  10/22/03  Stuffed Animal Vendor 
Nanjing nj77  10/22/03  Vegetable  Vendor 
Nanjing nj78  10/22/03  Vegetable  Store 
Nanjing nj79  10/22/03  Book  Store 
Nanjing nj80  10/22/03  DVD  Store 
Nanjing nj81  10/22/03  Restaurant 
Nanjing  nj82  10/24/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing  nj83  10/28/03  Stuffed Animal Vendor 
Nanjing nj84  11/01/03  Jewelry  Vendor 
Nanjing nj85  11/01/03  Household  Electronics 
Vendor 
Nanjing  nj86  11/03/03  Bicycle Repair Vendor 
Nanjing nj87  11/03/03  Ceramics  Vendor 
Nanjing nj88  11/03/03  Ceramics  Vendor 
Nanjing nj89  11/05/03  Clothing  Store 
Nanjing nj90  11/07/03  Flower  Vendor 
Nanjing nj91  11/07/03  Clothing  Store 
Nanjing  nj92  11/10/03  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing nj93  11/10/03  Vegetable  Vendor 
Nanjing nj94  11/10/03  DVD  Store 
Nanjing nj95  11/11/03  Jewelry  Vendor 
Nanjing nj96  11/17/03  Cosmetics  Vendor 
Nanjing nj97  11/17/03  Clothing  Vendor 
Nanjing nj98  11/18/03  Household  Eletronics 
Vendor 
Nanjing  nj99  11/18/03  Bicycle Repair Vendor 
Nanjing nj100  11/18/03  Clothing  Store 
Nanjing nj101  11/19/03  Book  Vendor 
Nanjing nj102  11/21/03  Fruit  Vendor 
Nanjing nj103  11/30/03  Ceramics  Vendor 
Nanjing nj104  11/30/03  Flower  Vendor 
Nanjing nj105  12/05/03  Book  Vendor 
Nanjing nj106  12/07/03  Clothing  Vendor 
Nanjing nj107  12/07/03  Clothing  Vendor 
Nanjing nj108  12/07/03  Clothing  Vendor 
Nanjing nj109  12/07/03  Ceramics  Vendor 
Nanjing nj110  12/07/03  Household  Electronics 
Vendor 
Nanjing nj111  12/11/03  Cosmetics  Vendor 
Nanjing  nj112  3/24/04  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing  nj113  4/04/04  Prepared Food Vendor 
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 Nanjing nj114  4/17/04  Clothing  Vendor 
Nanjing nj115  4/17/04  Jewelry  Vendor 
Nanjing  nj116  4/23/04  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing  nj117  5/05/04  Bicycle Repair Vendor 
Nanjing nj118  5/05/04  DVD  Store 
Nanjing nj119  5/06/04  Vegetable  Vendor 
Nanjing  nj120  5/13/04  Prepared Food Vendor 
Nanjing nj121  5/21/04  Cosmetics  Store 
Nanjing nj122  5/23/04  Clothing  Store 
Beijing bj1  7/15/04  Clothing  Vendor 
Beijing  bj2  7/15/04  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing  bj3  7/22/04  Bicycle Repair Vendor 
Beijing bj4  7/27/04  Ceramics  Vendor 
Beijing bj5  8/02/04  Fruit  Vendor 
Beijing  bj6  8/05/04  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing bj7  8/08/04  Book  Vendor 
Beijing bj8  8/14/04  Jewelry  Vendor 
Beijing  bj9  8/17/04  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing bj10  9/29/04  Fruit  Vendor 
Beijing bj11  10/03/04  Clothing  Vendor 
Beijing bj12  10/08/04  DVD  Store 
Beijing bj13  10/21/04  Vegetable  Vendor 
Beijing bj14  11/15/04  Restaurant 
Beijing  bj15  11/26/04  Bicycle Repair Vendor 
Beijing bj16  12/03/04  Jewelry  Vendor 
Beijing  bj17  12/07/04  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing bj18  12/08/04  DVD  Vendor 
Beijing bj19  2/18/05  Book  Vendor 
Beijing bj20  3/12/05  Fruit  Vendor 
Beijing bj21  3/27/05  Vegetable  Vendor 
Beijing bj22  4/19/05  Jewelry  Vendor 
Beijing bj23  4/23/05  Vegetable  Vendor 
Beijing bj24  5/09/05  Cosmetics  Vendor 
Beijing  bj25  5/13/05  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing  bj26  5/13/05  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing  bj27  5/23/05  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing bj28  5/29/05  DVD  Vendor 
Beijing  bj29  6/11/05  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing bj30  6/18/05  Vegetable  Vendor 
Beijing bj31  7/18/05  Vegetable  Vendor 
Beijing bj32  8/08/05  Jewelry  Vendor 
Beijing bj33  9/17/05  Jewelry  Vendor 
Beijing  bj34  9/21/05  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing bj35  9/23/05  DVD  Store 
Beijing bj36  10/26/05  Fruit  Vendor 
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Beijing bj37  12/14/05  Fruit  Vendor 
Beijing bj38  3/19/06  Clothing  Vendor 
Beijing bj39  4/06/06  Book  Vendor 
Beijing  bj40  5/15/06  Bicycle Repair Vendor 
Beijing  bj41  10/21/06  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing bj42  3/27/07  DVD  Vendor 
Beijing bj43  6/23/07  Vegetable  Vendor 
Beijing  bj44  6/23/07  Prepared Food Vendor 
Beijing bj45  7/05/07  Jewelry  Vendor 
Beijing bj46  7/08/07  Cosmetics  Vendor 
Beijing bj47  7/12/07  Clothing  Vendor 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
Nanjing City Appearance Administration Regulations
1 
 
General Rules 
 
1)  General emphasis on sanitation and a clean, productive work environment. 
2)  Focus on 
a.  Buildings 
b.  Streets 
c.  Public Places 
d.  Markets  
e.  Vehicles 
f.  Green areas and parks 
g.  Construction sites 
h.  Advertisements 
i.  Lighting (neon)  
3)  Stress on urban areas. 
4)  Need to unify administration of shirong issue areas. 
5)  Other departments with overlapping issue responsibilities (e.g. building, 
planning, construction, public services, parks, property, environmental 
protection, police, traffic, industry and commerce, health, etc.) should 
recognize the jurisdiction of and coordinate policies with the shirong. 
6)  Need to promote public education and awareness of city appearance issues. 
7)  The officers of the Nanjing shirong guanliju should be diligent in their work. 
8)  We should do our work adhering to high standards. 
 
Structural Appearance Administration 
 
9)  Newly built, expanded and reconstructed buildings must abide by national 
regulations. 
10) Existing structures need to be maintained in good condition.  Any structures 
facing the street that are not up to standards must initiate renovations.  If you 
knock down a wall to start a temporary business you need to first get 
permission.  Any non-permanent structures must get proper approval before 
starting business. 
11) Any building facing a major street needs to maintain its appearance. 
12) Do not let balconies/other building parts overhang major streets. 
 
                                                 
1 This is a partial translation of the 1998 Nanjing shirong regulations.  See Nanjing City Appearance 
Administration 南京市容管理局 (1998). 
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 Street, Public Place and Vehicle Appearance Administration 
 
13) Roads need to be maintained. 
14) Repairs of water/sewer covers need to be maintained. 
15) Can not make piles or randomly build on roadsides.  If you must pile or 
randomly build, need to get shirong permission first.  Can not set up stalls in 
areas prohibited by the city government. 
16) Sides of streets should look nice. 
17) Everything in public places should be kept up and it is the responsibility of 
each danwei to see that this is the case. 
18) All traffic fixtures, signs, poles, etc. need to be maintained. 
19) Any construction projects taking place near streets need to be well marked. 
20) All public places, including transportation sights, entertainment venues, 
markets, etc. need to maintain a nice appearance. 
21) Vehicles must be maintained (not leaking, etc.) and any cleaning must take 
place away from street fronts. 
 
Penalties 
 
4) If you illegally set up a street stall you can be charged a minimum of 10 renminbi 
and a maximum of 200, and under especially severe conditions your equipment can be 
temporarily confiscated. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Nanjing City Appearance Administration Fee Schedule 
 
       市容管理 
序号  项目名称 
计算单
位 
收费标准
（元) 
备注 
1  城镇垃圾处理费  户、月  5 
实行物业管理 2.5
元 
2  临时摊位费      
（1）  瓜果摊点 
摊位、
月 
  
  次干道以上   140   
  街巷及居民区   120   
（2） 
早点、百货、修
旧、服装等摊点 
摊位、
月 
  
  次干道以上   80   
（3）  街巷及居民区   60   
  季节性瓜果摊点 
摊位、
天 
 
农民进城卖瓜按
标准减半收取 
  次干道以上   5   
  街巷及居民区   4   
3 
临时摊位证照工本
费 
证  10  
4  公厕收费      
  移动厕所  人次  0.5  
  一类公厕  人次  0.3  
  二类公厕  人次  0.2  
  三类公厕  人次  0.1  
Source: http://njprice.com/test/smjfsc/shironggl.htm  REFERENCES 
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 GLOSSARY 
 
Chinese Terms 
 
Pinyin 
 
Chinese   English 
bao’an  保安  Security guard 
baojia  保甲  Mutual supervision 
system 
chengshi guanli xingzheng 
zhifaju (chengguan) 
城市管理行政执法局 
(城管) 
City Management (Law) 
Enforcement Department 
chengshi guanli 
weiyuanhui 
城市管理委员会  City Administration 
Committee 
chengshi guihuaju  城市规划局  City Planning Bureau 
chengshi jianshe he guanli  城市建设和管理  City Construction and 
Administration 
dangdai jingji zhixu 
hunluan de zhuangtai shi 
当前经济秩序混乱的现
状时 
Present state of economic 
order chaos 
daoban  盗版  Counterfeit or fake, as 
opposed to zhengban (正
版) or real/legal 
dixia jingji   地下经济  Underground economy 
fapiao  发票  Receipt; invoice (formal) 
feipin  废品  Scrap; recyclables 
fei zhenggui  非正规  Irregular 
fei zhengshi jingji  非正式经济  Informal Economy 
fei zhuliu jingji xuejia  非主流经济学家  Heterodox economists 
fuwu jigou  服务机构  Service organization 
guanli  管理  Regulate 
getihu  个体户  Privately owned small 
enterprise with less than 
8 employees 
gong’anju   公安局  Public Safety Bureau, 
Police 
gongshang xingzheng 
guanliju (gongshangju) 
工商行政管理局 
(工商局) 
Industrial and 
Commercial 
Administration Bureau 
gongwu quan  公务权   Public affairs powers 
gongzheng  公正  Fairness 
339 
 guanli de zhixu  管理的秩序  Governed order 
guanli jiancha dadui  管理监察大队  Management and 
supervision brigade 
gucheng  古城  Ancient city 
guding  固定  Fixed, stable 
guifanhua  规范化 
Standardize 
guihua shejiju   规划设计局 
Urban Planning Bureau 
guocheng gongzheng  过程公正  Procedural justice 
Guomindang  国民党  Nationalist Party 
guojia zhijian zongju  国家质检总局  National Quality and 
Technical Supervision 
Bureau 
hai meiyou chengshi 
gainian 
还没有城市概念  Still lack an urban 
mentality 
hefa(xing)  合法(性)  Legitimate; lawful 
(legitimacy) 
hukou  户口  Residence permit 
jiaomaoweilie  假冒伪劣  Fake and of poor quality 
jianbing  煎饼  Type of breakfast 
pancake 
jiancha dui  监察队  Inspection team 
Jiangsu Sheng  江苏省  Jiangsu Province 
jiaozi  饺子  Dumpling  
jiedao 
banshichu/weiyuanhui 
街道办事处/委员会  Street Office 
jieguo pingdeng  结果平等  Equality of results 
jumin weiyuanhui 
(juweihui) 
居民委员会  
(居委会) 
Residence Committees 
lameihui  拉美化   Latin Americanization 
laoxiang   老乡  Fellow villager 
liudongxing hen qiang  流动性很强  High mobility 
lingdao xiaozu   领导小组  Leading group 
luan or hunluan  乱 or 混乱  Chaos, chaotic, 
disorderly 
lvhua  绿化  “to make green,” 
meaning to create public 
green spaces 
maoyi shichang  贸易市场  Market places (literally, 
“trade markets”) 
meiguan  美观  Pleasing to the eye, 
pretty 
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 meiyou wenhua  没有文化  Uncultured  
niupixuan  牛皮癣  Psoriasis  
nongmao shichang  农贸市场  Farmers’ market 
pinkun  贫困  Poor; impoverished 
qingli zhengdun  清理整顿  Clean up and reorder (Li 
Zhang’s translation, a 
more typical translation 
of整顿 is “rectify”) 
quangguo weisheng 
chengshi 
全国卫生城市  National Hygienic City 
quanguo zhengdun he 
guifan shichang jingji 
zhixu lingdao xiaozu 
bangongshi 
全国整顿和规范市场经
济秩序领导小组办公室 
National Office on 
Rectification and 
Standardization of 
Market Economic Order 
shehui wending  社会稳定  Social stability 
shehui zhuyi shichang 
jingji zhixu 
社会主义市场经济秩序  Socialist market 
economic order 
shichang jiduan zhuyi  市场极端主义  Market extremism 
shichang jingji zhixu  市场经济秩序  Market economic order 
shichang zhixu  市场秩序  Market order 
shirong guanliju (shirong)  市容管理局 
(市容) 
City Appearance 
Administration Bureau 
shirong huanjing  市容环境  City appearance 
environment 
shirong jiancha  市容检查  City Appearance 
Inspection 
shirong jianchadui   市容检查队  City Appearance 
Inspection Team 
shizi qiao  狮子桥   Lion’s Bridge 
shouju  收据  Receipt (informal) 
shudujiehe  疏堵结合  Concurrently scatter and 
block (re: street vendors) 
siqing qiye   私营企业  Private business 
Subei  苏北  Northern Jiansu 
suzhi di   素质低  Low quality (often meant 
as a critique of both 
mental and physical 
characteristics) 
tandian  摊点  Stall; booth; vendor’s 
stand 
tandian zheng  摊点证  Vending license  
tanfan  摊贩  Street peddler; stall 
vendor 
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Tianze Jingji Yanjiusuo  天则经济研究所  Unirule Institute (lit. 
Natural Law Economic 
Research Institute) 
tieban youyu  铁板鱿鱼  Grilled squid 
weishengju  卫生局  Sanitation Bureau 
wending  稳定  Stability 
wenhuaju   文化局  Culture Bureau 
wenming  文明  Civilization; culture 
xiahai  下海  Literally “put to sea” but 
in current usage means to 
enter the market 
economy 
xiaochi  小吃  Snack 
xiaofan  小贩  Street peddler; stall 
vendor 
xin gudian ziyou zhuyi  新古典自由主义  Neo-classical liberalism 
xin quanwei zhuyi  新权威主义  Neo-authoritariansm 
Xin Shenghuo Yundong  新生活运动  New Life Movement 
xin ziyou zhuyi  新自由主义  Neoliberal  
xingzheng quan  行政权  Administrative powers 
xingzheng xukefa  行政许可法  Administrative License 
Law  
xinku  辛苦  Endure hardship 
youji zhan   游击战  Guerrilla war 
yule changsuo  娱乐场所  Entertainment venue 
yundong  运动  Campaign, drive, 
movement 
zhengban  正版  Legal/real 
zhengdun  整顿   Rectify 
zhengdun he guifan 
shichang jingji zhixu 
整顿和规范市场经济秩
序 
Rectify and standardize 
market economic order 
zhengjie  整洁  In good order, tidy 
zhengqi  整齐  Clean, neat 
zhifa  执法  (Law) enforcement 
zhifa dadui  执法大队  (Law) enforcement team 
zhiwu fanzui yufang   职务犯罪预防  Occupational Crime 
Prevention 
zifa de zhixu  自发的秩序  Spontaneous order 
ziyou jingzheng  自由竞争  Free competition 
ziyou tiaojie  自由调节  Self-regulating 
zizhi xingwei  自治   Self-governing 
 